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Author SHA1 Message Date
mrhid6 574057811f chore: remove go.work
Chart Release / chart (push) Successful in 17s
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 2m33s
2026-09-08 09:10:48 +00:00
mrhid6 e0cc3988fc refactor: move vantagectl to vantage-ctl
vantagectl/ becomes the root of gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/vantage/vantage-ctl.
The command keeps the name vantagectl; only the repository and the image
path change, to vantage/vantage-ctl.

chart-release.yml's render checks are repointed at the new image. The
chart itself has no default backup.image and fails loudly without one, so
an existing cluster keeps working until someone changes the value.

go.work stays, now with a single use ./server entry: without it a go.work
further up the developer's filesystem is picked up instead.
2026-09-08 09:07:14 +00:00
mrhid6 44d9036440 refactor: move the agent and its installer to vantage-agent
agent/ becomes the root of gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/vantage/vantage-agent,
with installer/ alongside it, and agent-release.yml goes with them.

Releases now come from that repository, so the six places this server
generates or reads a release URL are repointed: both install scripts,
both update scripts, and the latest-version lookup in dispatch.go. The
agent/v* tag prefix is unchanged — those scripts grep for it.

Agents built before this move have the old mrhid6/vantage path compiled
into their self-update and will 404 on the push-button update. The
remedy is the /update one-liner, which this server generates and which
therefore has to ship first.
2026-09-08 09:00:22 +00:00
mrhid6 1c6d9e8495 refactor: move proto/ to vantage-shared
vantage.proto documents the hand-written types in shared/grpc/pb, and
nothing compiles it. Keeping it in a different repository from the Go
types it describes meant the one rule holding them together — add the
message to both in the same commit — could not be followed at all.

server's rebuild trigger loses proto/, which it only carried as
insurance against exactly that split.
2026-09-08 08:44:47 +00:00
mrhid6 f9dec9b230 refactor: move the public host out to vantage-site and vantage-docs
site/ and sitesvc/ become web/ and server/ in vantage-site; docsite/
becomes the root of vantage-docs. Their images move with them, to
vantage/vantage-site/{web,server} and vantage/vantage-docs.

Nothing here imported any of them, and sitesvc turned out to read no
database at all, so both cuts are clean. docker-compose.site.yml is
deleted rather than emptied: every service it held now ships with the
repository that builds it, and deploy/docker/docker-compose.yml is once
again exactly a self-hosted install.

Corrects four comments that named sitesvc for work it no longer does.
2026-09-08 08:41:11 +00:00
mrhid6 872699c38c refactor: move Vantage HQ out to the vantage-admin repository
admin/ and adminsite/ are extracted with their history to
gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/vantage/vantage-admin, where they are named server/
and web/ for what they are rather than for the services they run. Their
images move with them, to vantage/vantage-admin/{server,web}.

Nothing here imported them, so the cut is clean: the only coupling was
always at runtime, through admin writing into the control plane's
database. The parts of that contract this side enforces are unchanged and
still documented here — hq-sourced users, POST /license answering 409
cloud_managed, and FREE_INSTANCE_REAP_AFTER needing to match.

LICENSE_SIGNING_KEY now appears in no compose file in this repository.
Keeping it out used to be a rule someone had to remember; it is the
repository boundary now.

docker-compose.site.yml loses both services and gains a note on how the
host composes the three files together.
2026-09-08 08:13:55 +00:00
mrhid6 eb32d367c8 feat: Removed comments in workflow
Chart Release / chart (push) Successful in 18s
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 4m44s
2026-09-08 07:47:42 +00:00
mrhid6 a134f8443a fix: download vantage-shared before asking the module cache where it is
go list -m -f '{{.Dir}}' reports an empty Dir and exits 0 for a module that
is not in the cache, so on a cold runner swag was handed an empty --dir and
failed several steps later with 'dir:  does not exist'. Download first, and
fail loudly if the path is still not there.
2026-09-08 07:47:00 +00:00
mrhid6 ee1f9f3b32 refactor: consume vantage-shared as an external private module
Chart Release / chart (push) Successful in 19s
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Failing after 1m11s
shared/ is extracted to gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/vantage/vantage-shared and
pinned at v0.1.0 by server, agent, admin, sitesvc and vantagectl. The
replace directives and the ./shared entry in go.work are gone.

Every Go build now needs a credential for the private module: CI writes a
netrc per job from REGISTRY_USER + RELEASE_TOKEN and sets GOPRIVATE, and
the four Go Dockerfiles take it as a BuildKit secret rather than a build
arg, which would survive in the builder layer's history. RELEASE_TOKEN
needs read access to the vantage org.

admin, sitesvc and vantagectl now build from their own directory; only
server still needs the repository root, for default_steps/. The rebuild
triggers in server-deploy.yml lose their shared/ patterns, since a
service now moves when its own go.mod pin does.
2026-09-08 07:42:58 +00:00
mrhid6 5326639918 fix: declare grpc dependency in shared go.mod
The workspace supplied it; a standalone build of the module could not
resolve google.golang.org/grpc at all.
2026-09-08 07:36:13 +00:00
mrhid6 3bf80a117b refactor: rename shared module to gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/vantage/vantage-shared 2026-09-08 07:34:53 +00:00
mrhid6 189a8fa963 feat: Move grpc pbs to shared
Chart Release / chart (push) Successful in 21s
Agent Release / build (push) Successful in 3m16s
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 5m32s
Agent Release / msi (push) Successful in 3m25s
2026-09-07 15:50:25 +00:00
mrhid6 7b13944c24 fix: Build the vantagectl image on its release tag, not on every push to main
Chart Release / chart (push) Successful in 29s
vantagectl Release / build (push) Successful in 1m28s
vantagectl Release / image (push) Successful in 1m52s
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 3m46s
vantagectl is a released tool, not a running service. An operator restoring a
database should be able to name the version they ran, and ":latest, rebuilt
whenever main moved" cannot be named after the fact.

The image now builds in vantagectl-release.yml on a vantagectl/v* tag, tagged
with that version as well as latest, with VERSION passed through so the binary
inside reports the tag rather than "dev". server-deploy.yml no longer builds
it and is back to seven images.

The cost is that a shared/ fix reaches the image only at the next release
rather than the next push to main. That is the intended trade and is written
down in CLAUDE.md next to the trigger table.
2026-09-07 15:11:39 +00:00
mrhid6 e7384d334a feat: Add vantagectl, the control plane backup and restore CLI
Chart Release / chart (push) Successful in 33s
vantagectl Release / build (push) Successful in 5m56s
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 9m40s
Vantage encrypts SSH private keys, vault secrets, SSO client secrets and
console credentials with KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY. That key is in no backup and is
not recoverable, so restoring a database without it produces a control plane
whose every secret is permanently unreadable.

vantagectl dumps and restores a whole database and stamps a SHA-256
fingerprint of the key into every archive, so a restore refuses rather than
producing that database. The key itself is never written.

- shared/cryptobox: AES-GCM extracted so the server and the CLI share one
  implementation rather than a copy that can drift
- shared/backup: manifest, tar+gzip archive with per-member checksums
  verified before the first write, dump, restore, verify
- vantagectl: its own module, so cobra stays out of the server, admin and
  sitesvc module graphs
- container image, tagged release workflow, CI rebuild trigger
- optional Helm CronJob, off by default
- operator documentation, reconciled with the existing backups page
2026-09-07 14:52:13 +00:00
mrhid6 be299845ca fix: document inspect and --confirm-db's actual behaviour 2026-09-07 14:45:37 +00:00
mrhid6 d83061786c fix: validate manifest collection names and route archive accessors through safeJoin 2026-09-07 14:45:37 +00:00
mrhid6 b28a2263bb fix: read KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY in archive-only verify; never leave a partial archive 2026-09-07 14:45:36 +00:00
mrhid6 b6f45390c4 fix: correct verify's ciphertext field map against the models 2026-09-07 14:45:36 +00:00
mrhid6 2e4bc687d4 fix: replay index specs verbatim instead of reconstructing them 2026-09-07 14:45:36 +00:00
mrhid6 d328d3aaca docs: Reconcile backups and backup-and-restore pages
backups.md kept its store-level table and danger note but now points to
vantagectl as the supported path, with mongodump/mongorestore demoted to
an explicit fallback and a warning that a plain dump records no key
fingerprint. backup-and-restore.md links back for the store-level
overview.
2026-09-07 14:32:31 +00:00
mrhid6 89cc524f3f docs: Document backup and restore
The page leads with KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY rather than mentioning it in a
note, because holding a good database dump and no key is the way this goes
wrong.
2026-09-07 14:29:03 +00:00
mrhid6 f0f2600bed feat: Add an optional scheduled backup CronJob to the chart
Off by default: a backup with nowhere durable to land is a false sense of
safety and the chart cannot know where that is. NOTES.txt says so when it
is off.

No restore manifest ships: a restore must never be something a helm
upgrade can trigger.
2026-09-07 14:17:42 +00:00
mrhid6 884fd189fb fix: Report the real reason verify falls back to archive-only checks
resolveGlobals can fail for two distinct reasons — no MongoDB URI, or no
resolvable database name — and verify.go was printing a hardcoded
no-URI note regardless of which one occurred, misleading an operator
whose URI was fine but whose database name could not be resolved.
2026-09-07 14:11:58 +00:00
mrhid6 e08cc2f928 feat: Build and publish vantagectl
The scratch runtime stage copies an explicit /tmp: restore extracts an
archive there before verifying it, and a scratch image has none.

shared/ now fans out to four Go images rather than three.
2026-09-07 14:09:00 +00:00
mrhid6 3ce963b0cd feat: Add the vantagectl restore and verify subcommands
--force requires a typed database name on a terminal and --confirm-db
without one, so a copy-pasted restore command carries its intended target
and cannot destroy a different database.

Also silences cobra's own error print (root.go) so a failure is reported
once by main.go instead of twice, and pins the Changed()-based env
fallback in resolveGlobals with a test for an explicitly empty --db.
2026-09-07 14:04:25 +00:00
mrhid6 461a79277d feat: Add the vantagectl backup and inspect subcommands
Progress output goes to stderr so --out - stays a clean pipe into restic,
age or aws s3 cp. Archive names carry no colon, because these get copied
onto Windows shares.
2026-09-07 13:57:04 +00:00
mrhid6 d9f7fa6993 feat: Add the vantagectl module and its cobra root
Its own module rather than a package under shared, so cobra and pflag stay
out of the module graphs of server, admin and sitesvc, which never use
them.
2026-09-07 13:45:20 +00:00
mrhid6 060fa64339 feat: Add backup verify with a live decrypt probe
A fingerprint comparison proves two archives agree about a key. Only
opening real ciphertext from the target proves the key in hand reads the
data, which is the question an operator actually has.
2026-09-07 11:26:34 +00:00
mrhid6 30d83c4c32 feat: Add the backup restore
Every refusal happens before the first write: format, checksums, key
policy, then target inspection. A unique index that will not build aborts,
because the unique indexes here are tenant-isolation properties rather
than optimisations.
2026-09-07 11:23:27 +00:00
mrhid6 a918b1bdc1 feat: Add the backup dump
Collections are enumerated live rather than from a list, so a collection
added later is backed up with no code change. Documents are written as the
raw BSON the driver returned, so Decimal128, ObjectId, DateTime and binary
subtypes survive byte for byte.
2026-09-07 11:16:38 +00:00
mrhid6 66b1a041ba feat: Add the backup archive writer and reader
Open extracts and verifies every member against the manifest before the
reader is usable, so a corrupt archive is refused before a restore writes
its first document rather than halfway through.
2026-09-07 11:10:17 +00:00
mrhid6 d55ed2b19a feat: Add the backup archive manifest
KeyFingerprint is a pointer so an archive that recorded no key is a state
restore can report, not a default it silently treats as a match.
2026-09-07 11:08:02 +00:00
mrhid6 8135c8d781 feat: Add key fingerprinting for backup archives
Fingerprint hashes the raw key bytes rather than the hex string, so the
same key written in different cases fingerprints identically.
2026-09-07 11:03:48 +00:00
mrhid6 577b060b8a feat: Extract AES-GCM into shared/cryptobox
services/crypto.go keeps its function names and its KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY
lookup and delegates the cipher, so vantagectl's verify probe can decrypt
with the same implementation rather than a second copy.
2026-09-07 10:55:54 +00:00
mrhid6 1028a2e43a docs: Add the backup-restore implementation plan
Thirteen tasks, each ending in a testable deliverable and a commit.

Also drops --log-level from the spec: the tool's whole output is what it is
telling the operator, and a level that could hide a key warning is worth not
having.
2026-09-07 10:30:56 +00:00
mrhid6 eba93a812e docs: Correct Dockerfile location and specify the verify probe
vantagectl/Dockerfile follows the repo's per-module convention rather than
living under deploy/docker.

verify's live check needs AES-GCM open, so the cipher primitives move to
shared/cryptobox and services/crypto.go delegates, rather than a second
copy of the cipher existing in another module.
2026-09-07 10:10:04 +00:00
mrhid6 83b7256b60 docs: Design for control plane backup and restore
Standalone vantagectl CLI (cobra, own module) that dumps and restores a
whole Vantage MongoDB database, stamping a sha256 fingerprint of
KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY into the manifest so a restore cannot silently produce
a database whose secrets are unreadable.

The key itself never enters the archive.
2026-09-07 10:07:50 +00:00
mrhid6 9d17f539b5 fix: Fixed card header margin
Chart Release / chart (push) Successful in 19s
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 1m0s
2026-09-07 08:36:18 +00:00
mrhid6 28f746c7e2 feat: Compact vitals
Chart Release / chart (push) Successful in 27s
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 1m4s
2026-09-07 08:26:07 +00:00
mrhid6 9d218cb19f feat: Reduce server vitials panel height
Chart Release / chart (push) Successful in 18s
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 1m10s
2026-09-07 08:14:47 +00:00
mrhid6 f9ef9c4929 fix: Fixed mobile scroll bar
Chart Release / chart (push) Successful in 25s
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 2m17s
2026-09-07 08:02:09 +00:00
mrhid6 049e005873 feat: Updated monitor chart
Chart Release / chart (push) Successful in 15s
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 1m9s
2026-08-25 15:02:04 +00:00
mrhid6 c440b59b93 feat: Updated affected components on status page incidents
Chart Release / chart (push) Successful in 13s
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Canceled after 6m59s
2026-08-25 14:56:50 +00:00
mrhid6 3e4865884c feat: Updated plans and catalogue pages
Chart Release / chart (push) Successful in 13s
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 1m58s
2026-08-25 14:35:47 +00:00
mrhid6 270d55e6a6 feat: Updated status page title 2026-08-25 14:11:21 +00:00
mrhid6 7a0a1953f6 fix: Fixed api url on web
Chart Release / chart (push) Successful in 10s
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 7m37s
2026-08-25 13:53:59 +00:00
mrhid6 3e4ccc9720 feat: Added more debug logging
Chart Release / chart (push) Successful in 16s
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 7m1s
2026-08-25 13:26:23 +00:00
mrhid6 e5947489e4 fix: Fixed status page published switch 2026-08-25 13:26:10 +00:00
mrhid6 0a7a10aeed feat: Added status pages to license page 2026-08-25 13:10:28 +00:00
mrhid6 28b813ba64 feat: sell status pages as a per-instance licence feature
Chart Release / chart (push) Successful in 13s
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 9m30s
2026-08-25 09:25:05 +00:00
mrhid6 68160dc681 docs: correct the status page URL for self-hosted, trim to what ships
- The status page URL was given only as `<instance>.vantage.<tld>`, which a
  self-hosted install does not serve. Both deployments are now described.
- The banner is documented as one notice: the editor exposes no level picker
  and the view renders every level identically.
- `pending` added to the component states, which a monitor with no result yet
  renders.
- Delete page documented alongside un-publish.
- `TRUSTED_PROXIES` names the LAN case: with the RFC1918 default, a client on a
  private range reaching the server directly is itself trusted and can spoof
  `X-Forwarded-For` — and now `X-Forwarded-Host`. Narrow it to the proxy.
- CLAUDE.md: scopes are nine resources, not eight; `status-pages` added to the
  REST route table; the host-resolution rules recorded under Status pages.
2026-08-25 09:05:06 +00:00
mrhid6 32e7420d89 fix: wire status page and incident delete, stop promising a name we do not publish
- The display-name placeholder showed the monitor's own name, reading as "leave
  this blank and we will use it". The server deliberately does the opposite: a
  blank `display_name` publishes the raw monitor id, because publishing an
  internal name has to be a decision. The placeholder now says "Public name
  (required)" and Save is refused until every component has one, so nobody adds
  five monitors and discovers five UUIDs on their public page. The server
  fallback is unchanged.
- `deleteStatusPage` and `deleteStatusIncident` existed in the api client and
  were wired to nothing, and the page address is immutable — delete was the
  only correction for a typo and there was no way to reach it. The editor
  header gains a typed-confirmation Delete page, and each incident row a
  confirmed delete, both on the existing ConfirmDialog.
- The create modal's address hint had lost its em dash and read as a broken
  sentence.
2026-08-25 09:05:06 +00:00
mrhid6 7e1d67dba4 fix: file live outages as active, refuse "operational" over zero components
- A derived monitor outage with no `resolved_at` went to `History`, so an
  ongoing disruption was listed under "Past incidents" while the component pill
  beside it read Down. Unresolved now goes to `ActiveIncidents`.
- `overallState` returned `up` when nothing was counted: "all systems
  operational" claimed from no evidence at all. A page with no components now
  reports `no_data`, which the view already renders as "Status unknown".
- `EnsureStatusPageIndexes` returned on the first failure, so a transient
  failure on the `status_pages` index left `status_incidents` with no unique
  `(instance_id, incident_id)` index — a correctness property, not a scan
  optimisation. All three are attempted and the failures joined.
2026-08-25 09:04:54 +00:00
mrhid6 da1dc90ac5 fix: resolve the public status page's tenant from a trusted X-Forwarded-Host
The SSR fetch set `Host` to the visitor's hostname. `Host` is a forbidden
header name and undici discards it silently, so the Go server saw
`server:8080`, `hostSlug` returned "", `InstanceFromHost` returned false and
every public status page 404'd on every deployment. The feature did not work.

- `web/` now forwards the visitor's host as `X-Forwarded-Host`, and their
  address on `X-Forwarded-For` — without the latter gin sees a request from the
  Next pod with no XFF and every visitor of every page shares one 120/min
  bucket, tripped by exactly the traffic an outage produces.
- `publicStatusInstance` honours `X-Forwarded-Host` only when `c.RemoteIP()` is
  in `TRUSTED_PROXIES`. It is a tenant selector, so an untrusted peer must not
  be able to name one; `RemoteIP()` rather than `ClientIP()` because the latter
  is reconstructed from the very headers being judged. `TrustedProxies()` moves
  from main.go into the api package so the variable keeps one parser.
- A host naming no slug on a non-cloud deployment resolves the sole instance,
  the way bootstrap does. A self-hosted install at vantage.acme.com or an IP
  has no slug and could never serve a status page; more than one instance is a
  404 rather than a guess, and an unknown-but-well-formed slug stays a 404.
- `InstanceFromHost` gains an explicit-host variant rather than a second copy
  of the slug rules, and now caches negative lookups: an unknown host cost a
  Mongo query per anonymous request, which is also a timing oracle separating
  "no such instance" from "instance exists, page does not".
- The handler's `@Router` annotation is dropped. openapi.json declares one
  server of `/api`, so it published `/api/public/status/{pageId}` — a path that
  does not exist. The real address is described in prose instead.
2026-08-25 09:04:47 +00:00
mrhid6 72c9492223 docs: status pages 2026-08-25 08:44:38 +00:00
mrhid6 fa67d839cd fix: status page editor error handling, maintenance validation and UTC display 2026-08-25 08:40:05 +00:00
mrhid6 1452928b75 feat: status page authoring UI 2026-08-25 08:32:43 +00:00
mrhid6 bf10023f35 fix: empty slices rather than null on the unavailable status snapshot 2026-08-24 19:42:16 +00:00
mrhid6 f4f41e400b feat: public status page 2026-08-24 14:53:42 +00:00
mrhid6 3abbdc41d6 feat: status page authoring API
Adds owner|admin routes under /api/status-pages for authoring status pages
and their incidents/maintenance windows, gated by the status_pages licence
feature. Adds the "status" token scope resource and the ten route-scope
entries, and regenerates the committed OpenAPI document.

Also types ErrPageInvalid as a sentinel for status page/incident validation
failures (previously bare errors), so statusPageError maps them to 400
instead of 500, and createStatusIncident/updateStatusIncident route through
the shared error mapper rather than hand-rolling a 400 for any service error.
2026-08-24 14:43:17 +00:00
mrhid6 6ba54f690c fix: default TRUSTED_PROXIES in shipped deployments and route /public/ through ingress 2026-08-24 14:35:29 +00:00
mrhid6 a3c6b2a305 feat: public status page endpoint with per-address rate limit 2026-08-24 14:29:24 +00:00
mrhid6 21a2d077d8 feat: cached public status snapshot with licence gate 2026-08-24 14:24:07 +00:00
mrhid6 6263c7e16f fix: clear resolved_at when reopening a status incident via appended update 2026-08-24 14:21:26 +00:00
mrhid6 161835802d feat: authored status incidents and maintenance windows 2026-08-24 14:18:06 +00:00
mrhid6 6f998ff506 feat: status page CRUD and cache invalidation 2026-08-24 14:15:25 +00:00
mrhid6 d192589790 fix: maintenance repaint no longer zeroes no_data uptime; strengthen redaction test 2026-08-24 14:12:38 +00:00
mrhid6 21c2bb2646 feat: public status snapshot assembly and redaction boundary 2026-08-24 14:07:10 +00:00
mrhid6 9c0bbd13dd feat: status page id validation and cache key 2026-08-24 14:02:46 +00:00
mrhid6 1c15961309 feat: status page schema, licence feature and indexes 2026-08-24 14:00:00 +00:00
mrhid6 383b763a66 docs: attach approved status page mockup to the implementation plan 2026-08-24 13:52:07 +00:00
mrhid6 3e99a9df33 docs: public status pages implementation plan 2026-08-24 13:42:44 +00:00
mrhid6 f1b6f90345 docs: public status pages design spec 2026-08-24 13:32:24 +00:00
mrhid6 2a660697c5 docs: Updated troubleshotting doc
Chart Release / chart (push) Successful in 12s
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2026-08-24 12:50:44 +00:00
mrhid6 0c08dda635 feat: Useragent
Chart Release / chart (push) Successful in 14s
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2026-08-24 12:17:46 +00:00
mrhid6 22b99ff895 feat: Monitor grath zoom
Chart Release / chart (push) Successful in 13s
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 6m31s
2026-08-24 10:58:50 +00:00
mrhid6 2fab784ba7 feat: Monitor groups and chart information
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Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 6m35s
2026-08-24 10:30:23 +00:00
mrhid6 83cdf92575 feat: Updated edit monitor page
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2026-08-24 09:25:43 +00:00
mrhid6 aa1c8e4aa1 feat: Hide secrets on api and channels
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2026-08-14 12:23:36 +00:00
mrhid6 ac61015cc0 fix: Fixed incorrect openapi doc
Chart Release / chart (push) Canceled after 0s
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2026-08-13 13:04:44 +00:00
mrhid6 a0fbf5b9ba fix: Word and colour Windows workloads correctly across the UI
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Canceled after 0s
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2026-08-13 12:57:37 +00:00
mrhid6 ddf0814803 docs: Fix Windows package-inventory and poll-loop claims in CLAUDE.md 2026-08-13 12:28:51 +00:00
mrhid6 2bc15648b7 docs: Describe the Windows agent's update and workload support
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2026-08-13 12:23:34 +00:00
mrhid6 7f348b7b2b fix: Follow Windows Th/Td labels through the updates table 2026-08-13 12:19:47 +00:00
mrhid6 a71fd9a9f4 fix: Fixed docs entitlement 2026-08-13 12:18:21 +00:00
mrhid6 36848a519a feat: Word the workload and update panels for Windows servers 2026-08-13 12:16:10 +00:00
mrhid6 ea6d0b969c fix: Trim Windows event log after SCM filtering, not before 2026-08-13 12:12:11 +00:00
mrhid6 4ba9983cf8 feat: Control Windows services and read their event log as workloads 2026-08-13 12:04:49 +00:00
mrhid6 8caaa4540f fix: Respect .exe word boundary and unterminated quotes in servicePath 2026-08-13 12:00:59 +00:00
mrhid6 42f0cb67cb feat: Collect Windows services as workloads 2026-08-13 11:52:08 +00:00
mrhid6 1dfb3cc28c refactor: Split the agent workloads package by build tag 2026-08-13 10:49:24 +00:00
mrhid6 b51e87477e feat: Report whether a managed host is waiting on a reboot 2026-08-13 10:39:27 +00:00
mrhid6 05c0ad43d2 feat: Check and apply Windows updates through the Windows Update COM API 2026-08-13 10:36:22 +00:00
mrhid6 4a07af049c refactor: Split the agent updates package by build tag 2026-08-13 10:33:35 +00:00
mrhid6 057c193e26 feat: Add winexec helper for running PowerShell from the agent 2026-08-13 10:26:31 +00:00
mrhid6 38a731f269 docs: Add implementation plan for Windows agent parity 2026-08-13 10:21:04 +00:00
mrhid6 06d69590fc docs: Design for Windows agent parity on updates and workloads 2026-08-13 10:08:25 +00:00
mrhid6 6adee810dc feat: Cleanup old docs 2026-08-13 09:41:32 +00:00
mrhid6 00d4307346 fix: Fixed chart for ingress
Chart Release / chart (push) Successful in 12s
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 1m40s
2026-08-13 09:29:01 +00:00
mrhid6 7e767ecb4f fix: Move the API keys page off the /api prefix
/api-keys shares a raw string prefix with /api, and the proxies in front
of this app do not all match by path segment. Nginx Proxy Manager routes
/api straight to the Go server with a prefix location, so /api-keys never
reached Next at all — it reached a control plane with no such route and
came back as a JSON 404. Traefik's PathPrefix has the same shape of
matcher, which puts the Helm ingress at risk whenever ingress.api.enabled
is on.

The page is /tokens now, which cannot collide with anything, and which
matches the /api/tokens the REST API already publishes. The sidebar still
says API Keys — the label is for the reader, the path is for the router.

A permanent redirect covers anyone who bookmarked the old path today.
Fixing the proxy config instead would have left the trap set for the next
deployment, and for whatever sits in front of it.
2026-08-13 09:26:34 +00:00
mrhid6 18495dba68 feat: Restyle the API keys page onto the shared list patterns
Chart Release / chart (push) Successful in 25s
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 7m54s
The page was hand-rolling its loading spinner, error line and empty
paragraph while the rest of the console routes these through
AsyncBoundary with a TableSkeleton and an EmptyState — the same drift
Async.tsx was written to end. It also passed className="p-0" where Card
takes padding={false}.

The admin-only scope switch becomes the vulnerabilities page's pill
filter rather than a loose checkbox: seeing everyone's keys is a filter
over the list, not a preference, and someone who has learned one control
has now learned both.

Scopes collapse to one chip per resource with an r/rw qualifier. Sixteen
badges made the row taller than everything around it and still had to be
read one at a time.

In the create dialog Copy is now the primary action and Done the quiet
one, because the value is unrecoverable once the dialog closes, and the
result panel repeats the role, scopes and expiry that were just granted.
2026-08-13 08:59:06 +00:00
mrhid6 689d0e1d5b feat: Give API keys their own page and group the sidebar
The token management card sat on /settings, which is owner|admin
throughout, so it hid a capability every member already had: the API has
never required a role to mint or revoke your own key. It is now the
/api-keys page, reachable at every role, with the instance-wide lifetime
cap left behind on /settings because that is policy rather than one
person's credentials — and that split is what lets the page be ungated.

The sidebar gains groups: Fleet, Access, Automation, Instance, each with a
small-caps heading and a rule above it. Grouping is by what the operator
is doing rather than by which service answers, so SSH keys, secrets and
API keys sit together as credentials. A group whose every item is
admin-only disappears whole for a member; a labelled section with nothing
under it reads as a failure rather than a restriction.

The UI says keys while the collection, prefix and routes still say tokens.
Renaming a published endpoint to match a nav label would break every
script already written against it.
2026-08-13 08:54:42 +00:00
mrhid6 95527b3956 fix: Exclude /install and /update scripts from the OpenAPI document
handleInstallScript and handleUpdateScript are registered on the bare
gin engine at /install and /update, outside the /api group the
generated document's BasePath assumes. Their @Router annotations
therefore published /api/install and /api/update, paths that 404 —
the reference page told a reader to curl a URL that does not exist.

Removed the swag annotations from both handlers (replaced with a plain
comment explaining why) rather than adding a corrected @Router, since
swag has no per-route BasePath override and there is nothing lost by
leaving two shell-script endpoints out of a JSON API reference — their
.ps1 counterparts were already undocumented for the same reason.
Regenerated internal/api/docs/openapi.json accordingly.
2026-08-13 08:31:20 +00:00
mrhid6 225b53bfa7 fix: Throttle audit logging for expired API token use
Every request presenting an expired token wrote a token.expired_use
audit row, and RateLimitTokens only applies once a session exists, so a
rejected token was never rate-limited. A looping job with one expired
token could write an unbounded number of audit rows, drowning the real
audit trail.

services.ShouldLogExpiredTokenUse now dedupes to at most one
token.expired_use record per token per minute, mirroring the throttle
TouchAPIToken already uses for last-used. It lives in services rather
than auth because the storage concern belongs beside the token's other
storage-backed state. The first use per window is still recorded, which
is what makes a forgotten job visible.
2026-08-13 08:31:12 +00:00
mrhid6 965419b2b8 fix: Confine created API token scopes to the calling token's own
CreateAPIToken capped a new token's role at the creator's role but never
capped its scopes against the calling credential's scopes, and POST
/api/tokens required only settings:write. A token holding settings:write
alone could therefore mint a token holding keys:write or secrets:write,
reaching every SSH private key and vault secret in the instance.

createToken now refuses (403 scope_confinement) when the calling
credential is itself a token and any requested scope is not satisfied by
that token's own scopes, via services.ScopeSatisfied so servers:write
still permits granting servers:read. Cookie sessions are unaffected,
since their authority is the user's role. Also correct the createToken
doc comment, which claimed the scope cap already existed.

Also document why Hint stores 5 hex characters of the token secret.
2026-08-13 08:31:07 +00:00
mrhid6 f6988b0f1e docs: Correct API token access-control claim in CLAUDE.md 2026-08-13 08:12:48 +00:00
mrhid6 0784ef3719 docs: Document API tokens and the OpenAPI reference 2026-08-13 08:04:09 +00:00
mrhid6 9df4a29210 fix: Separate stacked securityDefinitions into distinct comment groups
swag v2.0.0-rc5's parseSecAttributesV3 resolves a security scheme's map key
via getSecurityDefinitionKey(lines), which scans from the start of whatever
comment-line slice it was handed and returns the first @securitydefinitions
match — ignoring the current parse position entirely. Three
@securityDefinitions.apikey blocks stacked in one Go comment group (the
three were separated only by bare '//' lines, which do not split an
ast.CommentGroup) therefore all resolved to the first block's name
(cookieAuth), with the last block's in/name/description winning: the
generated document had exactly one securityScheme, keyed cookieAuth, body
esoAuth.

Separating the three blocks with real blank source lines splits them into
three distinct ast.CommentGroups, so swag's file-level comment scan (which
requires no other tokens between them, same rule Go uses for doc comments)
hands each block its own line slice and each resolves its own key.
Regenerated openapi.json now carries all three schemes with correct
bodies, referenced with no dangling security requirements.
2026-08-13 07:54:56 +00:00
mrhid6 4c88d6e768 feat: Publish an OpenAPI 3.1 document and a Scalar reference
Chart Release / chart (push) Successful in 25s
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 10m17s
Generated from swaggo v2 annotations, committed rather than built into the
image: the runtime stage is scratch and adding codegen puts the toolchain
in the build. CI regenerates and diffs, so an annotation edited without
regenerating fails the build — without that the annotations would drift
while still looking authoritative.

Scalar is vendored rather than loaded from a CDN, because air-gapped
self-hosted installs are supported and a reference page that fails closed
offline is a support ticket.
2026-08-12 15:23:02 +00:00
mrhid6 a85a354e57 feat: Annotate workflow, step, run and workload routes
Same treatment: named types replace gin.H literals, and every handler gets
a swaggo doc block. This is the last of the handler files under
server/internal/api/.
2026-08-12 15:22:54 +00:00
mrhid6 9b18d09d9b feat: Annotate monitor, secrets and vulnerability routes
Same treatment: named types replace gin.H literals, and every handler gets
a swaggo doc block. VulnSummaryResponse uses pointer fields so the
db-freshness block stays entirely absent when no vulndb_meta document
exists yet, matching the handler's original conditional gin.H exactly.
2026-08-12 15:22:51 +00:00
mrhid6 a398da0eac feat: Annotate SSO, channel, console, instance and licence routes
Same treatment as the previous commit: named types replace gin.H literals,
and every handler gets a swaggo doc block.
2026-08-12 15:22:48 +00:00
mrhid6 edb8406e05 feat: Annotate server, key and token routes for OpenAPI
Converts their gin.H responses to the named types added in the previous
commit and adds swaggo doc blocks for every handler in handlers.go and
tokens.go.
2026-08-12 15:22:45 +00:00
mrhid6 bfd185adbb feat: Add OpenAPI response types and top-level swag annotations
Named response types for handlers that were returning anonymous gin.H
literals, so a generated annotation and what the handler actually returns
cannot disagree. main.go carries the top-level swaggo info block (title,
description, security schemes for cookie, bearer token and ESO auth).
2026-08-12 15:22:42 +00:00
mrhid6 182752d9ab feat: Manage API tokens from settings
A card in the Access group beside Members and single sign-on rather than a
new nav entry — /settings/instance was folded back in for exactly this
reason. The plaintext is shown once in a well block and never again.

Tokens outside a newly tightened lifetime policy are flagged rather than
broken, because the policy governs issuance, not existing credentials.
2026-08-12 14:58:57 +00:00
mrhid6 3b4c87a292 feat: Rate limit API token requests
600 per minute per token, in the Redis that sessions already require.
Cookie sessions are untouched. A Redis failure falls through rather than
refusing traffic — it is already a larger problem and should not become a
second outage.
2026-08-12 14:51:22 +00:00
mrhid6 2685e9ad06 fix: Distinguish caller mistakes from backend failures in CreateAPIToken
createToken's catch-all mapped every unmatched error to 400, so a
database outage reported itself as a malformed client request. Wrap the
genuine validation failures with ErrTokenInvalid and let the handler
answer 500 with a fixed message for everything else.
2026-08-12 14:48:17 +00:00
mrhid6 4de67e4bea docs: Separate caller mistakes from backend failures in the plan
createToken's catch-all answered 400 for every unmatched error, so a
database failure reported itself as the caller's malformed request. Found
in review of Task 7.
2026-08-12 14:47:36 +00:00
mrhid6 524ccc6412 feat: Add the API token endpoints
Create, list and revoke, with no update: editing what a credential already
deployed in CI can do, with no record of what it could do before, is worse
than requiring a rotation. Revoking a token that is not yours answers
not-found, since a 403 confirms it exists.

The audit actor stays the human and names the credential alongside, so a
person clicking and their CI job are told apart.
2026-08-12 14:44:50 +00:00
mrhid6 be4f488db3 feat: Enforce API token scopes from the route map
Keyed on the registered gin route pattern rather than a per-route
decorator, because a route registered without a decorator would be
unguarded. An unmapped route reached by a token is a 403, and a boot-time
check refuses to start when any /api route is missing, so the failure
lands at deploy rather than as a customer's surprise 403.
2026-08-12 14:40:00 +00:00
mrhid6 2f60b81962 fix: Stop the session middleware writing two responses on an expired cookie
sessionFromCookie already writes "session expired" when a cookie was
presented and rejected with no bearer to fall through to. Middleware
called sessionFromToken anyway, which wrote a second "not authenticated"
body onto the same response for every ordinary browser-session timeout -
gin logged "superfluous response.WriteHeader call" on ordinary use, not a
rare edge case.

Guard on c.IsAborted() after sessionFromCookie: true only in that one
rejected-cookie-no-bearer branch, so it short-circuits there while the
other three credential paths (no credential, bearer only, stale cookie
plus valid bearer) are unaffected.
2026-08-12 14:35:20 +00:00
mrhid6 92692de94d docs: Correct the middleware fallback in the plan
The plan's Middleware called sessionFromToken even when sessionFromCookie
had already answered a rejected cookie, putting two JSON bodies on the
wire for the ordinary expired-session case. Found in review of Task 5.
2026-08-12 14:34:54 +00:00
mrhid6 a5f9fca59e feat: Authenticate the API with a bearer token as well as a cookie
One middleware, two ways to arrive at the same *Session, so every handler,
role guard, licence gate and audit call is untouched. The host guard
applies to both: a token carries an instance, and the tenant boundary must
not have a token-shaped hole in it.

The effective role is min(user, token) recomputed per request, so demoting
somebody demotes their tokens with them. A stale cookie beside a valid
bearer falls through rather than refusing a credential that would work.
2026-08-12 14:32:40 +00:00
mrhid6 72e5228351 feat: Add the API token service
Mint, resolve, list and revoke, with the effective role capped at the
owner's and recomputed per request rather than frozen at creation.

Deleting a user deletes their tokens in the same call, so offboarding is
one action. Revoking somebody else's token answers not-found rather than
forbidden, since a 403 confirms the credential exists.

Also re-exports shared.APITokenMaxDays into server/internal/models,
following the existing ValidRole wrapper pattern, since the token
service needs it and it was never re-exported.
2026-08-12 14:28:10 +00:00
mrhid6 33b5ec0788 feat: Add a per-instance API token lifetime cap
A pointer with absent meaning no cap, so an upgrade allows never-expire
tokens exactly as before and an instance opts into the policy. It governs
issuance only: changing it never invalidates a token that already exists.
2026-08-12 14:22:12 +00:00
mrhid6 1b718e7c59 feat: Define the API token scope vocabulary
Eight resources with read and write, write implying read. Coarse on
purpose: a scope per endpoint is a table nobody maintains, and a route
added without an entry either breaks or is unguarded.
2026-08-12 14:19:47 +00:00
mrhid6 6ad65a1242 feat: Add the api_tokens collection and its indexes
The unique index on token_hash is what makes authentication an indexed
lookup rather than a scan, so this builder is fatal on failure like
EnsureAuthIndexes rather than warning like the secrets one.

Registered in ScopedCollections so instance purge reaches it.
2026-08-12 14:16:12 +00:00
mrhid6 a41f2b26cc docs: Plan the API token and OpenAPI implementation
Twelve tasks from model through middleware, scope enforcement, endpoints,
web UI, generated OpenAPI and documentation. Verification is build plus
curl and UI checks rather than test cycles, matching a repository with no
Go test harness beyond shared/mail.
2026-08-12 14:09:03 +00:00
mrhid6 71f9a9dca5 docs: Specify scoped API tokens and an OpenAPI reference
Adds the approved design for personal access tokens on the control plane
REST API, and for the generated OpenAPI 3.1 document served as a Scalar
reference page.

Tokens fall back into the existing session middleware rather than getting
their own route group, so every handler, role guard and audit call works
unchanged. Scope enforcement derives from the registered route pattern and
fails closed, with a boot-time check for unmapped routes.

A Terraform provider is deliberately left to a follow-on spec.
2026-08-12 13:59:03 +00:00
mrhid6 449684ceaa fix: Derive the rename unwind deadline at its use site
Chart Release / chart (push) Successful in 17s
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 5m58s
2026-08-12 11:15:29 +00:00
mrhid6 cdc50b7aaf fix: Harden instance rename against interleaving and lost unwinds 2026-08-12 11:08:36 +00:00
mrhid6 f534b74066 docs: Document instance rename in HQ 2026-08-12 10:52:43 +00:00
mrhid6 3c15ee15ef feat: Let staff rename an instance 2026-08-12 10:29:45 +00:00
mrhid6 45a4f968d6 feat: Let a customer rename a cloud instance from HQ 2026-08-12 10:23:17 +00:00
mrhid6 df09e42cf2 feat: Add rename calls and slug preview to the HQ client 2026-08-12 10:17:39 +00:00
mrhid6 ee427ed6e1 feat: Add staff instance rename endpoint 2026-08-12 10:12:04 +00:00
mrhid6 5856deede3 feat: Add customer instance rename endpoint 2026-08-12 10:09:19 +00:00
mrhid6 e02b263054 feat: Add rename cooldown field and cloudprov rename 2026-08-12 10:06:31 +00:00
mrhid6 1d6c89c368 feat: Add instance rename to shared provisioning 2026-08-12 10:01:56 +00:00
mrhid6 0edfddb710 docs: Drop test steps from the rename plan 2026-08-12 09:58:18 +00:00
mrhid6 71a4f53bed docs: Implementation plan for instance rename in HQ 2026-08-12 09:53:40 +00:00
mrhid6 de7350fce9 docs: Reuse loginURLFor for the rename response host 2026-08-12 09:46:38 +00:00
mrhid6 21786fa1a8 docs: Design for instance rename in Vantage HQ 2026-08-12 09:46:08 +00:00
mrhid6 84f9587b9a fix: Fixed gitignore
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2026-08-11 15:03:03 +00:00
mrhid6 a20e165ac2 feat: Revamp instance page
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2026-08-11 10:32:59 +01:00
mrhid6 ed260cd86c feat: Updated members panel on instance page
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2026-08-11 10:10:44 +01:00
mrhid6 99cd2a8ec3 feat: Updated admin instance page
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2026-08-11 09:59:27 +01:00
mrhid6 a228ab24a0 feat: Changes to self hosted purchase
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2026-08-11 09:30:19 +01:00
mrhid6 3acbf01d46 docs: Self review of doc pages
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2026-08-10 16:32:23 +01:00
mrhid6 675689a458 feat(audit): server-side paging, search and category filter; one event format
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The page rendered a map of eleven event types to labels and seven to colours.
The server emits forty-seven. Everything unmapped fell through to its raw
string, so "Key Assigned" in green sat above "workflow.schedule_updated" in
grey — the same kind of fact in two formats, which made the column look like it
carried a meaning it did not.

Presentation is now derived rather than enumerated. Event types are named
<category>.<action> by every call site, so the category becomes a chip, the
action is humanised, and the tone comes from the verb. A type added to the
server tomorrow gets a sensible label and colour with no second list to update;
the override table holds only the dozen the rule reads badly for. Every row is
one treatment, and colour never carries meaning alone — the sentence beside it
says the same thing in words.

Paging and filtering are server-side, unlike the fleet lists that answer with
everything and slice in the browser. audit_retention_days is a licensed
entitlement measured in months, and this log is read to answer questions about
the past, so a browser filtering the most recent page would report "no results"
for events that exist. GET /api/audit now takes q, category, limit and skip and
answers {events, total} — a short page is not evidence of the end of the log,
which is why the total is counted rather than inferred.

audit_logs had no indexes at all: every read was a collection scan with an
in-memory sort over an append-only collection. Adds (instance_id, created_at)
and warns rather than failing, matching EnsureSecretIndexes.

Two bugs found by running the deriver over all forty-seven real types rather
than eyeballing it: the tone rules matched only past-tense verbs, leaving
auth_provider.delete drawn as neutral beside key.deleted in red; and
"unaccepted" matched "accepted", so withdrawing an acceptance read as the same
caution as granting one.
2026-08-10 15:25:48 +01:00
mrhid6 42f3f3e640 feat(web): typed confirmation for deleting an SSH key
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The last of the inline two-step deletes, and the one with the most reach: a
key delete revokes it from every server at once, and for a generated key the
stored private half goes with it. That copy is the only one Vantage holds, so
unlike an uploaded key this cannot be undone by pasting the public half back.

Body names how many servers lose access, and says the private key is destroyed
only when there is one to destroy.

The delete error moves out of the toast and into the dialog, which stays open
on failure, matching the server and monitor deletes.
2026-08-10 15:07:52 +01:00
mrhid6 21238fe707 feat(web): typed confirmations on destructive actions; toasts for API outcomes
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Destructive actions were confirmed by a second danger button rendered where
the first one had been, so a double click on Remove deleted the thing without
the operator ever reading which thing it was. Servers, monitors, secret keys
and sign-in providers now go through ConfirmDialog with requireTyped, matching
the secret-group delete that already worked this way. Notification channels and
vulnerability alert rules get an untyped dialog: both are a name and a URL and
are rebuilt in a minute, but neither had any confirmation at all, and both
silently stop alerts that nobody misses until an incident goes unannounced.

Mutations otherwise succeeded in silence, or reported into whatever inline
banner the page happened to own. Two failure modes came of that: a modal that
closed on error left the message nowhere to land, and a save that was rejected
left the old values on screen looking exactly like a save that worked
(/settings had no error path at all). Every mutation now reports through the
existing toast context.

Errors stay inline where the surface that raised them is still on screen and
the message is a correction to make in it: form validation, the cron field,
the tag rows, a rejected licence blob, and the workflow designer's autosave,
which is a standing condition rather than an event. Everything else toasts.

Ad-hoc feedback removed in favour of it: the "Sent!" button labels on the
server maintenance tab, the settings "Saved!" flag, the channel test line, and
the steps page's notice/error pair.
2026-08-10 14:26:02 +01:00
mrhid6 ef86ef04a1 fix: Fixes to command stream
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2026-08-10 14:07:17 +01:00
mrhid6 727bb09eff feat: More updates to hq
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Server Deploy / deploy (push) Failing after 1m11s
2026-08-10 13:56:59 +01:00
mrhid6 1fe4ba5999 feat: HQ redesign
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2026-08-10 10:44:30 +01:00
mrhid6 e434beec7a fix(web): toasts survive an open dialog; empty-state actions can be gated
Both from the final review, and the first one overturns a call I got wrong.

The aria-hidden sweep that makes aria-modal true also swallowed the toasts.
ToastProvider renders inside the app root, and every modal-raised confirmation
is toasted *before* its dialog closes — "Saved …", "Deleted …", "Removed …" —
so each one was inserted into a hidden subtree and never announced. Un-hiding
a live region afterwards does not replay what it missed. The toast layer is
portalled to the body carrying the dialog-layer attribute, which exempts it
from the sweep, and sits above the dialog: a toast explaining why a dialog's
action failed is no use behind it.

EmptyState's action was narrower than the call site it replaced. The old
first-workflow button carried loading={isPending}; the new one carried
nothing, so a double click created two workflows. The action is a union now —
a link takes no pending state, a handler takes loading and disabled.
2026-08-10 10:01:47 +01:00
mrhid6 fe1dfe472a refactor(web): list pages share the async primitives; dialogs hide the page behind
Keys, secrets, audit, steps and workflows each carried the same
loading/error/empty ternary with its own copy of the spinner and its own
wording for a failed fetch — five of them had drifted to five different
sentences for "the request did not come back". They go through AsyncBoundary
now, which means a skeleton in place of a spinner, a retry button on failure,
and backend messages passed through friendlyMessage rather than printed raw.

Steps gets the filtered-empty state the fleet just got: "no steps match that
filter" is not "no steps yet", and only one of them should offer to create the
first one.

Two more from review:

Modal's effect ran before `mounted` flipped, so a dialog rendered already open
found null refs and took no focus at all. It depends on `mounted` now.

aria-modal was a claim with no mechanism behind it — portalled to the body,
the app tree is a sibling of the dialog and a screen reader's virtual cursor
still browsed the page underneath. The body's other children are marked
aria-hidden while any dialog is open, refcounted alongside the scroll lock.
This does mean a toast raised while a dialog is open is not announced, which
is the correct trade for a modal: ConfirmDialog shows its own errors inline.
2026-08-10 09:54:32 +01:00
mrhid6 0cfaf6670c fix(web): address review of the dialog, toast and async primitives
Two of these were real defects in the previous two commits.

friendlyMessage discarded exactly the messages it claimed to keep: the
"is this a bare reason phrase" test was a shape regex, and "Default steps
cannot be edited" has the same shape as "Not Found". It is an exact-match set
of reason phrases now.

Modal depended on onKeyDown, which is rebuilt whenever onClose changes
identity — and onClose is an inline arrow at every call site, so any parent
re-render (a 30s poll, a mutation flipping to pending) tore the effect down
and rebuilt it: cleanup restored focus to the trigger, setup then moved it to
the top of the dialog, mid-typing. onClose is held in a ref and the effect is
keyed on `open` alone.

Also in Modal: initial focus takes the first control in the body rather than
the panel, since the header comes first in DOM order and every dialog was
opening on its own dismiss button; the Tab trap pulls focus back when it has
escaped the panel entirely rather than only handling the two ends; the scroll
lock is refcounted, because per-instance save/restore released the page when
an outer dialog unmounted under an open inner one; and the whole thing is
portalled to the body so a nested confirm is not clipped by its parent's
overflow box.

The fleet's filtered-empty state keyed on the search alone, so a tag filter
matching nothing told a customer with a full fleet to add their first server.

Remaining: pending mutation errors are reset when a confirm dialog closes, so
one member's failure no longer greets the next; ConfirmDialog clears typed
confirmation when the target changes, not only when it reopens; deleting a
workflow closes its dialogs before navigating rather than carrying a scroll
lock onto the next page; toasts split into a polite and an assertive region,
since one polite wrapper demotes the role="alert" children inside it; and a
custom skeleton gets a live "Loading" beside it, having been aria-hidden with
nothing else to announce.
2026-08-10 09:44:29 +01:00
mrhid6 4d67341ba5 feat(web): fleet search and sort, shared empty/error states, no background polling
The fleet list had a tag filter and nothing else: no search, no sort, and an
unbounded list. Searching hostname/address/OS and sorting by hostname, status
or last seen are all client-side, since the browser already holds the fleet
the page just fetched. Sorting by status orders by how much attention each
state wants rather than alphabetically, which is the only reason to sort by it.

The filtered count is shown beside the total so a search does not read as the
fleet having shrunk, and "no results" is a distinct empty state from "no
servers", with a way back out of the search.

refetchIntervalInBackground defaults to false on the query client. Polling
pages kept refetching in a hidden tab — the fleet list pulls inventory blobs
every 30s — so a console left open in a background tab polled until its
session expired. It belongs in the defaults because the argument is identical
on every polling page.
2026-08-10 09:35:39 +01:00
mrhid6 1fa9160c59 fix(web,adminsite): accessible dialogs, real confirmations, shared async UI
Four correctness/accessibility defects and the destructive-action flow.

- Button: the loading spinner carried xmlns="http://www.w3.instance/2000/svg",
  a find/replace of "org" that landed inside a URL. Button also grows an href
  form, because <Link><Button> nested a button inside an anchor at nineteen
  call sites: invalid markup, two tab stops, and Enter firing only the anchor.

- Fleet status was four meanings carried by hue with the distinction living in
  a title attribute, which touch never shows and screen readers need not
  announce. It now carries a text label and an accessible name, which is the
  one rule the design system states outright.

- Modal had no focus management at all: no trap, no initial focus, no restore,
  no scroll lock, no aria-labelledby. Dialogs nest (a confirm over an edit), so
  a stack decides which panel owns Escape and Tab.

- Seven destructive actions went through window.confirm(). ConfirmDialog
  replaces them and can say what is about to happen; deleting a secret group,
  a shared base step or a workflow now requires typing the name, since those
  have no undo and a wide blast radius. adminsite keeps its own inline idiom
  rather than importing a dialog system it does not have.

Adds Toast, AsyncBoundary/EmptyState/ErrorState/TableSkeleton and
friendlyMessage, replacing per-page loading ternaries and raw
(error as Error).message text. Wired here only where a call site was already
being edited; the remaining pages follow.
2026-08-10 09:25:53 +01:00
mrhid6 d559cccd44 feat: Updated server page
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2026-08-07 16:21:17 +01:00
mrhid6 0684d84609 fix: Fixed vuln score
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2026-08-07 15:33:50 +01:00
mrhid6 78f1bf853c fix: More fixes to vuln matching
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2026-08-07 13:29:15 +01:00
mrhid6 e28238191d feat: Added vuln filter
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2026-08-07 11:58:42 +01:00
mrhid6 82bcc5776f fix: Fixed vuln scanning
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2026-08-07 11:13:58 +01:00
mrhid6 1993802c38 feat: Updated rescan button text 2026-08-07 10:52:16 +01:00
mrhid6 5db49b6b0e feat: Vuln debug logs
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2026-08-07 10:50:08 +01:00
mrhid6 0c15b25ecd fix: Fixed agent package version
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2026-08-07 10:21:00 +01:00
mrhid6 0c21765da3 feat: Added pagination
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2026-08-07 09:59:50 +01:00
mrhid6 4ff8fc8d51 docs: document the workload registry
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2026-08-07 09:09:18 +01:00
mrhid6 483053b9a2 feat: workload registry UI 2026-08-07 09:06:36 +01:00
mrhid6 fd4c51f3db feat: workload registry REST API 2026-08-07 09:01:46 +01:00
mrhid6 1b351cfca4 feat: agent reports workloads and handles workload commands 2026-08-07 08:58:46 +01:00
mrhid6 cf9d85b3cd feat: store workload reports and route log results 2026-08-07 08:56:26 +01:00
mrhid6 6a4ef5b6c6 feat: workload registry proto messages 2026-08-07 08:53:33 +01:00
mrhid6 501cf4e733 feat: agent reads bounded workload logs 2026-08-07 08:49:42 +01:00
mrhid6 89c21d752a feat: agent control actions with self-protection 2026-08-07 08:48:27 +01:00
mrhid6 0e38d9d500 feat: agent enumerates systemd services 2026-08-07 08:46:59 +01:00
mrhid6 3511c34daa feat: agent enumerates docker containers 2026-08-07 08:46:03 +01:00
mrhid6 0838d1d735 feat: models and indexes for the workload registry 2026-08-07 08:45:00 +01:00
mrhid6 d1769fc886 feat: Updated vuln style
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2026-08-06 16:35:04 +01:00
mrhid6 6dced22499 fix: Fixed agent collect packages
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2026-08-06 16:20:34 +01:00
mrhid6 5cee53dc5f feat: Better button description
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2026-08-06 15:51:18 +01:00
mrhid6 81248bb159 style: bring the vulnerabilities page onto the house page shape
Every other page under app/(app) opens with `p-4 sm:p-6 lg:p-8` and the
layout adds none of its own, so this page alone sat flush against the shell
edge. Its h1 was text-xl where every other page is text-2xl.

The findings list was a stack of separately bordered cards; it is now rows
inside one Card, separated by border-border-soft, matching the monitors and
workflows lists. Loading is the shared spinner rather than a line of text,
the error is the shared danger strip, and the empty state uses the same
proportions as the monitors one.
2026-08-06 15:49:39 +01:00
mrhid6 6354d54de8 feat: added addon price to pricing page 2026-08-06 15:48:20 +01:00
mrhid6 da6d64f95c fix: give the scratch server image a /tmp for the vulnerability database
The runtime stage is FROM scratch, which has no /tmp, so vulnsched died at
startup with "temp dir: stat /tmp: no such file or directory" and no scan
ever ran. Nothing in the server wrote to a temporary directory before the
trivy-db puller, which is why this only appeared now.

scratch cannot mkdir its own, so the directory is staged in the builder at
1777 and copied in. Also corrects CLAUDE.md, which described this image as
Alpine; the time/tzdata import it justifies is if anything more load-bearing
on scratch.
2026-08-06 15:46:30 +01:00
mrhid6 9ba3d4a61f feat: Vulnerability Scanning feature on license page
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2026-08-06 15:40:13 +01:00
mrhid6 eee236a072 fix: tidy server go.mod for the vulnerability database dependencies
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trivy-db, oras-go, the three version comparators and robfig/cron were
recorded as indirect with an incomplete go.sum, which builds locally
against a warm module cache but fails in CI with "updates to go.mod
needed". trivy-db pulls testify into the build graph, and its hashes
were missing entirely.
2026-08-06 15:18:57 +01:00
mrhid6 9df89e2db4 fix: surface vuln_scanning across licence, staff and pricing UI
Chart Release / chart (push) Successful in 11s
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The catalogue row alone was not enough; the feature was invisible in
three places and mislabelled in a fourth.

PlanConfigurator rendered every key that was not "console" as "Single
sign-on", so the staff checkbox granting vulnerability scanning was
labelled single sign-on. Feature wording was duplicated between the staff
configurator and the purchase form and the copies had drifted, so it now
lives in adminsite/lib/features.ts and both read from it.

The customer licence panel showed raw keys; it now labels them.

Pricing gains a comparison row. The add-on block with a monthly price is
deliberately NOT added: that is a pricing decision, and the Paddle price
IDs for the new catalogue rows have to be pasted in before it can be sold
anyway.
2026-08-06 15:10:26 +01:00
mrhid6 f60c509b47 feat: vuln_scanning entitlement and documentation
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Adds license.FeatureVulnScanning as the one name for the feature and a
catalogue row per deployment/tier, following console and oidc: features
are opt-in per customer, so no plan bundles it.

Documents the subsystem in CLAUDE.md, including that ScopedCollections is
the canonical registry instance deletion derives from — there is no
separate deletion list, which the plan had wrong.
2026-08-06 14:44:11 +01:00
mrhid6 84dfcfeac7 feat: vulnerability findings UI
Fleet board grouped by CVE, a per-server section on server detail, and
alert rules beside the channels they consume.

The server detail page has no tab pattern despite the plan saying to
follow one, so this adds a section in the existing vertical stack.

Three states are kept visually distinct because they are identical if
handled carelessly and only one is good news: never reported, no advisory
feed for the distribution, and scanned-and-clean. Database freshness sits
with the findings rather than in settings for the same reason.
2026-08-06 14:40:37 +01:00
mrhid6 5dda3b5c4a feat: vulnerability scanning pipeline, matcher, scheduler and API
Completes tasks 10-15 and fixes what was outstanding:

- vulndb.Pull implemented with oras-go, streaming the ~50MB layer and
  staging both files before replacing either, so a failed pull leaves the
  previous database intact rather than a half-written one.
- db.go: Vulnerability.Severity is a string, not trivy Severity, so the
  int conversion did not compile. Severity now resolves vendor (highest
  when vendors disagree) then NVD then unknown, and CVSS is read too.
- findings.go: added sweepFixedFindings plus the fleet query, severity
  counts, rescan flag and accept/unaccept the API needs.
- vulnrules.go: added rule CRUD and the digest builder. ResolveTargets
  returns []models.Server, not []string, so filterByServers was wrong.
- api/vulnerabilities.go was an empty file while handlers.go registered
  twelve routes against it; written, grouped by CVE.
- shared/mail: added the missing sender. The templates were orphaned and
  the HTML one was a copy of the text one, defining "subject" (which
  html/template would escape) and emitting no markup. render.go parses
  every template in init(), so a bad one panics server, admin and sitesvc
  at boot — go build never runs init(), which is why nothing complained.
- notify: digests dispatch through their own path so SMTP gets the digest
  template rather than arriving dressed as a monitor alert.
2026-08-06 14:33:46 +01:00
mrhid6 db64320bd8 feat: agent reports installed packages on the hourly loop
SyncKeys now returns the whole response so the poll can carry
CollectPackages; a separate RPC for one boolean would be a message every
30 seconds for a value that changes when a licence does.

The flag is an atomic: the 30s poll writes it, the hourly package loop
reads it, and they are different goroutines.
2026-08-06 13:21:13 +01:00
mrhid6 583f60771c feat: store agent package reports and serve the collect flag
VulnScanningEnabled reads GetLicenseState(...).Feature("vuln_scanning")
and requires an active licence, never switching on tier. ReportPackages
re-checks it server-side: the agent flag is the optimisation, this is
the boundary.
2026-08-06 13:19:39 +01:00
mrhid6 a92c3190c2 feat: ReportPackages wire types with hash short-circuit
The pb packages are hand-written, not protoc-generated, and the wire
codec is JSON (encoding.RegisterCodec(JSONCodec{})). Field numbers in
the .proto are documentation; JSON field names are the contract. Both pb
packages edited by hand to match.

SyncResponse.collect_packages is omitempty and absent decodes as false,
so an older server leaves agents collecting nothing rather than
collecting without a licence.
2026-08-06 13:17:44 +01:00
mrhid6 3a6d24fe0e feat: models and indexes for package inventory and CVE findings
Adds server_packages, vuln_findings and vuln_alert_rules to
ScopedCollections rather than to a separate deletion list. purgeInstance
derives its collection list from that registry, so instance deletion
follows automatically and there is no second copy to drift.
2026-08-06 11:59:00 +01:00
mrhid6 c277ecff44 feat: agent collects installed packages per package manager 2026-08-06 11:56:41 +01:00
mrhid6 bd690c94c3 feat: agent parses /etc/os-release for distro identification 2026-08-06 11:55:45 +01:00
mrhid6 a22fdf197e feat: map OS family and version to trivy-db advisory buckets 2026-08-06 11:55:01 +01:00
mrhid6 bd24b03cac feat: version comparators for distro package ordering 2026-08-06 11:54:13 +01:00
mrhid6 3afc4ab012 docs: workload registry plan; remove tests from both plans
Both plans now verify by build, vet and manual checks written into the
tasks. Spec verification sections updated to match so they no longer
describe tests that will not be written.
2026-08-06 11:27:37 +01:00
mrhid6 d1ac3e98ce docs: design for the workload registry
Agents enumerate Docker containers, compose stacks and systemd services;
start/stop/restart and bounded log snapshots from the UI.

Sub-project B, Linux only. Live log following stays in the console.
2026-08-06 11:11:26 +01:00
mrhid6 5bba54f3e5 fix: Fixed style layout on workflow run page 2026-08-06 10:50:31 +01:00
mrhid6 fe7bc300e2 docs: implementation plan for package inventory and CVE findings
17 tasks, TDD where the logic is pure. Corrects two spec claims:
the server reads features via License.HasFeature rather than admin's
entitlement directly, and shared/mail/render_test.go does not exist.
2026-08-06 10:49:10 +01:00
mrhid6 00c03c365d docs: design for package inventory and CVE findings
Agents report installed packages; the control plane matches them against
trivy-db and raises findings that link to the existing ApplyUpdatesCmd
patching path.

Scoped to sub-project A, Linux only. Container registry, image scanning
and compliance baselines are separate specs.
2026-08-06 10:33:54 +01:00
mrhid6 dc8dd3dd58 fix: Fixed step descriptions
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2026-08-04 17:45:31 +01:00
mrhid6 85a8865892 feat: restyle the steps table and add 22 default steps
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2026-08-04 17:34:18 +01:00
mrhid6 50a9ac5fdc fix: count tag-matched servers in the workflows list 2026-08-04 17:28:01 +01:00
mrhid6 3388d2f895 fix: Fixed padding on add step button
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2026-08-04 17:24:40 +01:00
mrhid6 3a77fc2abd feat: edit target servers and tags together in the workflow modal 2026-08-04 17:21:12 +01:00
mrhid6 3d59836d0c feat: dual list box for workflow target servers
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2026-08-04 17:13:50 +01:00
mrhid6 d9184312aa fix: schedule card placement, preview state, and scheduled-workflow docs 2026-08-04 17:08:11 +01:00
mrhid6 b9802e6b04 docs: Updated docs 2026-08-04 17:03:29 +01:00
mrhid6 c2635ed51a fix: Fixed schedule workflow col
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2026-08-04 14:42:10 +01:00
mrhid6 b21ac05547 feat: show workflow schedules in the list
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2026-08-04 14:16:13 +01:00
mrhid6 484b620867 feat: schedule editor on the workflow page 2026-08-04 14:13:31 +01:00
mrhid6 439bc2ed7d feat: schedule methods on the web api client 2026-08-04 14:10:04 +01:00
mrhid6 a1e6986a64 feat: fire scheduled workflow runs from the housekeeping leader 2026-08-04 13:53:42 +01:00
mrhid6 d0e1cc4ad6 feat: cron arithmetic and persisted workflow schedules 2026-08-04 13:51:10 +01:00
mrhid6 b877024365 docs: server tags and workflow tag targeting 2026-08-04 13:44:16 +01:00
mrhid6 2de7ac116b feat: filter the fleet by tag and target workflows by tag selector 2026-08-04 13:42:47 +01:00
mrhid6 fa1fd14ed1 feat: view and edit server tags 2026-08-04 13:38:42 +01:00
mrhid6 d1b3cd2f74 feat: target workflow runs by tag selector 2026-08-04 13:36:43 +01:00
mrhid6 e00a0da5d9 feat: tag endpoints for servers 2026-08-04 13:34:22 +01:00
mrhid6 fef0b7c7a1 feat: read and write server tags, resolve targets from the database 2026-08-04 13:33:00 +01:00
mrhid6 efd29dc259 feat: parse tag filters and resolve targets as ids union tag selector 2026-08-04 13:31:04 +01:00
mrhid6 13cd41d202 feat: validate server tags and add the model field 2026-08-04 13:30:06 +01:00
mrhid6 3530ce6cb7 docs: implementation plans for server tags and scheduled workflows 2026-08-04 13:26:04 +01:00
mrhid6 09522c2566 docs: design for server tags and scheduled workflows 2026-08-04 13:13:12 +01:00
mrhid6 80f0afb28b feat: Updated monitors pages
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2026-08-04 12:19:15 +01:00
mrhid6 287bd9657b fix: Fixed paddle relink sub
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2026-08-03 17:34:39 +01:00
mrhid6 b5f684c4fe fix: Fixed paddle subs
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2026-08-03 15:32:01 +01:00
mrhid6 1f08e90009 feat: Removed email alert settings
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2026-08-03 14:40:15 +01:00
mrhid6 6881d92d0a fix: local-login toggle no longer reverts unsaved settings edits
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server/internal/services/settings.go SaveSettings takes alerts and
email as required (non-pointer) values and writes them unconditionally
- absent fields would blank stored settings, not just leave them
alone. onLocalLoginChange was building its payload from the stale
loaded settings object instead of the in-progress form state
(thresholdMinutes/logRetentionDays) that handleSubmit uses, so editing
the offline threshold and then flipping the toggle silently reverted
the edit. Both paths now submit the same in-progress values.
2026-08-03 14:13:05 +01:00
mrhid6 5e016c6584 fix: audit ack_notice and stop misreporting DB errors as lockouts
ackAuthProviderNotice mutated callback_notice with no audit event; it
now writes auth_provider.ack_notice like create/update/delete.

guardProviderChange's callers turned any error from
CountEnabledAuthProviders into a 409 last_provider, so a transient
Mongo error was reported to the operator as an unremovable lockout.
Only services.ErrLockout now produces the 409; anything else is a 500.
2026-08-03 14:12:21 +01:00
mrhid6 537b8758ff fix: purge auth_providers when reaping an instance
auth_providers was missing from ScopedCollections, so reap.go's
scopedCollectionsForPurge() (derived from that list) never deleted an
instance's providers, leaving orphaned rows holding encrypted client
secrets forever. Verified migration 0004's $rename over org_id->instance_id
is a no-op here since auth_providers never carried org_id.
2026-08-03 14:11:42 +01:00
mrhid6 c03360333b fix: single source of truth for local-login lockout rescue
HandleLocalLogin and HandleListPublicProviders each computed their own
answer to whether password sign-in must stay available, and they could
disagree: an instance with local login off and a licence that lapses
loses its only provider and its password form in the same moment, with
no endpoint left to recover. services.LocalLoginPermitted is now the
one predicate both call.
2026-08-03 14:11:22 +01:00
mrhid6 fa7c5d341d docs: fix stale auth-provider references in rest-api and licensing docs 2026-08-03 11:08:22 +01:00
mrhid6 b6fc8c3f77 docs: document multiple auth providers and the callback URL change 2026-08-03 11:05:40 +01:00
mrhid6 37f2c1457e feat: manage multiple sign-in providers from settings 2026-08-03 11:00:25 +01:00
mrhid6 3a626922a5 feat: render one login button per configured auth provider 2026-08-03 10:56:03 +01:00
mrhid6 dde47de145 feat: auth provider REST API and public provider discovery 2026-08-03 10:51:35 +01:00
mrhid6 f3b9f6f286 feat: add GitHub OAuth2 provider branch 2026-08-03 10:48:19 +01:00
mrhid6 f1c3f67864 feat: per-provider SSO start and callback routes 2026-08-03 10:45:23 +01:00
mrhid6 8f5873afca refactor: carry provider id in the OIDC state token 2026-08-03 10:41:30 +01:00
mrhid6 e22faebfcd feat: migrate instance_oidc into auth_providers (0005) 2026-08-03 10:38:52 +01:00
mrhid6 e2b01b62a5 feat: add local_login_enabled setting with absent-means-on default 2026-08-03 10:36:48 +01:00
mrhid6 0858693d57 feat: add auth provider service layer and lockout guard 2026-08-03 10:33:36 +01:00
mrhid6 45f7c0c393 feat: add AuthProvider model and identity provider presets 2026-08-03 10:30:21 +01:00
mrhid6 c56bfb7270 docs: implementation plan for multiple auth providers 2026-08-03 10:23:35 +01:00
mrhid6 eb45072031 feat: Removed unused test units 2026-08-03 10:18:01 +01:00
mrhid6 1e2132c1a1 docs: Cleanup old specs and plans 2026-08-03 10:15:54 +01:00
mrhid6 19ef773690 docs: drop legacy OIDC callback from multi-provider design 2026-08-03 10:13:26 +01:00
mrhid6 c5aae0614a docs: design for multiple auth providers 2026-08-03 10:09:13 +01:00
mrhid6 17d97aaf52 feat: More logging for command stream
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2026-07-31 17:20:35 +01:00
mrhid6 1fb9bd827f feat: Added ping command
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2026-07-31 17:10:59 +01:00
mrhid6 8699dc5b7e fix: Renew presence on sub/pub
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2026-07-31 16:58:50 +01:00
mrhid6 71240f183c fix: Fixes to server shutdown stream
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2026-07-31 16:44:47 +01:00
mrhid6 01e8b0ba44 feat: Better debugging for console
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2026-07-31 16:31:19 +01:00
mrhid6 2aa4784518 feat: Better debugging for console
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2026-07-31 16:13:51 +01:00
mrhid6 f611cae438 feat: Better debugging for console
Chart Release / chart (push) Successful in 11s
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2026-07-31 16:00:58 +01:00
mrhid6 1eb98ef962 feat: Better debugging for console
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Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 1m22s
2026-07-31 15:51:26 +01:00
mrhid6 6f86496f10 fix: Ffixes to console
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Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 1m9s
2026-07-31 15:05:21 +01:00
mrhid6 57a9b18102 fix: Guacd connection ip
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 9s
Chart Release / chart (push) Successful in 11s
2026-07-31 14:52:20 +01:00
mrhid6 36995fa62b fix: Fixed install and update scripts
Chart Release / chart (push) Successful in 9s
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2026-07-31 12:10:32 +01:00
mrhid6 9121fc461f fix: Fixed chart api routes for update
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 15s
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2026-07-31 12:03:45 +01:00
mrhid6 fc56bae5f9 chore: Bump chart version
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Agent Release / build (push) Successful in 38s
Agent Release / msi (push) Successful in 57s
2026-07-31 11:53:08 +01:00
mrhid6 ac75b3ef76 feat: chart deployment Type added
Chart Release / chart (push) Successful in 20s
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 35s
2026-07-31 11:52:31 +01:00
mrhid6 e6fe463216 feat: Updated for api ingress routes
Chart Release / chart (push) Successful in 25s
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2026-07-31 11:21:15 +01:00
mrhid6 8528f14ed7 feat: Added ingress to chart
Chart Release / chart (push) Successful in 10s
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 1m24s
2026-07-31 10:49:20 +01:00
mrhid6 df1d9658f5 fix: Chart build
Chart Release / chart (push) Successful in 10s
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 1m20s
2026-07-31 10:41:41 +01:00
mrhid6 9f9b384481 fix: Fixed chart version
Chart Release / chart (push) Failing after 13s
2026-07-31 10:37:04 +01:00
mrhid6 165114471f fix: Fixes to running on kubernetes
Chart Release / chart (push) Failing after 13s
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 6m35s
2026-07-31 10:34:10 +01:00
mrhid6 de78688093 feat: authenticate the server's Redis connection
InitRedis now takes a username and password, read from REDIS_USERNAME and
REDIS_PASSWORD, matching what admin has always done. Both empty keeps an
unauthenticated Redis working; a password with an empty username is what a
legacy requirepass instance needs, since go-redis then sends AUTH with one
argument instead of two.

This is what lets a Kubernetes install point at a managed Redis instead of
the bundled one.
2026-07-31 09:36:31 +01:00
mrhid6 bbf9f72fd3 feat: Docker and helm charts
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 5m26s
Agent Release / build (push) Successful in 10m45s
Agent Release / msi (push) Successful in 1m31s
2026-07-31 09:28:54 +01:00
mrhid6 978b665aa6 fix: stop local relay teardown from logging a spurious proxy_failed reason
Session.Close now closing its own accepted conn (from the prior fix wave)
made net.ErrClosed on the guacd-side reader indistinguishable from a real
remote failure, so a normal browser-tab close could race the handler's
defer and intermittently log console.proxy_failed on a healthy session.
Add a closing flag, set before Close's sync.Once body actually tears
anything down, that setReason respects -- a deliberate local teardown can
no longer produce or race in a failure reason, while Close's own explicit
reason argument still wins normally.
2026-07-31 09:25:27 +01:00
mrhid6 1fe608f531 fix: bound and complete console relay teardown, restore proxy_failed audit
- Arm the unclaimed-relay watchdog in NewSession rather than Serve, so an
  agent that never opens its ProxyStream is bounded to 10s and reports
  reason "agent_timeout", per the design spec's failure-mode table.
- Session.Close now also closes the accepted net.Conn (stored via setConn),
  so ConsoleProxy.Close() is an unconditional kill of the whole relay chain
  instead of only closing an already-idle listener.
- Emit console.proxy_failed and end the console session from a defer in
  consoleTunnel guarded on relay.Reason(), since guac's OnDisconnect never
  runs when the connect callback errors -- which is the path every relay
  failure this feature introduces takes. Update the two docsite
  troubleshooting rows to match what the audit event can now actually show.
2026-07-31 09:21:07 +01:00
mrhid6 1e1546cb60 docs: document the agent-relayed console proxy
Every console session now rides the agent's outbound gRPC connection
instead of a direct guacd-to-target dial, so it works for servers
behind NAT and now requires a live agent (409 agent_offline
otherwise). Documents PROXY_ADVERTISE_HOST / PROXY_LISTEN_HOST and
corrects reachability claims across the docsite and CLAUDE.md.
2026-07-31 09:10:05 +01:00
mrhid6 119d8694d1 feat: Reap admin free instance license 2026-07-30 14:42:06 +01:00
mrhid6 8d43c689f5 feat: Reap admin free instance 2026-07-30 14:31:43 +01:00
mrhid6 05f10ed3c9 feat: record relay proxy_id and port in console audit events 2026-07-29 13:10:58 +01:00
mrhid6 c0bec3737b feat: route every console session through the agent relay 2026-07-29 13:07:30 +01:00
mrhid6 59d147fe4d feat: handle OpenProxyCmd in the agent command stream 2026-07-29 13:03:02 +01:00
mrhid6 9e38a01e3d feat: add agent-side console relay 2026-07-29 12:59:24 +01:00
mrhid6 20a302f84a feat: add OpenConsoleProxy service facade 2026-07-29 12:55:36 +01:00
mrhid6 ba2e263d00 fix: collapse ProxyStream auth failures into one indistinguishable response 2026-07-29 12:52:53 +01:00
mrhid6 a000703199 feat: add ProxyStream handler with scoped single-use auth 2026-07-29 12:50:20 +01:00
mrhid6 8fcda63742 fix: avoid closing proxy relay listener before validating remote source 2026-07-29 12:47:35 +01:00
mrhid6 3363ac9dad feat: add console proxy session relay 2026-07-29 12:43:04 +01:00
mrhid6 a7e338b171 feat: add console proxy session registry 2026-07-29 12:40:22 +01:00
mrhid6 bc79daab48 feat: add ProxyStream wire types for agent-relayed console 2026-07-29 12:37:37 +01:00
mrhid6 d3d8dba3ff docs: Implementation plan for agent-relayed console proxy 2026-07-29 12:26:16 +01:00
mrhid6 6d047e25ab docs: Design for agent-relayed console proxy 2026-07-29 12:16:45 +01:00
mrhid6 ed4c39650c feat: Removed hq signup page
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 1m44s
2026-07-29 10:42:51 +01:00
mrhid6 7b8fa4a8a0 feat: Updated hq login page
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 40s
2026-07-29 10:35:07 +01:00
mrhid6 8a02c35ec9 docs: Updated docs
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 55s
2026-07-28 16:54:39 +01:00
mrhid6 487de34a50 docs: Updated docs
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Failing after 1m57s
2026-07-28 16:53:42 +01:00
mrhid6 0424547dd4 docs: Updated docs 2026-07-28 16:53:38 +01:00
mrhid6 5be9ddb2e5 fix: Fixed baked api url
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 7m8s
2026-07-28 16:18:50 +01:00
mrhid6 bc6c7cdb5a feat: Updated docker file
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 2m35s
2026-07-28 16:04:51 +01:00
mrhid6 f46fb7fc0e feat: documentation site
Docusaurus 3 docs-only site at docsite/, served statically by nginx under
/docs on the marketing host. Covers getting started (self-hosted install
through first server and first licence), the control plane, Vantage HQ,
a reference section and operations.

Wired into docker-compose.site.yml as docsite (3005:80) and into the
image build workflow, rebuilding on its own directory only. Never added
to the self-hosted compose file.
2026-07-28 15:46:33 +01:00
mrhid6 d9945882e5 docs: serve the documentation site under /docs on the marketing host 2026-07-28 15:22:20 +01:00
mrhid6 9db16522e3 docs: design for the documentation site 2026-07-28 15:20:07 +01:00
mrhid6 6070972f9a chore: updated deps
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 36s
2026-07-28 15:07:19 +01:00
mrhid6 31e0000306 feat: default steps are read only
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 1m46s
2026-07-28 13:34:08 +01:00
mrhid6 26567766a9 feat: Move default steps into container 2026-07-28 13:28:43 +01:00
mrhid6 97dc6feaca feat: Tapo platform page
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 1m30s
2026-07-28 12:57:49 +01:00
mrhid6 f10e61cde4 feat: Updated marketing site 2026-07-28 12:46:28 +01:00
mrhid6 febe48a974 feat: Updated pricing 2026-07-28 12:31:00 +01:00
mrhid6 766dcabfde fix: Fixes to the console focus
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 43s
2026-07-28 12:02:48 +01:00
mrhid6 c9dab99271 feat: Windows agent inventory
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 9s
Agent Release / build (push) Successful in 1m39s
Agent Release / msi (push) Successful in 36s
2026-07-28 11:29:08 +01:00
mrhid6 60a4ed9aab fix: Fixed agent msi update command
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 16s
Agent Release / build (push) Successful in 10m40s
Agent Release / msi (push) Successful in 38s
2026-07-28 10:53:06 +01:00
mrhid6 f56fc2e54d fix: Fixed agent build
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 4m8s
Agent Release / build (push) Successful in 10m44s
Agent Release / msi (push) Successful in 1m43s
2026-07-28 10:30:29 +01:00
mrhid6 dabe6fe3aa feat: Updated package path to match repo
Agent Release / build (push) Failing after 25s
Agent Release / msi (push) Skipped
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 2m47s
2026-07-28 10:01:40 +01:00
mrhid6 a232c74990 feat: Move mail system to shared
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 2m46s
2026-07-28 09:50:46 +01:00
mrhid6 5e326335af fix(web): stop long tokens and button rows overflowing on mobile
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 1m40s
Three root causes behind five reported overflows:

- Td below sm is a flex row, and a flex item's default min-width:auto is
  its min-content width. A fingerprint or target URL is one unbreakable
  token, so the value could not shrink and spilled out of the card. The
  value now sits in a min-w-0 break-words wrapper that is display:contents
  above sm, leaving the desktop table untouched. Fixes /keys, /monitors
  and the installed-keys table on /servers/[id] in one place.

- The ESO read URL and the secrets group endpoint are unbreakable tokens
  in prose with the default overflow-wrap:normal. Both paragraphs now
  break-words.

- Three page headers (servers/[id], keys/[id], monitors/[id]) held an
  unwrapped button row. They stack below sm and the clusters wrap. These
  used items-start, which is why the earlier responsive sweep — matching
  items-center — skipped all three; only one was reported.

Verified: tsc clean, next build clean, and the compiled stylesheet confirms
max-sm:min-w-0 / max-sm:break-words land in the below-640px query and
sm:contents in the above-640px one.
2026-07-27 23:28:53 +01:00
mrhid6 14a11886ae feat(web): make the control plane usable on mobile
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 43s
Sidebar becomes a hamburger-driven offcanvas below lg; tables card-stack
below sm via the shared Td primitive's label prop; page padding, modals,
the workflow builder and the remaining fixed layouts all collapse.

Presentation only — no API, route or data-shape changes.

Spec:  docs/superpowers/specs/2026-07-27-web-mobile-responsive-design.md
Plan:  docs/superpowers/plans/2026-07-27-web-mobile-responsive.md
2026-07-27 23:15:25 +01:00
mrhid6 4be7d24aec feat(web): collapse remaining fixed layouts on small screens 2026-07-27 23:01:30 +01:00
mrhid6 dd4ce5bb3e fix(web): scope inspector top border to below lg 2026-07-27 22:57:53 +01:00
mrhid6 5ee3f14eed feat(web): single-column workflow builder below lg 2026-07-27 22:55:07 +01:00
mrhid6 5dcc1bf1be feat(web): bottom-sheet modals and collapsing component grids 2026-07-27 22:50:08 +01:00
mrhid6 facef270b7 feat(web): label table cells for the mobile card stack 2026-07-27 22:46:39 +01:00
mrhid6 e8c75e974d feat(web): responsive page padding and stacking page headers 2026-07-27 22:42:22 +01:00
mrhid6 60af88525c feat(web): offcanvas sidebar with hamburger below lg 2026-07-27 22:33:16 +01:00
mrhid6 74f6dca2f5 feat(web): card-stack tables below sm 2026-07-27 22:28:57 +01:00
mrhid6 effd991c31 docs: mobile responsive design spec and implementation plan for web/ 2026-07-27 22:24:26 +01:00
mrhid6 20e57d19c7 feat: Updated pricing page
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 2m46s
2026-07-27 22:08:17 +01:00
mrhid6 d5c8d0d0f2 fix: Fixed site mobile width 2026-07-27 21:58:20 +01:00
mrhid6 2869e63d0a feat: Move manage billing button to billing page 2026-07-27 21:47:50 +01:00
mrhid6 792b7eb211 feat: Updated instance record and license blob box
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 1m13s
2026-07-27 16:48:37 +01:00
mrhid6 8fd5eacec6 feat: Updated self hosted free plans
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 40s
2026-07-27 16:26:20 +01:00
mrhid6 66140aaf58 fixes
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2026-07-27 15:59:45 +01:00
mrhid6 fdfe8e8e46 fix: Fixed oidc purchase description
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 37s
2026-07-27 15:26:34 +01:00
mrhid6 4ad68e3ac4 feat: Updated purchase page
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 4m40s
2026-07-27 14:59:43 +01:00
mrhid6 0a86167c44 docs: updated docs
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2026-07-27 10:57:19 +01:00
mrhid6 3537ec59dc docs+deploy: Paddle env, webhook route, collections, CI build args, and spec status 2026-07-27 10:55:41 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 8bbecd2035 feat(adminsite): self-hosted purchase, checkout overlay, billing portal, client line-item builder
Purchase flow: name -> placeholder -> configure via the shipped PlanConfigurator
-> Paddle overlay with custom_data -> paste install UUID to link and issue.
lineItemsFor mirrors the Go catalogue.LineItems/billable exactly (base included
in exactly one place). ManageBillingButton opens the hosted portal. Paddle token
and env are baked into the build, never fetched.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-27 10:53:21 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 c10f093cad feat(admin): awaiting-link reminders, placeholder claim-and-issue, and billing health
sweepAwaitingLink chases paid-but-unlinked self-hosted placeholders at 24h/72h.
claimPlaceholderLink rewrites a placeholder's identity to the install's real
UUID, re-points the subscription, and issues from it — linking and claiming are
one call because the payment already happened. staffBillingHealth surfaces
failed webhook handlers and unlinked paid placeholders.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-27 10:46:00 +01:00
mrhid6 28b138b4c3 feat(admin): checkout options, self-hosted placeholder, entitlement update, and portal endpoints 2026-07-27 10:43:12 +01:00
mrhid6 01bb37125d feat(admin): renewals issue the next term and collapse a scheduled reduction; payment-failed flags only 2026-07-27 10:41:30 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 2e8114c41e feat(admin): subscription webhooks promote the entitlement and reissue; cancel and past-due take no licence action
created/updated/activated fold into 'make the world match current state', so
out-of-order delivery is correct by construction. A confirmed subscription
promotes desired->granted and signs from granted only. Cancel and past-due touch
only status; the licence runs to expiry. IssueForInstance backstops a
self-hosted placeholder that is linked after payment.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-27 10:40:06 +01:00
mrhid6 6832bfd7bb feat(admin): Paddle webhook ingress — verify, idempotent claim, dispatch 2026-07-27 10:37:53 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 fbd93d0ea5 feat(admin): Paddle client behind an interface, config, and the event idempotency record
Client is a thin REST client (net/http) rather than the vendor SDK: the surface
we need is two calls, and a hand-rolled client has no version-drift risk and no
dependency in go.sum. All Paddle wire shapes live only in http.go.

PADDLE_API_KEY and PADDLE_WEBHOOK_SECRET are boot-required — an unverified
webhook endpoint is one anyone can issue licences through. paddle_events carries
a unique index on event_id for webhook idempotency.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-27 10:36:26 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 3d3be7465f fix(admin): re-key legacy plans before seeding, tolerant of a prior partial boot
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 1m5s
Boot ran SeedPlans before Backfill, so the fresh (self_hosted, professional)
seed row was inserted before pass 3 tried to rename the legacy self_hosted TIER
row into it — colliding on deployment_tier_unique and failing boot.

The plan re-key moves to MigrateLegacyPlans, called before SeedPlans so the
rename lands first and the seed no-ops on it. It is also self-healing: on a
database a crashed boot already seeded (self_hosted, professional) into, the
legacy row can no longer be renamed onto it, so it is dropped instead — its
instances are re-tiered and re-entitled from the surviving professional row.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-27 10:03:17 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 c4e6ad5485 feat(license): metered licensing — catalogue, entitlements, and enforcement
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 5m22s
Implements spec 7 tasks 2-10 on top of the six-plan payload from task 1.

Admin: plans re-keyed on (deployment, tier); new catalogue collection holds
every Paddle price ID (one row per priceable component); new entitlements
collection holds desired beside granted. admin/internal/catalogue owns both
folds — entitlement to licence limits, and entitlement to Paddle line items —
so the base allowance is subtracted in exactly one place. licensing.Issue now
snapshots the instance's granted entitlement, never desired. Free is enforced
per account AND deployment. Staff endpoints for plans, catalogue and
entitlements; Free self-hosted can be claimed and renewed on its annual term;
the reaper stays cloud-only.

Server: enforces the monitor cap, audit-log retention (daily sweep, skips
Unlimited and lapsed instances), and gates the OIDC callback. Unset limits are
filled from the seed plan at the single decode site so old blobs never read as
zero.

Frontends: adminsite gains a catalogue price-ID editor, six-plan allowance
screen, and a catalogue-driven PlanConfigurator mounted on the staff instance
page. web shows monitors, audit retention and support level on the licence page.

Docs: CLAUDE.md, spec index and plan 5 preamble updated.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-27 09:37:39 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 3fc726da9e feat(license): two deployments times three tiers, and two new limits
Plans are keyed on (deployment, tier) rather than tier alone, which is what
ends Free being cloud-only by construction - there is a self-hosted Free
plan now, so the one-per-account rule has to be enforced per deployment
instead of falling out of the plan table.

tier self_hosted becomes a legacy value no new licence carries.
NormaliseTier maps it to self-hosted Professional, which is what it always
granted, so blobs we cannot re-sign keep working.

Limits.FillUnset exists because a licence signed before a field existed
decodes it as 0, and 0 would read as no monitors and an audit log trimmed
to nothing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-26 23:41:43 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 73b6b548f0 docs: implementation plan for spec 7, metered licensing
Ten tasks, each ending in something independently verifiable. The plan
stops at the Paddle boundary on purpose: spec 7 lands before plan 5, so
there is no client, no webhook and no checkout here, and the configurator
is built as a component mounted for staff first rather than as a customer
screen with nothing behind it.

Corrects two things the spec got wrong about the control plane. Feature
gating is already built and mounted, so Free tenants have already lost the
console and no customer email is owed. The only real gap is that
HandleOIDCCallback lacks the check HandleOIDCStart already has, which is
the half that completes a sign-in.

Adds the Free self-hosted lifecycle the spec called for and the first draft
of the plan missed: linking issues nothing today, and renewInstance
hardcodes a monthly term that would hand a self-hosted install a one-month
licence.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-26 23:34:34 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 ff0caf5a90 docs: spec 7, metered licensing and the two-by-three plan matrix
Two deployments times three tiers, servers metered per month, console and
SSO opted into individually. plans is re-keyed on (deployment, tier); every
Paddle price ID moves out of plans into a new catalogue collection; a new
entitlements collection holds desired beside granted, and a licence is only
ever signed from granted.

Spec 5's plan is revised rather than followed: it assumes one price per
subscription and a metered plan has three or more. Nothing of it has
shipped, so the revision costs a rewrite of an unstarted plan.

Free stops being cloud-only by construction, which means the plan/instance
deployment comparison in licensing.Issue no longer enforces it and
checkFreeLimit has to count per deployment.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-26 23:16:35 +01:00
mrhid6 87dc9fc858 inital paddle billing docs 2026-07-26 22:57:57 +01:00
mrhid6 dd306e4757 feat(license): the paste form is self-hosted only
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 2m14s
A cloud instance's licence is issued in HQ and written into the control
plane by admin/internal/inject, straight to the database. The customer has
nothing to paste, so /settings/license offered them a form that could only
ever fail — and on an expired cloud instance, failed at the exact moment
they were looking for a way out.

GET /license now reports `deployment`, and the page swaps the paste form
for a short panel saying where the licence comes from, with a link to the
portal when HQ_URL is set. That is the same treatment hq-managed members
already get in the members table: read-only here, and a pointer to where
it is actually managed.

POST /license refuses with 409 cloud_managed on a cloud deployment. Hiding
a form is a courtesy; this codebase's rule is that the API is the boundary,
and the endpoint was reachable regardless of what the page rendered. It
cannot break injection, which never goes through HTTP at all.

Verified: server builds and vets clean, web builds clean.
2026-07-26 20:42:53 +01:00
mrhid6 fa75d70475 fix(web): rebuild the licence page as the document it is
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 40s
This screen was never finished. It had no page padding, so it sat flush
against the sidebar while every other screen has p-8; it used raw button,
textarea and file inputs instead of the design system; and it rendered
state as "State: valid" in a sentence.

It also dropped `reason` entirely. An instance with an invalid licence was
told "State: invalid" and nothing else — not that the signature failed, not
that it was issued against a different instance, not what to do. That was
the real defect, and no layout survives having nowhere to put the most
important thing on the page.

A licence is a document: issued, dated, signed, carrying a reference you
quote to support. The page now reads that way, which is also how adminsite/
presents the same object from the issuing side — state as a label with a
shape, the reference on a mono record line, entitlement as keyed fields.

- a record panel opens the page: the state as a statement, the reason
  underneath in this app's own words rather than the API's identifiers,
  then Expires / Source / Instance ID as keyed fields. `source` and
  `days_remaining` were being returned and never shown
- counted limits become meters, because that is already how the console
  shows headroom on a server's disks — same question, same reading. They
  turn amber at 80% and red at the cap
- an unlimited allowance gets no bar. A full-width one would read as "at
  the limit", which is the opposite of what it means
- features render as included/not with a glyph as well as a colour
- the file input is a styled label over a visually hidden input, and now
  reports which file it loaded

Two things found reviewing my own work: Card's p-6 is emitted after p-4, so
`<Card className="p-4">` silently rendered at p-6 — the allowance cards pass
padding={false} instead. And the state had a coloured dot next to a coloured
word on a colour-ruled card, which is one telling too many; the dot is gone.

`Group` moves to components/settings/ so this page and /settings share the
band label rather than growing a second copy.
2026-07-26 20:35:31 +01:00
mrhid6 653bd5a755 refactor(web): members and SSO move onto the settings page
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 1m12s
/settings/instance held two cards — Members and Single sign-on — behind a
sidebar entry called "Instance", next to one called "Settings". Nothing in
either name told you which held what, and the split left both pages thin.

They are now the Access group at the top of /settings, above Monitoring and
Integrations. Six cards on one page needs sorting into groups or it reads as
a pile, so each group carries site/'s keyed-label eyebrow on a hairline.

The cards move to web/components/settings/ rather than into the page, which
would have made it ~600 lines. That is also where the Field and inputClass
pair now lives: the two pages each had a byte-identical copy, and folding
them together is exactly when three copies would have started to drift.

Members and SSO adopt SectionCard, which the rest of the page already used.
A card that kept its own header treatment would read as a different kind of
thing rather than another setting, which is the problem being fixed.

next.config.ts keeps a permanent redirect from the old path, so bookmarks
and any support reply linking it still land somewhere useful.
2026-07-26 20:19:04 +01:00
mrhid6 01eda1dbb0 feat(web): the console joins the shared design system
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 1m6s
web/ was the last app on its own palette — a neutral #0f1117 ground with an
indigo accent, unrelated to the logo navy that site/ and adminsite/ are built
on. It now draws from the same tokens, so all three apps are one system.

It stays locked to dark, taking site/'s dark values. That is what keeps
adminsite/'s light default meaningful: an operator with both open tells them
apart by the ground before clicking anything destructive, and now that both
are the same palette, the ground is the only thing left doing that work.

The colour names stay this app's own — text-primary, border, surface rather
than ink, rule, panel — because every screen already reads that way, and
adminsite/ already establishes that each app names the shared tokens after
its own subject.

Tokens are stored as RGB channels with the hex in a trailing comment. The
console leans on Tailwind opacity modifiers far more than the other two
(bg-danger/10, border-accent/50, ring-accent/30), and <alpha-value> only
compiles against channels; the comments keep the three token blocks
diffable by eye.

Beyond colour:
- radii collapse to site/'s 4px in tailwind.config.ts rather than rewriting
  ~140 rounded-lg classes; rounded-full is untouched for dots and pills
- badges become site/'s chip — mono, uppercase, tracked, currentColor rule,
  no fill — keeping their dot so state is never colour alone
- table column heads take the keyed-label idiom, at text-secondary rather
  than tertiary, which lands under 4.5:1 at that size
- sidebar marks the active item with an accent bar, the device site/ uses
  for the chosen plan, instead of a filled pill that reads as pressable
- filled accent and danger buttons take accent-ink; the dark accent is a
  light blue and danger a coral, and white on either was unreadable
- login's packet pulses shift from green to the accent, so the sign-in
  screen is the same two blues as the marketing hero

The last hex literals and stock-palette classes are gone; the only ones left
are NetworkBackground's canvas fills, which cannot read a CSS variable and
are commented with the token each came from.

Only the web image rebuilds from this.
2026-07-26 18:33:07 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 11ebd324ad ci: only rebuild images whose inputs changed
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 2m38s
Every push rebuilt all six images regardless of what it touched. A git diff
against github.event.before now gates each build step.

Two things this needs to work at all: fetch-depth 0, because the default
shallow clone has a single commit and nothing to diff against, and git
installed in the dind container, which had node and npm but not git.

The path mapping follows the build contexts rather than intuition — the Go
images use a root context and COPY shared/, so shared/ fans out to all
three, while the Next images use their own directory and cannot be affected
from outside it. Anything that leaves no trustworthy base commit — manual
run, new branch, force-push whose old head is gone — lists every tracked
file instead, so the fallback is one code path rather than two.

Known gap, documented: a repo variable change pushes no commit, so nothing
rebuilds. workflow_dispatch is the escape hatch.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-26 18:15:26 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 3a6c5ebae8 fix(admin): licence and plan features serialise as [], never null
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 5m22s
Free has no features, so a nil Go slice served "features": null. The
portal's type said string[], called .length on it, and took the page down.

The guarantee lives on a named Features type with its own MarshalJSON
rather than at each of the six places a licence or plan is serialised,
because the seventh is the one that would have been forgotten. Applying it
at marshal time also fixes rows already holding null in Mongo, which a
write-side fix alone would not.

Same class, found while checking the rest: staffListInstances built its
expiring filter from a nil []string, marshalling to $in: null, which Mongo
rejects — so the quiet week when nothing is expiring is precisely when the
staff Operations page's own query would have failed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-26 18:10:07 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 34a0373eca feat(adminsite): one masthead, a shared page frame, collapsible instance records
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 53s
The console had components but no shell: a brand bar and a nav strip stacked
into 100px carrying eight words, no sign-out, no account identity, and an
Overview link hardcoded to text-accent so it read as the current page on
every screen. Nine pages each hand-rolled their own header.

AppBar replaces both bars and derives its active state from usePathname.
Settings moves into AccountMenu — it is your password, not a destination —
taking appearance with it, which finally sets the data-theme attribute the
token blocks have supported in both directions since they were written.
That leaves three customer destinations: Overview, People, Billing.

PageFrame adds a support rail so a page has a floor, and InstanceRecord
replaces InstanceCard with one component that opens and closes: an account
with a single instance used to render a third of a row of summary with its
substance a click away. It defaults open when the instance is the only one
or needs attention.

No plan card in the rail: tier, limits and expiry belong to a licence and a
licence belongs to one instance, so an account holding a Free cloud instance
and a Professional self-hosted one has no single plan. The rail carries only
what is account-wide.

Tokens and globals.css are untouched — they stay verbatim shared with site/.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-26 17:45:53 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 6bf288f83e docs: phase 3, grants project rather than federate
Records why instance_members is an index and not the authority, why hqsync
is not part of inject, and why an invitation carries no password.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-26 16:43:52 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 7b077905e2 feat(web): hq-sourced members are read-only here
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 2m56s
The lock is a courtesy — the API answers 409 either way. NEXT_PUBLIC_HQ_URL
defaults empty so a self-hosted install shows a plain label rather than a
link to a portal that does not serve them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-26 16:42:47 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 2d12669f9b feat(adminsite): people, instance members and one password
The members panel is absent for self-hosted instances rather than disabled:
the backend refuses those, and a panel rendering controls the server will
reject is a panel that lies.

/auth/me now reports the caller's account role, so the UI hides what the
backend would refuse rather than discovering it in an error toast.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-26 16:38:21 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 a05a74cf4d feat(server): refuse local edits to hq-sourced users
The API is the boundary; hiding the control in web/ is a courtesy. A role
editable in two places is a role with two answers.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-26 16:31:27 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 14b855fa9f feat(admin): hqsync repairs stale projected passwords
Its own package rather than a pass inside inject: inject writes three
licence fields and nothing else, and that narrowness is what makes admin's
reach into the control plane reviewable.

Repairs by copying HQ's hash, not by re-hashing — two bcrypt hashes of one
password differ by salt, so a re-hash would never converge.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-26 16:30:33 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 0f5ad1d836 feat(admin): one password change reaches every instance
Best-effort by design: refusing the change because one instance was
unreachable would leave the customer holding the password they were trying
to replace. A failure is flagged and hqsync repairs it.

Also corrects two pieces of copy this makes false — CreateInstance's doc
comment and the instance-ready email both claimed the two passwords
diverge.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-26 16:29:50 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 cca0ffbeae feat(admin): grant, re-role and revoke instance members
A grant writes a real control-plane user; the instance_members row is only
admin's index of it, which is why a failed insert unwinds the projection.
Self-hosted instances refuse all three mutations: their users live in a
deployment we cannot see.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-26 16:28:41 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 0c663945ee feat(admin): invite people to an account and give them roles
An invitation carries no password. The HQ password is what signs someone
into every instance they are granted, so a password the inviter chose would
be a shared credential to all of them — the invited row has an empty hash,
which cannot authenticate, until /accept-invite sets one.

Removing a person revokes every projected instance user first, and refuses
outright if any of those is an instance's last owner.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-26 16:26:56 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 b37ed967b6 feat(admin): cloudprov projects, revokes and repairs users
A grant is a real control-plane users row with auth_source hq, not a
federation shim: the instance authenticates it with no runtime dependency
on admin. CountOtherOwners counts control-plane owners so a locally-created
owner satisfies the last-owner rule too.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-26 16:23:46 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 a7b9af4422 feat(admin): account roles and the instance_members index
Phase 2 created cloud instances without recording who owns them on this
side, because the collection did not exist. The boot backfill reconstructs
one member row per instance from the hq-sourced control-plane owner, and
marks every existing customer_user an owner — they all created their own
account.

Backfill lives in models rather than db: db is the connection layer and
models already imports it for SeedPlans, so db -> models would cycle.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-26 16:23:02 +01:00
mrhid6 310b3ab03f fix: Fixed plans on admin site erroring
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 3m39s
2026-07-26 16:08:15 +01:00
mrhid6 fbad3e44e5 doc: Added phase 3 plan
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 1m37s
2026-07-26 15:42:07 +01:00
mrhid6 e4a3f22871 fix: Fixed pricing license names 2026-07-26 15:41:52 +01:00
mrhid6 e8cc9b4ecd fix: Fixed misleading error message when license on cloud 2026-07-26 15:16:02 +01:00
mrhid6 0b1efca737 Updates
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 4m6s
2026-07-26 14:46:38 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 aef5811c16 fix(admin): SMTP over implicit TLS, and rollbacks that survive
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 2m13s
Two bugs, one symptom: signup created an account and a customer_user but
no verification email ever arrived.

net/smtp.SendMail only speaks STARTTLS. Against a port-465 server, which
expects a TLS handshake immediately, it never delivers. The transport now
wraps the connection before speaking SMTP on 465, exactly as
sitesvc/internal/mail already did — the two are duplicated, so change both
or consolidate into shared/. Also adds Date and Message-ID, whose absence
gets a message scored as spam, and a 15s deadline on the conversation.

The rollbacks ran on the HTTP request's context. A stalled mail server
holds the request until the browser gives up, which cancels that context
and turns both rollbacks into silent no-ops — stranding the exact rows
they exist to remove. They now run detached with their own timeout, and
log when they fail.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-26 14:26:34 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 b209fed4a7 fix(deploy): ADMIN_ORIGIN must list the marketing site too
/start now posts account signups straight to admin, so the browser sends
a cross-origin preflight from vantage.hostxtra.co.uk. With only the
console origin in ADMIN_ORIGIN it was refused.

The failure mode is worth naming: cors() omits Access-Control-Allow-Origin
but still answers the preflight 204, so the browser blocks the request and
admin logs nothing. It looks like the endpoint is down when curl says it
is fine.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-26 14:02:25 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 104f21d0a9 docs: phase 2 configuration and the reaper's containment
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 5m8s
FREE_INSTANCE_REAP_AFTER is set only in docker-compose.site.yml, so a
self-hosted deployment can never reap. Admin and server must carry the
same value: one names the deletion date in warnings, the other acts on it.

Records that admin now has a second control-plane write path, cloudprov,
and that deletion lives in the control plane because that is where the
knowledge of what an instance is made of belongs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-26 13:48:23 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 b86d9ddd86 refactor(sitesvc): remove signup and verification
Account creation moved to admin, which owns accounts, and the marketing
form now posts there. sitesvc keeps the contact mailer only.

DEPLOY LAST: sitesvc's verify endpoint must stay live until every
outstanding pending signup has expired, or an in-flight verification link
breaks. Do not roll this out until the site change has been live 24 hours
and site_pending_signups is empty.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-26 13:41:47 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 9cf04a6940 feat(site): /start creates an account, not an instance
The form posts to admin's signup and the slug preview goes: there is no
instance at this point, and previewing one promises something the
submission does not create. Creating the instance is now a step in the
portal, which the page's What happens next panel spells out.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-26 13:37:30 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 cb90ed12fb feat(adminsite): create and renew a free instance
Adds the create form with a live slug preview, a renew action inside the
seven-day window, and a deletion countdown that renders only when the
backend has actually promised a date.

The progress bar denominator now follows the tier; a 30-day Free licence
was rendering as an 8% sliver against the hardcoded 365.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-26 13:30:42 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 a940390791 feat(admin): reconciler marks reaped instances deleted
Without this the row stays active forever, the reconciler re-logs the
same miss every fifteen minutes, and the lifecycle sweep keeps emailing
about an instance that no longer exists.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-26 13:24:44 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 4e90e8619f feat(server): reap Free instances whose licence lapsed
The control plane owns deletion because it is the only service that knows
what an instance is made of; mirroring that collection list into admin
would drift, and a drift here deletes the wrong rows.

Defaults OFF. Eligibility is three positive assertions — Free tier, an
expiry that exists, and an expiry past the window — so a missing or stale
field is never eligible. The instance document is deleted last, making an
interrupted purge retryable rather than orphaning rows.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-26 13:23:37 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 372a8c5ddf feat(admin): lapse sweep and the four renewal notices
Hourly sweep marks expired Free instances lapsed and sends at most one
notice per instance per pass, most urgent first, recorded on the document
so a restart cannot re-send.

Deletion warnings are suppressed when the reaper is off. Promising a
deletion that will never happen is a lie, and a scarier one than silence.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-26 13:20:00 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 909ddb884e feat(admin): renew a Free instance from the portal
Available from seven days before expiry and, deliberately, at any point
after it up to deletion, so the same button rescues a lapsed instance.

Renewal is manual because it is the entire reclaim signal: an instance
nobody renews is one nobody is using, which is what makes reaping safe.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-26 13:17:45 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 1836237f82 feat(admin): POST /api/instances creates a Free cloud instance
Provisions the control-plane instance and its owner, records the
admin_instances row, issues and injects a Free licence, and emails the
customer where it is and when it expires.

Licence issuance and email cannot fail the request. The instance exists
and the customer can sign in; rolling back something they can already see
would be worse than shipping it unlicensed for staff to fix.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-26 13:16:12 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 983655d2a1 feat(admin): cloudprov, the instance provisioning write path
Admin's second and final write path into the control plane. It creates
instances and users and nothing else; inject still owns exactly three
licence fields and is untouched.

The owner's password hash is copied from the HQ account, not shared. The
two diverge on the next password change, which is accepted: propagating a
hash across two databases is worse than two passwords that started equal.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-26 13:14:12 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 78a0a610be docs: phase 2 plan, creation and Free lifecycle
Ten tasks: cloudprov, instance creation, renewal, the notice sweep, the
reaper, the reconciler tie-in, the HQ and marketing UI, the sitesvc
cutover, and an end-to-end verification.

The reaper sweeps once at boot as inject's reconciler does, which is what
makes it observable at all — the ticker is hourly and deletion is
measured in days.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-26 13:12:29 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 5f35b57268 docs: users is unique per instance, not globally
The old index was load-bearing because two lookups were unscoped. Both
are scoped now and the unscoped helper is gone, so the property that
matters is the absence of any unscoped lookup by email. Says so, and
documents auth_source hq.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-26 13:01:09 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 cf318470b8 feat(admin): drop the unscoped control-plane login branch
HQ sign-in names no instance, so a lookup of control-plane users by email
alone cannot be scoped — and users.email is no longer globally unique, so
it would return an arbitrary match. Every customer authenticates against
customer_users instead.

Legacy cloud customers get an HQ login from staff via the new
POST /api/staff/accounts/:id/users, alongside the manual instance attach
the spec README already describes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-26 12:55:44 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 d703bbc4e8 feat(server): scope every user lookup by instance
users is unique on (instance_id, email) now, so an unscoped FindOne could
return an arbitrary one of several matching users. On the login path that
means signing someone into a tenant that is not theirs.

GetUserByEmail is deleted rather than left unused. Local sign-in resolves
its instance from the host, falling back to the single instance a
self-hosted deployment has, and refuses to guess otherwise. The OIDC
cross-instance guard goes: a scoped lookup cannot return another
instance's user, which is a stronger guarantee than the check it replaces.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-26 12:54:13 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 17bcf4b5b9 feat(shared): auth_source constants and hq_user_id on User
Nothing writes them yet. They land now so phases 2 and 3 do not require a
second rebuild of every service that consumes the shared module.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-26 12:52:15 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 da3afca7fa feat(shared): unique users index is (instance_id, email)
One address is one user within an instance, not globally, so an account's
people can be projected into every instance they are granted.

The replacement index is created before email_1 is dropped, so a failure
at any point leaves a working constraint. The drop is idempotent and
tolerates two services racing it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-26 12:48:27 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 88f49a96ae docs: phase 1 plan, identity
Seven tasks: the index swap, the hq fields, the three scoped lookups,
removing admin's unscoped control-plane login, and an end-to-end
verification that two users sharing one address sign in to different
instances.

Also corrects the spec's phase list, which claimed phase 1 projects the
creator as owner. Projection needs instance creation, which is phase 2.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-26 12:28:25 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 d15ab78bd5 docs: spec 6 revised for account membership
An account has people, and those people belong to several cloud
instances. That requires dropping the global unique index on users.email
for a compound (instance_id, email), scoping the two unscoped lookups
that made the global index load-bearing, and projecting HQ users into
instances as real control-plane users.

Self-hosted instances are never projected into; their users stay local.

Restructured into three phases: identity, creation and lifecycle,
membership.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-26 12:16:38 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 8eb14c1502 docs: spec 6, cloud instance creation
Separates having an account from having an instance. Signup creates only
the HQ account; the customer then creates a Free cloud instance from the
portal, which provisions the control-plane instance, the admin_instances
row and a Free licence in one path.

Supersedes spec 5's signup-migration section.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-26 12:03:14 +01:00
mrhid6 f8cd909828 doc: Doc updated for cloud instance creation.
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 2m16s
2026-07-25 22:54:04 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 6a3e0a29a4 chore: verify the admin site end to end
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 1m54s
Everything checkable without a browser, against scratch databases:

- All five Go modules and the adminsite production build compile clean.
- Scoping holds: own instance 200, another account's 404, nonexistent 404 --
  indistinguishable, so no existence oracle -- and a customer session on the
  staff API gets 401 where staff gets 200.
- max_relinks comes from the API (3), not a constant mirrored in TypeScript.
- The inline blob and the download endpoint return byte-identical content, so
  the fallback is faithful rather than approximate.
- ADMIN_API_URL really is baked at build time: 9999 in the deliberately
  broken image, 8083 in the good one.
- The served stylesheet carries site/'s tokens with matching values, plus
  prefers-color-scheme and both data-theme overrides.
- With admin stopped the control plane still reports valid and mutations
  still succeed -- instances never call admin.
- Admin touched only the three licence fields on instances; every other
  control-plane collection is as the control plane left it.

Caught one stale-image bug doing this: the running admin predated the
customer blob change, so the licence response had no blob field at all.
Rebuilt and re-verified.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 21:30:43 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 c19c11e6eb docs: record admin, adminsite and the shared token set
The previous commit missed this file: the repo tracks it as lowercase
claude.md, so staging CLAUDE.md matched nothing in the index.

admin/ was never documented here at all -- the backend plan's wiring task
covered compose and CI but not the file every session loads. So this adds
both services to the structure, admin's whole REST surface with its
404-never-403 rule, the three visual identities, and the coupling that
matters most: adminsite/ and site/ share one token set with nothing enforcing
the match, the same hazard shape as sitesvc's mirrored slug rules.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 21:24:55 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 85f6d47024 feat(adminsite): image, compose service, image build and docs
Publishes adminsite on 3004 -- 3000 is web, 3003 is the marketing site since
the port shuffle -- and adds the sixth CI image.

CLAUDE.md gains both new services. admin/ was never documented there at all:
the backend plan's wiring task covered compose and CI but not the file every
session actually loads. So this records admin's whole REST surface, its
404-not-403 rule, the three visual identities and, most importantly, that
adminsite/ and site/ share one token set with nothing enforcing the match --
the same hazard shape as sitesvc's mirrored slug rules.

Also notes that admin's REDIS_ADDR reaches admin only, because the base
compose hardcodes redis:6379 for server.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 21:24:37 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 4175608772 feat(adminsite): staff licence history, audit and plan editing
Licences and audit are both filterable client-side: the endpoints cap at 500
rows and staff are narrowing a list already in front of them.

Plans carry both guard rails spec 4 asks for. The confirmation names each
field that changes and states how many licences are already issued and
unaffected -- existing licences snapshotted their plan at issue time, and
saying so is what stops a well-meaning edit being followed by a panicked
reissue. Deployment is displayed and never editable, because moving a tier
between cloud and self-hosted would break the cloud-only rule spec 1 leans
on; that is a code review, not a form field.

The two edit buttons are the concrete changes staff need on day one. A
general-purpose limits editor waits until somebody asks for it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 21:20:54 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 24060b2c5a chore(adminsite): remove the frontend test suite
Removes vitest, React Testing Library, the config, the setup file and all
eleven test files, plus the test scripts and dev dependencies. Done at the
user's direction; it matches the rest of the repo, which has no automated
tests in any language.

All eleven were observed passing before removal, and their assertions are
kept in the plan as acceptance criteria to check by hand rather than deleted
outright -- they are the clearest statement of what each component has to do.

Consequence worth stating: Task 16's manual pass is now the only verification
that exists for spec 4. Four behaviours it must cover carefully, because each
is easy to break invisibly: 404-not-403 scoping, the expired card naming what
still works, relink disabling at zero, and the blob fallback when a download
fails.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 21:19:34 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 cefbac625c feat(adminsite): the licence ledger and staff instance actions
The screen that answers "why did this stop working on the 14th". Read top to
bottom it is one instance's whole history: what was issued, why, by whom, and
what replaced it.

Superseded entries stay visible and overprinted rather than disappearing,
because licences are append-only and hiding them would destroy the only
record that answers the question. Each links to its successor.

Injection state is shown live for cloud instances and omitted for
self-hosted, where the customer holds the blob and there is nothing for us to
have written. Staff relinks carry no cap, with the reason stated inline: the
customer cap exists to put a human in the loop, and this is that human.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 21:15:41 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 73efb206ac feat(adminsite): staff accounts, search by UUID and account detail
Search covers name, email, Paddle customer ID and instance UUID. The UUID
case is the one that matters: a support email often contains a UUID and
nothing else, and the empty state says so rather than just reporting nothing
found.

Account detail gathers everything about one customer on one screen --
instances, subscriptions, people, audit -- and says plainly when an account
has no people because it is a cloud account whose owner signs in with
control-plane credentials.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 21:12:48 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 7fea321376 feat(adminsite): staff operations dashboard
Four counts, each one work somebody has to do today: failed injections,
licences expiring inside 14 days, past-due subscriptions, and purchases
unlinked for more than 48 hours. No totals and no revenue -- nothing that
cannot be acted on. Every row links straight to the thing that needs doing.

An empty queue says "nothing to do here" rather than rendering a bare zero,
so a quiet dashboard reads as quiet rather than broken.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 21:10:48 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 b583e9803f feat(adminsite): the self-hosted link flow and billing view
The link screen carries the whole burden of the five-minute bar: it names
where to find the instance ID, validates the format before asking the server
so a typo is instant rather than a round trip, surfaces the backend's own
message when a UUID is already linked, and on success lands the customer
directly on the download rather than back on a list.

Billing is deliberately thin and says plainly that billing changes go
through support, rather than linking to a Paddle portal that does not exist
until spec 5.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 21:08:46 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 92ac1eeb62 feat(adminsite): licence delivery, paste instructions and relink
The blob is shown inline as well as offered as a file, because a licence is
signed public data bound to one instance -- useless anywhere else -- and a
blocked download must never leave a paying customer stuck. Admin now returns
it to its owner for the same reason.

Relink shows the remaining allowance from the backend's max_relinks rather
than a hardcoded 3, and at zero it disables and says to contact support
instead of failing at the API.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 21:06:21 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 242a587340 feat(adminsite): instance cards and the customer overview
State reads three ways on every card -- a stripe, a shaped-and-labelled
pill, and the copy -- so it survives a colourblind reader and a glance at
arm's length. Colour alone would fail on the one screen where getting it
wrong costs money.

The expired card leads with what still works, because that is the first
thing a worried customer wants to know and the backend really does keep
servers, monitors and agent keys running. The awaiting-link card is
deliberately loud: a customer who has paid and not linked has paid for
nothing yet.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 21:03:37 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 7a8e683d99 feat(adminsite): session guards and the auth screens
Route-group layouts do the guarding. A customer session on /staff/* is
redirected to its own home rather than shown a refusal -- there is nothing to
tell them about. This is UX only: admin enforces the same boundary with
RequireStaff/RequireCustomer and answers 404 rather than 403 for another
account's data, which is the layer that actually matters.

Signup carries the honeypot the backend expects and reports "check your
email" rather than claiming an account exists, matching a backend that
creates nothing until the link is opened.

Buttons match site/'s .btn--solid and .btn--line, neutral border included.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 21:00:54 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 3e447fd024 feat(adminsite): test harness, typed client and the not-connected state
The repo's first frontend test setup: Vitest, React Testing Library, jsdom.
Scoped to the flows that lose money or leak data when broken, per spec 4.

lib/api.ts collapses every failure into three the UI can act on:
NotConnected (unreachable, or no URL baked in), ApiError 401 (redirect), and
ApiError with the backend's own message, which is customer-facing and shown
verbatim rather than replaced with something vaguer.

The not-connected panel names the variable, the value baked in, and both
reasons it fails -- unreachable from the browser, or missing from admin's
ADMIN_ORIGIN. Proven by test before it existed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 20:57:51 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 6953f5e972 feat(adminsite): scaffold and site/'s token system
A fifth Next.js app, built like web/ and site/: App Router, React 18,
Tailwind 3, TanStack Query, standalone output.

app/globals.css carries site/app/globals.css's token blocks copied verbatim
rather than retyped, so the two cannot drift by transcription. Tailwind holds
var() references only -- no component or config entry may contain a hex
value. The semantic three are aliased: site/'s --up/--pend/--down become
valid/warn/expired, so each app names the colours for what it shows.

Unlike web/, there is no rewrite proxy: the browser calls admin directly, so
NEXT_PUBLIC_ADMIN_API_URL must be browser-reachable and listed in admin's
ADMIN_ORIGIN.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 20:55:25 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 55526263a0 feat(admin): staff instance detail, subscriptions and richer search
Closes the rest of what spec 4's screens need. Account search now also
matches a Paddle customer ID and resolves an instance UUID to its owning
account -- a support email often contains a UUID and nothing else, and the
old search returned nothing for it.

GET /api/staff/instances/:id is the "why did this stop working" screen's
data: the instance, its account, its whole licence history newest first, and
whether the control plane currently holds the blob we think it holds.
Injection state is reported only for cloud, because for self-hosted the
customer holds the blob and there is nothing for us to have written.

Account detail gains subscriptions, customer users and its own audit trail.
No secret leaves: the password hash and both verify-token fields are json:"-".

The control-plane write surface is unchanged -- still exactly one UpdateOne
of three licence fields in inject.go, with reads everywhere else.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 20:50:11 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 4bb7400b8e feat(admin): session probe, self-hosted signup and the relink cap
Adds GET /auth/me so the admin site's route guards can know who is signed
in, POST /auth/signup for self-hosted customers, and max_relinks on the
account payload so the UI never hardcodes a rule the backend enforces.

Signup follows sitesvc's proven shape: honeypot answered as success, a
generic 201 when the address already exists, and nothing usable until the
emailed link is opened.

Also fixes a lockout found while verifying it. When the verification email
failed, the account was rolled back but the customer_users row survived --
an orphan that can never be signed in to and that holds the unique index on
email, so every later signup with that address got a cheerful 201 and the
customer was locked out of their own address with no visible error.
CreateCustomerUser now undoes its own insert.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 20:48:09 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 79afcc2e16 docs(plan): match the admin site to site/'s design tokens
Replaces the petrol-and-serif direction with site/app/globals.css's token
set copied verbatim: brand navy accent, the same neutrals, the same clamp
type scale, 1200px rail, 4px radii, and site/'s heading treatment of the
sans at weight 800 rather than a serif display face.

The semantic three are aliased rather than renamed -- globals.css carries
site/'s --up/--pend/--down, and Tailwind exposes them as valid/warn/expired
so each app names them for what it actually shows. Same colours either way.

Tailwind now holds var() references only, so no component or config can
carry a hex value and drift. Buttons match site/'s .btn--solid and
.btn--line, including the neutral border on the secondary variant.

Records the caveat this creates: site/'s dark accent (#5b9be8) sits nearer
web/'s indigo than the light navy does, so the "which app am I in" cue rests
on the light ground and dark must not become the default.

Drops the guilloche ornament -- site/ carries nothing like it. The ledger
stays, because it is information design rather than decoration.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 20:31:55 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 8708bd9498 docs(plan): add the admin site implementation plan
Sixteen tasks: two that close gaps in admin's API, thirteen frontend, one
verification pass.

Auditing spec 4's screens against what spec 3 actually shipped turned up
eight things the UI needs and the backend does not expose -- including no
GET /auth/me at all, which no route guard can work without, and no signup
endpoint for the self-hosted flow the spec's app/signup/ implies. Those are
tasks 1 and 2 rather than frontend improvisation.

Records the approved design direction as fixed constraints: light ground
because web/ is dark-locked and telling the two apart is what stops a
Reissue landing in the wrong tab, petrol accent because green, amber and red
are spoken for by licence state and indigo belongs to web/, and the licence
ledger as the one screen that earns ornament.

Serves vantage-hq.hostxtra.co.uk on 3004 -- 3002 is the marketing site now,
and the host stays outside *.vantage.hostxtra.co.uk because that namespace
is per-tenant instance subdomains.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 20:22:00 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 58c37bf81b feat(admin): support authenticated Redis, and point at the external server
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 2m14s
Adds REDIS_USERNAME and REDIS_PASSWORD. Both are optional, so an
unauthenticated instance still works unchanged. Redis 6+ ACL auth takes
both; a legacy requirepass instance takes the password with an empty
username, which is what go-redis needs to send single-argument AUTH.

Admin now defaults to the external Redis at 10.10.10.2:6379 rather than the
compose-local one, and no longer declares depends_on: redis -- it is not
starting that container any more. The base stack keeps its own Redis for
`server`, which still has no auth support.

Also fixes SMTP_PASSWORD in the admin block: it read `$SMTP_PASSWORD:-}`
rather than `${SMTP_PASSWORD:-}`, which appended a literal `:-}` to the
password and would have failed SMTP auth at the first verification email.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 19:50:19 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 946a748038 chore: declare go 1.26 rather than 1.26.4 across the workspace
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 5m58s
The 1.26.4 floor meant a base toolchain of 1.26.2 could not load the
workspace at all: the terminal worked only because GOTOOLCHAIN=auto
silently swapped in a downloaded 1.26.4, and gopls -- which does not get
that switch -- failed every packages.Load with

  go: go.work requires go >= 1.26.4 (running go 1.26.2)

Nothing needed the patch-level floor. agent/go.mod already declared plain
go 1.26, so this makes the workspace uniform rather than introducing a new
convention, and CI is unaffected because golang:1.26 is already newer.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 19:33:58 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 481649e03f chore: update go.work.sum for the admin module
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 19:21:53 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 cfdc00552e docs: mark the admin backend shipped and verified
Ticks all 66 plan steps and records spec 3 as shipped.

Also corrects a stale line that still claimed existing cloud tenants are
grandfathered by migration 0005. That migration was reverted before plan 2
shipped; those instances are read-only until licensed by hand, and the same
file already said so one table above.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 19:21:45 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 b7221d8111 fix(admin): reconcile once at boot, not only on the ticker
StartReconciler only fired on its 15-minute ticker, so nothing reconciled
until a full interval had passed and restarting admin repaired nothing.

Injection failures are most likely around a deploy or a crash, which is
exactly when the backstop was asleep -- a paying customer could sit
read-only for 15 minutes with the repair already computable. A restart is
now also a supported way to force reconciliation.

Found by the plan's own Step 8, which assumed this behaviour: verified by
tampering with a control-plane blob, confirming the instance went invalid,
and watching the boot pass restore it (checked 1, repaired 1).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 19:21:16 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 7e6d7074d6 feat(admin): compose service and image build
Adds admin to docker-compose.site.yml and a fourth Go image to the build
workflow, both following the conventions the other services already use.

LICENSE_SIGNING_KEY now appears in exactly one service in exactly one
compose file. It must never be added to server, and the self-hosted
docker-compose.yml still does not mention admin at all.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 19:11:52 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 268134d821 feat(admin): staff API and the route table
Completes the service -- this is the first commit where the whole thing
compiles and serves.

staffCreateInstance adopts a cloud instance that already exists in the
control plane, taking its name and slug from there and refusing when no
such instance exists: an admin row pointing at nothing would issue licences
nobody can use. Adopt then issue is how the existing read-only cloud
instances get licensed.

staffRelink has no attempt cap. The customer-facing limit exists to put a
human in front of the fourth attempt, and this is that human.

Editing a plan changes what a tier grants from now on only; existing
licences snapshotted theirs at issue time.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 19:11:04 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 c829cc41d9 feat(admin): linking, relink and the scoped customer API
Every customer handler that names an instance resolves it through
ownedInstance, which returns 404 rather than 403 for another account's
instance -- a 403 confirms the instance exists, which is an existence
oracle over customer data.

The unique index on admin_instances.instance_id, not the pre-check, is what
actually prevents two accounts owning one instance. Relink issues a
replacement covering the REMAINING term, so it cannot be used to extend a
subscription, and the old licence is not revoked because offline
verification has no revocation -- its instance binding is what stops it.

The route table lands with the staff handlers in the next commit so every
commit builds.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 19:09:13 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 07a3756b18 feat(admin): self-hosted customer accounts with email verification
Mirrors the pattern sitesvc already proves: 32 random bytes, only the
SHA-256 hash stored, a 24-hour expiry, and the token cleared on use -- so a
leaked database yields no working links.

Unverified login returns a distinct "verify your email address first" rather
than the generic error. The address is already known to be theirs, so there
is nothing to disclose and that is the only useful thing to say.

Licence blobs are emailed inline. A blob is signed public data, not a
secret: it is useless on any instance other than the one it names.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 19:07:47 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 769839a70d feat(admin): cloud owner login against the control plane
Cloud customers sign in with the control-plane credentials they already
hold, so there is no second password to manage. Two accepted consequences,
documented at the handler: their control-plane password now also unlocks
billing, and only role owner may sign in -- admin and member are refused
because billing is an owner concern.

A self-hosted customer_users row wins over a control-plane user with the
same address, so the precedence is chosen rather than emergent.

Adds the reads of control users this needs; the write surface is still one
UpdateOne on instances.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 19:06:23 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 480a578deb feat(admin): sessions, staff auth and adminctl
One Redis session store and one cookie for all three identities. Staff
login returns the same error for every failure mode and spends a bcrypt
comparison against a dummy hash when no user exists, so neither the message
nor the timing confirms which addresses have accounts.

Staff users are created only by adminctl. There is no signup endpoint: a
licensing authority that can be joined over the internet is not one.

Pins gin and go-redis to the versions server/ already uses rather than the
latest tidy would pick.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 19:05:28 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 a636a48e07 feat(admin): cloud injection and the 15-minute reconciler
Injection is a single UpdateOne of three licence fields, so it is
idempotent and safe to re-run. The control plane caches licence state for
60 seconds, so an injected licence takes effect within a minute with no
restart.

Deliver never fails its caller. The reconciler, not the issuance path, is
what actually guarantees a cloud instance ends up holding the licence admin
says it holds -- injection at issue time is best-effort and this is the
backstop.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 19:02:45 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 427191b14c feat(admin): licence issuance with plan snapshots and supersession
Issue is the only place that signs. It records the licence, supersedes its
predecessor and updates the instance -- but deliberately does not deliver.

The ordering matters: a licence recorded but not delivered is recoverable,
because the customer can download it. A licence delivered but not recorded
is a support mystery with no paper trail.

Free stays cloud-only through one comparison of plan against instance
deployment, not a flag. Renewals reset relink_count because the cap is per
term.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 19:01:47 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 b8fcf89ee7 feat(admin): documents, indexes and the plan seed
Adds admin's own documents, its unique indexes and the plan seed from
shared/license.

Licences are append-only -- a renewal writes a new row and supersedes the
old one -- because the history is the support tool. Plans are seeded with
$setOnInsert only, so a redeploy never stamps over staff edits to limits,
features or Paddle IDs.

admin_instances.instance_id unique is a correctness property, not an
optimisation: without it two customers could both claim one self-hosted
UUID and both be issued licences for it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 19:00:37 +01:00
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5 64eac6dbc7 feat(admin): module skeleton, config and two database connections
Adds the admin module: env config with fail-fast validation, two MongoDB
connections (its own vantage_admin database plus a narrow path into the
control plane), the boot sequence and the image.

Config refuses to start without a signing key, and both Mongo URIs must
name their database inline -- admin talks to two databases, so a bare
MONGO_DB would be ambiguous about which.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 18:58:44 +01:00
mrhid6 c4f1684304 docs(plan): drop backfill, add staff instance attach
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Failing after 37s
Existing cloud instances get licensed by hand through the admin UI instead of
an automated backfill. That needs POST /api/staff/instances, which nothing else
provided — without it there is no way to attach an existing cloud instance to
an account.
2026-07-24 16:08:29 +01:00
mrhid6 8ed3bec511 docs: mark plans 1 and 2 shipped 2026-07-24 16:00:45 +01:00
mrhid6 58faf2e57f docs: add the admin-backend implementation plan 2026-07-24 16:00:37 +01:00
mrhid6 8e5f35f40c revert(server): drop the licence grandfather migration
Instances stay read-only until a licence is set. No licence is generated by
the control plane, which keeps the signing key out of it entirely.
2026-07-24 15:49:46 +01:00
mrhid6 eb8b85ccfe fix(server): add the lk go.sum entry the workspace was masking
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 2m21s
go build inside the Docker image runs outside the workspace, so server/go.sum
needed the hyperboloide/lk entry that GOWORK resolution was supplying locally.
Caught by the image build, not by go build.
2026-07-24 15:35:01 +01:00
mrhid6 09a39090c6 feat(server): grandfather existing cloud instances onto Professional 2026-07-24 15:26:26 +01:00
mrhid6 8626898e5e feat(web): licence banner, settings page and feature gating 2026-07-24 15:25:29 +01:00
mrhid6 ee4dff09c9 feat: show the instance ID after setup 2026-07-24 15:20:00 +01:00
mrhid6 8d88b16f20 feat(server): keep monitors and in-flight runs going when a licence lapses
Monitor execution and the workflow runner are deliberately unguarded: billing
state must not take away a customer's ability to know their infrastructure is
on fire, and killing a run midway leaves a half-configured server.

The plan called for a server-limit check in gRPC Register. Left out: a server
row only comes from CreateServer, which already checks the cap, so counting in
Register counts the caller itself and would reject a legitimate agent at
exactly the cap.
2026-07-24 15:15:06 +01:00
mrhid6 120c9c6735 feat(server): licence API, mutation gate and feature gates
RequireActiveLicense is mounted on the /api group so new routes are gated by
where they live. GET /api/servers/new is named explicitly: it mints a
pre-registration token, so it mutates despite the method.
2026-07-24 15:13:35 +01:00
mrhid6 855537c535 feat(server): enforce licence limits on servers, secret groups and channels 2026-07-24 15:11:03 +01:00
mrhid6 1d3fcebb28 feat(server): resolve licence state per instance 2026-07-24 15:09:47 +01:00
mrhid6 f9f382049d feat(shared): add licence fields to Instance 2026-07-24 15:08:48 +01:00
mrhid6 e4d7569a1c refactor(server): correct stale org wording in messages 2026-07-24 15:07:54 +01:00
mrhid6 c3e363eccc refactor(server): finish the Org to Instance rename
Private identifiers plan 0b's naming map missed, plus the OrgOIDC model type.
No wire format, database field or route changes.
2026-07-24 15:07:06 +01:00
mrhid6 6fde319b2f feat(license): trust the production signing key 2026-07-24 15:01:03 +01:00
mrhid6 4f1fce32c1 feat(license): add lkctl for issuing licences by hand 2026-07-24 14:59:13 +01:00
mrhid6 968408b955 feat(license): add offline verification 2026-07-24 14:58:25 +01:00
mrhid6 95c5d531ae feat(license): add signing and the trusted key list 2026-07-24 14:57:52 +01:00
mrhid6 b0d8edf9b6 feat(license): add the licence payload and tier seed table 2026-07-24 14:57:21 +01:00
mrhid6 a50219c0d9 docs: correct licence scheme to ECDSA P-384 with SHA-256
hyperboloide/lk signs with ECDSA P-384 and SHA-256, not ed25519, and encodes
keys as base32 rather than hex. Probed in task 1 of the licensing-core plan.
Design is unaffected — only the prose was wrong.
2026-07-24 14:56:36 +01:00
mrhid6 f10fe61916 chore(shared): add hyperboloide/lk for licence signing
Probed the library before building against it. Two corrections to plan 1:

- PublicKey.ToB32String() returns one value, not (string, error)
- The scheme is ECDSA P-384 with SHA-256, not ed25519 as the spec and plan
  claim. Design is unaffected; the prose needs fixing.
2026-07-24 14:53:26 +01:00
mrhid6 bc1cda26f8 docs: add implementation plans for licensing-core and instance-licensing
- 2026-07-24-licensing-core.md: 7 tasks. lk payload, offline verify, the
  trusted key slice, the noSign build tag, and lkctl for issuing by hand.
- 2026-07-24-instance-licensing.md: 10 tasks. Licence on the instance
  document, cached runtime state, deny-by-default mutation gate, feature
  gates, service-layer limits, settings UI, and migration 0005 to
  grandfather existing cloud instances.

Plan 2 opens by finishing the Org to Instance rename: 18 private identifiers
survived plan 0b's sweep. Nothing functional, but the file that gains the
licence cache is one of the two still carrying the old names.

Spec index updated with plan links and shipped status.
2026-07-24 14:48:45 +01:00
mrhid6 f646ce5c47 chore(server): remove rename-rollback
Migration 0004 is complete and verified on live, so the inverse rename has
served its purpose. Reverting the release now means restoring a backup.
2026-07-24 14:40:35 +01:00
mrhid6 1eb8c79623 Merge branch 'feat/shared-module'
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 2m43s
Shared Go module extraction (spec 0a) and the Org to Instance rename (spec 0b).

- shared/ module holds the documents and provisioning rules the control plane
  and sitesvc both write; sitesvc's hand-copied duplicates are deleted
- Org becomes Instance everywhere, including the org_id field on all 17
  tenant-scoped collections, via migration 0004_org_to_instance
- cmd/rename-rollback reverses the migration
- Go images now build from the repo root so the replace directive resolves

Migration verified against a seeded legacy fixture: lossless, tenant-isolated,
idempotent, resumable and reversible. NOT yet rehearsed against a production
snapshot, which plan 0b requires before deploying.
2026-07-24 14:21:56 +01:00
mrhid6 539403cccf fix(server): drop stale indexes before renaming the tenant key
Two defects found by running migration 0004 against a seeded legacy database.

A unique index on org_id treats a missing org_id as null. Renaming the field
strips it, so the second document collided and the whole update failed:

  E11000 duplicate key error collection: instance_oidc index: org_id_1
  dup key: { org_id: null }

The index cleanup therefore has to run BEFORE the field rename, not after.
rename-rollback needs the symmetric step for instance_id, or reverting hits
the same wall.

The detection also silently matched nothing: the driver decodes an index key
document as bson.D, not bson.M, so the type assertion always failed and no
index was ever dropped. IndexKeyedOn now handles both.
2026-07-24 14:15:05 +01:00
mrhid6 50a06dfdc0 refactor(site): rename Organisation to Instance
The signup form now posts instance_name, matching sitesvc.

Also restores site/next-env.d.ts. Its /// <reference> directives had been
stripped, which removed the Next.js type environment and failed the build
with "Cannot find name 'Promise'". Same cause as the agent's missing build
constraint.
2026-07-24 14:04:52 +01:00
mrhid6 b70ccc97d4 refactor(web): rename Organisation to Instance 2026-07-24 14:01:19 +01:00
mrhid6 3f0f12b111 refactor(sitesvc): rename Org to Instance, refuse an unmigrated database
The signup form's JSON field becomes instance_name, and the pending-signup
document field with it. That collection is sitesvc-private and expires after
24 hours, so no migration is needed, but in-flight signups written before the
deploy will fail verification.
2026-07-24 14:00:11 +01:00
mrhid6 3891a2c239 feat(server): add rename-rollback command for migration 0004 2026-07-24 13:59:04 +01:00
mrhid6 4f041d2f4b refactor(server): rename Org to Instance
Adds migration 0004_org_to_instance, the ScopedCollections list, the
AssertNoScopedCollectionMissed boot check, and moves EnsureAuthIndexes into
its own file.

Two ordering constraints the rename exposed, both now enforced and commented:

- 0004 must run BEFORE EnsureAuthIndexes. The index builder creates
  instances.slug, which would create an empty instances collection and make
  0004 refuse to rename orgs onto an existing target.
- Migrations 0001 to 0003 run BEFORE 0004 and still read and write org_id, so
  they use a private legacyOrg struct rather than shared/models.
2026-07-24 13:58:41 +01:00
mrhid6 43a2fdb3a0 refactor(shared): rename Org to Instance 2026-07-24 13:54:31 +01:00
mrhid6 de0e7b7cae chore: commit go.work.sum 2026-07-24 13:53:35 +01:00
mrhid6 0226936758 fix(agent): restore the !linux build constraint on collect_other.go
Unrelated to the shared module work; pre-existing on main.

"_other" is not a GOOS suffix, so without the constraint this file compiled
on Linux alongside collect_linux.go and redeclared collect. Linux agent
builds failed, which agent-release.yml depends on.
2026-07-24 13:48:23 +01:00
mrhid6 42cd73c5b8 build: build Go images from the repo root for the shared module
Also pins the explicit shared require in both go.mod files. `go mod tidy`
in workspace mode drops it, which breaks the Docker build where no
workspace exists.
2026-07-24 13:45:45 +01:00
mrhid6 51622a922b refactor(sitesvc): use shared models and provision
Deletes internal/provision and the hand-mirrored Org and User structs. The
control plane and sitesvc now share one definition of both.
2026-07-24 13:43:58 +01:00
mrhid6 76d3111a72 refactor(server): use shared models, provision and indexes
Also removes the duplicate Slugify in stepscan.go; workflow step slugs now
use the shared definition too.
2026-07-24 13:42:44 +01:00
mrhid6 b335dc77e3 feat(shared): add EnsureCoreIndexes 2026-07-24 13:39:46 +01:00
mrhid6 51db5ab2e9 feat(shared): add CreateOrg, RollbackOrg and CreateUser
Adopts sitesvc's retry-on-duplicate-key slug loop. The control plane
previously returned an error when it lost the slug race.
2026-07-24 13:39:20 +01:00
mrhid6 d715d2150c feat(shared): add slug rules and shared document models 2026-07-24 13:38:52 +01:00
mrhid6 98687043f7 chore: scaffold shared module 2026-07-24 13:38:05 +01:00
mrhid6 bdc26e4799 docs: add implementation plans for specs 0a and 0b
- 2026-07-24-shared-module.md: 8 tasks, extract the shared Go module
- 2026-07-24-instance-rename.md: 9 tasks, Org -> Instance including the
  database field, with migration 0004 and a rollback command

No automated tests per instruction; verification is by compiler, grep, and
manual end-to-end plus production-snapshot rehearsal. Spec testing sections
updated to match.
2026-07-24 13:31:14 +01:00
mrhid6 b027ad3f7f docs: add licensing programme specs
Seven specs covering the licensing and billing programme:

- 0a shared-module: extract shared Go module, remove sitesvc duplication
- 0b instance-rename: Org -> Instance, including the database field
- 1  licensing-core: lk-signed licence payload, offline verify, CLI issuer
- 2  instance-licensing: storage, enforcement, degraded mode, settings UI
- 3  admin-backend: accounts, instances, licences, subscriptions, injection
- 4  admin-site: staff and customer portal
- 5  paddle-billing: catalog, checkout, webhooks, signup migration

Design only. No implementation.

Un-ignores docs/superpowers/ so specs are versioned.
2026-07-24 13:13:47 +01:00
mrhid6 fd32c96d86 feat: Updated site
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 2m23s
2026-07-24 11:50:11 +01:00
mrhid6 b74cd10dfc fix: Fixed bg zoffset
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 51s
2026-07-24 11:23:36 +01:00
mrhid6 460b4afb22 fix: FIxed compile error
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 1m45s
2026-07-24 11:18:14 +01:00
mrhid6 9cc9e68d90 fix: FIxed compile error
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Failing after 1m3s
2026-07-24 11:06:57 +01:00
mrhid6 accf7493e9 feat: Updated login bg
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Failing after 1m0s
2026-07-24 11:02:44 +01:00
mrhid6 f0547317f7 feat: Updated login screen text
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 49s
2026-07-24 10:52:25 +01:00
mrhid6 60f0ddecd6 fix: Fixed sidebar logo
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 1m44s
2026-07-24 10:37:53 +01:00
mrhid6 8f5aebdd63 fix: Fixed sidebar logo
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 1m33s
2026-07-24 10:36:55 +01:00
mrhid6 a6030ef62f feat: Updated logo
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 3m51s
2026-07-24 10:31:11 +01:00
mrhid6 7df79d05f1 fix: Fixes to platform page
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 1m32s
2026-07-24 10:13:33 +01:00
mrhid6 f002eab1f6 fix: Fixed compile error
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Failing after 2m51s
2026-07-24 10:01:06 +01:00
mrhid6 e798365be2 feat: Removed comments
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Failing after 1m13s
2026-07-24 09:56:54 +01:00
mrhid6 1a6cf03c03 feat: Removed comments
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Failing after 1m59s
2026-07-24 09:51:30 +01:00
mrhid6 3b52bcbeb8 updates
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 2m50s
2026-07-24 09:24:03 +01:00
mrhid6 693d59a3e2 feat: Marketing site
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 5m51s
2026-07-22 16:50:13 +01:00
mrhid6 7a3b8cb700 feat: Updated claude.md 2026-07-22 13:22:26 +01:00
mrhid6 97bc766afb feat: Remove plans 2026-07-22 13:03:19 +01:00
mrhid6 9ffae221ac fix: Fixed server install scripts
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 59s
2026-07-22 12:59:05 +01:00
mrhid6 cbb66c63f6 feat: multi-tenant SaaS — orgs, auth, per-org isolation
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 1m31s
Converts Vantage from a single-admin self-hosted app into a multi-tenant
SaaS. Org isolation is org_id row-scoping in one shared deployment and
database; each org gets a subdomain via wildcard DNS, but the hostname is
a routing hint and never an authorization boundary.

- Orgs, users and roles (owner|admin|member) with local password auth,
  first-run bootstrap, and per-org OIDC replacing the global provider
- Redis sessions carrying org and role; host/session mismatch guard
- Every tenant-scoped collection carries org_id; handlers take org from
  the session only, never from client input
- Agent gRPC path resolves org from the servers record, so agent configs
  and the shared gRPC host are unchanged
- Per-org settings and ESO read token, replacing global singletons
- Frontend: login, setup and org settings pages; org-aware AuthProvider
- Migrations 0001-0003 backfill an existing single-tenant instance

Reviewed per task plus a whole-branch and a migration-focused pass.
2026-07-22 11:13:28 +01:00
mrhid6 0d4fb896bb docs(spec): correct collection names and per-org caveats
The spec named the audit collection "audit" and the channels collection
"channels"; the code uses audit_logs and notification_channels. The
migration followed the spec, which is how it came to backfill two
collections that do not exist.
2026-07-22 11:13:19 +01:00
mrhid6 0b7e55d301 fix(server): adopt the migrated org on bootstrap; survive fresh install
Two failures found by tracing the migration path against a real upgrade.

Bootstrap orphaned the entire dataset. On upgrade, 0001 creates the
Default org and stamps every legacy document with it, but the instance
has no users, so the operator must run /auth/bootstrap to get in — and
that unconditionally created a SECOND org and put the owner in it. Every
org-scoped read then filtered on the new org, so the operator would log
into an empty Vantage while all their data sat under "default". Nothing
errored and agents kept syncing, so it presented as total data loss.
Bootstrap now adopts the sole existing org, renaming and re-slugging it,
and only creates one when no org exists. More than one org with no users
is refused rather than guessed.

Fresh installs crash-looped. Nothing creates the settings collection
before EnsureSettingsIndexes, so DropOne returned NamespaceNotFound (26),
isIndexNotFound matched only IndexNotFound (27), and that check is fatal.
The same early return also skipped index creation in the secrets and
workflow ensures.

Also: only insert the backfill org on ErrNoDocuments, so a transient read
error can't race the fatal unique slug index; run 0002 before 0003 so the
settings migration can't be pushed into its ambiguous branch; fail 0002's
ambiguous case with a remedy instead of continuing into a fatal index
build; and skip non-string ids in the owner backfill rather than aborting.
2026-07-22 10:51:42 +01:00
mrhid6 77a92787fb fix: repair migration collection names and cross-cutting scoping gaps
Findings from the final whole-branch review.

- scopedCollections named "audit" and "channels", but the code writes to
  audit_logs and notification_channels. On upgrade from single-tenant,
  legacy audit events and channels would never get org_id, becoming
  invisible to org-filtered reads while channels silently stopped firing
  — and the detection loop counted the wrong names, so the 0001 marker
  could be written having migrated nothing. Names fixed, plus migration
  0003 so an incorrectly-migrated instance converges with a fresh one.
- EnsureAuthIndexes failure is now fatal. GetUserByEmail is unscoped and
  the OIDC cross-org guard compares against whichever duplicate Mongo
  returns first, so users.email uniqueness is a security invariant, and a
  legacy collection with duplicate emails is the realistic upgrade case.
- Evict the per-org OIDC provider cache on save; rotating away from a
  compromised IdP previously had no effect until restart.
- Build the oauth2 config per request instead of mutating a shared cached
  pointer outside the mutex, which raced on RedirectURL between
  concurrent logins for the same org.
- Stamp org_id on console_sessions, incidents and monitor_rollups, the
  last collections with no tenant column. 0003 derives their org from the
  owning server/monitor rather than defaulting, so one org's console
  history and incident timeline cannot merge into another's.
- Seed default steps when an org is created, not only at boot.
- Reject an empty session OrgID at the middleware.
- Derive the app root label from APP_ROOT_LABEL instead of hardcoding
  "vantage", which silently disabled the host guard off that domain.
- Stop caching negative slug lookups, so a new org's subdomain resolves
  immediately.
2026-07-22 10:44:17 +01:00
mrhid6 aa31cd8a10 fix: validate roles, guard last owner, scope bootstrap status
Security review of e70b2f0. The UI gating was correctly backed by
RequireRole everywhere; these are the missing validation gaps behind it.

- UpdateUserRole and createOrgUser accepted any role string verbatim, so
  an admin could self-promote to owner, create an owner outright, or set
  a junk role that silently stripped a user's access. Roles are now
  whitelisted, only an owner may grant or remove the owner role, and an
  actor cannot change their own.
- Neither demote nor delete guarded the last owner, so an org could reach
  zero owners. Both now refuse when no owner would remain, returning 409.
  Self-delete rejected.
- CountUsers counted across all orgs, so a locked-out org could never
  re-bootstrap once another tenant existed, and the unauthenticated
  bootstrap-status endpoint reported instance-wide state. It now answers
  per-org on an org host, falling back to global only on the apex.
- HandleMe repeats the middleware's host/org check; it sits outside the
  middleware so it can still return its own 401.
- Post-bootstrap now sends the new owner to their org host's login page.
  The session cookie is deliberately scoped to the exact host, so the old
  redirect landed them unauthenticated.
- AuthProvider renders an error state instead of mounting the shell with
  a null user when /auth/me fails for a reason other than 401.
- api.ts unwraps {"error": ...} so these messages render as text.
2026-07-22 10:26:21 +01:00
mrhid6 e70b2f0e67 feat(web): login, first-run setup, org settings; org-aware AuthProvider
- Route group (app) holds AuthProvider + Sidebar, so /login and /setup
  render without app chrome and never mount the provider.
- AuthProvider drops the removed auth_enabled flag and exposes
  {user, org, isAdmin}.
- New login page (password + SSO), first-run setup page, and org settings
  page with a members table and the OIDC provider form.
- Settings page and the Organization nav entry are gated on role, since
  /api/settings now 403s for members.
- GET /api/org/oidc gains client_secret_set so the UI can show whether a
  secret is stored; the secret itself is still never serialized, and an
  empty submitted value still means "keep the stored one".
- Fix logout: the sidebar linked to /auth/logout with a GET, but the route
  is POST-only, so logout was 404ing.
2026-07-22 10:17:12 +01:00
mrhid6 156c5354de fix(server): close fail-open paths in monitor org checks
Review hardening on e2f5f1f. None of these were live bypasses; all were
one bad row or one new caller away from becoming one.

- Replace the empty-orgID sentinel with explicit scheduler entry points.
  The sentinel meant "skip the org check" and was keyed on a value read
  from a DB record on the agent path, so a server doc with a blank org_id
  would silently disable isolation. The exported agent-facing functions
  now reject an empty orgID outright.
- ValidateAgentToken errors when the resolved server has no org.
- UpdateMonitor's runner and channel_ids type assertions were fail-open:
  a wrong-typed value skipped validation while the $set still ran. Now a
  hard error.
- Normalise an empty runner on update to the server runner, matching
  create. Previously it matched no runner at all, so the monitor silently
  stopped being checked and stopped alerting.
- IngestResult returns an error for an unknown monitor, so probing an
  unknown ID looks the same as probing a foreign one.
2026-07-22 10:05:37 +01:00
mrhid6 e2f5f1fa8c feat(grpc): resolve org from server record for agent RPCs
Two instances of the branch's recurring bug class remained in the agent
path: a client-supplied ID accepted as data, then consumed by an
unscoped query.

- ListMonitorsForRunner filtered on `runner` alone, and `runner` is set
  by the client on monitor create/update. Org A could point a monitor at
  org B's server_id and org B's agent would fetch and execute the check.
  Now org-filtered, and `runner` is validated against the caller's org on
  create and update.
- IngestResult resolved the monitor via the unfiltered getMonitorByID
  using a monitor_id from the agent's request body, letting org A's agent
  write state and incidents into org B's monitor and fire its channels.
  Now rejects on org mismatch and on a monitor not assigned to the
  reporting agent.

The in-process scheduler passes an empty orgID as a documented sentinel
for the cross-org server-run sweep.

Install script still emits a single shared GRPC_HOST; the agent path
resolves org from the server record, never from a hostname.
2026-07-22 10:00:30 +01:00
mrhid6 4f512d01f1 fix(server): harden per-org settings migration and sweeps
Review follow-ups on e5363a6:

- MigrateSettingsOrg no longer guesses via the "default" slug. One org
  means stamp that org; zero orgs means synthesise Default; more than
  one means leave it alone and log, since guessing would hand one org
  another's SMTP config and ESO token.
- EnsureSettingsIndexes failure is now fatal. Without the unique index
  on org_id, GetSettings returns an arbitrary duplicate; without the one
  on the token hash, ResolveSecretsReadToken picks an arbitrary org.
- Name the token-hash index explicitly so it stops colliding with the
  legacy name DropOne targets, and exclude the empty string from the
  partial filter.
- Log retention: distinguish a missing run doc from a Mongo error, so a
  transient failure skips the directory rather than purging it at the
  30-day default.
- Offline sweep: fresh context per org, log-and-continue on a per-org
  error, plus a final pass for servers whose org no longer exists.
- ESO handler 401s on an empty token-derived org rather than querying
  org_id "".
2026-07-22 09:41:51 +01:00
mrhid6 e5363a64ee fix(server): per-org settings and ESO read token
The settings collection was a single global document, so every org
shared one SMTP config, alert config, retention policy and ESO read
token. GetSecretGroupDecryptedAny then flattened every org's secrets
for a group into one map, meaning any tenant's token read every
tenant's secrets.

- settings gains org_id; GetSettings/SaveSettings/RotateSecretsReadToken/
  GetWorkflowLogRetentionDays all take orgID
- VerifySecretsReadToken replaced by ResolveSecretsReadToken, which
  resolves the org from the presented token's hash; the ESO endpoint
  derives its org from the token rather than a session, since it is
  called machine-to-machine
- GetSecretGroupDecryptedAny deleted in favour of the org-scoped variant
- settings and token-rotation routes now require owner/admin
- offline sweep and log retention resolve org per server / per run
- migration 0002 stamps the legacy settings doc with the default org

Note: /api/settings now 403s for members; the web settings page needs a
matching role check.
2026-07-22 09:35:47 +01:00
mrhid6 5a701acc82 fix: Removed tests 2026-07-22 09:31:29 +01:00
mrhid6 dff3668a25 fix(server): validate cross-org resource ownership
Review of the org-scoping pass found that org_id on a query filter
protects the row you look up, but does nothing when a handler accepts a
foreign resource ID as data and a downstream unscoped query consumes it.

- AssignKey: verify key and server both belong to the org
- BuildAuthorizedKeys: resolve server first, scope assignments and keys
  to that server's org (was honouring foreign assignment rows)
- Workflows: validate TargetServerIDs on create/update and re-check at
  trigger time
- Monitor incidents/uptime handlers: gate on org-scoped GetMonitor
- GetChannels: take orgID; validate channel_ids on monitor create/update
- Secret and default-step unique indexes: scope to org_id so a second
  org no longer hits E11000
- DeleteServer/DeleteMonitor: scope cascading deletes
2026-07-22 09:28:43 +01:00
mrhid6 850aa0ed05 feat(server): org-scope service layer + handlers + org admin API
Threads org_id through every admin-facing service function (servers, keys,
assignments, secrets, workflows/steps/runs, monitors, channels, audit),
adds RequireRole middleware, and wires /api/org user + OIDC management
routes. Agent/scheduler paths keep unique-key signatures and resolve org
from the loaded record; internal-only helpers (getServerByID,
getRunByID, getMonitorByID) preserve those call sites.
2026-07-21 16:56:39 +01:00
mrhid6 d0ed9885e7 feat(auth): per-org OIDC resolver replaces global provider 2026-07-21 16:41:50 +01:00
mrhid6 ff22340561 feat(auth): host-based org resolution + session/host match guard 2026-07-21 16:38:24 +01:00
mrhid6 2038e86b53 feat(auth): local email/password login + first-run bootstrap 2026-07-21 16:36:13 +01:00
mrhid6 404214d82e fix(services): keep original step Slugify; org reuses it 2026-07-21 16:33:31 +01:00
mrhid6 01fd2e201e feat(services): org create+slug and user service with bcrypt 2026-07-21 16:30:42 +01:00
mrhid6 066095ffca feat(auth): session carries org_id/role; add context helpers 2026-07-21 16:28:06 +01:00
mrhid6 022b1ef8ec feat(server): auth indexes + default-org backfill migration 2026-07-21 16:25:37 +01:00
mrhid6 a8771a6e4d style(models): gofmt org_id field alignment 2026-07-21 16:24:16 +01:00
mrhid6 502045d3af feat(models): add org/user/org_oidc models and org_id on scoped collections 2026-07-21 16:23:14 +01:00
mrhid6 ea73fc3a18 docs(plan): saas auth + orgs implementation plan 2026-07-21 16:20:20 +01:00
mrhid6 75b86e3843 docs(spec): add org slug, host-based resolution, single gRPC endpoint 2026-07-21 16:15:29 +01:00
mrhid6 9767e18123 chore: removed old plans 2026-07-21 15:54:11 +01:00
mrhid6 19b4aef95b feat(server): dark-themed HTML email notification template
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 1m22s
2026-07-21 15:14:57 +01:00
333 changed files with 57893 additions and 12483 deletions
+1
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graphify-out/graph.json merge=graphify
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@@ -1,117 +0,0 @@
name: Agent Release
on:
push:
tags:
- "agent/v*"
jobs:
build:
runs-on: ubuntu-docker
container: node:26
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Set up Go
uses: actions/setup-go@v5
with:
go-version: "1.26"
cache: true
cache-dependency-path: agent/go.sum
- name: Extract version
id: version
run: echo "VERSION=${GITHUB_REF_NAME#agent/}" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
- name: Build
working-directory: agent
env:
VERSION: ${{ steps.version.outputs.VERSION }}
run: |
mkdir -p dist
GOOS=linux GOARCH=amd64 go build \
-ldflags="-s -w -X main.Version=${VERSION}" \
-o dist/vantage-agent-linux-amd64 ./cmd
GOOS=linux GOARCH=arm64 go build \
-ldflags="-s -w -X main.Version=${VERSION}" \
-o dist/vantage-agent-linux-arm64 ./cmd
GOOS=windows GOARCH=amd64 go build \
-ldflags="-s -w -X main.Version=${VERSION}" \
-o dist/vantage-agent-windows-amd64.exe ./cmd
- name: Checksums
working-directory: agent/dist
run: sha256sum vantage-agent-linux-amd64 vantage-agent-linux-arm64 vantage-agent-windows-amd64.exe > checksums.txt
- name: Create release
uses: https://gitea.com/actions/gitea-release-action@v1
with:
token: ${{ secrets.RELEASE_TOKEN }}
files: |
agent/dist/vantage-agent-linux-amd64
agent/dist/vantage-agent-linux-arm64
agent/dist/vantage-agent-windows-amd64.exe
agent/dist/checksums.txt
msi:
needs: build
runs-on: windows-2022
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Set up Go
uses: actions/setup-go@v5
with:
go-version: "1.26"
cache: true
cache-dependency-path: agent/go.sum
- name: Extract version
id: version
shell: pwsh
run: |
$v = "${{ github.ref_name }}" -replace '^agent/v', ''
"VERSION=$v" | Out-File -Append $env:GITHUB_OUTPUT
# MSI ProductVersion must be numeric x.x.x.x
"MSIVERSION=$v.0" | Out-File -Append $env:GITHUB_OUTPUT
- name: Build agent exe
working-directory: agent
shell: pwsh
env:
VERSION: ${{ steps.version.outputs.VERSION }}
run: |
$env:GOOS = "windows"; $env:GOARCH = "amd64"
go build -ldflags="-s -w -X main.Version=$env:VERSION" -o ../installer/vantage-agent-windows-amd64.exe ./cmd
- name: Install WiX
shell: pwsh
run: dotnet tool install --global wix --version 5.*
- name: Build MSI
working-directory: installer
shell: pwsh
run: |
$env:PATH = "$env:PATH;$env:USERPROFILE\.dotnet\tools"
wix build vantage-agent.wxs -d Version=${{ steps.version.outputs.MSIVERSION }} -o vantage-agent.msi
(Get-FileHash vantage-agent.msi -Algorithm SHA256).Hash.ToLower() + " vantage-agent.msi" | Out-File -Encoding ascii checksums-msi.txt
- name: Attach MSI to release
working-directory: installer
shell: pwsh
env:
TOKEN: ${{ secrets.RELEASE_TOKEN }}
run: |
$api = "${{ github.server_url }}/api/v1/repos/${{ github.repository }}"
$tag = [uri]::EscapeDataString("${{ github.ref_name }}")
$headers = @{ Authorization = "token $env:TOKEN" }
# gitea-release-action can't find a slashed tag, so append via the API directly
$rel = Invoke-RestMethod -Headers $headers -Uri "$api/releases/tags/$tag"
foreach ($f in "vantage-agent.msi", "checksums-msi.txt") {
$name = [uri]::EscapeDataString($f)
Invoke-RestMethod -Headers $headers -Method Post -InFile $f `
-ContentType "application/octet-stream" `
-Uri "$api/releases/$($rel.id)/assets?name=$name"
}
+239
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,239 @@
name: Chart Release
on:
# Every push that touches the chart is validated. Publishing is separate and
# deliberate: a chart version is immutable in the registry once pushed, so
# it must come from a tag someone chose, not from whatever landed on main.
# No `paths` filter on push, deliberately. A paths filter applies to tag
# pushes too, so tagging a commit that happened not to touch the chart
# would skip the publish entirely — a release that silently does nothing.
# Validation is seconds of helm rendering; running it on every push to main
# is cheaper than that failure mode.
push:
branches:
- main
tags:
- "chart/v*"
pull_request:
paths:
- "deploy/chart/**"
workflow_dispatch:
env:
CHART_DIR: deploy/chart/vantage
HELM_VERSION: v3.16.3
jobs:
chart:
runs-on: ubuntu-docker
container: alpine:3.21
steps:
# git for actions/checkout, curl for both the Helm download and the
# registry upload, tar because the Helm tarball is not self-extracting.
- name: Setup
run: apk add --no-cache bash curl git tar nodejs npm
- name: Install Helm
run: |
set -eu
curl -fsSL "https://get.helm.sh/helm-${HELM_VERSION}-linux-amd64.tar.gz" \
| tar -xz -C /tmp linux-amd64/helm
mv /tmp/linux-amd64/helm /usr/local/bin/helm
helm version --short
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Lint
run: helm lint "$CHART_DIR"
# Rendering is the real test. `helm lint` accepts a chart whose
# templates fail to execute, and every guard in this chart is a
# template `fail` that only fires during rendering.
- name: Render default values
run: helm template test "$CHART_DIR" > /dev/null
- name: Render a multi-replica install
run: |
helm template test "$CHART_DIR" \
--set server.replicaCount=3 \
--set web.replicaCount=3 > /dev/null
# The reaper deletes whole instances, so "does this env appear only
# in cloud mode" is worth asserting rather than eyeballing.
- name: Check the reaper is cloud-only
run: |
set -eu
if helm template test "$CHART_DIR" | grep -q FREE_INSTANCE_REAP_AFTER; then
echo "FREE_INSTANCE_REAP_AFTER is set on a self-hosted render"
exit 1
fi
if ! helm template test "$CHART_DIR" \
--set server.env.deploymentType=cloud \
| grep -q FREE_INSTANCE_REAP_AFTER; then
echo "FREE_INSTANCE_REAP_AFTER is missing from a cloud render"
exit 1
fi
echo "ok: reaper configured in cloud mode only"
- name: Render with backups enabled
run: |
helm template test "$CHART_DIR" \
--set backup.enabled=true \
--set backup.image=gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/vantage/vantage-ctl:latest \
--set backup.pvcName=vantage-backups > /dev/null
- name: Render against external Redis and MongoDB
run: |
helm template test "$CHART_DIR" \
--set redis.enabled=false \
--set redis.addr=redis.example.com:6379 \
--set mongo.enabled=false \
--set server.env.mongoUri=mongodb://mongo.example.com:27017/vantage > /dev/null
- name: Render with the Traefik ingress
run: |
helm template test "$CHART_DIR" \
--set ingress.enabled=true \
--set ingress.web.host=vantage.example.com \
--set ingress.grpc.host=agents.example.com \
--set ingress.tls.certResolver=letsencrypt \
--set server.env.grpcHost=agents.example.com:443 > /dev/null
# The shape the cloud deployment actually uses: a wildcard tenant
# namespace, /api and /auth routed at the edge, and no apex — that
# belongs to the marketing site, which this chart does not deploy.
- name: Render a wildcard host with edge-routed API paths
run: |
helm template test "$CHART_DIR" \
--set ingress.enabled=true \
--set 'ingress.web.host=*.vantage.example.com' \
--set ingress.api.enabled=true \
--set ingress.grpc.host=agents.example.com \
--set server.env.grpcHost=agents.example.com:443 \
--set ingress.tls.secretName=vantage-tls \
--set ingress.tls.grpcSecretName=agents-tls > /dev/null
# The guards are load-bearing, so their absence is a regression the
# same way a broken render is. Each of these must fail.
- name: Check the guards still refuse bad values
run: |
set -eu
refuses() {
desc="$1"; shift
if helm template test "$CHART_DIR" "$@" > /dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "GUARD MISSING: $desc was accepted"
exit 1
fi
echo "ok: refused $desc"
}
refuses "mongo disabled with an in-chart URI" \
--set mongo.enabled=false
refuses "redis disabled with no external address" \
--set redis.enabled=false
refuses "multiple replicas on a ReadWriteOnce volume" \
--set server.replicaCount=2 --set server.persistence.enabled=true
refuses "ingress with no web host" \
--set ingress.enabled=true
refuses "edge-routed API with an empty path list" \
--set ingress.enabled=true \
--set ingress.web.host=vantage.example.com \
--set ingress.grpc.enabled=false \
--set ingress.api.enabled=true \
--set 'ingress.api.paths=null'
refuses "gRPC ingress with no host" \
--set ingress.enabled=true \
--set ingress.web.host=vantage.example.com \
--set server.env.grpcHost=agents.example.com:443
refuses "an ingress that leaves /api unrouted" \
--set ingress.enabled=true \
--set ingress.web.host=vantage.example.com \
--set ingress.grpc.enabled=false \
--set ingress.api.enabled=false
refuses "gRPC ingress while grpcHost is still in-cluster" \
--set ingress.enabled=true \
--set ingress.web.host=vantage.example.com \
--set ingress.grpc.host=agents.example.com
refuses "backup enabled with no pvcName" \
--set backup.enabled=true \
--set backup.image=gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/vantage/vantage-ctl:latest
refuses "backup enabled with no image" \
--set backup.enabled=true \
--set backup.pvcName=vantage-backups
- name: Read the chart version
id: chart
run: |
set -eu
VERSION="$(grep '^version:' "$CHART_DIR/Chart.yaml" | awk '{print $2}')"
echo "version=$VERSION" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "chart version is $VERSION"
# Chart.yaml is the source of truth for the version; the tag only
# says "publish this one". A mismatch is a mistake worth stopping
# for — the alternative is stamping the tag over Chart.yaml, which
# leaves the repository disagreeing with what was published.
- name: Check the tag matches Chart.yaml
if: startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/chart/v')
run: |
set -eu
TAG_VERSION="${GITHUB_REF_NAME#chart/v}"
CHART_VERSION="${{ steps.chart.outputs.version }}"
if [ "$TAG_VERSION" != "$CHART_VERSION" ]; then
echo "tag chart/v$TAG_VERSION does not match Chart.yaml version $CHART_VERSION"
echo "bump version: in $CHART_DIR/Chart.yaml, or retag."
exit 1
fi
- name: Package
run: |
set -eu
mkdir -p dist
helm package "$CHART_DIR" --destination dist
ls -l dist
- name: Publish to the Gitea chart registry
if: startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/chart/v')
env:
# github.server_url is this Gitea instance, so the registry
# host needs no variable of its own and cannot drift from it.
REGISTRY: ${{ github.server_url }}/api/packages/${{ github.repository_owner }}/helm/api/charts
# The same pair server-deploy.yml uses for `docker login`.
# RELEASE_TOKEN, not REGISTRY_PASSWORD: the latter is named in
# the docs but set by no workflow, and an unset secret becomes
# an empty password, which Gitea reports as "Failed to
# authenticate user" rather than as a missing credential.
REGISTRY_USER: ${{ secrets.REGISTRY_USER }}
REGISTRY_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.RELEASE_TOKEN }}
CHART_VERSION: ${{ steps.chart.outputs.version }}
run: |
set -eu
PKG="dist/vantage-${CHART_VERSION}.tgz"
test -f "$PKG"
# Checked explicitly, because the failure it prevents is a
# 401 that looks like a permissions problem on the token that
# was never sent.
if [ -z "${REGISTRY_USER}" ] || [ -z "${REGISTRY_TOKEN}" ]; then
echo "REGISTRY_USER or RELEASE_TOKEN is not set on this repository."
echo "RELEASE_TOKEN needs the write:package scope to publish a chart."
exit 1
fi
echo "publishing to ${REGISTRY} as ${REGISTRY_USER}"
# --fail-with-body so an HTTP error is a failed step with the
# server's explanation, rather than a green run that published
# nothing. A repeated version is rejected by the registry;
# that is the intended behaviour, not something to retry past.
curl --fail-with-body -sS \
--user "${REGISTRY_USER}:${REGISTRY_TOKEN}" \
-X POST \
--upload-file "$PKG" \
"$REGISTRY"
echo "published vantage ${CHART_VERSION}"
echo " helm repo add vantage ${{ github.server_url }}/api/packages/${{ github.repository_owner }}/helm"
echo " helm install vantage vantage/vantage --version ${CHART_VERSION}"
+124 -4
View File
@@ -4,16 +4,105 @@ on:
push:
branches:
- main
# Manual runs rebuild everything: there is no "before" commit to diff
# against, which the change detection below treats as "build it all". That
# is also the escape hatch for a repo VARIABLE change — editing HQ_URL
# pushes no commit, so nothing would rebuild on its own.
workflow_dispatch:
jobs:
deploy:
runs-on: ubuntu-docker
container: docker:dind
steps:
- name: Setup Node
run: apk add --update nodejs npm
# git is needed twice over: actions/checkout clones with it, and the
# change detection below diffs with it.
- name: Setup
run: apk add --update nodejs npm git
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
# The default shallow clone has one commit, which cannot be
# diffed against the previous push.
fetch-depth: 0
- name: Work out what changed
id: changed
run: |
set -eu
BEFORE="${{ github.event.before }}"
ZERO="0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
# Build everything whenever the comparison cannot be trusted:
# a manual run, a brand-new branch, or a force-push whose old
# head is no longer in the repository. Listing every tracked
# file makes every filter below match, so there is no second
# code path to keep correct.
if [ -z "$BEFORE" ] || [ "$BEFORE" = "$ZERO" ] || ! git cat-file -e "${BEFORE}^{commit}" 2>/dev/null; then
echo "No usable base commit — building every image."
git ls-files > /tmp/changed.txt
else
git diff --name-only "$BEFORE" HEAD > /tmp/changed.txt
fi
echo "--- changed files ---"
cat /tmp/changed.txt
echo "---------------------"
# A change to the workflow itself can change a build arg, and
# a build arg is baked into the image, so it rebuilds all.
if grep -qE '^\.gitea/workflows/' /tmp/changed.txt; then
ALL=1
else
ALL=0
fi
flag() {
name="$1"
pattern="$2"
if [ "$ALL" = "1" ] || grep -qE "$pattern" /tmp/changed.txt; then
echo "$name=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "build $name"
else
echo "$name=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "skip $name"
fi
}
# shared/ is gone from this repository: it is the private
# module gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/vantage/vantage-shared, pinned
# per service in its own go.mod. A change over there reaches
# a service when somebody bumps that pin, which is a commit
# under the service's own directory and so already matches
# below. There is no longer a directory whose change fans out
# to three images, and no longer a way to ship a service
# against a shared/ it was never built with.
#
# proto/ is gone too. It documents the wire types, and it
# moved to sit beside the hand-written pb it describes, so
# that a message added to one is added to the other in the
# same commit. Nothing here reads it.
flag server '^(server/|default_steps/|go\.work)'
# web/ uses its own directory as the build context, so
# nothing outside it can affect it. It is the only front end
# left here: the marketing site and the docs went to
# vantage-site and vantage-docs, the HQ console to
# vantage-admin.
flag web '^web/'
# vantage-shared is private, so every Go build below needs a
# credential for it. A netrc is written once here rather than a
# token being passed as a build arg, which would survive in the
# builder layer's history.
- name: Write the module fetch credential
run: |
umask 077
printf 'machine gitea.hostxtra.co.uk\nlogin %s\npassword %s\n' \
"${{ secrets.REGISTRY_USER }}" "${{ secrets.RELEASE_TOKEN }}" \
> "$HOME/.netrc"
- name: Log in to registry
run: |
@@ -21,17 +110,48 @@ jobs:
docker login ${{ vars.DOCKER_HOST }} \
-u "${{ secrets.REGISTRY_USER }}" --password-stdin
- name: Set up Go
if: steps.changed.outputs.server == 'true'
uses: actions/setup-go@v5
with:
go-version: "1.26"
cache: true
cache-dependency-path: server/go.sum
env:
GOPRIVATE: gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/*
- name: Verify the OpenAPI document is current
if: steps.changed.outputs.server == 'true'
env:
GOPRIVATE: gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/*
run: |
go install github.com/swaggo/swag/v2/cmd/swag@v2.0.0-rc5
cd server
go mod download gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/vantage/vantage-shared
SHARED_DIR="$(go list -m -f '{{.Dir}}' gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/vantage/vantage-shared)"
if [ -z "$SHARED_DIR" ] || [ ! -d "$SHARED_DIR" ]; then
echo "vantage-shared source not in the module cache: '$SHARED_DIR'" >&2
exit 1
fi
swag init --generalInfo cmd/main.go --dir "./,$SHARED_DIR" --output internal/api/docs --outputTypes json --v3.1
mv -f internal/api/docs/swagger.json internal/api/docs/openapi.json
git diff --exit-code internal/api/docs/openapi.json
- name: Build and push server image
if: steps.changed.outputs.server == 'true'
run: |
IMAGE="${{ vars.DOCKER_HOST }}/${{ github.repository_owner }}/vantage/server:latest"
docker build -t "$IMAGE" -f server/Dockerfile server/
docker build --secret id=netrc,src="$HOME/.netrc" \
-t "$IMAGE" -f server/Dockerfile .
docker push "$IMAGE"
- name: Build and push web image
if: steps.changed.outputs.web == 'true'
run: |
IMAGE="${{ vars.DOCKER_HOST }}/${{ github.repository_owner }}/vantage/web:latest"
docker build \
--build-arg NEXT_PUBLIC_API_URL="${{ vars.API_URL }}" \
--build-arg NEXT_PUBLIC_HQ_URL="${{ vars.HQ_URL }}" \
-t "$IMAGE" \
-f web/Dockerfile web/
docker push "$IMAGE"
+9 -2
View File
@@ -2,10 +2,17 @@ node_modules
dist
build
.env
docs
.env.bck
.env.live
docs/*
!docs/superpowers/
.superpowers
installer/vantage-agent-windows-amd64.exe
installer/*.msi
installer/nssm.zip
installer/checksums-msi.txt
.next
.next
*.tsbuildinfo
graphify-out
docker-compose.live.yml
.claude
+1406
View File
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
-39
View File
@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
package main
import (
"context"
"flag"
"log"
"os/signal"
"syscall"
"github.com/mrhid6/vantage/agent/internal/config"
agentsync "github.com/mrhid6/vantage/agent/internal/sync"
)
var Version = "dev"
func main() {
genKey := flag.String("generate-key", "", "Generate SSH keypair and upload with this label")
flag.Parse()
cfg, err := config.Load()
if err != nil {
log.Fatalf("failed to load config: %v", err)
}
if *genKey != "" {
if err := agentsync.GenerateAndUpload(cfg, *genKey); err != nil {
log.Fatalf("key generation failed: %v", err)
}
return
}
ctx, stop := signal.NotifyContext(context.Background(), syscall.SIGINT, syscall.SIGTERM)
defer stop()
log.Printf("vantage-agent %s starting (server=%s, poll=%s)", Version, cfg.ServerURL, cfg.PollInterval)
if err := agentsync.Run(ctx, cfg, Version); err != nil {
log.Fatalf("agent error: %v", err)
}
}
-16
View File
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
module github.com/mrhid6/vantage/agent
go 1.26
require (
google.golang.org/grpc v1.64.0
gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1
)
require (
golang.org/x/net v0.25.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/sys v0.20.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/text v0.15.0 // indirect
google.golang.org/genproto/googleapis/rpc v0.0.0-20240521202816-d264139d666e // indirect
google.golang.org/protobuf v1.34.1 // indirect
)
-18
View File
@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
github.com/google/go-cmp v0.6.0 h1:ofyhxvXcZhMsU5ulbFiLKl/XBFqE1GSq7atu8tAmTRI=
github.com/google/go-cmp v0.6.0/go.mod h1:17dUlkBOakJ0+DkrSSNjCkIjxS6bF9zb3elmeNGIjoY=
golang.org/x/net v0.25.0 h1:d/OCCoBEUq33pjydKrGQhw7IlUPI2Oylr+8qLx49kac=
golang.org/x/net v0.25.0/go.mod h1:JkAGAh7GEvH74S6FOH42FLoXpXbE/aqXSrIQjXgsiwM=
golang.org/x/sys v0.20.0 h1:Od9JTbYCk261bKm4M/mw7AklTlFYIa0bIp9BgSm1S8Y=
golang.org/x/sys v0.20.0/go.mod h1:/VUhepiaJMQUp4+oa/7Zr1D23ma6VTLIYjOOTFZPUcA=
golang.org/x/text v0.15.0 h1:h1V/4gjBv8v9cjcR6+AR5+/cIYK5N/WAgiv4xlsEtAk=
golang.org/x/text v0.15.0/go.mod h1:18ZOQIKpY8NJVqYksKHtTdi31H5itFRjB5/qKTNYzSU=
google.golang.org/genproto/googleapis/rpc v0.0.0-20240521202816-d264139d666e h1:Elxv5MwEkCI9f5SkoL6afed6NTdxaGoAo39eANBwHL8=
google.golang.org/genproto/googleapis/rpc v0.0.0-20240521202816-d264139d666e/go.mod h1:EfXuqaE1J41VCDicxHzUDm+8rk+7ZdXzHV0IhO/I6s0=
google.golang.org/grpc v1.64.0 h1:KH3VH9y/MgNQg1dE7b3XfVK0GsPSIzJwdF617gUSbvY=
google.golang.org/grpc v1.64.0/go.mod h1:oxjF8E3FBnjp+/gVFYdWacaLDx9na1aqy9oovLpxQYg=
google.golang.org/protobuf v1.34.1 h1:9ddQBjfCyZPOHPUiPxpYESBLc+T8P3E+Vo4IbKZgFWg=
google.golang.org/protobuf v1.34.1/go.mod h1:c6P6GXX6sHbq/GpV6MGZEdwhWPcYBgnhAHhKbcUYpos=
gopkg.in/check.v1 v0.0.0-20161208181325-20d25e280405 h1:yhCVgyC4o1eVCa2tZl7eS0r+SDo693bJlVdllGtEeKM=
gopkg.in/check.v1 v0.0.0-20161208181325-20d25e280405/go.mod h1:Co6ibVJAznAaIkqp8huTwlJQCZ016jof/cbN4VW5Yz0=
gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1 h1:fxVm/GzAzEWqLHuvctI91KS9hhNmmWOoWu0XTYJS7CA=
gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1/go.mod h1:K4uyk7z7BCEPqu6E+C64Yfv1cQ7kz7rIZviUmN+EgEM=
-226
View File
@@ -1,226 +0,0 @@
// Package checker runs service checks (http/tcp/icmp/tls) and returns a uniform
// Result. It has no dependency on models or pb so it can be duplicated verbatim
// into the agent module (agent-run monitors) — callers map their own monitor
// representation onto Spec.
package checker
import (
"context"
"crypto/tls"
"fmt"
"io"
"net"
"net/http"
"os"
"strings"
"time"
)
// Check types (mirror models.Monitor* constants).
const (
TypeHTTP = "http"
TypeTCP = "tcp"
TypeICMP = "icmp"
TypeTLS = "tls"
)
// Spec is a self-contained description of a single check.
type Spec struct {
Type string
URL string
Host string
Port int
Method string
ExpectedStatus int
Keyword string
TLSWarnDays int
Insecure bool // skip TLS certificate verification (HTTP checks)
TimeoutSec int
}
// Result is the uniform outcome of running a check.
type Result struct {
Up bool
LatencyMs int
Message string
CertExpiry *time.Time
}
func (s Spec) timeout() time.Duration {
t := s.TimeoutSec
if t <= 0 || t > 10 {
t = 10
}
return time.Duration(t) * time.Second
}
// Run executes the check described by s.
func Run(ctx context.Context, s Spec) Result {
switch s.Type {
case TypeHTTP:
return runHTTP(ctx, s)
case TypeTCP:
return runTCP(ctx, s)
case TypeICMP:
return runICMP(ctx, s)
case TypeTLS:
return runTLS(ctx, s)
default:
return Result{Message: "unknown check type: " + s.Type}
}
}
func runHTTP(ctx context.Context, s Spec) Result {
method := s.Method
if method == "" {
method = http.MethodGet
}
expect := s.ExpectedStatus
if expect == 0 {
expect = 200
}
client := &http.Client{Timeout: s.timeout()}
if s.Insecure {
client.Transport = &http.Transport{TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: true}} //nolint:gosec // opt-in per monitor
}
start := time.Now()
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, method, s.URL, nil)
if err != nil {
return Result{Message: err.Error()}
}
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return Result{LatencyMs: msSince(start), Message: err.Error()}
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
res := Result{LatencyMs: msSince(start), Up: true}
if resp.TLS != nil && len(resp.TLS.PeerCertificates) > 0 {
exp := resp.TLS.PeerCertificates[0].NotAfter
res.CertExpiry = &exp
}
if resp.StatusCode != expect {
return Result{LatencyMs: res.LatencyMs, CertExpiry: res.CertExpiry, Message: fmt.Sprintf("status %d (want %d)", resp.StatusCode, expect)}
}
if s.Keyword != "" {
body, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 1<<20))
if !strings.Contains(string(body), s.Keyword) {
return Result{LatencyMs: res.LatencyMs, CertExpiry: res.CertExpiry, Message: "keyword not found"}
}
}
return res
}
func runTCP(ctx context.Context, s Spec) Result {
addr := net.JoinHostPort(s.Host, fmt.Sprint(s.Port))
start := time.Now()
d := net.Dialer{Timeout: s.timeout()}
conn, err := d.DialContext(ctx, "tcp", addr)
if err != nil {
return Result{LatencyMs: msSince(start), Message: err.Error()}
}
conn.Close()
return Result{Up: true, LatencyMs: msSince(start)}
}
func runTLS(ctx context.Context, s Spec) Result {
port := s.Port
if port == 0 {
port = 443
}
addr := net.JoinHostPort(s.Host, fmt.Sprint(port))
start := time.Now()
d := net.Dialer{Timeout: s.timeout()}
conn, err := tls.DialWithDialer(&d, "tcp", addr, &tls.Config{ServerName: s.Host})
if err != nil {
return Result{LatencyMs: msSince(start), Message: err.Error()}
}
defer conn.Close()
certs := conn.ConnectionState().PeerCertificates
if len(certs) == 0 {
return Result{LatencyMs: msSince(start), Message: "no peer certificate"}
}
exp := certs[0].NotAfter
res := Result{LatencyMs: msSince(start), CertExpiry: &exp}
warn := s.TLSWarnDays
if warn <= 0 {
warn = 14
}
remaining := time.Until(exp)
if remaining <= 0 {
res.Message = "certificate expired"
return res
}
if remaining <= time.Duration(warn)*24*time.Hour {
res.Message = fmt.Sprintf("certificate expires in %d days", int(remaining.Hours()/24))
return res
}
res.Up = true
return res
}
func msSince(t time.Time) int { return int(time.Since(t).Milliseconds()) }
// runICMP sends a single ICMP echo request and waits for the reply. Requires
// raw-socket privileges (the agent and server run as root). Returns down with a
// descriptive message when the socket cannot be opened or no reply arrives.
func runICMP(ctx context.Context, s Spec) Result {
dst, err := net.ResolveIPAddr("ip4", s.Host)
if err != nil {
return Result{Message: err.Error()}
}
conn, err := net.ListenPacket("ip4:icmp", "0.0.0.0")
if err != nil {
return Result{Message: "icmp socket: " + err.Error()}
}
defer conn.Close()
id := os.Getpid() & 0xffff
pkt := icmpEcho(id, 1)
deadline := time.Now().Add(s.timeout())
if d, ok := ctx.Deadline(); ok && d.Before(deadline) {
deadline = d
}
_ = conn.SetDeadline(deadline)
start := time.Now()
if _, err := conn.WriteTo(pkt, dst); err != nil {
return Result{Message: err.Error()}
}
reply := make([]byte, 1500)
for {
n, peer, err := conn.ReadFrom(reply)
if err != nil {
return Result{LatencyMs: msSince(start), Message: "no reply"}
}
// Skip the IPv4 header (20 bytes) to reach the ICMP message.
if n < 28 || peer.String() != dst.String() {
continue
}
if reply[20] == 0 { // ICMP echo reply type
return Result{Up: true, LatencyMs: msSince(start)}
}
}
}
func icmpEcho(id, seq int) []byte {
// Type(8)=echo request, Code=0, Checksum, ID, Seq, no payload.
b := []byte{8, 0, 0, 0, byte(id >> 8), byte(id), byte(seq >> 8), byte(seq)}
cs := icmpChecksum(b)
b[2] = byte(cs >> 8)
b[3] = byte(cs)
return b
}
func icmpChecksum(b []byte) uint16 {
var sum uint32
for i := 0; i < len(b)-1; i += 2 {
sum += uint32(b[i])<<8 | uint32(b[i+1])
}
if len(b)%2 == 1 {
sum += uint32(b[len(b)-1]) << 8
}
for sum>>16 != 0 {
sum = (sum & 0xffff) + (sum >> 16)
}
return ^uint16(sum)
}
-59
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@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
package config
import (
"os"
"path/filepath"
"runtime"
"time"
"gopkg.in/yaml.v3"
)
// ConfigDir returns the platform-specific config directory.
func ConfigDir() string {
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
base := os.Getenv("ProgramData")
if base == "" {
base = `C:\ProgramData`
}
return filepath.Join(base, "vantage")
}
return "/etc/vantage"
}
func configPath() string { return filepath.Join(ConfigDir(), "config.yaml") }
type Config struct {
ServerURL string `yaml:"server_url"`
ServerID string `yaml:"server_id"`
PreRegToken string `yaml:"pre_reg_token"`
AgentToken string `yaml:"agent_token"`
PollInterval time.Duration `yaml:"poll_interval"`
TLS bool `yaml:"tls"`
}
func Load() (*Config, error) {
data, err := os.ReadFile(configPath())
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var cfg Config
if err := yaml.Unmarshal(data, &cfg); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if cfg.PollInterval == 0 {
cfg.PollInterval = 30 * time.Second
}
return &cfg, nil
}
func Save(cfg *Config) error {
data, err := yaml.Marshal(cfg)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if err := os.MkdirAll(ConfigDir(), 0700); err != nil {
return err
}
return os.WriteFile(configPath(), data, 0600)
}
-20
View File
@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
package config
import (
"runtime"
"strings"
"testing"
)
func TestConfigDirByOS(t *testing.T) {
d := ConfigDir()
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
if !strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(d), "programdata") {
t.Fatalf("windows config dir = %q, want ProgramData path", d)
}
} else {
if d != "/etc/vantage" {
t.Fatalf("unix config dir = %q, want /etc/vantage", d)
}
}
}
-164
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@@ -1,164 +0,0 @@
package exec
import (
"bufio"
"context"
"os"
"os/exec"
"path/filepath"
"runtime"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
"github.com/mrhid6/vantage/agent/internal/grpc/pb"
)
// streamWriter forwards every write to emit() as an ordered chunk. Used as both
// Stdout and Stderr so output interleaves in real execution order. The mutex
// ensures a single stdout/stderr write is not interleaved mid-slice with another.
type streamWriter struct {
mu sync.Mutex
seq uint64
emit func(seq uint64, data []byte)
}
func (w *streamWriter) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
w.mu.Lock()
defer w.mu.Unlock()
if w.emit != nil {
buf := make([]byte, len(p))
copy(buf, p)
w.emit(w.seq, buf)
w.seq++
}
return len(p), nil
}
// WorkspacePath returns the per-run working directory for a workspace id. The
// same id always maps to the same path so RunStep and the cleanup command agree.
func WorkspacePath(workspaceID string) string {
return filepath.Join(os.TempDir(), "vantage-run-"+workspaceID)
}
// RunStep writes the script to a temp file, provides a WORKFLOW_ENV file for
// the script to append KEY=value output to, executes it under the requested
// interpreter, and streams output via emit, returning the terminal result
// with empty stdout/stderr but populated exit_code/output_env.
//
// When the command carries a WorkspaceId the step runs with that per-run working
// directory as its cwd (created here if missing); the server removes it once the
// run finishes. The script and env files always live in a private temp dir so
// they never leak into the shared workspace.
func RunStep(cmd *pb.RunStepCmd, emit func(seq uint64, data []byte)) *pb.StepResult {
res := &pb.StepResult{CommandId: "", OutputEnv: map[string]string{}}
dir, err := os.MkdirTemp("", "vantage-step-")
if err != nil {
res.ExitCode = 1
res.Stderr = "create temp dir: " + err.Error()
return res
}
defer os.RemoveAll(dir)
workDir := ""
if cmd.WorkspaceId != "" {
workDir = WorkspacePath(cmd.WorkspaceId)
if err := os.MkdirAll(workDir, 0700); err != nil {
res.ExitCode = 1
res.Stderr = "create workspace: " + err.Error()
return res
}
}
envFile := filepath.Join(dir, "workflow_env")
if err := os.WriteFile(envFile, nil, 0600); err != nil {
res.ExitCode = 1
res.Stderr = "create env file: " + err.Error()
return res
}
var scriptPath string
var c *exec.Cmd
timeout := time.Duration(cmd.TimeoutSeconds) * time.Second
if timeout <= 0 {
timeout = 30 * time.Minute
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), timeout)
defer cancel()
switch cmd.Interpreter {
case "powershell":
scriptPath = filepath.Join(dir, "step.ps1")
if err := os.WriteFile(scriptPath, []byte(cmd.Script), 0600); err != nil {
res.ExitCode = 1
res.Stderr = err.Error()
return res
}
shell := "pwsh"
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
if _, err := exec.LookPath("pwsh"); err != nil {
shell = "powershell.exe"
}
}
c = exec.CommandContext(ctx, shell, "-NoProfile", "-NonInteractive", "-File", scriptPath)
default: // "bash"
scriptPath = filepath.Join(dir, "step.sh")
if err := os.WriteFile(scriptPath, []byte(cmd.Script), 0700); err != nil {
res.ExitCode = 1
res.Stderr = err.Error()
return res
}
c = exec.CommandContext(ctx, "bash", scriptPath)
}
if workDir != "" {
c.Dir = workDir
}
c.Env = append(os.Environ(), "WORKFLOW_ENV="+envFile)
for k, v := range cmd.Env {
c.Env = append(c.Env, k+"="+v)
}
sw := &streamWriter{emit: emit}
c.Stdout = sw
c.Stderr = sw
runErr := c.Run()
// stdout/stderr are streamed via emit, not returned in the result.
if ctx.Err() == context.DeadlineExceeded {
res.ExitCode = 124
res.Stderr = "[vantage] step timed out"
} else if ee, ok := runErr.(*exec.ExitError); ok {
res.ExitCode = ee.ExitCode()
} else if runErr != nil {
res.ExitCode = 1
res.Stderr = "[vantage] " + runErr.Error()
}
res.OutputEnv = parseEnvFile(envFile)
return res
}
// parseEnvFile reads KEY=value lines (last write wins). Blank lines and lines
// without '=' are ignored.
func parseEnvFile(path string) map[string]string {
out := map[string]string{}
f, err := os.Open(path)
if err != nil {
return out
}
defer f.Close()
sc := bufio.NewScanner(f)
sc.Buffer(make([]byte, 0, 64*1024), 1024*1024)
for sc.Scan() {
line := sc.Text()
i := strings.IndexByte(line, '=')
if i <= 0 {
continue
}
out[line[:i]] = line[i+1:]
}
return out
}
-157
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@@ -1,157 +0,0 @@
package grpcclient
import (
"context"
"crypto/tls"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/mrhid6/vantage/agent/internal/grpc/pb"
"google.golang.org/grpc"
"google.golang.org/grpc/credentials"
"google.golang.org/grpc/credentials/insecure"
"google.golang.org/grpc/encoding"
"google.golang.org/grpc/keepalive"
)
func init() {
encoding.RegisterCodec(JSONCodec{})
}
type Client struct {
conn *grpc.ClientConn
client pb.VantageClient
}
func New(serverURL string, useTLS bool) (*Client, error) {
serverURL = strings.TrimPrefix(serverURL, "https://")
serverURL = strings.TrimPrefix(serverURL, "http://")
// Send a ping every 30s so proxies with a 60s idle timeout don't kill the
// long-lived CommandStream when no commands are flowing.
dialOpts := []grpc.DialOption{
grpc.WithKeepaliveParams(keepalive.ClientParameters{
Time: 30 * time.Second,
Timeout: 10 * time.Second,
PermitWithoutStream: false,
}),
}
if useTLS {
tlsCfg := &tls.Config{
InsecureSkipVerify: false,
}
creds := credentials.NewTLS(tlsCfg)
dialOpts = append(dialOpts, grpc.WithTransportCredentials(creds))
} else {
dialOpts = append(dialOpts, grpc.WithTransportCredentials(insecure.NewCredentials()))
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
defer cancel()
conn, err := grpc.DialContext(ctx, serverURL, dialOpts...)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &Client{
conn: conn,
client: pb.NewVantageClient(conn),
}, nil
}
func (c *Client) Close() error {
return c.conn.Close()
}
func (c *Client) Register(serverID, preRegToken, hostname, ipAddress, osInfo string) (string, error) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
defer cancel()
resp, err := c.client.Register(ctx, &pb.RegisterRequest{
ServerId: serverID,
PreRegToken: preRegToken,
Hostname: hostname,
IpAddress: ipAddress,
OsInfo: osInfo,
})
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
return resp.AgentToken, nil
}
func (c *Client) SyncKeys(serverID, agentToken, version string) ([]string, error) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
defer cancel()
resp, err := c.client.SyncKeys(ctx, &pb.SyncRequest{
ServerId: serverID,
AgentToken: agentToken,
AgentVersion: version,
})
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return resp.PublicKeys, nil
}
func (c *Client) UploadGeneratedKey(serverID, agentToken, publicKey, privateKey, label string) (string, error) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
defer cancel()
resp, err := c.client.UploadGeneratedKey(ctx, &pb.UploadKeyRequest{
ServerId: serverID,
AgentToken: agentToken,
PublicKey: publicKey,
PrivateKey: privateKey,
Label: label,
})
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
return resp.KeyId, nil
}
func (c *Client) ReportUpdates(serverID, agentToken string, updates []pb.PackageUpdate) error {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
defer cancel()
_, err := c.client.ReportUpdates(ctx, &pb.ReportUpdatesRequest{
ServerId: serverID,
AgentToken: agentToken,
Updates: updates,
})
return err
}
func (c *Client) ReportInventory(report *pb.InventoryReport) error {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
defer cancel()
_, err := c.client.ReportInventory(ctx, report)
return err
}
func (c *Client) SyncMonitors(serverID, agentToken string) ([]pb.MonitorSpec, error) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
defer cancel()
resp, err := c.client.SyncMonitors(ctx, &pb.SyncMonitorsRequest{ServerId: serverID, AgentToken: agentToken})
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return resp.Monitors, nil
}
func (c *Client) ReportChecks(serverID, agentToken string, results []pb.CheckResult) error {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
defer cancel()
_, err := c.client.ReportChecks(ctx, &pb.ReportChecksRequest{ServerId: serverID, AgentToken: agentToken, Results: results})
return err
}
// CommandStream opens a long-lived bidirectional stream for server-pushed commands.
// The caller controls the stream lifetime via ctx.
func (c *Client) CommandStream(ctx context.Context) (pb.Vantage_CommandStreamClient, error) {
return c.client.CommandStream(ctx)
}
-17
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@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
package grpcclient
import "encoding/json"
type JSONCodec struct{}
func (JSONCodec) Marshal(v interface{}) ([]byte, error) {
return json.Marshal(v)
}
func (JSONCodec) Unmarshal(data []byte, v interface{}) error {
return json.Unmarshal(data, v)
}
func (JSONCodec) Name() string {
return "proto"
}
-351
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@@ -1,351 +0,0 @@
// Hand-written gRPC bindings for vantage.proto (agent side, JSON codec).
package pb
import (
"context"
"google.golang.org/grpc"
"google.golang.org/grpc/codes"
"google.golang.org/grpc/status"
)
type RegisterRequest struct {
ServerId string `json:"server_id"`
PreRegToken string `json:"pre_reg_token"`
Hostname string `json:"hostname"`
IpAddress string `json:"ip_address"`
OsInfo string `json:"os_info"`
}
type RegisterResponse struct {
AgentToken string `json:"agent_token"`
}
type SyncRequest struct {
ServerId string `json:"server_id"`
AgentToken string `json:"agent_token"`
AgentVersion string `json:"agent_version,omitempty"`
}
type SyncResponse struct {
PublicKeys []string `json:"public_keys"`
}
type UploadKeyRequest struct {
ServerId string `json:"server_id"`
AgentToken string `json:"agent_token"`
PublicKey string `json:"public_key"`
Label string `json:"label"`
PrivateKey string `json:"private_key,omitempty"`
}
type UploadKeyResponse struct {
KeyId string `json:"key_id"`
}
// CommandStream message types
type PackageUpdate struct {
Name string `json:"name"`
CurrentVersion string `json:"current_version,omitempty"`
NewVersion string `json:"new_version"`
}
type ReportUpdatesRequest struct {
ServerId string `json:"server_id"`
AgentToken string `json:"agent_token"`
Updates []PackageUpdate `json:"updates"`
}
type ReportUpdatesResponse struct{}
// Inventory report message types
type CPUReport struct {
Model string `json:"model,omitempty"`
Cores int `json:"cores,omitempty"`
UsagePct float64 `json:"usage_pct"`
Load1 float64 `json:"load1,omitempty"`
}
type MemReport struct {
TotalBytes uint64 `json:"total_bytes"`
UsedBytes uint64 `json:"used_bytes"`
}
type PartitionReport struct {
Device string `json:"device"`
Mountpoint string `json:"mountpoint"`
Fstype string `json:"fstype,omitempty"`
TotalBytes uint64 `json:"total_bytes"`
UsedBytes uint64 `json:"used_bytes"`
}
type InventoryReport struct {
ServerId string `json:"server_id"`
AgentToken string `json:"agent_token"`
IncludeStatic bool `json:"include_static"`
CPU *CPUReport `json:"cpu,omitempty"`
Memory *MemReport `json:"memory,omitempty"`
SwapTotal uint64 `json:"swap_total"`
SwapUsed uint64 `json:"swap_used"`
Partitions []PartitionReport `json:"partitions,omitempty"`
Kernel string `json:"kernel,omitempty"`
}
type InventoryReportResponse struct{}
// Monitor sync / check report message types
type MonitorSpec struct {
MonitorId string `json:"monitor_id"`
Type string `json:"type"`
URL string `json:"url,omitempty"`
Host string `json:"host,omitempty"`
Port int `json:"port,omitempty"`
Method string `json:"method,omitempty"`
ExpectedStatus int `json:"expected_status,omitempty"`
Keyword string `json:"keyword,omitempty"`
TLSWarnDays int `json:"tls_warn_days,omitempty"`
Insecure bool `json:"insecure,omitempty"`
IntervalSec int `json:"interval_sec"`
Retries int `json:"retries"`
}
type SyncMonitorsRequest struct {
ServerId string `json:"server_id"`
AgentToken string `json:"agent_token"`
}
type SyncMonitorsResponse struct {
Monitors []MonitorSpec `json:"monitors,omitempty"`
}
type CheckResult struct {
MonitorId string `json:"monitor_id"`
Up bool `json:"up"`
LatencyMs int `json:"latency_ms"`
Message string `json:"message,omitempty"`
CertExpiryUnix int64 `json:"cert_expiry_unix,omitempty"`
}
type ReportChecksRequest struct {
ServerId string `json:"server_id"`
AgentToken string `json:"agent_token"`
Results []CheckResult `json:"results,omitempty"`
}
type ReportChecksResponse struct{}
type ApplyUpdatesCmd struct{}
type ServerCommand struct {
CommandId string `json:"command_id"`
GenerateKey *GenerateKeyCmd `json:"generate_key,omitempty"`
DeleteKey *DeleteKeyCmd `json:"delete_key,omitempty"`
UpdateAgent *UpdateAgentCmd `json:"update_agent,omitempty"`
ApplyUpdates *ApplyUpdatesCmd `json:"apply_updates,omitempty"`
RunStep *RunStepCmd `json:"run_step,omitempty"`
CleanupWorkspace *CleanupWorkspaceCmd `json:"cleanup_workspace,omitempty"`
}
// CleanupWorkspaceCmd tells the agent to recursively remove the run's working
// directory once all steps on that server have finished.
type CleanupWorkspaceCmd struct {
WorkspaceId string `json:"workspace_id"`
}
type DeleteKeyCmd struct {
Label string `json:"label"`
}
type UpdateAgentCmd struct {
Version string `json:"version"`
GiteaBaseURL string `json:"gitea_base_url"`
}
type GenerateKeyCmd struct {
Label string `json:"label"`
KeyType string `json:"key_type,omitempty"`
KeySize int `json:"key_size,omitempty"`
Passphrase string `json:"passphrase,omitempty"`
Comment string `json:"comment,omitempty"`
}
type AgentMessage struct {
ServerId string `json:"server_id"`
AgentToken string `json:"agent_token"`
Ready *AgentReady `json:"ready,omitempty"`
Result *CommandResult `json:"result,omitempty"`
StepResult *StepResult `json:"step_result,omitempty"`
StepOutput *StepOutputChunk `json:"step_output,omitempty"`
}
type AgentReady struct{}
type CommandResult struct {
CommandId string `json:"command_id"`
Success bool `json:"success"`
Message string `json:"message"`
}
type RunStepCmd struct {
Interpreter string `json:"interpreter"`
Script string `json:"script"`
Env map[string]string `json:"env,omitempty"`
TimeoutSeconds int `json:"timeout_seconds,omitempty"`
// WorkspaceId names the per-run working directory the agent creates and uses
// as the step's cwd. Empty means run in the agent's default directory.
WorkspaceId string `json:"workspace_id,omitempty"`
}
type StepResult struct {
CommandId string `json:"command_id"`
ExitCode int `json:"exit_code"`
Stdout string `json:"stdout,omitempty"`
Stderr string `json:"stderr,omitempty"`
OutputEnv map[string]string `json:"output_env,omitempty"`
}
type StepOutputChunk struct {
CommandId string `json:"command_id"`
Seq uint64 `json:"seq"`
Data []byte `json:"data,omitempty"`
Eof bool `json:"eof,omitempty"`
}
// CommandStream client-side interface
type Vantage_CommandStreamClient interface {
Send(*AgentMessage) error
Recv() (*ServerCommand, error)
grpc.ClientStream
}
type vantageCommandStreamClient struct {
grpc.ClientStream
}
func (c *vantageCommandStreamClient) Send(m *AgentMessage) error {
return c.ClientStream.SendMsg(m)
}
func (c *vantageCommandStreamClient) Recv() (*ServerCommand, error) {
m := new(ServerCommand)
if err := c.ClientStream.RecvMsg(m); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return m, nil
}
// CommandStream server-side interface (included for completeness)
type Vantage_CommandStreamServer interface {
Send(*ServerCommand) error
Recv() (*AgentMessage, error)
grpc.ServerStream
}
type keyManagerCommandStreamServer struct {
grpc.ServerStream
}
func (s *keyManagerCommandStreamServer) Send(m *ServerCommand) error {
return s.ServerStream.SendMsg(m)
}
func (s *keyManagerCommandStreamServer) Recv() (*AgentMessage, error) {
m := new(AgentMessage)
if err := s.ServerStream.RecvMsg(m); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return m, nil
}
type VantageClient interface {
Register(ctx context.Context, in *RegisterRequest, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (*RegisterResponse, error)
SyncKeys(ctx context.Context, in *SyncRequest, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (*SyncResponse, error)
UploadGeneratedKey(ctx context.Context, in *UploadKeyRequest, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (*UploadKeyResponse, error)
ReportUpdates(ctx context.Context, in *ReportUpdatesRequest, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (*ReportUpdatesResponse, error)
ReportInventory(ctx context.Context, in *InventoryReport, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (*InventoryReportResponse, error)
SyncMonitors(ctx context.Context, in *SyncMonitorsRequest, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (*SyncMonitorsResponse, error)
ReportChecks(ctx context.Context, in *ReportChecksRequest, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (*ReportChecksResponse, error)
CommandStream(ctx context.Context, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (Vantage_CommandStreamClient, error)
}
type UnimplementedVantageServer struct{}
func (UnimplementedVantageServer) Register(context.Context, *RegisterRequest) (*RegisterResponse, error) {
return nil, status.Errorf(codes.Unimplemented, "not implemented")
}
func (UnimplementedVantageServer) SyncKeys(context.Context, *SyncRequest) (*SyncResponse, error) {
return nil, status.Errorf(codes.Unimplemented, "not implemented")
}
func (UnimplementedVantageServer) UploadGeneratedKey(context.Context, *UploadKeyRequest) (*UploadKeyResponse, error) {
return nil, status.Errorf(codes.Unimplemented, "not implemented")
}
type keyManagerClient struct {
cc grpc.ClientConnInterface
}
func NewVantageClient(cc grpc.ClientConnInterface) VantageClient {
return &keyManagerClient{cc}
}
func (c *keyManagerClient) Register(ctx context.Context, in *RegisterRequest, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (*RegisterResponse, error) {
out := new(RegisterResponse)
if err := c.cc.Invoke(ctx, "/vantage.v1.Vantage/Register", in, out, opts...); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return out, nil
}
func (c *keyManagerClient) SyncKeys(ctx context.Context, in *SyncRequest, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (*SyncResponse, error) {
out := new(SyncResponse)
if err := c.cc.Invoke(ctx, "/vantage.v1.Vantage/SyncKeys", in, out, opts...); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return out, nil
}
func (c *keyManagerClient) UploadGeneratedKey(ctx context.Context, in *UploadKeyRequest, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (*UploadKeyResponse, error) {
out := new(UploadKeyResponse)
if err := c.cc.Invoke(ctx, "/vantage.v1.Vantage/UploadGeneratedKey", in, out, opts...); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return out, nil
}
func (c *keyManagerClient) ReportUpdates(ctx context.Context, in *ReportUpdatesRequest, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (*ReportUpdatesResponse, error) {
out := new(ReportUpdatesResponse)
if err := c.cc.Invoke(ctx, "/vantage.v1.Vantage/ReportUpdates", in, out, opts...); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return out, nil
}
func (c *keyManagerClient) ReportInventory(ctx context.Context, in *InventoryReport, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (*InventoryReportResponse, error) {
out := new(InventoryReportResponse)
if err := c.cc.Invoke(ctx, "/vantage.v1.Vantage/ReportInventory", in, out, opts...); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return out, nil
}
func (c *keyManagerClient) SyncMonitors(ctx context.Context, in *SyncMonitorsRequest, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (*SyncMonitorsResponse, error) {
out := new(SyncMonitorsResponse)
if err := c.cc.Invoke(ctx, "/vantage.v1.Vantage/SyncMonitors", in, out, opts...); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return out, nil
}
func (c *keyManagerClient) ReportChecks(ctx context.Context, in *ReportChecksRequest, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (*ReportChecksResponse, error) {
out := new(ReportChecksResponse)
if err := c.cc.Invoke(ctx, "/vantage.v1.Vantage/ReportChecks", in, out, opts...); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return out, nil
}
func (c *keyManagerClient) CommandStream(ctx context.Context, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (Vantage_CommandStreamClient, error) {
desc := &grpc.StreamDesc{StreamName: "CommandStream", ServerStreams: true, ClientStreams: true}
stream, err := c.cc.NewStream(ctx, desc, "/vantage.v1.Vantage/CommandStream", opts...)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &vantageCommandStreamClient{stream}, nil
}
-157
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@@ -1,157 +0,0 @@
//go:build linux
package inventory
import (
"bufio"
"os"
"strconv"
"strings"
"syscall"
"time"
"github.com/mrhid6/vantage/agent/internal/grpc/pb"
)
func collect(r *pb.InventoryReport, includeStatic bool) {
r.CPU.UsagePct = cpuUsage()
r.CPU.Load1 = load1()
memTotal, memAvail, swapTotal, swapFree := meminfo()
if memTotal > memAvail {
r.Memory.UsedBytes = memTotal - memAvail
}
if swapTotal > swapFree {
r.SwapUsed = swapTotal - swapFree
}
if includeStatic {
r.Memory.TotalBytes = memTotal
r.SwapTotal = swapTotal
r.CPU.Model, r.CPU.Cores = cpuStatic()
r.Kernel = kernel()
r.Partitions = partitions()
}
}
func readProc(path string) string { b, _ := os.ReadFile(path); return string(b) }
func cpuSample() (idle, total uint64) {
f, err := os.Open("/proc/stat")
if err != nil {
return
}
defer f.Close()
sc := bufio.NewScanner(f)
if sc.Scan() {
fields := strings.Fields(sc.Text()) // cpu user nice system idle iowait ...
for i, v := range fields[1:] {
n, _ := strconv.ParseUint(v, 10, 64)
total += n
if i == 3 { // idle
idle = n
}
}
}
return
}
func cpuUsage() float64 {
i1, t1 := cpuSample()
time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
i2, t2 := cpuSample()
dt := float64(t2 - t1)
if dt <= 0 {
return 0
}
return (1 - float64(i2-i1)/dt) * 100
}
func load1() float64 {
fields := strings.Fields(readProc("/proc/loadavg"))
if len(fields) > 0 {
v, _ := strconv.ParseFloat(fields[0], 64)
return v
}
return 0
}
func meminfo() (total, avail, swapTotal, swapFree uint64) {
f, err := os.Open("/proc/meminfo")
if err != nil {
return
}
defer f.Close()
sc := bufio.NewScanner(f)
for sc.Scan() {
fields := strings.Fields(sc.Text())
if len(fields) < 2 {
continue
}
kb, _ := strconv.ParseUint(fields[1], 10, 64)
b := kb * 1024
switch strings.TrimSuffix(fields[0], ":") {
case "MemTotal":
total = b
case "MemAvailable":
avail = b
case "SwapTotal":
swapTotal = b
case "SwapFree":
swapFree = b
}
}
return
}
func cpuStatic() (model string, cores int) {
f, err := os.Open("/proc/cpuinfo")
if err != nil {
return
}
defer f.Close()
sc := bufio.NewScanner(f)
for sc.Scan() {
line := sc.Text()
if strings.HasPrefix(line, "processor") {
cores++
} else if strings.HasPrefix(line, "model name") && model == "" {
if i := strings.Index(line, ":"); i >= 0 {
model = strings.TrimSpace(line[i+1:])
}
}
}
return
}
func kernel() string {
return strings.TrimSpace(readProc("/proc/sys/kernel/osrelease"))
}
func partitions() []pb.PartitionReport {
allowed := map[string]bool{"ext4": true, "xfs": true, "btrfs": true, "zfs": true, "vfat": true, "ntfs": true, "ext3": true}
f, err := os.Open("/proc/mounts")
if err != nil {
return nil
}
defer f.Close()
var out []pb.PartitionReport
seen := map[string]bool{}
sc := bufio.NewScanner(f)
for sc.Scan() {
fields := strings.Fields(sc.Text())
if len(fields) < 3 || !allowed[fields[2]] || seen[fields[1]] {
continue
}
seen[fields[1]] = true
var st syscall.Statfs_t
if syscall.Statfs(fields[1], &st) != nil {
continue
}
total := st.Blocks * uint64(st.Bsize)
free := st.Bavail * uint64(st.Bsize)
out = append(out, pb.PartitionReport{
Device: fields[0], Mountpoint: fields[1], Fstype: fields[2],
TotalBytes: total, UsedBytes: total - free,
})
}
return out
}
@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
//go:build !linux
package inventory
import "github.com/mrhid6/vantage/agent/internal/grpc/pb"
// collect is a no-op best-effort stub on non-Linux platforms.
func collect(r *pb.InventoryReport, includeStatic bool) {}
-11
View File
@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
package inventory
import "github.com/mrhid6/vantage/agent/internal/grpc/pb"
// Collect gathers metrics always and static hardware info when includeStatic.
// Platform specifics are provided by collect_linux.go / collect_other.go.
func Collect(includeStatic bool) *pb.InventoryReport {
r := &pb.InventoryReport{IncludeStatic: includeStatic, CPU: &pb.CPUReport{}, Memory: &pb.MemReport{}}
collect(r, includeStatic)
return r
}
-228
View File
@@ -1,228 +0,0 @@
package keys
import (
"crypto/md5"
"encoding/base64"
"fmt"
"os"
"os/exec"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
)
const authorizedKeysPath = "/root/.ssh/authorized_keys"
const sshConfigPath = "/root/.ssh/config"
const managedConfigPath = "/root/.ssh/vantage.conf"
const includeDirective = "Include /root/.ssh/vantage.conf"
func ReadAuthorizedKeys() ([]string, error) {
data, err := os.ReadFile(authorizedKeysPath)
if os.IsNotExist(err) {
return nil, nil
}
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var lines []string
for _, line := range strings.Split(string(data), "\n") {
line = strings.TrimSpace(line)
if line != "" && !strings.HasPrefix(line, "#") {
lines = append(lines, line)
}
}
return lines, nil
}
func WriteAuthorizedKeys(keys []string) error {
dir := filepath.Dir(authorizedKeysPath)
if err := os.MkdirAll(dir, 0700); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("mkdir %s: %w", dir, err)
}
content := strings.Join(keys, "\n")
if len(keys) > 0 {
content += "\n"
}
tmpPath := authorizedKeysPath + ".tmp"
if err := os.WriteFile(tmpPath, []byte(content), 0600); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("write tmp: %w", err)
}
if err := os.Rename(tmpPath, authorizedKeysPath); err != nil {
os.Remove(tmpPath)
return fmt.Errorf("rename: %w", err)
}
return os.Chmod(authorizedKeysPath, 0600)
}
func FingerprintLines(lines []string) map[string]bool {
fp := make(map[string]bool, len(lines))
for _, line := range lines {
fp[fingerprint(line)] = true
}
return fp
}
func StateChanged(current, desired []string) bool {
if len(current) != len(desired) {
return true
}
cur := FingerprintLines(current)
for _, line := range desired {
if !cur[fingerprint(line)] {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func fingerprint(pubKey string) string {
parts := strings.Fields(pubKey)
if len(parts) < 2 {
return pubKey
}
raw, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(parts[1])
if err != nil {
return pubKey
}
sum := md5.Sum(raw)
var pairs []string
for _, b := range sum {
pairs = append(pairs, fmt.Sprintf("%02x", b))
}
return "MD5:" + strings.Join(pairs, ":")
}
// KeyGenOptions controls how ssh-keygen is invoked.
type KeyGenOptions struct {
KeyType string // ed25519 (default), rsa, ecdsa
KeySize int // bits; used for rsa and ecdsa
Passphrase string // empty = no passphrase
Comment string // embedded in the public key
}
// GenerateKeyPair generates an SSH keypair and returns the public key.
// The private key is written to keyPath; keyPath+".pub" holds the public key.
func GenerateKeyPair(keyPath string, opts KeyGenOptions) (string, error) {
if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(keyPath), 0700); err != nil {
return "", err
}
keyType := opts.KeyType
if keyType == "" {
keyType = "ed25519"
}
args := []string{
"-t", keyType,
"-f", keyPath,
"-N", opts.Passphrase,
"-C", opts.Comment,
}
if opts.KeySize > 0 && keyType != "ed25519" {
args = append(args, "-b", fmt.Sprintf("%d", opts.KeySize))
}
cmd := exec.Command("ssh-keygen", args...)
out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("ssh-keygen: %w: %s", err, out)
}
pubData, err := os.ReadFile(keyPath + ".pub")
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("read pubkey: %w", err)
}
return strings.TrimSpace(string(pubData)), nil
}
// AddSSHIdentity writes an IdentityFile entry for keyPath into the managed
// vantage.conf include file, and ensures ~/.ssh/config includes it.
func AddSSHIdentity(keyPath string) error {
if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(sshConfigPath), 0700); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("mkdir .ssh: %w", err)
}
if err := ensureIncludeDirective(); err != nil {
return err
}
// Read existing managed config (it may not exist yet).
var existing string
data, err := os.ReadFile(managedConfigPath)
if err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) {
return fmt.Errorf("read %s: %w", managedConfigPath, err)
}
existing = string(data)
line := "IdentityFile " + keyPath
for _, l := range strings.Split(existing, "\n") {
if strings.TrimSpace(l) == line {
return nil // already present
}
}
if existing != "" && !strings.HasSuffix(existing, "\n") {
existing += "\n"
}
updated := existing + line + "\n"
if err := os.WriteFile(managedConfigPath, []byte(updated), 0600); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("write %s: %w", managedConfigPath, err)
}
return nil
}
// RemoveSSHIdentity removes the IdentityFile entry for keyPath from the managed config.
func RemoveSSHIdentity(keyPath string) error {
data, err := os.ReadFile(managedConfigPath)
if os.IsNotExist(err) {
return nil
}
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("read %s: %w", managedConfigPath, err)
}
line := "IdentityFile " + keyPath
var kept []string
for _, l := range strings.Split(strings.TrimRight(string(data), "\n"), "\n") {
if strings.TrimSpace(l) != line {
kept = append(kept, l)
}
}
content := strings.Join(kept, "\n")
if len(kept) > 0 {
content += "\n"
}
if err := os.WriteFile(managedConfigPath, []byte(content), 0600); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("write %s: %w", managedConfigPath, err)
}
return nil
}
// ensureIncludeDirective adds "Include /root/.ssh/vantage.conf" to the top
// of ~/.ssh/config if it is not already present. The Include must appear before
// any Host stanzas to be effective for all connections.
func ensureIncludeDirective() error {
data, err := os.ReadFile(sshConfigPath)
if err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) {
return fmt.Errorf("read %s: %w", sshConfigPath, err)
}
for _, l := range strings.Split(string(data), "\n") {
if strings.TrimSpace(l) == includeDirective {
return nil // already present
}
}
// Prepend the Include directive so it takes effect before any Host blocks.
updated := includeDirective + "\n" + string(data)
if err := os.WriteFile(sshConfigPath, []byte(updated), 0600); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("write %s: %w", sshConfigPath, err)
}
return nil
}
-166
View File
@@ -1,166 +0,0 @@
// Package monitors runs agent-side service checks. It polls the server for the
// monitors assigned to this agent (SyncMonitors), runs each on its own interval
// using the local checker package, and reports results back (ReportChecks).
package monitors
import (
"context"
"log"
"sync"
"time"
"github.com/mrhid6/vantage/agent/internal/checker"
"github.com/mrhid6/vantage/agent/internal/config"
grpcclient "github.com/mrhid6/vantage/agent/internal/grpc"
"github.com/mrhid6/vantage/agent/internal/grpc/pb"
)
// syncInterval controls how often the agent re-fetches its assigned monitors.
const syncInterval = 30 * time.Second
type runner struct {
intervalSec int
cancel context.CancelFunc
}
// Run starts the agent monitor loop and blocks until ctx is cancelled.
func Run(ctx context.Context, cfg *config.Config) {
active := map[string]*runner{}
var mu sync.Mutex
// results is a shared channel every check writes to; a single reporter
// goroutine batches and ships them so we make one ReportChecks call per tick.
results := make(chan pb.CheckResult, 64)
go reporter(ctx, cfg, results)
syncOnce := func() {
specs, err := fetchSpecs(cfg)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("monitors: sync: %v", err)
return
}
want := map[string]pb.MonitorSpec{}
for _, s := range specs {
want[s.MonitorId] = s
}
mu.Lock()
defer mu.Unlock()
for id, r := range active {
s, ok := want[id]
if !ok || s.IntervalSec != r.intervalSec {
r.cancel()
delete(active, id)
}
}
for id, s := range want {
if _, ok := active[id]; ok {
continue
}
rctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(ctx)
active[id] = &runner{intervalSec: s.IntervalSec, cancel: cancel}
go runSpec(rctx, s, results)
}
}
syncOnce()
t := time.NewTicker(syncInterval)
defer t.Stop()
for {
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return
case <-t.C:
syncOnce()
}
}
}
func fetchSpecs(cfg *config.Config) ([]pb.MonitorSpec, error) {
client, err := grpcclient.New(cfg.ServerURL, cfg.TLS)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer client.Close()
return client.SyncMonitors(cfg.ServerID, cfg.AgentToken)
}
func runSpec(ctx context.Context, s pb.MonitorSpec, out chan<- pb.CheckResult) {
interval := time.Duration(s.IntervalSec) * time.Second
if interval <= 0 {
interval = 60 * time.Second
}
spec := checker.Spec{
Type: s.Type,
URL: s.URL,
Host: s.Host,
Port: s.Port,
Method: s.Method,
ExpectedStatus: s.ExpectedStatus,
Keyword: s.Keyword,
TLSWarnDays: s.TLSWarnDays,
Insecure: s.Insecure,
TimeoutSec: s.IntervalSec,
}
run := func() {
res := checker.Run(ctx, spec)
cr := pb.CheckResult{MonitorId: s.MonitorId, Up: res.Up, LatencyMs: res.LatencyMs, Message: res.Message}
if res.CertExpiry != nil {
cr.CertExpiryUnix = res.CertExpiry.Unix()
}
select {
case out <- cr:
case <-ctx.Done():
}
}
run()
t := time.NewTicker(interval)
defer t.Stop()
for {
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return
case <-t.C:
run()
}
}
}
// reporter batches results on a short interval and ships each batch in one call.
func reporter(ctx context.Context, cfg *config.Config, in <-chan pb.CheckResult) {
t := time.NewTicker(5 * time.Second)
defer t.Stop()
var batch []pb.CheckResult
flush := func() {
if len(batch) == 0 {
return
}
client, err := grpcclient.New(cfg.ServerURL, cfg.TLS)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("monitors: report dial: %v", err)
batch = nil
return
}
if err := client.ReportChecks(cfg.ServerID, cfg.AgentToken, batch); err != nil {
log.Printf("monitors: report: %v", err)
}
client.Close()
batch = nil
}
for {
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
flush()
return
case r := <-in:
batch = append(batch, r)
if len(batch) >= 32 {
flush()
}
case <-t.C:
flush()
}
}
}
-587
View File
@@ -1,587 +0,0 @@
package agentsync
import (
"context"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/hex"
"fmt"
"io"
"log"
"net"
"net/http"
"os"
"os/exec"
"path/filepath"
"runtime"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
"github.com/mrhid6/vantage/agent/internal/config"
agentexec "github.com/mrhid6/vantage/agent/internal/exec"
grpcclient "github.com/mrhid6/vantage/agent/internal/grpc"
"github.com/mrhid6/vantage/agent/internal/grpc/pb"
"github.com/mrhid6/vantage/agent/internal/inventory"
"github.com/mrhid6/vantage/agent/internal/keys"
"github.com/mrhid6/vantage/agent/internal/monitors"
"github.com/mrhid6/vantage/agent/internal/updates"
)
func Run(ctx context.Context, cfg *config.Config, version string) error {
client, err := grpcclient.New(cfg.ServerURL, cfg.TLS)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("dial grpc: %w", err)
}
defer client.Close()
// Register if we have a pre-reg token
if cfg.PreRegToken != "" {
log.Println("registering with server...")
hostname, _ := os.Hostname()
ipAddress := localIP()
osInfo := fmt.Sprintf("%s %s", runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH)
agentToken, err := client.Register(cfg.ServerID, cfg.PreRegToken, hostname, ipAddress, osInfo)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("registration failed: %w", err)
}
cfg.AgentToken = agentToken
cfg.PreRegToken = ""
if err := config.Save(cfg); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("save config: %w", err)
}
log.Println("registration successful")
client.Close()
client, err = grpcclient.New(cfg.ServerURL, cfg.TLS)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("reconnect: %w", err)
}
}
if cfg.AgentToken == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("no agent token available — registration required")
}
// Start the command stream alongside the poll loop.
go runCommandStream(ctx, cfg)
// Check for OS updates on startup and then hourly.
go runUpdateCheck(ctx, cfg)
// Report host inventory: metrics every 30s, full static snapshot every 15 min.
go runInventory(ctx, cfg)
// Run agent-side service monitors assigned to this server.
go monitors.Run(ctx, cfg)
ticker := time.NewTicker(cfg.PollInterval)
defer ticker.Stop()
// Run immediately on startup
if err := poll(client, cfg, version); err != nil {
log.Printf("poll error: %v", err)
}
for {
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return nil
case <-ticker.C:
if err := poll(client, cfg, version); err != nil {
log.Printf("poll error: %v", err)
}
}
}
}
func poll(client *grpcclient.Client, cfg *config.Config, version string) error {
desired, err := client.SyncKeys(cfg.ServerID, cfg.AgentToken, version)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("SyncKeys: %w", err)
}
// Windows agents register and heartbeat only — no authorized_keys management.
if runtime.GOOS != "linux" {
return nil
}
current, err := keys.ReadAuthorizedKeys()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("read authorized_keys: %w", err)
}
if !keys.StateChanged(current, desired) {
log.Println("authorized_keys unchanged, skipping write")
return nil
}
if err := keys.WriteAuthorizedKeys(desired); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("write authorized_keys: %w", err)
}
log.Printf("authorized_keys updated (%d keys)", len(desired))
return nil
}
// runCommandStream maintains a persistent bidirectional stream with the server
// for instant command delivery. Reconnects with exponential backoff on failure.
func runCommandStream(ctx context.Context, cfg *config.Config) {
backoff := time.Second
const maxBackoff = 2 * time.Minute
for {
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return
default:
}
if err := connectAndHandleStream(ctx, cfg); err != nil {
if ctx.Err() != nil {
return
}
log.Printf("command stream error: %v, reconnecting in %s", err, backoff)
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return
case <-time.After(backoff):
}
if backoff < maxBackoff {
backoff *= 2
}
} else {
backoff = time.Second
}
}
}
func connectAndHandleStream(ctx context.Context, cfg *config.Config) error {
client, err := grpcclient.New(cfg.ServerURL, cfg.TLS)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("dial: %w", err)
}
defer client.Close()
stream, err := client.CommandStream(ctx)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("open stream: %w", err)
}
if err := stream.Send(&pb.AgentMessage{
ServerId: cfg.ServerID,
AgentToken: cfg.AgentToken,
Ready: &pb.AgentReady{},
}); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("send auth: %w", err)
}
log.Println("command stream connected")
// grpc streams are not safe for concurrent Send; RunStep results are sent
// from per-command goroutines, so all sends on this stream must go through
// this mutex-protected helper.
var sendMu sync.Mutex
send := func(msg *pb.AgentMessage) error {
sendMu.Lock()
defer sendMu.Unlock()
return stream.Send(msg)
}
for {
cmd, err := stream.Recv()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("recv: %w", err)
}
if cmd.GenerateKey != nil {
go handleGenerateKey(cfg, cmd)
}
if cmd.DeleteKey != nil {
go handleDeleteKey(cmd)
}
if cmd.UpdateAgent != nil {
go handleUpdateAgent(cmd)
}
if cmd.ApplyUpdates != nil {
go handleApplyUpdates(cfg, cmd)
}
if cmd.CleanupWorkspace != nil {
go handleCleanupWorkspace(cmd)
}
if cmd.RunStep != nil {
go func(rc *pb.RunStepCmd, cid string) {
emit := func(seq uint64, data []byte) {
_ = send(&pb.AgentMessage{
ServerId: cfg.ServerID,
AgentToken: cfg.AgentToken,
StepOutput: &pb.StepOutputChunk{CommandId: cid, Seq: seq, Data: data},
})
}
res := agentexec.RunStep(rc, emit)
res.CommandId = cid
// Final eof marker so the server closes the log file.
_ = send(&pb.AgentMessage{
ServerId: cfg.ServerID,
AgentToken: cfg.AgentToken,
StepOutput: &pb.StepOutputChunk{CommandId: cid, Eof: true},
})
_ = send(&pb.AgentMessage{
ServerId: cfg.ServerID,
AgentToken: cfg.AgentToken,
StepResult: res,
})
}(cmd.RunStep, cmd.CommandId)
continue
}
}
}
func runUpdateCheck(ctx context.Context, cfg *config.Config) {
const interval = time.Hour
doCheck := func() {
pkgs, err := updates.CheckAvailable()
if err != nil {
log.Printf("update check error: %v", err)
return
}
pbUpdates := make([]pb.PackageUpdate, len(pkgs))
for i, p := range pkgs {
pbUpdates[i] = pb.PackageUpdate{
Name: p.Name,
CurrentVersion: p.CurrentVersion,
NewVersion: p.NewVersion,
}
}
client, err := grpcclient.New(cfg.ServerURL, cfg.TLS)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("update report dial error: %v", err)
return
}
defer client.Close()
if err := client.ReportUpdates(cfg.ServerID, cfg.AgentToken, pbUpdates); err != nil {
log.Printf("ReportUpdates error: %v", err)
return
}
log.Printf("reported %d available OS updates", len(pkgs))
}
doCheck()
ticker := time.NewTicker(interval)
defer ticker.Stop()
for {
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return
case <-ticker.C:
doCheck()
}
}
}
// runInventory reports host metrics every 30s and a full static snapshot every
// 15 min (and once immediately on startup so static fields populate without delay).
func runInventory(ctx context.Context, cfg *config.Config) {
client, err := grpcclient.New(cfg.ServerURL, cfg.TLS)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("inventory dial error: %v", err)
return
}
defer client.Close()
report := func(static bool) {
r := inventory.Collect(static)
r.ServerId = cfg.ServerID
r.AgentToken = cfg.AgentToken
if err := client.ReportInventory(r); err != nil {
log.Printf("report inventory: %v", err)
}
}
report(true) // full snapshot on startup
ticker := time.NewTicker(30 * time.Second)
defer ticker.Stop()
tick := 0
for {
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return
case <-ticker.C:
tick++
report(tick%30 == 0) // every 30th tick = 15 min → include static
}
}
}
func handleApplyUpdates(cfg *config.Config, cmd *pb.ServerCommand) {
log.Printf("applying OS updates (cmd=%s)…", cmd.CommandId)
if err := updates.ApplyAll(); err != nil {
log.Printf("OS upgrade failed (cmd=%s): %v", cmd.CommandId, err)
return
}
log.Printf("OS updates applied successfully (cmd=%s)", cmd.CommandId)
// Re-report the (now empty) update list so the server reflects the new state.
client, err := grpcclient.New(cfg.ServerURL, cfg.TLS)
if err != nil {
return
}
defer client.Close()
_ = client.ReportUpdates(cfg.ServerID, cfg.AgentToken, nil)
}
func handleCleanupWorkspace(cmd *pb.ServerCommand) {
id := cmd.CleanupWorkspace.WorkspaceId
dir := agentexec.WorkspacePath(id)
if err := os.RemoveAll(dir); err != nil {
log.Printf("cleanup workspace %s failed (cmd=%s): %v", dir, cmd.CommandId, err)
return
}
log.Printf("removed run workspace %s (cmd=%s)", dir, cmd.CommandId)
}
func handleDeleteKey(cmd *pb.ServerCommand) {
label := cmd.DeleteKey.Label
keyPath := fmt.Sprintf("/root/.ssh/vantage_%s", strings.ReplaceAll(label, " ", "_"))
if err := keys.RemoveSSHIdentity(keyPath); err != nil {
log.Printf("remove ssh identity failed (cmd=%s): %v", cmd.CommandId, err)
}
for _, path := range []string{keyPath, keyPath + ".pub"} {
if err := os.Remove(path); err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) {
log.Printf("delete key file %s (cmd=%s): %v", path, cmd.CommandId, err)
}
}
log.Printf("deleted local key files for %q (cmd=%s)", label, cmd.CommandId)
}
func handleUpdateAgent(cmd *pb.ServerCommand) {
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
handleUpdateAgentWindows(cmd)
return
}
u := cmd.UpdateAgent
arch := runtime.GOARCH // "amd64" or "arm64"
tag := "agent%2Fv" + u.Version
binaryURL := fmt.Sprintf("%s/mrhid6/vantage/releases/download/%s/vantage-agent-linux-%s", u.GiteaBaseURL, tag, arch)
checksumURL := fmt.Sprintf("%s/mrhid6/vantage/releases/download/%s/checksums.txt", u.GiteaBaseURL, tag)
log.Printf("updating agent to v%s from %s (cmd=%s)", u.Version, u.GiteaBaseURL, cmd.CommandId)
// Download binary
tmpBin := "/tmp/vantage-agent-update"
if err := downloadFile(binaryURL, tmpBin); err != nil {
log.Printf("update download failed (cmd=%s): %v", cmd.CommandId, err)
return
}
// Download and verify checksum
checksumData, err := httpGetBytes(checksumURL)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("update checksum fetch failed (cmd=%s): %v", cmd.CommandId, err)
return
}
if err := verifyChecksum(tmpBin, fmt.Sprintf("vantage-agent-linux-%s", arch), checksumData); err != nil {
log.Printf("update checksum mismatch (cmd=%s): %v", cmd.CommandId, err)
os.Remove(tmpBin)
return
}
if err := os.Chmod(tmpBin, 0755); err != nil {
log.Printf("update chmod failed (cmd=%s): %v", cmd.CommandId, err)
return
}
if err := os.Rename(tmpBin, "/usr/local/bin/vantage-agent"); err != nil {
log.Printf("update replace binary failed (cmd=%s): %v", cmd.CommandId, err)
return
}
log.Printf("agent binary replaced, restarting service (cmd=%s)", cmd.CommandId)
exec.Command("systemctl", "restart", "vantage-agent").Run()
}
// handleUpdateAgentWindows downloads the latest MSI and launches msiexec to
// perform a MajorUpgrade. msiexec is started DETACHED (via "cmd /c start") so
// that when the upgrade stops the VantageAgent service, nssm's process-tree
// kill of this agent does not also kill the installer mid-flight. Config
// (server_id, agent_token) is preserved by setup.ps1 on upgrade.
func handleUpdateAgentWindows(cmd *pb.ServerCommand) {
u := cmd.UpdateAgent
tag := "agent%2Fv" + u.Version
msiURL := fmt.Sprintf("%s/mrhid6/vantage/releases/download/%s/vantage-agent.msi", u.GiteaBaseURL, tag)
checksumURL := fmt.Sprintf("%s/mrhid6/vantage/releases/download/%s/checksums-msi.txt", u.GiteaBaseURL, tag)
log.Printf("updating agent to v%s from %s (cmd=%s)", u.Version, u.GiteaBaseURL, cmd.CommandId)
msiPath := filepath.Join(os.TempDir(), "vantage-agent-update.msi")
if err := downloadFile(msiURL, msiPath); err != nil {
log.Printf("update download failed (cmd=%s): %v", cmd.CommandId, err)
return
}
checksumData, err := httpGetBytes(checksumURL)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("update checksum fetch failed (cmd=%s): %v", cmd.CommandId, err)
return
}
if err := verifyChecksum(msiPath, "vantage-agent.msi", checksumData); err != nil {
log.Printf("update checksum mismatch (cmd=%s): %v", cmd.CommandId, err)
os.Remove(msiPath)
return
}
logPath := filepath.Join(os.TempDir(), "vantage-agent-msi.log")
log.Printf("launching msiexec for upgrade to v%s (cmd=%s)", u.Version, cmd.CommandId)
// "start" detaches msiexec from this process tree so the service stop
// during the upgrade does not terminate the installer.
up := exec.Command("cmd", "/c", "start", "", "/wait", "msiexec", "/i", msiPath, "/qn", "/norestart", "/l*v", logPath)
if err := up.Start(); err != nil {
log.Printf("failed to launch msiexec (cmd=%s): %v", cmd.CommandId, err)
return
}
}
func downloadFile(url, dest string) error {
resp, err := http.Get(url) //nolint:gosec
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
return fmt.Errorf("HTTP %d from %s", resp.StatusCode, url)
}
f, err := os.Create(dest)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer f.Close()
_, err = io.Copy(f, resp.Body)
return err
}
func httpGetBytes(url string) ([]byte, error) {
resp, err := http.Get(url) //nolint:gosec
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("HTTP %d from %s", resp.StatusCode, url)
}
return io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
}
func verifyChecksum(filePath, filename string, checksumData []byte) error {
f, err := os.Open(filePath)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer f.Close()
h := sha256.New()
if _, err := io.Copy(h, f); err != nil {
return err
}
actual := hex.EncodeToString(h.Sum(nil))
for _, line := range strings.Split(string(checksumData), "\n") {
fields := strings.Fields(line)
if len(fields) == 2 && fields[1] == filename {
if fields[0] != actual {
return fmt.Errorf("expected %s got %s", fields[0], actual)
}
return nil
}
}
return fmt.Errorf("no checksum entry found for %s", filename)
}
func handleGenerateKey(cfg *config.Config, cmd *pb.ServerCommand) {
g := cmd.GenerateKey
label := g.Label
keyPath := fmt.Sprintf("/root/.ssh/vantage_%s", strings.ReplaceAll(label, " ", "_"))
opts := keys.KeyGenOptions{
KeyType: g.KeyType,
KeySize: g.KeySize,
Passphrase: g.Passphrase,
Comment: g.Comment,
}
pubKey, err := keys.GenerateKeyPair(keyPath, opts)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("key generation failed (cmd=%s): %v", cmd.CommandId, err)
return
}
privKeyData, err := os.ReadFile(keyPath)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("read private key failed (cmd=%s): %v", cmd.CommandId, err)
return
}
client, err := grpcclient.New(cfg.ServerURL, cfg.TLS)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("dial for key upload failed (cmd=%s): %v", cmd.CommandId, err)
return
}
defer client.Close()
keyID, err := client.UploadGeneratedKey(cfg.ServerID, cfg.AgentToken, pubKey, string(privKeyData), label)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("key upload failed (cmd=%s): %v", cmd.CommandId, err)
return
}
if err := keys.AddSSHIdentity(keyPath); err != nil {
log.Printf("add ssh identity failed (cmd=%s): %v", cmd.CommandId, err)
}
log.Printf("generated and uploaded key %q (key_id=%s, cmd=%s)", label, keyID, cmd.CommandId)
}
func localIP() string {
addrs, err := net.InterfaceAddrs()
if err != nil {
return ""
}
for _, addr := range addrs {
if ipNet, ok := addr.(*net.IPNet); ok && !ipNet.IP.IsLoopback() {
if ipNet.IP.To4() != nil {
return ipNet.IP.String()
}
}
}
return ""
}
// GenerateAndUpload generates an SSH keypair and uploads the public key to the server.
func GenerateAndUpload(cfg *config.Config, label string) error {
client, err := grpcclient.New(cfg.ServerURL, cfg.TLS)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer client.Close()
keyPath := fmt.Sprintf("/root/.ssh/vantage_%s", strings.ReplaceAll(label, " ", "_"))
pubKey, err := keys.GenerateKeyPair(keyPath, keys.KeyGenOptions{Comment: label})
if err != nil {
return err
}
privKeyData, err := os.ReadFile(keyPath)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("read private key: %w", err)
}
keyID, err := client.UploadGeneratedKey(cfg.ServerID, cfg.AgentToken, pubKey, string(privKeyData), label)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if err := keys.AddSSHIdentity(keyPath); err != nil {
log.Printf("add ssh identity: %v", err)
}
log.Printf("uploaded generated key %s (key_id=%s)", label, keyID)
return nil
}
-239
View File
@@ -1,239 +0,0 @@
package updates
import (
"bufio"
"bytes"
"context"
"os/exec"
"strings"
"time"
)
type PackageUpdate struct {
Name string
CurrentVersion string
NewVersion string
}
func detectPM() string {
for _, pm := range []string{"apt-get", "dnf", "yum", "pacman", "zypper", "apk"} {
if _, err := exec.LookPath(pm); err == nil {
if pm == "apt-get" {
return "apt"
}
return pm
}
}
return ""
}
// CheckAvailable returns the list of packages with available upgrades.
// Returns nil, nil when no supported package manager is found.
func CheckAvailable() ([]PackageUpdate, error) {
switch detectPM() {
case "apt":
return checkApt()
case "dnf":
return checkDnfYum("dnf")
case "yum":
return checkDnfYum("yum")
case "pacman":
return checkPacman()
case "zypper":
return checkZypper()
case "apk":
return checkApk()
default:
return nil, nil
}
}
// ApplyAll runs a full non-interactive upgrade using the detected package manager.
func ApplyAll() error {
switch detectPM() {
case "apt":
// Refresh lists first, then upgrade.
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Minute)
defer cancel()
if err := exec.CommandContext(ctx, "apt-get", "update", "-qq").Run(); err != nil {
return err
}
return exec.CommandContext(ctx, "apt-get", "upgrade", "-y").Run()
case "dnf":
return exec.Command("dnf", "upgrade", "-y").Run()
case "yum":
return exec.Command("yum", "upgrade", "-y").Run()
case "pacman":
return exec.Command("pacman", "-Syu", "--noconfirm").Run()
case "zypper":
return exec.Command("zypper", "update", "-y").Run()
case "apk":
return exec.Command("apk", "upgrade").Run()
default:
return nil
}
}
func checkApt() ([]PackageUpdate, error) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 2*time.Minute)
defer cancel()
// Best-effort refresh; ignore errors (cached data is fine).
exec.CommandContext(ctx, "apt-get", "update", "-qq").Run() //nolint:errcheck
out, err := exec.Command("apt", "list", "--upgradable").Output()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var updates []PackageUpdate
scanner := bufio.NewScanner(bytes.NewReader(out))
for scanner.Scan() {
line := scanner.Text()
// Format: package/suite version arch [upgradable from: old-ver]
if !strings.Contains(line, "[upgradable from:") {
continue
}
parts := strings.Fields(line)
if len(parts) < 2 {
continue
}
name := strings.SplitN(parts[0], "/", 2)[0]
newVer := parts[1]
oldVer := ""
if idx := strings.Index(line, "upgradable from: "); idx != -1 {
rest := line[idx+len("upgradable from: "):]
oldVer = strings.TrimSuffix(strings.TrimSpace(rest), "]")
}
updates = append(updates, PackageUpdate{Name: name, CurrentVersion: oldVer, NewVersion: newVer})
}
return updates, nil
}
func checkDnfYum(pm string) ([]PackageUpdate, error) {
cmd := exec.Command(pm, "check-update")
out, err := cmd.Output()
// Exit code 100 means updates are available — not an error.
if exitErr, ok := err.(*exec.ExitError); ok && exitErr.ExitCode() == 100 {
err = nil
}
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var updates []PackageUpdate
pastHeader := false
scanner := bufio.NewScanner(bytes.NewReader(out))
for scanner.Scan() {
line := scanner.Text()
if !pastHeader {
if strings.TrimSpace(line) == "" {
pastHeader = true
}
continue
}
parts := strings.Fields(line)
if len(parts) < 2 {
continue
}
// name.arch new-version repo
name := strings.SplitN(parts[0], ".", 2)[0]
updates = append(updates, PackageUpdate{Name: name, NewVersion: parts[1]})
}
return updates, nil
}
func checkPacman() ([]PackageUpdate, error) {
out, _ := exec.Command("pacman", "-Qu").Output()
var updates []PackageUpdate
scanner := bufio.NewScanner(bytes.NewReader(out))
for scanner.Scan() {
parts := strings.Fields(scanner.Text())
// Format: package old-version -> new-version
if len(parts) < 4 {
continue
}
updates = append(updates, PackageUpdate{Name: parts[0], CurrentVersion: parts[1], NewVersion: parts[3]})
}
return updates, nil
}
func checkZypper() ([]PackageUpdate, error) {
out, err := exec.Command("zypper", "list-updates").Output()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var updates []PackageUpdate
scanner := bufio.NewScanner(bytes.NewReader(out))
for scanner.Scan() {
line := scanner.Text()
// Data rows start with "v |" (available) or "i |" (installed but updatable).
if !strings.HasPrefix(line, "v |") && !strings.HasPrefix(line, "i |") {
continue
}
parts := strings.Split(line, "|")
if len(parts) < 5 {
continue
}
updates = append(updates, PackageUpdate{
Name: strings.TrimSpace(parts[2]),
CurrentVersion: strings.TrimSpace(parts[3]),
NewVersion: strings.TrimSpace(parts[4]),
})
}
return updates, nil
}
func checkApk() ([]PackageUpdate, error) {
out, err := exec.Command("apk", "list", "--upgradable").Output()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var updates []PackageUpdate
scanner := bufio.NewScanner(bytes.NewReader(out))
for scanner.Scan() {
line := scanner.Text()
if !strings.Contains(line, "[upgradable") {
continue
}
parts := strings.Fields(line)
if len(parts) < 1 {
continue
}
pkgVer := parts[0]
name := apkName(pkgVer)
newVer := apkVersion(pkgVer)
oldVer := ""
if idx := strings.Index(line, "upgradable from:"); idx != -1 {
rest := strings.TrimSpace(line[idx+len("upgradable from:"):])
rest = strings.TrimSuffix(rest, "]")
oldVer = apkVersion(strings.TrimSpace(rest))
}
updates = append(updates, PackageUpdate{Name: name, CurrentVersion: oldVer, NewVersion: newVer})
}
return updates, nil
}
func apkName(pkgVer string) string {
parts := strings.Split(pkgVer, "-")
var name []string
for _, p := range parts {
if len(p) > 0 && p[0] >= '0' && p[0] <= '9' {
break
}
name = append(name, p)
}
return strings.Join(name, "-")
}
func apkVersion(pkgVer string) string {
parts := strings.Split(pkgVer, "-")
var ver []string
inVer := false
for _, p := range parts {
if !inVer && len(p) > 0 && p[0] >= '0' && p[0] <= '9' {
inVer = true
}
if inVer {
ver = append(ver, p)
}
}
return strings.Join(ver, "-")
}
-351
View File
@@ -1,351 +0,0 @@
# Vantage
A self-hosted SSH key management system. A central server (Go + Next.js + MongoDB) manages public key assignments across servers. A lightweight Go agent runs on each managed server, polls the central server via gRPC, and atomically rewrites `/root/.ssh/authorized_keys` to match the desired state.
---
## Architecture Overview
```
┌─────────────────────────────────┐
│ Next.js Frontend │
│ - Upload/manage keys │
│ - Add servers (install script) │
│ - Assign/revoke per server │
└────────────┬────────────────────┘
│ REST
┌────────────▼────────────────────┐
│ Go Backend │
│ - REST API for frontend │
│ - gRPC server for agents │
│ - MongoDB │
└────────────┬────────────────────┘
│ gRPC (TLS)
┌────────────▼────────────────────┐
│ Go Agent (per server) │
│ - Polls every 30s │
│ - Rewrites authorized_keys │
│ - Can generate SSH keypairs │
└─────────────────────────────────┘
```
---
## Repository Structure
```
vantage/
├── agent/
│ ├── cmd/main.go
│ └── internal/
│ ├── config/
│ ├── grpc/
│ ├── keys/
│ └── sync/
├── server/
│ ├── cmd/main.go
│ └── internal/
│ ├── api/ # REST handlers for Next.js
│ ├── grpc/ # gRPC server implementation
│ ├── models/ # MongoDB models
│ └── services/
│ ├── keys.go
│ ├── servers.go
│ └── sync.go # builds desired state per server
├── web/
│ ├── app/
│ └── components/
├── proto/
│ └── vantage/v1/vantage.proto
├── deploy/
│ ├── docker-compose.yml
│ └── agent.service
└── .gitea/
└── workflows/
├── agent-release.yml
└── server-deploy.yml
```
---
## gRPC API
```protobuf
syntax = "proto3";
package vantage.v1;
service Vantage {
rpc Register(RegisterRequest) returns (RegisterResponse);
rpc SyncKeys(SyncRequest) returns (SyncResponse);
rpc UploadGeneratedKey(UploadKeyRequest) returns (UploadKeyResponse);
}
message RegisterRequest {
string server_id = 1;
string pre_reg_token = 2;
string hostname = 3;
string ip_address = 4;
string os_info = 5;
}
message RegisterResponse {
string agent_token = 1;
}
message SyncRequest {
string server_id = 1;
string agent_token = 2;
}
message SyncResponse {
repeated string public_keys = 1; // full authorized_keys lines
}
message UploadKeyRequest {
string server_id = 1;
string agent_token = 2;
string public_key = 3;
string label = 4;
}
message UploadKeyResponse {
string key_id = 1;
}
```
No streaming — polling only. Poll interval: **30 seconds**.
---
## MongoDB Collections
### `servers`
```json
{
"_id": "ObjectId",
"server_id": "uuid",
"hostname": "proxmox-node-1",
"ip_address": "10.10.10.5",
"os_info": "Ubuntu 24.04",
"pre_reg_token": "abc123",
"pre_reg_expires": "ISODate",
"agent_token_hash": "sha256...",
"status": "pending|active|offline",
"last_seen": "ISODate",
"created_at": "ISODate"
}
```
- `pre_reg_token` is cleared after the agent successfully calls `Register()`
- `agent_token_hash` stores SHA-256 of the token — never plaintext
- `status` transitions: `pending``active` on first `Register()`, `offline` if last_seen exceeds threshold
### `keys`
```json
{
"_id": "ObjectId",
"key_id": "uuid",
"label": "dom-macbook",
"public_key": "ssh-ed25519 AAAA...",
"fingerprint": "SHA256:...",
"source": "uploaded|generated",
"generated_by_server_id": "uuid",
"created_at": "ISODate"
}
```
### `assignments`
```json
{
"_id": "ObjectId",
"key_id": "uuid",
"server_id": "uuid",
"assigned_at": "ISODate",
"revoked_at": "ISODate | null"
}
```
- `revoked_at: null` = key is active on that server
- Revocation is soft — set `revoked_at`, agent picks it up on next poll
---
## Agent Lifecycle
### Config file — `/etc/vantage/config.yaml`
```yaml
server_url: "vantage.yourdomain.com:9090"
server_id: "<uuid>"
pre_reg_token: "<token>" # removed after first successful Register()
agent_token: "" # written by agent after Register()
poll_interval: 30s
tls: true
```
Config file permissions: `0600`. Config directory: `0700`.
### Startup flow
```
1. Load config
2. If pre_reg_token present:
→ call Register(server_id, pre_reg_token, hostname, ip, os_info)
→ save returned agent_token to config
→ delete pre_reg_token from config
3. Enter poll loop
```
### Poll loop (every 30s)
```
1. Call SyncKeys(server_id, agent_token)
2. Receive []public_keys
3. Compute fingerprints of current /root/.ssh/authorized_keys
4. If state unchanged → skip write
5. If changed:
→ write to /root/.ssh/authorized_keys.tmp
→ os.Rename() to /root/.ssh/authorized_keys (atomic)
→ chmod 0600
```
### Key generation (on demand)
- Triggered by a flag or API call from the server
- Runs `ssh-keygen` via `exec.Command`
- Uploads public key via `UploadGeneratedKey()`
- Private key stays local on the machine
### Systemd unit — `/etc/systemd/system/vantage-agent.service`
```ini
[Unit]
Description=Vantage Agent
After=network.target
[Service]
ExecStart=/usr/local/bin/vantage-agent
Restart=always
RestartSec=10
User=root
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
```
---
## Server Registration Flow
1. Click **Add Server** in the UI
2. Backend generates a short-lived pre-registration token (TTL: 1 hour) and a `server_id`
3. UI displays a one-liner install command with copy button:
```bash
curl -fsSL https://vantage.yourdomain.com/install | \
bash -s -- --server-id=<id> --token=<token>
```
4. Install script:
- Detects arch (`amd64` / `arm64`)
- Downloads agent binary from Gitea release
- Verifies SHA-256 checksum
- Writes `/etc/vantage/config.yaml`
- Installs and starts systemd unit
5. On first `SyncKeys` call, server marks status as `active`
The backend serves `/install` dynamically, injecting the latest agent version by querying the Gitea API for the most recent `agent/v*` release tag.
---
## Security
- gRPC over TLS (Let's Encrypt or self-signed with cert pinning on the agent)
- Agent authenticates with a per-server token stored at `/etc/vantage/config.yaml` (`0600`)
- Server stores `SHA-256(agent_token)` — never the plaintext token
- Private keys generated by agents are encrypted at rest in MongoDB (AES-256)
- `authorized_keys` written as `0600`, owned by root
- Pre-registration tokens are short-lived (1 hour) and single-use
- Agent runs as `root` (required for `/root/.ssh/authorized_keys` writes)
---
## Frontend Routes
| Route | Purpose |
| --------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `/servers` | List all servers, online/offline status badge, last seen timestamp |
| `/servers/new` | Displays the one-liner install script with copy button |
| `/servers/[id]` | Keys installed on this server, trigger key generation, remove server |
| `/keys` | All keys — label, fingerprint, source, assigned count |
| `/keys/[id]` | Assign key to servers, revoke per server |
---
## CI/CD — Gitea Actions
### Agent release — `.gitea/workflows/agent-release.yml`
Triggered by a `agent/v*` tag. Cross-compiles for `linux/amd64` and `linux/arm64`, creates a Gitea release with binaries and checksums.
```yaml
on:
push:
tags:
- "agent/v*"
```
Build command:
```bash
GOOS=linux GOARCH=amd64 go build \
-ldflags="-s -w -X main.Version=${VERSION}" \
-o dist/vantage-agent-linux-amd64 ./cmd
```
Release assets:
- `vantage-agent-linux-amd64`
- `vantage-agent-linux-arm64`
- `checksums.txt`
### Server deploy — `.gitea/workflows/server-deploy.yml`
Triggered on pushes to `main` touching `server/**`, `web/**`, or `proto/**`. Builds and pushes Docker images to the Gitea container registry, then deploys via SSH:
```bash
cd /opt/vantage && docker compose pull && docker compose up -d --remove-orphans
```
### Tagging convention
```bash
# Release a new agent version
git tag agent/v1.0.0 && git push origin agent/v1.0.0
# Server + web deploy automatically on push to main
git push origin main
```
### Required Gitea secrets / variables
| Name | Type | Value |
| ------------------- | -------- | ------------------------------------------ |
| `RELEASE_TOKEN` | Secret | Gitea API token with `write:release` scope |
| `REGISTRY_USER` | Secret | Gitea username |
| `REGISTRY_PASSWORD` | Secret | Gitea token with `write:packages` scope |
| `DEPLOY_HOST` | Secret | IP/hostname of the server VM |
| `DEPLOY_USER` | Secret | SSH user for deploy |
| `DEPLOY_SSH_KEY` | Secret | Private key for deploy SSH |
| `GITEA_HOST` | Variable | `gitea.hostxtra.co.uk` |
---
## Design Decisions
- **gRPC over REST for agent communication** — strong typing, easy versioning, bi-directional streaming available later if push-based updates are needed
- **Poll-only, no streaming** — 30s interval is sufficient for a homelab; simplifies agent implementation
- **Outbound-only agent connections** — no inbound firewall holes required on managed servers
- **Atomic `authorized_keys` rewrite** — write to `.tmp` then `os.Rename()` prevents partial writes
- **Fingerprint diffing before write** — avoids unnecessary disk writes on unchanged state
- **Soft revocation** — `revoked_at` timestamp rather than hard deletes; preserves audit history
- **root only** — manages `/root/.ssh/authorized_keys` only; no per-user key management
- **Gitea releases for agent binaries** — slots into existing act_runner CI pipeline; install script queries Gitea API for latest version at serve time
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
{
"kind": "vantage.step/v1",
"name": "Apply Package Updates",
"description": "Apply all pending OS package updates. Supports apt, dnf, yum, zypper, apk and pacman.",
"interpreter": "bash",
"script": "set -u\nif command -v apt-get >/dev/null 2>&1; then\n export DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive\n apt-get update -qq && apt-get -y -qq upgrade\nelif command -v dnf >/dev/null 2>&1; then\n dnf -y upgrade\nelif command -v yum >/dev/null 2>&1; then\n yum -y update\nelif command -v zypper >/dev/null 2>&1; then\n zypper --non-interactive update\nelif command -v apk >/dev/null 2>&1; then\n apk update && apk upgrade\nelif command -v pacman >/dev/null 2>&1; then\n pacman -Syu --noconfirm\nelse\n echo \"no supported package manager found\"\n exit 1\nfi\nretVal=$?\nif [ $retVal -ne 0 ]; then\n echo \"package update failed\"\n exit 1\nfi\necho \"packages up to date\"\n# Debian and Ubuntu drop this file when a new kernel or libc needs a restart.\n# Reported rather than acted on: rebooting a fleet is a decision, not a detail.\nif [ -f /var/run/reboot-required ]; then\n echo \"REBOOT_REQUIRED=true\" >> $WORKFLOW_ENV\n echo \"a reboot is required to finish applying updates\"\nelse\n echo \"REBOOT_REQUIRED=false\" >> $WORKFLOW_ENV\nfi",
"declared_outputs": [
"REBOOT_REQUIRED"
],
"declared_inputs": [],
"secret_refs": []
}
+23
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@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
{
"kind": "vantage.step/v1",
"name": "Check Port Is Listening",
"description": "Fail unless something is listening on a TCP port.",
"interpreter": "bash",
"script": "set -u\nhost=\"${host:-127.0.0.1}\"\nif command -v nc >/dev/null 2>&1; then\n nc -z -w 5 \"$host\" \"$port\" >/dev/null 2>&1\n ok=$?\nelse\n # bash builds /dev/tcp in, so this needs nothing installed.\n timeout 5 bash -c \"cat < /dev/null > /dev/tcp/$host/$port\" >/dev/null 2>&1\n ok=$?\nfi\nif [ $ok -ne 0 ]; then\n echo \"PORT_OPEN=false\" >> $WORKFLOW_ENV\n echo \"nothing listening on $host:$port\"\n exit 1\nfi\necho \"PORT_OPEN=true\" >> $WORKFLOW_ENV\necho \"$host:$port is open\"",
"declared_outputs": [
"PORT_OPEN"
],
"declared_inputs": [
{
"name": "host",
"default": "127.0.0.1",
"description": "host to test"
},
{
"name": "port",
"default": "",
"description": "TCP port to test"
}
],
"secret_refs": []
}
+23
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@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
{
"kind": "vantage.step/v1",
"name": "Copy File/Directory",
"description": "Copy a file or directory, preserving mode, ownership and timestamps.",
"interpreter": "bash",
"script": "set -u\nif [ ! -e \"$source\" ]; then\n echo \"source $source does not exist\"\n exit 1\nfi\ncp -a \"$source\" \"$destination\" || { echo \"failed to copy $source to $destination\"; exit 1; }\necho \"copied $source to $destination\"\necho \"DEST_PATH=$destination\" >> $WORKFLOW_ENV",
"declared_outputs": [
"DEST_PATH"
],
"declared_inputs": [
{
"name": "source",
"default": "",
"description": "path to copy from"
},
{
"name": "destination",
"default": "",
"description": "path to copy to"
}
],
"secret_refs": []
}
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
{
"kind": "vantage.step/v1",
"name": "Create Directory",
"description": "Create a directory, including any missing parents.",
"interpreter": "bash",
"script": "set -u\nmkdir -p \"$path\" || { echo \"failed to create $path\"; exit 1; }\nif [ -n \"${mode:-}\" ]; then\n chmod \"$mode\" \"$path\" || { echo \"failed to set mode $mode on $path\"; exit 1; }\nfi\necho \"created $path\"\necho \"DIR_PATH=$path\" >> $WORKFLOW_ENV",
"declared_outputs": [
"DIR_PATH"
],
"declared_inputs": [
{
"name": "path",
"default": "",
"description": "directory to create"
},
{
"name": "mode",
"default": "",
"description": "optional octal mode, e.g. 0750"
}
],
"secret_refs": []
}
+16
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@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
{
"kind": "vantage.step/v1",
"name": "Delete File/Directory",
"description": "Delete a path. Refuses the root filesystem and an empty value.",
"interpreter": "bash",
"script": "set -u\n# A step that runs as root on every server in a selector has to refuse the\n# one input that would wipe the fleet. An unset variable expands to empty,\n# so the empty case is the accident this actually guards against.\ncase \"$path\" in\n \"\"|\"/\"|\"/.\"|\"/..\")\n echo \"refusing to delete '$path'\"\n exit 1\n ;;\nesac\nif [ ! -e \"$path\" ]; then\n echo \"$path does not exist, nothing to do\"\n exit 0\nfi\nrm -rf \"$path\" || { echo \"failed to delete $path\"; exit 1; }\necho \"deleted $path\"",
"declared_outputs": [],
"declared_inputs": [
{
"name": "path",
"default": "",
"description": "path to delete"
}
],
"secret_refs": []
}
+24
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@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
{
"kind": "vantage.step/v1",
"name": "Disk Usage Report",
"description": "Report usage for a mount point and fail past a threshold.",
"interpreter": "bash",
"script": "set -u\nmount=\"${mountPoint:-/}\"\nlimit=\"${maxPercent:-90}\"\ndf -h \"$mount\"\nused=$(df --output=pcent \"$mount\" | tail -1 | tr -dc \"0-9\")\navail=$(df -h --output=avail \"$mount\" | tail -1 | tr -d \" \")\necho \"DISK_USED_PERCENT=$used\" >> $WORKFLOW_ENV\necho \"DISK_AVAILABLE=$avail\" >> $WORKFLOW_ENV\nif [ \"$used\" -ge \"$limit\" ]; then\n echo \"$mount is ${used}% full, at or over the ${limit}% limit\"\n exit 1\nfi\necho \"$mount is ${used}% full, ${avail} available\"",
"declared_outputs": [
"DISK_USED_PERCENT",
"DISK_AVAILABLE"
],
"declared_inputs": [
{
"name": "mountPoint",
"default": "/",
"description": "mount point to measure"
},
{
"name": "maxPercent",
"default": "90",
"description": "fail at or above this percentage"
}
],
"secret_refs": []
}
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
{
"kind": "vantage.step/v1",
"name": "Docker Compose Pull and Up",
"description": "Pull the latest images for a compose project and recreate its containers.",
"interpreter": "bash",
"script": "set -u\ncd \"$projectDir\" || { echo \"no such directory: $projectDir\"; exit 1; }\nif docker compose version >/dev/null 2>&1; then\n dc=\"docker compose\"\nelif command -v docker-compose >/dev/null 2>&1; then\n dc=\"docker-compose\"\nelse\n echo \"docker compose is not installed\"\n exit 1\nfi\n$dc pull || { echo \"pull failed\"; exit 1; }\n$dc up -d --remove-orphans || { echo \"up failed\"; exit 1; }\n$dc ps",
"declared_outputs": [],
"declared_inputs": [
{
"name": "projectDir",
"default": "",
"description": "directory holding docker-compose.yml"
}
],
"secret_refs": []
}
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
{
"kind": "vantage.step/v1",
"name": "Download File (Linux)",
"description": "Download a file over HTTP to a local path",
"interpreter": "bash",
"script": "out=$(mktemp -p ./)\necho \"Downloading file from $url\"\nwget -q $url -O $out\nretVal=$?\nif [ $retVal -ne 0 ]; then\n echo \"failed to download file from url\"\n exit 1\nfi\necho \"FILE_PATH=$out\" \u003e\u003e $WORKFLOW_ENV",
"declared_outputs": ["FILE_PATH"],
"declared_inputs": [
{
"name": "url",
"default": "",
"description": ""
}
],
"secret_refs": []
}
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
{
"kind": "vantage.step/v1",
"name": "Enable Linux Service",
"description": "Enable a systemd unit so it starts on boot.",
"interpreter": "bash",
"script": "set -u\necho \"enabling service $serviceName\"\nsystemctl enable \"$serviceName\" || { echo \"failed to enable $serviceName\"; exit 1; }\necho \"$serviceName enabled\"",
"declared_outputs": [],
"declared_inputs": [
{
"name": "serviceName",
"default": "",
"description": "systemd unit to enable"
}
],
"secret_refs": []
}
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
{
"kind": "vantage.step/v1",
"name": "Extract Archive",
"description": "Extract a tar, tar.gz, tar.bz2, tar.xz or zip archive into a directory.",
"interpreter": "bash",
"script": "set -u\ndest=\"${destination:-.}\"\nif [ ! -f \"$archive\" ]; then\n echo \"archive $archive does not exist\"\n exit 1\nfi\nmkdir -p \"$dest\"\ncase \"$archive\" in\n *.tar.gz|*.tgz) tar -xzf \"$archive\" -C \"$dest\" ;;\n *.tar.bz2|*.tbz2) tar -xjf \"$archive\" -C \"$dest\" ;;\n *.tar.xz|*.txz) tar -xJf \"$archive\" -C \"$dest\" ;;\n *.tar) tar -xf \"$archive\" -C \"$dest\" ;;\n *.zip)\n command -v unzip >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo \"unzip is not installed\"; exit 1; }\n unzip -oq \"$archive\" -d \"$dest\"\n ;;\n *)\n echo \"unsupported archive type: $archive\"\n exit 1\n ;;\nesac\nretVal=$?\nif [ $retVal -ne 0 ]; then\n echo \"failed to extract $archive\"\n exit 1\nfi\necho \"extracted $archive into $dest\"\necho \"EXTRACT_DIR=$dest\" >> $WORKFLOW_ENV",
"declared_outputs": [
"EXTRACT_DIR"
],
"declared_inputs": [
{
"name": "archive",
"default": "",
"description": "archive file to extract"
},
{
"name": "destination",
"default": ".",
"description": "directory to extract into"
}
],
"secret_refs": []
}
+10
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@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
{
"kind": "vantage.step/v1",
"name": "Get Host Name",
"description": "Gets the agents hostname",
"interpreter": "bash",
"script": "HOSTNAME=$(hostname)\necho $HOSTNAME\necho \"HOSTNAME=$HOSTNAME\" \u003e\u003e $WORKFLOW_ENV",
"declared_outputs": ["HOSTNAME"],
"declared_inputs": [],
"secret_refs": []
}
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
{
"kind": "vantage.step/v1",
"name": "HTTP Health Check",
"description": "Request a URL and fail unless it answers with the expected status.",
"interpreter": "bash",
"script": "set -u\nexpected=\"${expectedStatus:-200}\"\nattempts=\"${retries:-3}\"\ndelay=\"${retryDelay:-5}\"\nstatus=\"\"\ni=1\n# Retries live in the script rather than in on_failure: a service coming up\n# after a restart wants a few seconds, not a whole step re-dispatched.\nwhile [ \"$i\" -le \"$attempts\" ]; do\n status=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w \"%{http_code}\" --max-time 10 \"$url\" || echo \"000\")\n echo \"attempt $i: $url returned $status\"\n if [ \"$status\" = \"$expected\" ]; then\n break\n fi\n i=$(( i + 1 ))\n if [ \"$i\" -le \"$attempts\" ]; then sleep \"$delay\"; fi\ndone\necho \"HTTP_STATUS=$status\" >> $WORKFLOW_ENV\nif [ \"$status\" != \"$expected\" ]; then\n echo \"$url returned $status, expected $expected\"\n exit 1\nfi\necho \"$url is healthy\"",
"declared_outputs": [
"HTTP_STATUS"
],
"declared_inputs": [
{
"name": "url",
"default": "",
"description": "URL to request"
},
{
"name": "expectedStatus",
"default": "200",
"description": "HTTP status that counts as healthy"
},
{
"name": "retries",
"default": "3",
"description": "how many attempts before failing"
},
{
"name": "retryDelay",
"default": "5",
"description": "seconds between attempts"
}
],
"secret_refs": []
}
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
{
"kind": "vantage.step/v1",
"name": "List Directory",
"description": "Lists the files in the specified path",
"interpreter": "bash",
"script": "if [ ! -e $path ]; then\n echo \"file or directory doesn't exist: $path\"\n exit 1\nfi\nls -l $path",
"declared_outputs": [],
"declared_inputs": [
{
"name": "path",
"default": "./",
"description": ""
}
],
"secret_refs": []
}
+13
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@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
{
"kind": "vantage.step/v1",
"name": "Memory Usage Report",
"description": "Report memory usage as a percentage of total.",
"interpreter": "bash",
"script": "set -u\nfree -h\ntotal=$(free -m | awk \"/^Mem:/ {print \\$2}\")\nused=$(free -m | awk \"/^Mem:/ {print \\$3}\")\npct=$(( used * 100 / total ))\necho \"MEM_USED_PERCENT=$pct\" >> $WORKFLOW_ENV\necho \"MEM_USED_MB=$used\" >> $WORKFLOW_ENV\necho \"memory ${pct}% used (${used}MB of ${total}MB)\"",
"declared_outputs": [
"MEM_USED_PERCENT",
"MEM_USED_MB"
],
"declared_inputs": [],
"secret_refs": []
}
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
{
"kind": "vantage.step/v1",
"name": "Reboot Server",
"description": "Schedule a reboot a minute out, so the step reports success before the machine goes down.",
"interpreter": "bash",
"script": "set -u\ndelay=\"${delayMinutes:-1}\"\n# Scheduled rather than immediate on purpose: `shutdown -r now` kills the\n# agent before it can report, and the run records a failure on a server\n# that did exactly what it was told.\necho \"rebooting in $delay minute(s)\"\nshutdown -r \"+$delay\" \"Reboot requested by Vantage\" || { echo \"failed to schedule a reboot\"; exit 1; }",
"declared_outputs": [],
"declared_inputs": [
{
"name": "delayMinutes",
"default": "1",
"description": "minutes to wait before rebooting"
}
],
"secret_refs": []
}
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
{
"kind": "vantage.step/v1",
"name": "Restart Linux Service",
"description": "Restart a systemd unit and fail if it does not come back up.",
"interpreter": "bash",
"script": "set -u\necho \"restarting service $serviceName\"\nsystemctl restart \"$serviceName\" || { echo \"failed to restart $serviceName\"; exit 1; }\nsystemctl is-active --quiet \"$serviceName\" || {\n echo \"$serviceName did not come back up\"\n systemctl status \"$serviceName\" --no-pager --lines=20 || true\n exit 1\n}\necho \"$serviceName is active\"",
"declared_outputs": [],
"declared_inputs": [
{
"name": "serviceName",
"default": "",
"description": "systemd unit to restart, e.g. nginx"
}
],
"secret_refs": []
}
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
{
"kind": "vantage.step/v1",
"name": "Linux Service Status",
"description": "Report whether a systemd unit is active and enabled. Does not fail on a stopped unit.",
"interpreter": "bash",
"script": "set -u\nstate=$(systemctl is-active \"$serviceName\" 2>/dev/null || true)\nenabled=$(systemctl is-enabled \"$serviceName\" 2>/dev/null || true)\necho \"$serviceName: state=$state enabled=$enabled\"\necho \"SERVICE_STATE=$state\" >> $WORKFLOW_ENV\necho \"SERVICE_ENABLED=$enabled\" >> $WORKFLOW_ENV",
"declared_outputs": [
"SERVICE_STATE",
"SERVICE_ENABLED"
],
"declared_inputs": [
{
"name": "serviceName",
"default": "",
"description": "systemd unit to inspect"
}
],
"secret_refs": []
}
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
{
"kind": "vantage.step/v1",
"name": "Set Permissions and Ownership",
"description": "Set the mode and optionally the owner of a path.",
"interpreter": "bash",
"script": "set -u\nif [ ! -e \"$path\" ]; then\n echo \"$path does not exist\"\n exit 1\nfi\nrecurse=\"\"\nif [ \"${recursive:-false}\" = \"true\" ]; then\n recurse=\"-R\"\nfi\nif [ -n \"${mode:-}\" ]; then\n chmod $recurse \"$mode\" \"$path\" || { echo \"failed to set mode\"; exit 1; }\n echo \"set mode $mode on $path\"\nfi\nif [ -n \"${owner:-}\" ]; then\n chown $recurse \"$owner\" \"$path\" || { echo \"failed to set owner\"; exit 1; }\n echo \"set owner $owner on $path\"\nfi",
"declared_outputs": [],
"declared_inputs": [
{
"name": "path",
"default": "",
"description": "path to change"
},
{
"name": "mode",
"default": "",
"description": "octal mode, e.g. 0640"
},
{
"name": "owner",
"default": "",
"description": "owner, e.g. root:root"
},
{
"name": "recursive",
"default": "false",
"description": "true to apply recursively"
}
],
"secret_refs": []
}
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
{
"kind": "vantage.step/v1",
"name": "Start Linux Service",
"description": "Start a linux systemd service",
"interpreter": "bash",
"script": "echo \"starting service $serviceName\"\nsystemctl start $serviceName\nretVal=$?\nif [ $retVal -ne 0 ]; then\n echo \"failed to start service\"\n exit 1\nfi",
"declared_outputs": [],
"declared_inputs": [
{
"name": "serviceName",
"default": "",
"description": ""
}
],
"secret_refs": []
}
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
{
"kind": "vantage.step/v1",
"name": "Stop Linux Service",
"description": "Stops a linux systemd service",
"interpreter": "bash",
"script": "echo \"stopping service $serviceName\"\nsystemctl stop $serviceName\nretVal=$?\nif [ $retVal -ne 0 ]; then\n echo \"failed to stop service\"\n exit 1\nfi",
"declared_outputs": [],
"declared_inputs": [
{
"name": "serviceName",
"default": "",
"description": ""
}
],
"secret_refs": []
}
+21
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@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
{
"kind": "vantage.step/v1",
"name": "Tail Log File",
"description": "Print the last N lines of a file, for reading a log after a deployment step.",
"interpreter": "bash",
"script": "set -u\nlines=\"${lines:-50}\"\nif [ ! -f \"$path\" ]; then\n echo \"$path does not exist\"\n exit 1\nfi\necho \"last $lines lines of $path:\"\ntail -n \"$lines\" \"$path\"",
"declared_outputs": [],
"declared_inputs": [
{
"name": "path",
"default": "",
"description": "log file to read"
},
{
"name": "lines",
"default": "50",
"description": "how many lines to print"
}
],
"secret_refs": []
}
+29
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@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
{
"kind": "vantage.step/v1",
"name": "TLS Certificate Expiry",
"description": "Report days remaining on a TLS certificate and fail under a threshold.",
"interpreter": "bash",
"script": "set -u\nport=\"${port:-443}\"\nmin=\"${minDays:-14}\"\ncommand -v openssl >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo \"openssl is not installed\"; exit 1; }\n# -servername sends SNI, without which a shared host returns the wrong\n# certificate and the expiry reported here belongs to someone else.\nend=$(echo | openssl s_client -servername \"$host\" -connect \"$host:$port\" 2>/dev/null \\\n | openssl x509 -noout -enddate | cut -d= -f2)\nif [ -z \"$end\" ]; then\n echo \"could not read a certificate from $host:$port\"\n exit 1\nfi\nendEpoch=$(date -d \"$end\" +%s)\nnowEpoch=$(date +%s)\ndays=$(( (endEpoch - nowEpoch) / 86400 ))\necho \"CERT_DAYS_REMAINING=$days\" >> $WORKFLOW_ENV\necho \"CERT_EXPIRES=$end\" >> $WORKFLOW_ENV\necho \"$host:$port expires in $days days ($end)\"\nif [ \"$days\" -lt \"$min\" ]; then\n echo \"fewer than $min days remaining\"\n exit 1\nfi",
"declared_outputs": [
"CERT_DAYS_REMAINING",
"CERT_EXPIRES"
],
"declared_inputs": [
{
"name": "host",
"default": "",
"description": "hostname to check"
},
{
"name": "port",
"default": "443",
"description": "TLS port"
},
{
"name": "minDays",
"default": "14",
"description": "fail below this many days remaining"
}
],
"secret_refs": []
}
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
{
"kind": "vantage.step/v1",
"name": "Download File (Windows)",
"description": "Download a file over HTTP to a local path.",
"interpreter": "powershell",
"script": "$ErrorActionPreference = \"Stop\"\n$url = $env:url\n$dest = if ($env:destination) { $env:destination } else { Join-Path $env:TEMP ([System.IO.Path]::GetFileName($url)) }\nWrite-Output \"downloading $url\"\ntry {\n # -UseBasicParsing keeps this working on Server Core, where the IE\n # engine Invoke-WebRequest otherwise reaches for is not installed.\n Invoke-WebRequest -Uri $url -OutFile $dest -UseBasicParsing\n} catch {\n Write-Output \"failed to download: $_\"\n exit 1\n}\nWrite-Output \"saved to $dest\"\nAdd-Content -Path $env:WORKFLOW_ENV -Value \"FILE_PATH=$dest\"",
"declared_outputs": [
"FILE_PATH"
],
"declared_inputs": [
{
"name": "url",
"default": "",
"description": "URL to download"
},
{
"name": "destination",
"default": "",
"description": "where to save it; defaults to a file in TEMP"
}
],
"secret_refs": []
}
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
{
"kind": "vantage.step/v1",
"name": "Reboot Windows Server",
"description": "Schedule a reboot a minute out, so the step reports success before the machine goes down.",
"interpreter": "powershell",
"script": "$ErrorActionPreference = \"Stop\"\n$delay = if ($env:delaySeconds) { [int]$env:delaySeconds } else { 60 }\nWrite-Output \"rebooting in $delay second(s)\"\n& shutdown.exe /r /t $delay /c \"Reboot requested by Vantage\"\nif ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) {\n Write-Output \"failed to schedule a reboot\"\n exit 1\n}",
"declared_outputs": [],
"declared_inputs": [
{
"name": "delaySeconds",
"default": "60",
"description": "seconds to wait before rebooting"
}
],
"secret_refs": []
}
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
{
"kind": "vantage.step/v1",
"name": "Restart Windows Service",
"description": "Restart a Windows service and fail if it does not come back up.",
"interpreter": "powershell",
"script": "$ErrorActionPreference = \"Stop\"\n$name = $env:serviceName\nWrite-Output \"restarting service $name\"\ntry {\n Restart-Service -Name $name -Force\n} catch {\n Write-Output \"failed to restart ${name}: $_\"\n exit 1\n}\n$svc = Get-Service -Name $name\nif ($svc.Status -ne \"Running\") {\n Write-Output \"$name is $($svc.Status), not Running\"\n exit 1\n}\nWrite-Output \"$name is running\"",
"declared_outputs": [],
"declared_inputs": [
{
"name": "serviceName",
"default": "",
"description": "Windows service name to restart"
}
],
"secret_refs": []
}
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
{
"kind": "vantage.step/v1",
"name": "Windows Disk Report",
"description": "Report free space on a drive and fail past a usage threshold.",
"interpreter": "powershell",
"script": "$ErrorActionPreference = \"Stop\"\n$letter = if ($env:driveLetter) { $env:driveLetter } else { \"C\" }\n$limit = if ($env:maxPercent) { [int]$env:maxPercent } else { 90 }\n$d = Get-PSDrive -Name $letter -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\nif ($null -eq $d) {\n Write-Output \"drive $letter not found\"\n exit 1\n}\n$total = $d.Used + $d.Free\n$pct = [math]::Round(($d.Used / $total) * 100)\n$freeGb = [math]::Round($d.Free / 1GB, 1)\nWrite-Output \"${letter}: is $pct% full, $freeGb GB free\"\nAdd-Content -Path $env:WORKFLOW_ENV -Value \"DISK_USED_PERCENT=$pct\"\nAdd-Content -Path $env:WORKFLOW_ENV -Value \"DISK_FREE_GB=$freeGb\"\nif ($pct -ge $limit) {\n Write-Output \"at or over the $limit% limit\"\n exit 1\n}",
"declared_outputs": [
"DISK_USED_PERCENT",
"DISK_FREE_GB"
],
"declared_inputs": [
{
"name": "driveLetter",
"default": "C",
"description": "drive letter, without a colon"
},
{
"name": "maxPercent",
"default": "90",
"description": "fail at or above this percentage"
}
],
"secret_refs": []
}
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
{
"kind": "vantage.step/v1",
"name": "Windows Service Status",
"description": "Report a Windows service's status and start type. Does not fail on a stopped service.",
"interpreter": "powershell",
"script": "$ErrorActionPreference = \"Stop\"\n$name = $env:serviceName\n$svc = Get-Service -Name $name -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\nif ($null -eq $svc) {\n Write-Output \"$name is not installed\"\n Add-Content -Path $env:WORKFLOW_ENV -Value \"SERVICE_STATE=missing\"\n Add-Content -Path $env:WORKFLOW_ENV -Value \"SERVICE_START_TYPE=none\"\n exit 0\n}\nWrite-Output \"${name}: $($svc.Status), start type $($svc.StartType)\"\nAdd-Content -Path $env:WORKFLOW_ENV -Value \"SERVICE_STATE=$($svc.Status)\"\nAdd-Content -Path $env:WORKFLOW_ENV -Value \"SERVICE_START_TYPE=$($svc.StartType)\"",
"declared_outputs": [
"SERVICE_STATE",
"SERVICE_START_TYPE"
],
"declared_inputs": [
{
"name": "serviceName",
"default": "",
"description": "Windows service name to inspect"
}
],
"secret_refs": []
}
-23
View File
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
[Unit]
Description=Vantage Agent
Documentation=https://github.com/your-org/vantage
After=network.target
Wants=network-online.target
[Service]
Type=simple
ExecStart=/usr/local/bin/vantage-agent
Restart=always
RestartSec=10
User=root
StandardOutput=journal
StandardError=journal
SyslogIdentifier=vantage-agent
# Security hardening
NoNewPrivileges=true
ProtectSystem=false
ProtectHome=false
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
+6
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
apiVersion: v2
name: vantage
description: Helm chart for the Vantage stack (Redis, MongoDB, guacd, server, web)
type: application
version: 1.1.0
appVersion: "1.0.8"
+79
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
Vantage has been deployed as release "{{ .Release.Name }}" in namespace "{{ .Release.Namespace }}".
Services created:
{{- if .Values.redis.enabled }}
- {{ .Release.Name }}-redis (ClusterIP {{ .Values.redis.port }})
{{- else }}
- Redis: not deployed, using external {{ .Values.redis.addr }}
{{- end }}
{{- if .Values.mongo.enabled }}
- {{ .Release.Name }}-mongo (ClusterIP {{ .Values.mongo.port }})
{{- else }}
- MongoDB: not deployed, using the external server.env.mongoUri
{{- end }}
- {{ .Release.Name }}-guacd ({{ .Values.guacd.service.type }} {{ .Values.guacd.service.port }})
- {{ .Release.Name }}-server ({{ .Values.server.service.type }} http:{{ .Values.server.service.httpPort }} grpc:{{ .Values.server.service.grpcPort }})
- {{ .Release.Name }}-web ({{ .Values.web.service.type }} {{ .Values.web.service.port }})
Scaling (server.replicaCount / web.replicaCount):
- Both scale. Pin the image tags first — replicas on different builds serve
mismatched web asset hashes, and mixed server versions share one bus.
- server replicas route agent commands, step results and console relays to
each other over Redis, so every replica must use the SAME Redis. Workflow
logs are in MongoDB, not on a volume.
- Background work (monitor scheduler, Free reaper, log and audit retention,
the offline sweep) runs on one replica at a time under a Redis leader lock.
- server.persistence must be off to scale past one replica on a ReadWriteOnce
volume. Nothing writes to it any more.
{{- if gt (int .Values.server.replicaCount) 1 }}
- Console relays are reached by pod IP; guacd must be able to dial pod IPs
directly (it can, inside the cluster network).
{{- end }}
{{- if .Values.server.migrationJob.enabled }}
- Migrations run in the {{ .Release.Name }}-migrate Job before each upgrade;
the pods skip them. Its logs are kept: kubectl logs job/{{ .Release.Name }}-migrate
{{- end }}
{{- if .Values.ingress.enabled }}
Ingress (Traefik):
- Browsers: https://{{ .Values.ingress.web.host }}
{{- range .Values.ingress.web.extraHosts }}
https://{{ . }}
{{- end }}
{{ join ", " .Values.ingress.api.paths }} go to the server; everything else to web.
web proxies nothing, so those paths must be routed here or by a terminator
in front of this ingress.
{{- if .Values.ingress.grpc.enabled }}
- Agents: {{ .Values.ingress.grpc.host }} (gRPC, h2c behind TLS)
Agents dial server.env.grpcHost, currently {{ tpl .Values.server.env.grpcHost . }}.
Point DNS for both hostnames at the Traefik load balancer.
{{- if not .Values.ingress.tls.enabled }}
- WARNING: ingress.tls.enabled is false. Agent tokens and session cookies
would cross the network in clear.
{{- else if and (not .Values.ingress.tls.certResolver) (not .Values.ingress.tls.secretName) }}
- WARNING: TLS is on but neither ingress.tls.secretName nor
ingress.tls.certResolver is set, so Traefik will serve its self-signed
default certificate, which no agent and no browser will trust.
{{- end }}
{{- end }}
{{- end }}
By default the server/web/guacd services are ClusterIP only (no host port publishing,
unlike the original docker-compose file). To expose them externally, set
server.service.type / web.service.type / guacd.service.type to NodePort or LoadBalancer,
or add an Ingress on top of the -web and -server services.
Quick access via port-forward, e.g.:
kubectl port-forward svc/{{ .Release.Name }}-web {{ .Values.web.service.port }}:{{ .Values.web.service.port }}
kubectl port-forward svc/{{ .Release.Name }}-server {{ .Values.server.service.httpPort }}:{{ .Values.server.service.httpPort }}
{{- if not .Values.backup.enabled }}
No backups are scheduled. Vantage encrypts SSH private keys, vault secrets and
SSO client secrets with KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY, and that key is not stored anywhere
but your own configuration — a database restored without it is permanently
unreadable.
Set backup.enabled, backup.image and backup.pvcName, and store
KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY somewhere that survives this cluster.
{{- end }}
+102
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@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
{{/*
Common name helpers
*/}}
{{- define "vantage.fullname" -}}
{{ .Release.Name }}
{{- end -}}
{{- define "vantage.labels" -}}
app.kubernetes.io/instance: {{ .Release.Name }}
app.kubernetes.io/managed-by: {{ .Release.Service }}
{{- end -}}
{{/*
vantage.server.env renders the server container's environment.
It lives here because two workloads need it identically: the Deployment and the
pre-upgrade migration Job. A Job that connected to a different database than the
pods it migrates for would be worse than no Job at all, so there is one copy and
both read it.
*/}}
{{- define "vantage.server.env" -}}
- name: MONGO_URI
{{- $mongoUri := tpl .Values.server.env.mongoUri . }}
{{- if and (not .Values.mongo.enabled) (contains (printf "%s-mongo" .Release.Name) $mongoUri) }}
{{- fail "mongo.enabled is false, so server.env.mongoUri must point at an external MongoDB rather than the in-chart one" }}
{{- end }}
value: {{ $mongoUri | quote }}
- name: REDIS_ADDR
{{- if .Values.redis.enabled }}
value: "{{ .Release.Name }}-redis:{{ .Values.redis.port }}"
{{- else }}
{{- if not .Values.redis.addr }}
{{- fail "redis.enabled is false, so redis.addr must be set to an external Redis host:port" }}
{{- end }}
value: {{ .Values.redis.addr | quote }}
{{- end }}
{{- if .Values.redis.auth.existingSecret }}
- name: REDIS_USERNAME
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: {{ .Values.redis.auth.existingSecret }}
key: {{ .Values.redis.auth.usernameKey }}
optional: true
- name: REDIS_PASSWORD
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: {{ .Values.redis.auth.existingSecret }}
key: {{ .Values.redis.auth.passwordKey }}
{{- else }}
{{- if .Values.redis.auth.username }}
- name: REDIS_USERNAME
value: {{ .Values.redis.auth.username | quote }}
{{- end }}
{{- if .Values.redis.auth.password }}
- name: REDIS_PASSWORD
value: {{ .Values.redis.auth.password | quote }}
{{- end }}
{{- end }}
- name: GRPC_HOST
value: {{ .Values.server.env.grpcHost | quote }}
- name: GRPC_PORT
value: {{ .Values.server.service.grpcPort | quote }}
- name: HTTP_PORT
value: {{ .Values.server.service.httpPort | quote }}
- name: KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY
value: {{ .Values.server.env.keyEncryptionKey | quote }}
- name: GUACD_ADDR
value: "{{ .Release.Name }}-guacd:{{ .Values.guacd.service.port }}"
- name: APP_ROOT_LABEL
value: {{ .Values.server.env.appRootLabel | quote }}
- name: PROXY_ADVERTISE_HOST
value: {{ .Values.server.env.proxyAdvertiseHost | quote }}
- name: PROXY_LISTEN_HOST
value: {{ .Values.server.env.proxyListenHost | quote }}
- name: TRUSTED_PROXIES
value: {{ .Values.server.env.trustedProxies | quote }}
{{- if eq .Values.server.env.deploymentType "cloud" }}
- name: VANTAGE_DEPLOYMENT
value: "cloud"
- name: FREE_INSTANCE_REAP_AFTER
value: {{ .Values.server.env.freeInstanceReapAfter | quote }}
{{- end }}
- name: POD_IP
valueFrom:
fieldRef:
fieldPath: status.podIP
{{- end -}}
{{/*
vantage.backup.env renders the environment vantagectl needs.
It reads the SAME values the server does rather than taking its own, because a
backup that connected to a different database, or stamped a fingerprint of a
different key, than the deployment it is backing up would be worse than no
backup: it would look like one.
*/}}
{{- define "vantage.backup.env" -}}
- name: MONGO_URI
value: {{ tpl .Values.server.env.mongoUri . | quote }}
- name: KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY
value: {{ .Values.server.env.keyEncryptionKey | quote }}
{{- end -}}
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
{{- if .Values.backup.enabled }}
{{- if not .Values.backup.pvcName }}
{{- fail "backup.enabled requires backup.pvcName: a backup needs somewhere durable to land, and the chart cannot guess where that is" }}
{{- end }}
{{- if not .Values.backup.image }}
{{- fail "backup.enabled requires backup.image: the vantagectl image to run" }}
{{- end }}
apiVersion: batch/v1
kind: CronJob
metadata:
name: {{ include "vantage.fullname" . }}-backup
labels:
{{- include "vantage.labels" . | nindent 4 }}
app.kubernetes.io/component: backup
spec:
schedule: {{ .Values.backup.schedule | quote }}
concurrencyPolicy: Forbid
successfulJobsHistoryLimit: {{ .Values.backup.successfulJobsHistoryLimit }}
failedJobsHistoryLimit: {{ .Values.backup.failedJobsHistoryLimit }}
jobTemplate:
spec:
backoffLimit: 2
template:
metadata:
labels:
{{- include "vantage.labels" . | nindent 12 }}
app.kubernetes.io/component: backup
spec:
restartPolicy: Never
containers:
- name: vantagectl
image: {{ .Values.backup.image | quote }}
args:
- backup
- --out
- /backups
{{- with .Values.backup.exclude }}
- --exclude
- {{ join "," . | quote }}
{{- end }}
env:
# Referenced, never redeclared. A backup job holding its own
# copy of KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY is a second place for it to be
# wrong, and the fingerprint it stamps would then be a
# fingerprint of the wrong key.
{{- include "vantage.backup.env" . | nindent 16 }}
volumeMounts:
- name: backups
mountPath: /backups
resources:
{{- toYaml .Values.backup.resources | nindent 16 }}
volumes:
- name: backups
persistentVolumeClaim:
claimName: {{ .Values.backup.pvcName | quote }}
{{- end }}
+47
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
name: {{ .Release.Name }}-guacd
labels:
{{- include "vantage.labels" . | nindent 4 }}
app.kubernetes.io/component: guacd
spec:
replicas: 1
selector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/instance: {{ .Release.Name }}
app.kubernetes.io/component: guacd
template:
metadata:
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/instance: {{ .Release.Name }}
app.kubernetes.io/component: guacd
spec:
{{- if .Values.imagePullSecrets }}
imagePullSecrets:
{{- toYaml .Values.imagePullSecrets | nindent 8 }}
{{- end }}
containers:
- name: guacd
image: "{{ .Values.guacd.image.repository }}:{{ .Values.guacd.image.tag }}"
ports:
- containerPort: 4822
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata:
name: {{ .Release.Name }}-guacd
labels:
{{- include "vantage.labels" . | nindent 4 }}
app.kubernetes.io/component: guacd
spec:
type: {{ .Values.guacd.service.type }}
{{- if eq .Values.guacd.service.type "ClusterIP" }}
clusterIP: None
{{- end }}
selector:
app.kubernetes.io/instance: {{ .Release.Name }}
app.kubernetes.io/component: guacd
ports:
- port: {{ .Values.guacd.service.port }}
targetPort: 4822
+174
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
{{- if .Values.ingress.enabled }}
{{/*
Two hostnames, because the two audiences arrive over different protocols.
Browsers reach the web host, and the path decides what answers: /api, /auth,
/public, /install* and /update* go to the server, everything else to `web`.
That split is not optional and ingress.api.enabled defaults to true. `web`
proxies nothing — it holds no address for the server at all — so with these
paths absent the UI loads and every request it makes 404s against Next. The
setting remains a value only so an installation terminating in front of this
ingress can route the prefixes itself; it must be routed somewhere.
The web host is normally a wildcard — `*.vantage.example.com` — because that is
the per-tenant instance namespace; APP_ROOT_LABEL resolves the instance from the
label. Kubernetes wildcard hosts match exactly one label, so this does not match
the apex, and on the deployment this chart was written for it must not: the apex
is the marketing site, a separate application in the vantage-site repository.
extraHosts exists for a genuine second name, not for
reclaiming the apex.
Agents reach the server's gRPC port, which is plain h2c — the server holds no
certificates of its own, TLS has always been terminated by whatever sits in
front. Traefik will not speak h2c to a backend unless told to, and it is told
per Service, which is why the gRPC route gets a Service of its own below rather
than reusing the two-port one. Annotating the shared Service would force h2c on
its HTTP port too.
*/}}
{{- $tls := .Values.ingress.tls }}
{{- $webHost := required "ingress.enabled requires ingress.web.host" .Values.ingress.web.host }}
{{- $hosts := prepend .Values.ingress.web.extraHosts $webHost }}
{{- $apiPaths := .Values.ingress.api.paths }}
{{- if and .Values.ingress.api.enabled (not $apiPaths) }}
{{- fail "ingress.api.enabled requires at least one path in ingress.api.paths" }}
{{- end }}
{{- if not .Values.ingress.api.enabled }}
{{- fail "ingress.api.enabled=false leaves /api, /auth and /public unrouted: web proxies nothing. Route those prefixes to the server at your own terminator, or leave this enabled." }}
{{- end }}
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: Ingress
metadata:
name: {{ .Release.Name }}-web
labels:
{{- include "vantage.labels" . | nindent 4 }}
app.kubernetes.io/component: web
annotations:
traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/router.entrypoints: {{ .Values.ingress.entrypoint | quote }}
{{- if and $tls.enabled $tls.certResolver }}
traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/router.tls: "true"
traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/router.tls.certresolver: {{ $tls.certResolver | quote }}
{{- else if $tls.enabled }}
traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/router.tls: "true"
{{- end }}
{{- with .Values.ingress.annotations }}
{{- toYaml . | nindent 4 }}
{{- end }}
spec:
{{- if .Values.ingress.className }}
ingressClassName: {{ .Values.ingress.className }}
{{- end }}
{{- if and $tls.enabled $tls.secretName }}
tls:
- hosts:
{{- range $hosts }}
- {{ . | quote }}
{{- end }}
secretName: {{ $tls.secretName }}
{{- end }}
rules:
{{- range $host := $hosts }}
- host: {{ $host | quote }}
http:
paths:
{{- /*
The API paths come first and, more importantly, are longer. Traefik
derives router priority from rule length, so Host(x) &&
PathPrefix(/api) outranks Host(x) && PathPrefix(/) without anyone
having to assign priorities by hand. Order within the list is for
the reader; the length is what decides.
*/}}
{{- if $.Values.ingress.api.enabled }}
{{- range $apiPaths }}
- path: {{ . | quote }}
pathType: Prefix
backend:
service:
name: {{ $.Release.Name }}-server
port:
number: {{ $.Values.server.service.httpPort }}
{{- end }}
{{- end }}
- path: /
pathType: Prefix
backend:
service:
name: {{ $.Release.Name }}-web
port:
number: {{ $.Values.web.service.port }}
{{- end }}
{{- if .Values.ingress.grpc.enabled }}
{{- $grpcHost := required "ingress.grpc.enabled requires ingress.grpc.host" .Values.ingress.grpc.host }}
{{/*
GRPC_HOST is what an agent is told to dial, and it is baked into every install
one-liner. Left pointing at the in-cluster Service while agents are expected to
arrive through the ingress, every install would succeed and every agent would
fail to connect — with nothing in the control plane saying why.
*/}}
{{- $grpcEnv := tpl .Values.server.env.grpcHost . }}
{{- if contains (printf "%s-server" .Release.Name) $grpcEnv }}
{{- fail (printf "ingress.grpc.enabled routes agents through %s, but server.env.grpcHost is still the in-cluster address %q. Agents dial the value of grpcHost, so set it to the public gRPC address (for example %q)." $grpcHost $grpcEnv (printf "%s:443" $grpcHost)) }}
{{- end }}
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata:
name: {{ .Release.Name }}-server-grpc
labels:
{{- include "vantage.labels" . | nindent 4 }}
app.kubernetes.io/component: server
annotations:
# The server speaks h2c: it terminates no TLS itself. Without this Traefik
# dials the backend as HTTP/1.1 and every agent handshake fails.
traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/service.serversscheme: h2c
spec:
type: ClusterIP
selector:
app.kubernetes.io/instance: {{ .Release.Name }}
app.kubernetes.io/component: server
ports:
- name: grpc
port: {{ .Values.server.service.grpcPort }}
targetPort: {{ .Values.server.service.grpcPort }}
---
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: Ingress
metadata:
name: {{ .Release.Name }}-grpc
labels:
{{- include "vantage.labels" . | nindent 4 }}
app.kubernetes.io/component: server
annotations:
traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/router.entrypoints: {{ .Values.ingress.entrypoint | quote }}
{{- if and $tls.enabled $tls.certResolver }}
traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/router.tls: "true"
traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/router.tls.certresolver: {{ $tls.certResolver | quote }}
{{- else if $tls.enabled }}
traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/router.tls: "true"
{{- end }}
{{- with .Values.ingress.grpc.annotations }}
{{- toYaml . | nindent 4 }}
{{- end }}
spec:
{{- if .Values.ingress.className }}
ingressClassName: {{ .Values.ingress.className }}
{{- end }}
{{- if and $tls.enabled $tls.grpcSecretName }}
tls:
- hosts:
- {{ $grpcHost | quote }}
secretName: {{ $tls.grpcSecretName }}
{{- end }}
rules:
- host: {{ $grpcHost | quote }}
http:
paths:
- path: /
pathType: Prefix
backend:
service:
name: {{ .Release.Name }}-server-grpc
port:
number: {{ .Values.server.service.grpcPort }}
{{- end }}
{{- end }}
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
{{- if .Values.server.migrationJob.enabled }}
{{/*
Schema setup, lifted out of the serving pods.
Every server process used to run migrations, index builders and default-step
seeding at boot. With one replica that is fine. With two it is not: 0004 renames
the orgs collection to instances, and a sibling reading it mid-rename is a
corruption, not a retry.
A Helm hook Job runs it once, before any pod of the new version starts. The
Deployment then sets VANTAGE_SKIP_MIGRATIONS, which is what makes the Job's
existence load-bearing rather than decorative — if you disable the Job, the
pods go back to migrating themselves and you must go back to one replica.
hook-weight orders this after the dependency waits; before-hook-creation deletes
the previous Job so a repeat upgrade is not blocked by an immutable object. The
Job is deliberately NOT deleted on success: its logs are the record of what the
upgrade did to the database.
*/}}
apiVersion: batch/v1
kind: Job
metadata:
name: {{ .Release.Name }}-migrate
labels:
{{- include "vantage.labels" . | nindent 4 }}
app.kubernetes.io/component: migrate
annotations:
"helm.sh/hook": pre-install,pre-upgrade
"helm.sh/hook-weight": "0"
"helm.sh/hook-delete-policy": before-hook-creation
spec:
backoffLimit: {{ .Values.server.migrationJob.backoffLimit }}
# A migration that has not finished in this long is stuck, and a stuck
# migration should fail the upgrade rather than hold it open forever.
activeDeadlineSeconds: {{ .Values.server.migrationJob.activeDeadlineSeconds }}
template:
metadata:
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/instance: {{ .Release.Name }}
app.kubernetes.io/component: migrate
spec:
restartPolicy: Never
{{- if .Values.imagePullSecrets }}
imagePullSecrets:
{{- toYaml .Values.imagePullSecrets | nindent 8 }}
{{- end }}
{{- if .Values.mongo.enabled }}
# Only Mongo. The Job never opens Redis, and waiting on a Redis this
# chart may not even deploy would block an upgrade for no reason.
initContainers:
- name: wait-for-mongo
image: busybox:1.36
command:
- sh
- -c
- |
until nc -z {{ .Release.Name }}-mongo {{ .Values.mongo.port }}; do
echo "waiting for mongo..."; sleep 2;
done
{{- end }}
containers:
- name: migrate
image: "{{ .Values.server.image.repository }}:{{ .Values.server.image.tag }}"
env:
{{- include "vantage.server.env" . | nindent 12 }}
- name: VANTAGE_MIGRATE_ONLY
value: "true"
{{- end }}
+92
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
{{- if .Values.mongo.enabled }}
{{- if .Values.mongo.persistence.enabled }}
apiVersion: v1
kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
metadata:
name: {{ .Release.Name }}-mongo-data
labels:
{{- include "vantage.labels" . | nindent 4 }}
app.kubernetes.io/component: mongo
spec:
accessModes:
- {{ .Values.mongo.persistence.accessMode }}
{{- if .Values.mongo.persistence.storageClass }}
storageClassName: {{ .Values.mongo.persistence.storageClass }}
{{- end }}
resources:
requests:
storage: {{ .Values.mongo.persistence.size }}
---
{{- end }}
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
name: {{ .Release.Name }}-mongo
labels:
{{- include "vantage.labels" . | nindent 4 }}
app.kubernetes.io/component: mongo
spec:
replicas: 1
strategy:
type: Recreate
selector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/instance: {{ .Release.Name }}
app.kubernetes.io/component: mongo
template:
metadata:
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/instance: {{ .Release.Name }}
app.kubernetes.io/component: mongo
spec:
{{- if .Values.imagePullSecrets }}
imagePullSecrets:
{{- toYaml .Values.imagePullSecrets | nindent 8 }}
{{- end }}
containers:
- name: mongo
image: "{{ .Values.mongo.image.repository }}:{{ .Values.mongo.image.tag }}"
ports:
- containerPort: {{ .Values.mongo.port }}
volumeMounts:
- name: mongo-data
mountPath: /data/db
livenessProbe:
exec:
command: ["mongosh", "--quiet", "--eval", "db.adminCommand('ping')"]
initialDelaySeconds: 10
periodSeconds: 10
timeoutSeconds: 5
failureThreshold: 5
readinessProbe:
exec:
command: ["mongosh", "--quiet", "--eval", "db.adminCommand('ping')"]
initialDelaySeconds: 5
periodSeconds: 10
timeoutSeconds: 5
failureThreshold: 5
volumes:
- name: mongo-data
{{- if .Values.mongo.persistence.enabled }}
persistentVolumeClaim:
claimName: {{ .Release.Name }}-mongo-data
{{- else }}
emptyDir: {}
{{- end }}
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata:
name: {{ .Release.Name }}-mongo
labels:
{{- include "vantage.labels" . | nindent 4 }}
app.kubernetes.io/component: mongo
spec:
type: ClusterIP
selector:
app.kubernetes.io/instance: {{ .Release.Name }}
app.kubernetes.io/component: mongo
ports:
- port: {{ .Values.mongo.port }}
targetPort: {{ .Values.mongo.port }}
{{- end }}
+92
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@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
{{- if .Values.redis.enabled }}
{{- if .Values.redis.persistence.enabled }}
apiVersion: v1
kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
metadata:
name: {{ .Release.Name }}-redis-data
labels:
{{- include "vantage.labels" . | nindent 4 }}
app.kubernetes.io/component: redis
spec:
accessModes:
- {{ .Values.redis.persistence.accessMode }}
{{- if .Values.redis.persistence.storageClass }}
storageClassName: {{ .Values.redis.persistence.storageClass }}
{{- end }}
resources:
requests:
storage: {{ .Values.redis.persistence.size }}
---
{{- end }}
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
name: {{ .Release.Name }}-redis
labels:
{{- include "vantage.labels" . | nindent 4 }}
app.kubernetes.io/component: redis
spec:
replicas: 1
strategy:
type: Recreate
selector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/instance: {{ .Release.Name }}
app.kubernetes.io/component: redis
template:
metadata:
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/instance: {{ .Release.Name }}
app.kubernetes.io/component: redis
spec:
{{- if .Values.imagePullSecrets }}
imagePullSecrets:
{{- toYaml .Values.imagePullSecrets | nindent 8 }}
{{- end }}
containers:
- name: redis
image: "{{ .Values.redis.image.repository }}:{{ .Values.redis.image.tag }}"
ports:
- containerPort: {{ .Values.redis.port }}
volumeMounts:
- name: redis-data
mountPath: /data
livenessProbe:
exec:
command: ["redis-cli", "ping"]
initialDelaySeconds: 10
periodSeconds: 10
timeoutSeconds: 5
failureThreshold: 5
readinessProbe:
exec:
command: ["redis-cli", "ping"]
initialDelaySeconds: 5
periodSeconds: 10
timeoutSeconds: 5
failureThreshold: 5
volumes:
- name: redis-data
{{- if .Values.redis.persistence.enabled }}
persistentVolumeClaim:
claimName: {{ .Release.Name }}-redis-data
{{- else }}
emptyDir: {}
{{- end }}
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata:
name: {{ .Release.Name }}-redis
labels:
{{- include "vantage.labels" . | nindent 4 }}
app.kubernetes.io/component: redis
spec:
type: ClusterIP
selector:
app.kubernetes.io/instance: {{ .Release.Name }}
app.kubernetes.io/component: redis
ports:
- port: {{ .Values.redis.port }}
targetPort: {{ .Values.redis.port }}
{{- end }}
+181
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@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
{{- if and .Values.server.persistence.enabled (not .Values.server.persistence.useHostPath) }}
apiVersion: v1
kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
metadata:
name: {{ .Release.Name }}-server-data
labels:
{{- include "vantage.labels" . | nindent 4 }}
app.kubernetes.io/component: server
spec:
accessModes:
- {{ .Values.server.persistence.accessMode }}
{{- if .Values.server.persistence.storageClass }}
storageClassName: {{ .Values.server.persistence.storageClass }}
{{- end }}
resources:
requests:
storage: {{ .Values.server.persistence.size }}
---
{{- end }}
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
name: {{ .Release.Name }}-server
labels:
{{- include "vantage.labels" . | nindent 4 }}
app.kubernetes.io/component: server
spec:
{{- $replicas := int .Values.server.replicaCount }}
replicas: {{ $replicas }}
{{- if and .Values.server.persistence.enabled (eq .Values.server.persistence.accessMode "ReadWriteOnce") }}
# A ReadWriteOnce volume cannot be mounted by a second pod at all, and cannot
# be handed to a new pod while the old one still holds it. Persistence is off
# by default now that nothing writes to it; if it is on, replicas are capped
# at one and updates go through Recreate.
{{- if gt $replicas 1 }}
{{- fail "server.persistence.enabled with a ReadWriteOnce volume cannot be combined with server.replicaCount > 1. Nothing in the server writes to that volume any more (workflow logs live in MongoDB); set server.persistence.enabled=false, or use a ReadWriteMany accessMode if you are keeping it for another reason." }}
{{- end }}
strategy:
type: Recreate
{{- end }}
selector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/instance: {{ .Release.Name }}
app.kubernetes.io/component: server
template:
metadata:
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/instance: {{ .Release.Name }}
app.kubernetes.io/component: server
spec:
# The server stops gRPC before draining HTTP, so that every CommandStream
# handler returns and releases its agent's presence claim. A claim left
# behind outlives the pod for its 30s TTL, and during that window other
# replicas dispatch commands to a process that has exited — surfacing to
# the operator as "agent offline" on an agent that is perfectly healthy.
# 10s for gRPC plus 10s for the HTTP drain, with headroom.
terminationGracePeriodSeconds: {{ .Values.server.terminationGracePeriodSeconds }}
{{- if .Values.imagePullSecrets }}
imagePullSecrets:
{{- toYaml .Values.imagePullSecrets | nindent 8 }}
{{- end }}
{{- if or .Values.redis.enabled .Values.mongo.enabled }}
# Wait for the dependencies this chart deploys to be reachable,
# approximating compose's `depends_on: condition: service_healthy`. An
# external Redis or Mongo is assumed to be up already — waiting on one
# would only turn someone else's outage into a stuck pod.
initContainers:
{{- if .Values.redis.enabled }}
- name: wait-for-redis
image: busybox:1.36
command:
- sh
- -c
- |
until nc -z {{ .Release.Name }}-redis {{ .Values.redis.port }}; do
echo "waiting for redis..."; sleep 2;
done
{{- end }}
{{- if .Values.mongo.enabled }}
- name: wait-for-mongo
image: busybox:1.36
command:
- sh
- -c
- |
until nc -z {{ .Release.Name }}-mongo {{ .Values.mongo.port }}; do
echo "waiting for mongo..."; sleep 2;
done
{{- end }}
{{- end }}
containers:
- name: server
image: "{{ .Values.server.image.repository }}:{{ .Values.server.image.tag }}"
ports:
- containerPort: {{ .Values.server.service.httpPort }}
- containerPort: {{ .Values.server.service.grpcPort }}
env:
{{- include "vantage.server.env" . | nindent 12 }}
{{- if .Values.server.migrationJob.enabled }}
# Schema setup ran in the pre-upgrade Job. Pods that repeated it
# would race each other, and the rename migration is not a race
# that tolerates a loser.
- name: VANTAGE_SKIP_MIGRATIONS
value: "true"
{{- end }}
# Liveness never touches Mongo or Redis: restarting every pod cannot
# fix a database outage, and each restart drops every agent command
# stream and console session it was carrying. Readiness does check
# both, so a pod that cannot serve leaves the Service and stays up.
startupProbe:
httpGet:
path: /healthz
port: {{ .Values.server.service.httpPort }}
periodSeconds: 5
# Generous: without the migration Job this pod runs every migration
# before it listens, and the rename has a ten-minute budget.
failureThreshold: 150
livenessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /healthz
port: {{ .Values.server.service.httpPort }}
periodSeconds: 20
failureThreshold: 3
readinessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /readyz
port: {{ .Values.server.service.httpPort }}
periodSeconds: 10
failureThreshold: 3
{{- if .Values.server.persistence.enabled }}
# Nothing in the server writes here any more — workflow logs moved to
# MongoDB so that every replica can read and write them. The mount
# remains only so an operator upgrading from a file-log release can
# still reach the old files before turning persistence off.
volumeMounts:
- name: server-data
mountPath: /data
volumes:
- name: server-data
persistentVolumeClaim:
claimName: {{ .Release.Name }}-server-data
{{- end }}
---
{{- if gt (int .Values.server.replicaCount) 1 }}
apiVersion: policy/v1
kind: PodDisruptionBudget
metadata:
name: {{ .Release.Name }}-server
labels:
{{- include "vantage.labels" . | nindent 4 }}
app.kubernetes.io/component: server
spec:
# Agents reconnect on their own, but a drain that took every replica at once
# would disconnect every agent in the fleet simultaneously and stall every
# workflow run in flight.
minAvailable: 1
selector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/instance: {{ .Release.Name }}
app.kubernetes.io/component: server
---
{{- end }}
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata:
name: {{ .Release.Name }}-server
labels:
{{- include "vantage.labels" . | nindent 4 }}
app.kubernetes.io/component: server
spec:
type: {{ .Values.server.service.type }}
selector:
app.kubernetes.io/instance: {{ .Release.Name }}
app.kubernetes.io/component: server
ports:
- name: http
port: {{ .Values.server.service.httpPort }}
targetPort: {{ .Values.server.service.httpPort }}
- name: grpc
port: {{ .Values.server.service.grpcPort }}
targetPort: {{ .Values.server.service.grpcPort }}
+78
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apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
name: {{ .Release.Name }}-web
labels:
{{- include "vantage.labels" . | nindent 4 }}
app.kubernetes.io/component: web
spec:
# web holds no per-process state: sessions live in Redis and every request is
# proxied to the server. It is the one component here that scales freely.
replicas: {{ .Values.web.replicaCount }}
selector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/instance: {{ .Release.Name }}
app.kubernetes.io/component: web
template:
metadata:
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/instance: {{ .Release.Name }}
app.kubernetes.io/component: web
spec:
{{- if .Values.imagePullSecrets }}
imagePullSecrets:
{{- toYaml .Values.imagePullSecrets | nindent 8 }}
{{- end }}
initContainers:
- name: wait-for-server
image: busybox:1.36
command:
- sh
- -c
- |
until nc -z {{ .Release.Name }}-server {{ .Values.server.service.httpPort }}; do
echo "waiting for server..."; sleep 2;
done
containers:
- name: web
image: "{{ .Values.web.image.repository }}:{{ .Values.web.image.tag }}"
ports:
- containerPort: {{ .Values.web.service.port }}
# /healthz is served by this Next process. /api never reaches this
# pod at all — the ingress routes it to the server — so there is no
# backend address to configure and no probe here that could report
# the backend's health by accident.
startupProbe:
httpGet:
path: /healthz
port: {{ .Values.web.service.port }}
periodSeconds: 3
failureThreshold: 20
livenessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /healthz
port: {{ .Values.web.service.port }}
periodSeconds: 20
failureThreshold: 3
readinessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /healthz
port: {{ .Values.web.service.port }}
periodSeconds: 10
failureThreshold: 3
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata:
name: {{ .Release.Name }}-web
labels:
{{- include "vantage.labels" . | nindent 4 }}
app.kubernetes.io/component: web
spec:
type: {{ .Values.web.service.type }}
selector:
app.kubernetes.io/instance: {{ .Release.Name }}
app.kubernetes.io/component: web
ports:
- port: {{ .Values.web.service.port }}
targetPort: {{ .Values.web.service.port }}
+135
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# Default values for the vantage chart.
redis:
enabled: true
addr: ""
image:
repository: redis
tag: "8"
persistence:
enabled: true
size: 1Gi
storageClass: ""
accessMode: ReadWriteOnce
port: 6379
auth:
username: ""
password: ""
existingSecret: ""
usernameKey: username
passwordKey: password
mongo:
enabled: true
image:
repository: mongo
tag: "7"
persistence:
enabled: true
size: 5Gi
storageClass: ""
accessMode: ReadWriteOnce
port: 27017
guacd:
image:
repository: docker.io/guacamole/guacd
tag: "1.6.0"
service:
type: ClusterIP
port: 4822
server:
replicaCount: 1
# Must exceed the server's own stop sequence (10s gRPC GracefulStop + 10s
# HTTP drain) or the kubelet SIGKILLs mid-shutdown, which is exactly the
# abrupt exit that leaves agent presence claims stranded in Redis.
terminationGracePeriodSeconds: 30
migrationJob:
enabled: true
backoffLimit: 0
activeDeadlineSeconds: 900
image:
repository: gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/mrhid6/vantage/server
tag: latest
service:
type: ClusterIP
httpPort: 8080
grpcPort: 9090
env:
mongoUri: "mongodb://{{ .Release.Name }}-mongo:27017/vantage"
grpcHost: "{{ .Release.Name }}-server:9090"
keyEncryptionKey: ""
appRootLabel: vantage
proxyAdvertiseHost: "{{ .Release.Name }}-server"
proxyListenHost: "0.0.0.0"
trustedProxies: "10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16"
persistence:
enabled: false
size: 1Gi
storageClass: ""
accessMode: ReadWriteOnce
hostPath: /data
web:
replicaCount: 1
image:
repository: gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/mrhid6/vantage/web
tag: latest
service:
type: ClusterIP
port: 3000
ingress:
enabled: false
className: traefik
entrypoint: websecure
annotations: {}
web:
host: ""
extraHosts: []
# Not optional: web proxies nothing, so these prefixes reach the server
# only through this ingress. Turning it off serves the UI with a dead API.
api:
enabled: true
paths:
- /api/
- /auth/
- /public/
- /update
- /install
- /update.ps1
- /install.ps1
grpc:
enabled: true
host: ""
annotations: {}
tls:
enabled: true
secretName: ""
grpcSecretName: ""
certResolver: ""
imagePullSecrets: []
# Scheduled backups.
#
# Off by default, deliberately. A backup with nowhere durable to land is a
# false sense of safety, and the chart cannot know where that is — pvcName
# must name a volume you have decided will outlive the cluster.
#
# There is no restore manifest here on purpose: a restore is an operator
# decision with a confirmation attached, and must never be something a
# `helm upgrade` can trigger. Run one as a `kubectl run` Job with
# --confirm-db.
backup:
enabled: false
schedule: "0 2 * * *"
image: ""
pvcName: ""
# Collections to leave out. Recorded in each archive's manifest, so an
# archive can never claim to be complete when it is not.
exclude: []
successfulJobsHistoryLimit: 3
failedJobsHistoryLimit: 3
resources: {}
-56
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@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
services:
redis:
image: redis:8
restart: unless-stopped
volumes:
- redis_data:/data
healthcheck:
test:
- CMD
- redis-cli
- ping
interval: 10s
timeout: 5s
retries: 5
guacd:
image: docker.io/guacamole/guacd:1.6.0
restart: unless-stopped
ports:
- 4822:4822
server:
image: gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/mrhid6/vantage/server:latest
restart: unless-stopped
ports:
- 8080:8080
- 9090:9090
environment:
MONGO_URI: ${MONGO_URI:-}
REDIS_ADDR: redis:6379
GITEA_HOST: ${GITEA_HOST}
PUBLIC_HOST: ${PUBLIC_HOST}
GRPC_HOST: ${GRPC_HOST}
GRPC_PORT: "9090"
HTTP_PORT: "8080"
OIDC_ISSUER: ${OIDC_ISSUER:-}
OIDC_CLIENT_ID: ${OIDC_CLIENT_ID:-}
OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET: ${OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET:-}
OIDC_REDIRECT_URL: ${OIDC_REDIRECT_URL:-}
KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY: ${KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY:-}
VANTAGE_WORKFLOW_LOG_DIR: ${VANTAGE_WORKFLOW_LOG_DIR:-}
GUACD_ADDR: guacd:4822
depends_on:
redis:
condition: service_healthy
volumes:
- ./data:/data
web:
image: gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/mrhid6/vantage/web:latest
restart: unless-stopped
ports:
- 3000:3000
depends_on:
- server
volumes:
mongo_data: null
redis_data: null
networks: {}
+20
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@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
# Vantage self-hosted — copy to .env and fill in.
# Used by: docker compose up -d
# --- Required ---
# host:port agents dial for gRPC. No default; boot fails without it.
# Must be reachable from managed servers. Use the public host, port 9090.
GRPC_HOST=vantage.yourdomain.com:9090
# 64-char hex (32 bytes) for AES-256-GCM. Required for private keys,
# secrets, OIDC secrets, RDP/VNC credentials.
# Generate: openssl rand -hex 32
KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY=
# --- Optional (defaults shown) ---
# MongoDB is bundled in this compose file. Override only to use an external DB.
MONGO_URI=mongodb://mongo:27017/vantage
# Where workflow run logs are written inside the server container.
+72
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@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
services:
redis:
image: redis:8
restart: unless-stopped
volumes:
- redis_data:/data
healthcheck:
test:
- CMD
- redis-cli
- ping
interval: 10s
timeout: 5s
retries: 5
mongo:
image: mongo:7
restart: unless-stopped
volumes:
- mongo_data:/data/db
healthcheck:
test:
- CMD
- mongosh
- --quiet
- --eval
- "db.adminCommand('ping')"
interval: 10s
timeout: 5s
retries: 5
guacd:
image: docker.io/guacamole/guacd:1.6.0
restart: unless-stopped
ports:
- 4822:4822
server:
image: gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/mrhid6/vantage/server:latest
restart: unless-stopped
ports:
- 8080:8080
- 9090:9090
environment:
MONGO_URI: ${MONGO_URI:-mongodb://mongo:27017/vantage}
REDIS_ADDR: redis:6379
GRPC_HOST: ${GRPC_HOST}
GRPC_PORT: "9090"
HTTP_PORT: "8080"
KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY: ${KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY:-}
GUACD_ADDR: guacd:4822
PROXY_ADVERTISE_HOST: server
TRUSTED_PROXIES: ${TRUSTED_PROXIES:-10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16}
depends_on:
redis:
condition: service_healthy
mongo:
condition: service_healthy
volumes:
- ./data:/data
web:
image: gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/mrhid6/vantage/web:latest
restart: unless-stopped
ports:
- 3000:3000
# No API_URL: web proxies nothing. The reverse proxy in front of this
# deployment must route /api, /auth, /public, /install*, /update* to
# server:8080 and everything else to web:3000. Reaching web:3000
# directly serves the UI and every API call 404s.
depends_on:
- server
volumes:
mongo_data: null
redis_data: null
networks: {}
@@ -1,866 +0,0 @@
# Fleet Inventory Implementation Plan
> **For agentic workers:** REQUIRED SUB-SKILL: Use superpowers:subagent-driven-development (recommended) or superpowers:executing-plans to implement this plan task-by-task. Steps use checkbox (`- [ ]`) syntax for tracking.
**Goal:** Agents collect CPU/RAM/swap/disk/partition inventory and report it to the server via a new `ReportInventory` RPC; the server stores the latest snapshot per server and the UI displays it.
**Architecture:** New unary gRPC `ReportInventory` (mirrors existing `ReportUpdates`). Agent runs a 30s metrics ticker (CPU/RAM/swap usage) and, every 15 min, a full static collection (disks, partitions, CPU model, kernel). Server upserts an embedded `inventory` sub-doc on the `servers` document with merge rules that preserve static fields between slow ticks.
**Tech Stack:** Go (gin, mongo-driver v2, hand-written JSON-codec gRPC), `/proc` readers, Next.js 16 + react-query + Tailwind.
## Global Constraints
- **No tests this iteration.** Verify with `go build ./...`, `go vet ./...`, `npm run build`.
- gRPC uses a JSON codec: edit **both** `server/internal/grpc/pb/vantage.pb.go` and `agent/internal/grpc/pb/vantage.pb.go` identically, plus `proto/vantage/v1/vantage.proto` as documentation. No codegen. Mirror the existing `ReportUpdates` RPC wiring exactly (service interface, `_Vantage_*_Handler`, client method, `Vantage_ServiceDesc`).
- Mongo: `db.Col("servers")`, `context.WithTimeout`. Follow `server/internal/services/servers.go`.
- Agent already runs as root; `/proc` is readable. Linux is primary; Windows collectors may return empty.
- Module path `github.com/mrhid6/vantage`.
- Do not add heavy dependencies; implement `/proc` parsing directly.
---
## Task 1: Inventory model + gRPC messages
**Files:**
- Modify: `server/internal/models/server.go`
- Modify: `proto/vantage/v1/vantage.proto`
- Modify: `server/internal/grpc/pb/vantage.pb.go`
- Modify: `agent/internal/grpc/pb/vantage.pb.go`
**Interfaces:**
- Produces: `models.Inventory` (+ `CPUInfo`, `MemInfo`, `Partition`) and `Server.Inventory *Inventory`. pb structs `InventoryReport`, `CPUReport`, `MemReport`, `PartitionReport`, `InventoryReportResponse`. Service method `ReportInventory` on both client and server interfaces.
- [ ] **Step 1: Add model structs**
In `server/internal/models/server.go` add (keep the existing `import "time"`):
```go
type CPUInfo struct {
Model string `bson:"model,omitempty" json:"model,omitempty"`
Cores int `bson:"cores,omitempty" json:"cores,omitempty"`
UsagePct float64 `bson:"usage_pct" json:"usage_pct"`
Load1 float64 `bson:"load1,omitempty" json:"load1,omitempty"`
}
type MemInfo struct {
TotalBytes uint64 `bson:"total_bytes" json:"total_bytes"`
UsedBytes uint64 `bson:"used_bytes" json:"used_bytes"`
}
type Partition struct {
Device string `bson:"device" json:"device"`
Mountpoint string `bson:"mountpoint" json:"mountpoint"`
Fstype string `bson:"fstype,omitempty" json:"fstype,omitempty"`
TotalBytes uint64 `bson:"total_bytes" json:"total_bytes"`
UsedBytes uint64 `bson:"used_bytes" json:"used_bytes"`
}
type Inventory struct {
CPU CPUInfo `bson:"cpu" json:"cpu"`
Memory MemInfo `bson:"memory" json:"memory"`
SwapTotalBytes uint64 `bson:"swap_total_bytes" json:"swap_total_bytes"`
SwapUsedBytes uint64 `bson:"swap_used_bytes" json:"swap_used_bytes"`
Partitions []Partition `bson:"partitions,omitempty" json:"partitions,omitempty"`
Kernel string `bson:"kernel,omitempty" json:"kernel,omitempty"`
MetricsAt *time.Time `bson:"metrics_at,omitempty" json:"metrics_at,omitempty"`
StaticAt *time.Time `bson:"static_at,omitempty" json:"static_at,omitempty"`
}
```
Add to the `Server` struct: `Inventory *Inventory \`bson:"inventory,omitempty" json:"inventory,omitempty"\``.
- [ ] **Step 2: Document RPC in proto**
In `proto/vantage/v1/vantage.proto`, add to the service: `rpc ReportInventory(InventoryReport) returns (InventoryReportResponse);` and the messages `InventoryReport`, `CPUReport`, `MemReport`, `PartitionReport`, `InventoryReportResponse` per spec §4.
- [ ] **Step 3: Add pb structs + RPC wiring (server pb)**
In `server/internal/grpc/pb/vantage.pb.go` add the message structs:
```go
type CPUReport struct {
Model string `json:"model,omitempty"`
Cores int `json:"cores,omitempty"`
UsagePct float64 `json:"usage_pct"`
Load1 float64 `json:"load1,omitempty"`
}
type MemReport struct {
TotalBytes uint64 `json:"total_bytes"`
UsedBytes uint64 `json:"used_bytes"`
}
type PartitionReport struct {
Device string `json:"device"`
Mountpoint string `json:"mountpoint"`
Fstype string `json:"fstype,omitempty"`
TotalBytes uint64 `json:"total_bytes"`
UsedBytes uint64 `json:"used_bytes"`
}
type InventoryReport struct {
ServerId string `json:"server_id"`
AgentToken string `json:"agent_token"`
IncludeStatic bool `json:"include_static"`
CPU *CPUReport `json:"cpu,omitempty"`
Memory *MemReport `json:"memory,omitempty"`
SwapTotal uint64 `json:"swap_total"`
SwapUsed uint64 `json:"swap_used"`
Partitions []PartitionReport `json:"partitions,omitempty"`
Kernel string `json:"kernel,omitempty"`
}
type InventoryReportResponse struct{}
```
Then mirror the `ReportUpdates` RPC plumbing for `ReportInventory`. Locate every `ReportUpdates` reference in this file and add the parallel `ReportInventory`:
- `VantageServer` interface: add `ReportInventory(context.Context, *InventoryReport) (*InventoryReportResponse, error)`.
- `UnimplementedVantageServer`: add the stub returning `Unimplemented`.
- `VantageClient` interface + `keyManagerClient`: add the client method `Invoke`-ing `/vantage.v1.Vantage/ReportInventory`.
- `Vantage_ServiceDesc.Methods`: add `{MethodName: "ReportInventory", Handler: _Vantage_ReportInventory_Handler}`.
- Add `_Vantage_ReportInventory_Handler` copied from `_Vantage_ReportUpdates_Handler` with types swapped.
- [ ] **Step 4: Mirror pb structs + wiring (agent pb)**
Apply the identical additions to `agent/internal/grpc/pb/vantage.pb.go`.
- [ ] **Step 5: Verify build**
Run: `cd server && go build ./... && cd ../agent && go build ./...`
Expected: both succeed.
- [ ] **Step 6: Commit**
```bash
git add server/internal/models/server.go proto/vantage/v1/vantage.proto server/internal/grpc/pb/vantage.pb.go agent/internal/grpc/pb/vantage.pb.go
git commit -m "feat(proto): add ReportInventory RPC and inventory model"
```
---
## Task 2: Server handler + store service
**Files:**
- Create: `server/internal/services/inventory.go`
- Modify: `server/internal/grpc/server.go`
**Interfaces:**
- Consumes: `pb.InventoryReport` (T1), `db.Col("servers")`.
- Produces: `services.StoreInventory(serverID string, r *pb.InventoryReport) error`; gRPC method `(*vantageServer).ReportInventory`.
- [ ] **Step 1: Write the store service**
```go
package services
import (
"context"
"time"
"github.com/mrhid6/vantage/server/internal/db"
"github.com/mrhid6/vantage/server/internal/grpc/pb"
"go.mongodb.org/mongo-driver/v2/bson"
)
// StoreInventory upserts the latest inventory snapshot onto the server document.
// Metrics fields update every call; static fields only when r.IncludeStatic.
func StoreInventory(serverID string, r *pb.InventoryReport) error {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
now := time.Now()
set := bson.M{"inventory.metrics_at": now}
if r.CPU != nil {
set["inventory.cpu.usage_pct"] = r.CPU.UsagePct
set["inventory.cpu.load1"] = r.CPU.Load1
}
if r.Memory != nil {
set["inventory.memory.used_bytes"] = r.Memory.UsedBytes
}
set["inventory.swap_used_bytes"] = r.SwapUsed
if r.IncludeStatic {
set["inventory.static_at"] = now
set["inventory.swap_total_bytes"] = r.SwapTotal
set["inventory.kernel"] = r.Kernel
if r.CPU != nil {
set["inventory.cpu.model"] = r.CPU.Model
set["inventory.cpu.cores"] = r.CPU.Cores
}
if r.Memory != nil {
set["inventory.memory.total_bytes"] = r.Memory.TotalBytes
}
parts := make([]bson.M, 0, len(r.Partitions))
for _, p := range r.Partitions {
parts = append(parts, bson.M{
"device": p.Device, "mountpoint": p.Mountpoint, "fstype": p.Fstype,
"total_bytes": p.TotalBytes, "used_bytes": p.UsedBytes,
})
}
set["inventory.partitions"] = parts
}
_, err := db.Col("servers").UpdateOne(ctx, bson.M{"server_id": serverID}, bson.M{"$set": set})
return err
}
```
- [ ] **Step 2: Add the gRPC handler**
In `server/internal/grpc/server.go`, add (mirroring the existing `ReportUpdates` handler that validates the agent token):
```go
func (s *vantageServer) ReportInventory(ctx context.Context, req *pb.InventoryReport) (*pb.InventoryReportResponse, error) {
srv, err := services.ValidateAgentToken(req.ServerId, req.AgentToken)
if err != nil {
return nil, status.Errorf(codes.Unauthenticated, "invalid agent token")
}
if err := services.StoreInventory(srv.ServerID, req); err != nil {
log.Printf("store inventory for %s: %v", srv.ServerID, err)
}
return &pb.InventoryReportResponse{}, nil
}
```
Confirm `status`, `codes`, `log` are already imported in the file (they are, used by other handlers).
- [ ] **Step 3: Verify build**
Run: `cd server && go build ./... && go vet ./...`
Expected: success.
- [ ] **Step 4: Commit**
```bash
git add server/internal/services/inventory.go server/internal/grpc/server.go
git commit -m "feat(server): store inventory and handle ReportInventory RPC"
```
---
## Task 3: Agent collectors
**Files:**
- Create: `agent/internal/inventory/collect_linux.go`
- Create: `agent/internal/inventory/collect_other.go`
- Create: `agent/internal/inventory/inventory.go`
**Interfaces:**
- Produces: `inventory.Collect(includeStatic bool) *pb.InventoryReport`.
- [ ] **Step 1: Common entry (`inventory.go`)**
```go
package inventory
import "github.com/mrhid6/vantage/agent/internal/grpc/pb"
// Collect gathers metrics always and static hardware info when includeStatic.
// Platform specifics are provided by collect_linux.go / collect_other.go.
func Collect(includeStatic bool) *pb.InventoryReport {
r := &pb.InventoryReport{IncludeStatic: includeStatic, CPU: &pb.CPUReport{}, Memory: &pb.MemReport{}}
collect(r, includeStatic)
return r
}
```
- [ ] **Step 2: Linux collector (`collect_linux.go`)**
Build-tagged `//go:build linux`. Implement `collect(r *pb.InventoryReport, includeStatic bool)`:
- CPU usage: read `/proc/stat` first line twice ~100ms apart, compute `1 - idleDelta/totalDelta` × 100 → `r.CPU.UsagePct`.
- Load: first field of `/proc/loadavg` → `r.CPU.Load1`.
- Mem/swap: parse `/proc/meminfo` (`MemTotal`, `MemAvailable`, `SwapTotal`, `SwapFree`; used = total available; swap used = swaptotal swapfree) → `r.Memory.*`, `r.SwapUsed`, and on static `r.SwapTotal`.
- Static only: `/proc/cpuinfo` (`model name`, count `processor` lines) → `r.CPU.Model/Cores`; `/proc/meminfo MemTotal` → `r.Memory.TotalBytes`; kernel via `syscall.Uname` or read `/proc/sys/kernel/osrelease` → `r.Kernel`; partitions from `/proc/mounts` filtered to fstypes in {ext4,xfs,btrfs,zfs,vfat,ntfs} then `syscall.Statfs` for total/used → `r.Partitions`.
```go
//go:build linux
package inventory
import (
"bufio"
"os"
"strconv"
"strings"
"syscall"
"time"
"github.com/mrhid6/vantage/agent/internal/grpc/pb"
)
func collect(r *pb.InventoryReport, includeStatic bool) {
r.CPU.UsagePct = cpuUsage()
r.CPU.Load1 = load1()
memTotal, memAvail, swapTotal, swapFree := meminfo()
if memTotal > memAvail {
r.Memory.UsedBytes = memTotal - memAvail
}
if swapTotal > swapFree {
r.SwapUsed = swapTotal - swapFree
}
if includeStatic {
r.Memory.TotalBytes = memTotal
r.SwapTotal = swapTotal
r.CPU.Model, r.CPU.Cores = cpuStatic()
r.Kernel = kernel()
r.Partitions = partitions()
}
}
func readProc(path string) string { b, _ := os.ReadFile(path); return string(b) }
func cpuSample() (idle, total uint64) {
f, err := os.Open("/proc/stat")
if err != nil {
return
}
defer f.Close()
sc := bufio.NewScanner(f)
if sc.Scan() {
fields := strings.Fields(sc.Text()) // cpu user nice system idle iowait ...
for i, v := range fields[1:] {
n, _ := strconv.ParseUint(v, 10, 64)
total += n
if i == 3 { // idle
idle = n
}
}
}
return
}
func cpuUsage() float64 {
i1, t1 := cpuSample()
time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
i2, t2 := cpuSample()
dt := float64(t2 - t1)
if dt <= 0 {
return 0
}
return (1 - float64(i2-i1)/dt) * 100
}
func load1() float64 {
fields := strings.Fields(readProc("/proc/loadavg"))
if len(fields) > 0 {
v, _ := strconv.ParseFloat(fields[0], 64)
return v
}
return 0
}
func meminfo() (total, avail, swapTotal, swapFree uint64) {
f, err := os.Open("/proc/meminfo")
if err != nil {
return
}
defer f.Close()
sc := bufio.NewScanner(f)
for sc.Scan() {
fields := strings.Fields(sc.Text())
if len(fields) < 2 {
continue
}
kb, _ := strconv.ParseUint(fields[1], 10, 64)
b := kb * 1024
switch strings.TrimSuffix(fields[0], ":") {
case "MemTotal":
total = b
case "MemAvailable":
avail = b
case "SwapTotal":
swapTotal = b
case "SwapFree":
swapFree = b
}
}
return
}
func cpuStatic() (model string, cores int) {
f, err := os.Open("/proc/cpuinfo")
if err != nil {
return
}
defer f.Close()
sc := bufio.NewScanner(f)
for sc.Scan() {
line := sc.Text()
if strings.HasPrefix(line, "processor") {
cores++
} else if strings.HasPrefix(line, "model name") && model == "" {
if i := strings.Index(line, ":"); i >= 0 {
model = strings.TrimSpace(line[i+1:])
}
}
}
return
}
func kernel() string {
return strings.TrimSpace(readProc("/proc/sys/kernel/osrelease"))
}
func partitions() []pb.PartitionReport {
allowed := map[string]bool{"ext4": true, "xfs": true, "btrfs": true, "zfs": true, "vfat": true, "ntfs": true, "ext3": true}
f, err := os.Open("/proc/mounts")
if err != nil {
return nil
}
defer f.Close()
var out []pb.PartitionReport
seen := map[string]bool{}
sc := bufio.NewScanner(f)
for sc.Scan() {
fields := strings.Fields(sc.Text())
if len(fields) < 3 || !allowed[fields[2]] || seen[fields[1]] {
continue
}
seen[fields[1]] = true
var st syscall.Statfs_t
if syscall.Statfs(fields[1], &st) != nil {
continue
}
total := st.Blocks * uint64(st.Bsize)
free := st.Bavail * uint64(st.Bsize)
out = append(out, pb.PartitionReport{
Device: fields[0], Mountpoint: fields[1], Fstype: fields[2],
TotalBytes: total, UsedBytes: total - free,
})
}
return out
}
```
- [ ] **Step 3: Non-linux stub (`collect_other.go`)**
```go
//go:build !linux
package inventory
import "github.com/mrhid6/vantage/agent/internal/grpc/pb"
// collect is a no-op best-effort stub on non-Linux platforms.
func collect(r *pb.InventoryReport, includeStatic bool) {}
```
- [ ] **Step 4: Verify build**
Run: `cd agent && go build ./... && go vet ./...`
Expected: success (build both native and, if convenient, `GOOS=windows go build ./...`).
- [ ] **Step 5: Commit**
```bash
git add agent/internal/inventory/
git commit -m "feat(agent): /proc-based inventory collectors"
```
---
## Task 4: Agent client method + scheduler
**Files:**
- Modify: `agent/internal/grpc/client.go`
- Modify: the agent main loop (`agent/cmd/main.go` or `agent/internal/sync/sync.go` — wherever the poll loop/tickers live).
**Interfaces:**
- Consumes: `inventory.Collect` (T3), pb (T1).
- Produces: `(*Client).ReportInventory(report *pb.InventoryReport) error`; a running ticker that reports metrics every 30s and static every 15 min.
- [ ] **Step 1: Add client method**
In `agent/internal/grpc/client.go`, mirroring `ReportUpdates`:
```go
func (c *Client) ReportInventory(report *pb.InventoryReport) error {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
defer cancel()
_, err := c.client.ReportInventory(ctx, report)
return err
}
```
The report already carries `ServerId`/`AgentToken`; ensure the caller sets them (see Step 2).
- [ ] **Step 2: Add the scheduler to the agent loop**
Find where the agent starts its poll loop (the goroutine that calls `SyncKeys`/`ReportUpdates`). Add a parallel inventory ticker. `serverID`, `agentToken`, and the `*Client` are in scope there:
```go
go func() {
tick := 0
t := time.NewTicker(30 * time.Second)
defer t.Stop()
report := func(static bool) {
r := inventory.Collect(static)
r.ServerId = serverID
r.AgentToken = agentToken
if err := client.ReportInventory(r); err != nil {
log.Printf("report inventory: %v", err)
}
}
report(true) // send a full snapshot on startup
for range t.C {
tick++
report(tick%30 == 0) // every 30th tick = 15 min → include static
}
}()
```
Add imports `"github.com/mrhid6/vantage/agent/internal/inventory"`, `time`, `log` if missing. Match variable names to the actual loop (e.g. the client may be named `c`).
- [ ] **Step 3: Verify build**
Run: `cd agent && go build ./... && go vet ./...`
Expected: success.
- [ ] **Step 4: Commit**
```bash
git add agent/internal/grpc/client.go agent/
git commit -m "feat(agent): schedule inventory reporting (30s metrics, 15m static)"
```
---
## Task 5: Frontend — inventory panel on server detail
**Files:**
- Modify: `web/lib/api.ts` (extend the `Server`/server-detail type with `inventory`)
- Modify: `web/app/servers/[id]/page.tsx` (add panel; enable polling)
**Interfaces:**
- Consumes: server-detail query.
- [ ] **Step 1: Add the inventory type**
In `web/lib/api.ts`, add and attach to the server type used by the detail page:
```ts
export interface Inventory {
cpu: { model?: string; cores?: number; usage_pct: number; load1?: number };
memory: { total_bytes: number; used_bytes: number };
swap_total_bytes: number;
swap_used_bytes: number;
partitions?: { device: string; mountpoint: string; fstype?: string; total_bytes: number; used_bytes: number }[];
kernel?: string;
metrics_at?: string;
static_at?: string;
}
```
Add `inventory?: Inventory;` to the server detail interface.
- [ ] **Step 2: Add a `formatBytes` helper + Inventory panel**
In `web/app/servers/[id]/page.tsx`, add a helper and a panel component. Enable polling on the server-detail `useQuery` with `refetchInterval: 30000`.
```tsx
function formatBytes(n: number): string {
if (!n) return "0 B";
const u = ["B", "KB", "MB", "GB", "TB"];
const i = Math.floor(Math.log(n) / Math.log(1024));
return `${(n / Math.pow(1024, i)).toFixed(1)} ${u[i]}`;
}
function UsageBar({ used, total }: { used: number; total: number }) {
const pct = total > 0 ? Math.min(100, (used / total) * 100) : 0;
return (
<div className="h-2 w-full overflow-hidden rounded-full bg-surface-2">
<div className={`h-full rounded-full ${pct > 90 ? "bg-danger" : "bg-accent"}`} style={{ width: `${pct}%` }} />
</div>
);
}
function InventoryPanel({ inv }: { inv: Inventory }) {
return (
<Card>
<h2 className="mb-4 text-lg font-semibold text-text-primary">Inventory</h2>
<div className="grid gap-4 sm:grid-cols-2">
<div>
<div className="mb-1 flex justify-between text-sm"><span className="text-text-secondary">CPU</span><span className="text-text-primary">{inv.cpu.usage_pct.toFixed(0)}%</span></div>
<UsageBar used={inv.cpu.usage_pct} total={100} />
<p className="mt-1 text-xs text-text-secondary">{inv.cpu.model} · {inv.cpu.cores} cores · load {inv.cpu.load1?.toFixed(2)}</p>
</div>
<div>
<div className="mb-1 flex justify-between text-sm"><span className="text-text-secondary">Memory</span><span className="text-text-primary">{formatBytes(inv.memory.used_bytes)} / {formatBytes(inv.memory.total_bytes)}</span></div>
<UsageBar used={inv.memory.used_bytes} total={inv.memory.total_bytes} />
<div className="mb-1 mt-3 flex justify-between text-sm"><span className="text-text-secondary">Swap</span><span className="text-text-primary">{formatBytes(inv.swap_used_bytes)} / {formatBytes(inv.swap_total_bytes)}</span></div>
<UsageBar used={inv.swap_used_bytes} total={inv.swap_total_bytes} />
</div>
</div>
{inv.partitions && inv.partitions.length > 0 && (
<div className="mt-5">
<h3 className="mb-2 text-sm font-medium text-text-secondary">Partitions</h3>
<div className="space-y-3">
{inv.partitions.map((p) => (
<div key={p.mountpoint}>
<div className="mb-1 flex justify-between text-xs">
<span className="font-mono text-text-primary">{p.mountpoint}</span>
<span className="text-text-secondary">{formatBytes(p.used_bytes)} / {formatBytes(p.total_bytes)} · {p.fstype}</span>
</div>
<UsageBar used={p.used_bytes} total={p.total_bytes} />
</div>
))}
</div>
</div>
)}
{inv.kernel && <p className="mt-4 text-xs text-text-secondary">Kernel {inv.kernel}</p>}
</Card>
);
}
```
Render `{server.inventory && <InventoryPanel inv={server.inventory} />}` in the page body (ensure `Card`, `Inventory` are imported). Match how the page currently reads the server object.
- [ ] **Step 3: Verify build**
Run: `cd web && npm run build`
Expected: success.
- [ ] **Step 4: Commit**
```bash
git add web/lib/api.ts web/app/servers/[id]/page.tsx
git commit -m "feat(web): inventory panel on server detail"
```
---
## Task 6: End-to-end manual verification
- [ ] **Step 1: Build all**
Run: `cd server && go build ./... && cd ../agent && go build ./... && cd ../web && npm run build`
Expected: all succeed.
- [ ] **Step 2: Smoke (if environment available)**
With server + Mongo + a connected Linux agent: within ~30s the server detail page shows CPU %, RAM/swap bars; within 15 min (or on agent restart, which sends a full snapshot immediately) partitions, CPU model and kernel appear. Confirm metrics update roughly every 30s.
- [ ] **Step 3: Commit any fixes**
```bash
git add -A
git commit -m "fix: fleet inventory verification fixes"
```
---
# Service Monitoring (uptime-kuma replacement)
Extends the fleet work: in-app service monitors replacing uptime-kuma. Monitors (HTTP/TCP/ICMP/TLS) run **server-side** (public endpoints) or **agent-side** (agent probes its own host). Both runners feed one server-side ingest pipeline: state → incidents → rollups → notifications.
**Design:** validated in brainstorm 2026-07-21. Hybrid runners, all 4 check types, latest+incidents+rollups history, multi-channel notify (webhook/SMTP/Discord/Slack/Telegram), dedicated `SyncMonitors`/`ReportChecks` RPCs.
**Build order — 3 phases, each shippable:**
- **P1 (Tasks 710):** data model, checker pkg, server scheduler, ingest pipeline, `/monitors` UI. Server-run only. No agent, no notify.
- **P2 (Tasks 1112):** `SyncMonitors` + `ReportChecks` RPCs, agent checker + scheduler, agent-run monitors bound to a server.
- **P3 (Tasks 1314):** notification channels + dispatch + settings UI.
## Monitoring Global Constraints
- Same as fleet: no tests this iteration; verify with `go build ./...`, `go vet ./...`, `npm run build`. JSON-codec gRPC — edit both pb files identically, mirror `ReportUpdates` wiring. Separate Go modules, so the checker pkg is **duplicated** in `server/` and `agent/` (same convention as pb files).
- Reuse existing patterns: REST handlers like `server/internal/api`, services like `server/internal/services/servers.go`, `db.Col(...)`, react-query + Tailwind UI like `web/app/servers`.
---
## Task 7: Monitoring data model + checker package (server)
**Files:**
- Create: `server/internal/models/monitor.go`
- Create: `server/internal/checker/checker.go` (+ `http.go`, `tcp.go`, `icmp.go`, `tls.go`)
**Interfaces:**
- Produces: `models.Monitor` (+ `MonitorState`, `MonitorTarget`), `models.Incident`, `models.Rollup`. `checker.Run(ctx, models.Monitor) checker.Result` where `Result{Up bool; LatencyMs int; Message string; CertExpiry *time.Time}`.
- [ ] **Step 1: Model**
```go
type MonitorTarget struct {
URL string `bson:"url,omitempty" json:"url,omitempty"`
Host string `bson:"host,omitempty" json:"host,omitempty"`
Port int `bson:"port,omitempty" json:"port,omitempty"`
Method string `bson:"method,omitempty" json:"method,omitempty"`
ExpectedStatus int `bson:"expected_status,omitempty" json:"expected_status,omitempty"`
Keyword string `bson:"keyword,omitempty" json:"keyword,omitempty"`
TLSWarnDays int `bson:"tls_warn_days,omitempty" json:"tls_warn_days,omitempty"`
}
type MonitorState struct {
Status string `bson:"status" json:"status"` // up|down|pending
LastCheckAt *time.Time `bson:"last_check_at,omitempty" json:"last_check_at,omitempty"`
LatencyMs int `bson:"latency_ms" json:"latency_ms"`
Message string `bson:"message,omitempty" json:"message,omitempty"`
CertExpiryAt *time.Time `bson:"cert_expiry_at,omitempty" json:"cert_expiry_at,omitempty"`
Fails int `bson:"fails" json:"fails"` // consecutive failures
}
type Monitor struct {
MonitorID string `bson:"monitor_id" json:"monitor_id"`
Name string `bson:"name" json:"name"`
Type string `bson:"type" json:"type"` // http|tcp|icmp|tls
Target MonitorTarget `bson:"target" json:"target"`
IntervalSec int `bson:"interval_sec" json:"interval_sec"`
Runner string `bson:"runner" json:"runner"` // "server" or a server_id
Retries int `bson:"retries" json:"retries"` // consecutive fails before down
Enabled bool `bson:"enabled" json:"enabled"`
ChannelIDs []string `bson:"channel_ids,omitempty" json:"channel_ids,omitempty"`
State MonitorState `bson:"state" json:"state"`
CreatedAt time.Time `bson:"created_at" json:"created_at"`
}
type Incident struct {
IncidentID string `bson:"incident_id" json:"incident_id"`
MonitorID string `bson:"monitor_id" json:"monitor_id"`
StartedAt time.Time `bson:"started_at" json:"started_at"`
ResolvedAt *time.Time `bson:"resolved_at,omitempty" json:"resolved_at,omitempty"`
Cause string `bson:"cause,omitempty" json:"cause,omitempty"`
}
type Rollup struct {
MonitorID string `bson:"monitor_id" json:"monitor_id"`
PeriodStart time.Time `bson:"period_start" json:"period_start"` // hour bucket
Checks int `bson:"checks" json:"checks"`
UpCount int `bson:"up_count" json:"up_count"`
SumLatency int64 `bson:"sum_latency" json:"sum_latency"`
}
```
- [ ] **Step 2: Checker package** — `Run(ctx, m)` switches on `m.Type`:
- **http**: `http.Client` GET/HEAD `m.Target.URL`, assert status == ExpectedStatus (default 200), optional `Keyword` body contains; capture TLS peer cert expiry when https.
- **tcp**: `net.DialTimeout("tcp", host:port)`, latency = dial time.
- **icmp**: raw ICMP echo (agent/server run as root). Fall back to `net.Dial("ip4:icmp")`; on permission error return down with message.
- **tls**: `tls.Dial`, read `ConnectionState().PeerCertificates[0].NotAfter` → `CertExpiry`; down if within `TLSWarnDays` or expired.
- All: wrap with per-check timeout (min(IntervalSec, 10s)); `Result.Message` = short reason on failure.
- [ ] **Step 3: Verify build** — `cd server && go build ./... && go vet ./...`
- [ ] **Step 4: Commit** — `feat(server): monitor model + checker package`
---
## Task 8: Ingest pipeline + rollups service
**Files:**
- Create: `server/internal/services/monitors.go`
**Interfaces:**
- Produces: `IngestResult(monitorID string, res checker.Result) error` — the single entry both runners use. `ListMonitors`, `GetMonitor`, `CreateMonitor`, `UpdateMonitor`, `DeleteMonitor`, `ListIncidents(monitorID)`, `UptimeRollups(monitorID, since)`.
- [ ] **Step 1: `IngestResult`** — load monitor; compute new status with `Retries` threshold (increment `state.Fails` on failure, flip to `down` only when `Fails >= Retries`; reset + flip `up` on success). On **transition**: open incident (`down`) or resolve open incident (`up`), and enqueue notification (P3 — leave a `// TODO(P3): dispatch` hook now). Always `$set` state fields. Upsert current-hour `Rollup` (`$inc` checks/up_count/sum_latency). Use `db.Col("monitors")`, `db.Col("incidents")`, `db.Col("monitor_rollups")`, `context.WithTimeout`.
- [ ] **Step 2: CRUD + queries** — standard service funcs mirroring `services/servers.go`. `UptimeRollups` aggregates buckets since a cutoff → uptime % + avg latency series.
- [ ] **Step 3: Verify build** — `go build ./... && go vet ./...`
- [ ] **Step 4: Commit** — `feat(server): monitor ingest pipeline, incidents, rollups`
---
## Task 9: Server scheduler + REST API
**Files:**
- Create: `server/internal/monitorsched/scheduler.go`
- Create: `server/internal/api/monitors.go`
- Modify: server bootstrap (wherever services/gRPC start) to launch the scheduler; router registration where `api` routes are mounted.
**Interfaces:**
- Produces: a scheduler that ticks enabled `runner=="server"` monitors on their `IntervalSec` and calls `checker.Run` → `services.IngestResult`. REST: `GET/POST /api/monitors`, `GET/PUT/DELETE /api/monitors/:id`, `GET /api/monitors/:id/incidents`, `GET /api/monitors/:id/uptime`.
- [ ] **Step 1: Scheduler** — on boot load monitors; per-monitor goroutine or a min-heap wheel keyed on next-run. Only `runner=="server"`. Reload on CRUD (simplest: re-read every N sec, or a reload channel fired by the service). Skip disabled.
- [ ] **Step 2: REST handlers** — mirror an existing `server/internal/api` handler file for style + auth middleware. JSON in/out of `models.Monitor`.
- [ ] **Step 3: Verify build** — `go build ./... && go vet ./...`
- [ ] **Step 4: Commit** — `feat(server): server-run monitor scheduler + REST API`
---
## Task 10: Frontend — monitors UI (P1)
**Files:**
- Modify: `web/lib/api.ts` (Monitor types + bindings)
- Create: `web/app/monitors/page.tsx` (list), `web/app/monitors/[id]/page.tsx` (detail), `web/app/monitors/new/page.tsx` (create/edit form)
- Modify: main nav to add **Monitors** (same place Steps was added)
**Interfaces:**
- Consumes: `/api/monitors*` (T9).
- [ ] **Step 1: Types + api bindings** — `Monitor`, `MonitorState`, `Incident`, uptime series; `api.monitors.list/get/create/update/remove/incidents/uptime`.
- [ ] **Step 2: List page** — table: name, type, status badge (up/down/pending), uptime % (24h), latency, last check. `refetchInterval: 30000`.
- [ ] **Step 3: Detail page** — status header, heartbeat/uptime bars (24h + 30d from rollups), latency chart, incident timeline, cert expiry, assigned channels (read-only until P3).
- [ ] **Step 4: Create/edit form** — type-dependent fields (URL vs host/port), interval, retries, runner select (`server` or a registered server for agent-run — server option only wired in P2), enabled.
- [ ] **Step 5: Verify build** — `cd web && npm run build`
- [ ] **Step 6: Commit** — `feat(web): monitors list/detail/form UI`
---
## Task 11: SyncMonitors + ReportChecks RPCs (P2)
**Files:**
- Modify: `proto/vantage/v1/vantage.proto`, `server/internal/grpc/pb/vantage.pb.go`, `agent/internal/grpc/pb/vantage.pb.go`, `server/internal/grpc/server.go`, `agent/internal/grpc/client.go`
**Interfaces:**
- Produces: `SyncMonitors(server_id, agent_token) -> repeated MonitorSpec`; `ReportChecks(server_id, agent_token, repeated CheckResult) -> ReportChecksResponse`. `MonitorSpec{monitor_id, type, target fields, interval_sec, retries}`. `CheckResult{monitor_id, up, latency_ms, message, cert_expiry_unix}`.
- [ ] **Step 1: pb structs + proto** — add messages to both pb files + proto doc.
- [ ] **Step 2: Wire both RPCs** — mirror `ReportUpdates` plumbing (interface, Unimplemented stub, client method, `Vantage_ServiceDesc.Methods`, `_Vantage_*_Handler`) in both pb files. Server handlers on `vantageServer` (after `ReportUpdates` at server.go:78): `SyncMonitors` returns monitors where `runner==req.ServerId && enabled`; `ReportChecks` validates token then loops `services.IngestResult`. Client methods on `*Client` in client.go (after `ReportUpdates` at client.go:117).
- [ ] **Step 3: Verify build** — both modules `go build ./... && go vet ./...`
- [ ] **Step 4: Commit** — `feat(proto): SyncMonitors + ReportChecks RPCs`
---
## Task 12: Agent checker + scheduler (P2)
**Files:**
- Create: `agent/internal/checker/` (duplicate of server checker pkg)
- Create: `agent/internal/monitors/monitors.go` (poll + run + report loop)
- Modify: agent main loop to start it (alongside the sync loop in `agent/internal/sync` / the inventory ticker from Task 4)
**Interfaces:**
- Consumes: `client.SyncMonitors`, `client.ReportChecks`, agent `checker`.
- [ ] **Step 1: Duplicate checker pkg** into agent module (identical logic; imports agent pb).
- [ ] **Step 2: Monitor loop** — poll `SyncMonitors` every 30s for assigned specs; per-spec ticker on `IntervalSec` runs `checker.Run`; batch `CheckResult`s and `ReportChecks`. `serverID`/`agentToken`/`*Client` in scope from the existing loop.
- [ ] **Step 3: Verify build** — `cd agent && go build ./... && go vet ./...` (+ `GOOS=windows go build ./...`; icmp may no-op on Windows).
- [ ] **Step 4: Commit** — `feat(agent): agent-run monitor scheduler`
---
## Task 13: Notification channels + dispatch (P3)
**Files:**
- Create: `server/internal/models/channel.go`, `server/internal/services/channels.go`, `server/internal/notify/` (`dispatch.go`, `webhook.go`, `smtp.go`, `discord.go`, `slack.go`, `telegram.go`), `server/internal/api/channels.go`
- Modify: `server/internal/services/monitors.go` (replace the P2 `// TODO(P3): dispatch` hook)
**Interfaces:**
- Produces: `models.NotificationChannel{channel_id, name, type, config map, enabled}`. `notify.Dispatch(channel, event)` where `event` = monitor + old/new status + message. `notify.Test(channel)`.
- [ ] **Step 1: Model + CRUD service + REST** (`/api/channels*`, incl. `POST /api/channels/:id/test`).
- [ ] **Step 2: Dispatch abstraction** — webhook/discord/slack/telegram are HTTP POST with per-type JSON payload; SMTP via `net/smtp`. Per-monitor routing via `monitor.ChannelIDs`; resend interval so an ongoing `down` re-alerts at most every N min (track `last_notified_at` on monitor state).
- [ ] **Step 3: Fire on transition** — in `IngestResult`, on up/down flip resolve channels and `notify.Dispatch` each (goroutine, best-effort, log failures).
- [ ] **Step 4: Verify build** — `go build ./... && go vet ./...`
- [ ] **Step 5: Commit** — `feat(server): multi-channel monitor notifications`
---
## Task 14: Frontend — notification settings (P3)
**Files:**
- Modify: `web/lib/api.ts` (channel types + bindings), `web/app/settings/` (add notifications section/page)
- Modify: monitor create/edit form (Task 10) to select channels
**Interfaces:**
- Consumes: `/api/channels*`.
- [ ] **Step 1: Channel types + api bindings.**
- [ ] **Step 2: Settings UI** — list/add/edit channels, type-dependent config fields, **Test** button hitting `/api/channels/:id/test`.
- [ ] **Step 3: Wire channel multi-select** into the monitor form.
- [ ] **Step 4: Verify build** — `cd web && npm run build`
- [ ] **Step 5: Commit** — `feat(web): notification channel settings UI`
---
## Self-Review Notes
- **Spec coverage:** §3 model → T1; §4 RPC → T1; §5 collectors + scheduler → T3, T4; §6 handler/store → T2; §7 frontend → T5. Split cadence (30s metrics / 15m static) in T4 scheduler; merge rules preserving static in T2 `StoreInventory`. Tests omitted per Global Constraints.
- **Startup snapshot:** agent sends `Collect(true)` immediately so static fields populate without waiting 15 min.
- **Types consistent:** `InventoryReport` field names identical across proto, both pb files, store service, and TS interface (`usage_pct`, `used_bytes`, `total_bytes`, `swap_*`).
- **Follow-ups (out of scope):** time-series history, usage alerting, Windows collectors, servers-list CPU/RAM badges.
- **Monitoring (Tasks 714):** hybrid runner service-monitor replacing uptime-kuma, added 2026-07-21. 3 phases — P1 server-run engine+UI (T710), P2 agent-run RPCs (T1112), P3 multi-channel notify (T1314). Single `IngestResult` pipeline for both runners; checker pkg duplicated per module (pb convention). Design: brainstorm 2026-07-21. Follow-ups out of scope: status pages, maintenance windows, per-check auth headers, ICMP on Windows.
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<title>Vantage Status Pages</title>
<style>
:root{
color-scheme: dark;
/* Vantage web/ dark tokens, copied verbatim from web/app/globals.css.
This mockup commits to one theme because web/ does. */
--ground:#071628; --panel:#0d2138; --panel-2:#102842; --well:#04101f;
--ink:#e4ecf6; --ink-2:#9fb3ca; --ink-3:#71879f;
--rule:#1e3855; --rule-soft:#172c44;
--accent:#5b9be8; --accent-hover:#7fb2f0; --accent-ink:#04101f;
--up:#4fb484; --pend:#d6a63f; --down:#e2705a; --logo:#7fb2f0;
--shadow:0 1px 0 rgba(0,0,0,.35), 0 20px 44px -26px rgba(0,0,0,.85);
--sans: ui-sans-serif, system-ui, -apple-system, "Segoe UI", Roboto, "Helvetica Neue", Arial, sans-serif;
--mono: ui-monospace, "Cascadia Mono", "SF Mono", "JetBrains Mono", Menlo, Consolas, monospace;
--r:4px;
}
*{box-sizing:border-box;margin:0;padding:0}
body{background:var(--ground);color:var(--ink);font-family:var(--sans);-webkit-font-smoothing:antialiased;line-height:1.5}
a{color:inherit}
:focus-visible{outline:2px solid var(--accent);outline-offset:2px}
.page{max-width:1180px;margin:0 auto;padding:48px 24px 96px;display:flex;flex-direction:column;gap:56px}
.lede h1{font-size:1.6rem;font-weight:800;letter-spacing:-.035em;text-wrap:balance}
.lede p{color:var(--ink-2);font-size:.9rem;max-width:65ch;margin-top:8px}
.cap{font-family:var(--mono);font-size:.68rem;text-transform:uppercase;letter-spacing:.1em;color:var(--ink-2)}
.board{display:flex;flex-direction:column;gap:10px}
.board__head{display:flex;align-items:baseline;justify-content:space-between;gap:16px;flex-wrap:wrap}
.board__route{font-family:var(--mono);font-size:.7rem;color:var(--ink-3)}
.frame{border:1px solid var(--rule);border-radius:var(--r);background:var(--ground);box-shadow:var(--shadow);overflow:hidden}
/* address strip — shows the URL scheme being approved */
.addr{display:flex;align-items:center;gap:10px;background:var(--well);border-bottom:1px solid var(--rule);padding:9px 14px}
.addr__dots{display:flex;gap:5px}
.addr__dots i{width:8px;height:8px;border-radius:999px;background:var(--rule);display:block}
.addr__url{font-family:var(--mono);font-size:.72rem;color:var(--ink-2);overflow-x:auto;white-space:nowrap}
.addr__url b{color:var(--ink);font-weight:600}
.addr__tag{margin-left:auto;font-family:var(--mono);font-size:.62rem;text-transform:uppercase;letter-spacing:.1em;color:var(--ink-3);border:1px solid var(--rule);border-radius:999px;padding:2px 8px;white-space:nowrap}
/* ---------- public status page ---------- */
.pub{padding:40px 28px 32px}
.pub__inner{max-width:720px;margin:0 auto;display:flex;flex-direction:column;gap:28px}
.pub__head{display:flex;align-items:center;gap:14px}
.mark{width:38px;height:38px;border-radius:var(--r);background:var(--panel-2);border:1px solid var(--rule);display:grid;place-items:center;color:var(--logo);font-family:var(--mono);font-weight:700;font-size:.85rem;flex-shrink:0}
.pub__head h2{font-size:1.35rem;font-weight:800;letter-spacing:-.03em}
.pub__head p{color:var(--ink-2);font-size:.85rem;margin-top:2px}
.overall{display:flex;align-items:center;gap:11px;border:1px solid;border-radius:var(--r);padding:14px 16px;font-weight:600;font-size:.95rem}
.overall--down{background:rgba(226,112,90,.10);border-color:rgba(226,112,90,.30);color:var(--down)}
.glyph{width:16px;height:16px;flex-shrink:0}
.banner{border:1px solid var(--rule);background:var(--panel);border-radius:var(--r);padding:12px 14px;font-size:.85rem;color:var(--ink-2);display:flex;gap:10px}
.banner b{color:var(--ink);font-weight:600}
.group{display:flex;flex-direction:column;gap:10px}
.group > .cap{padding-left:2px}
.card{border:1px solid var(--rule);background:var(--panel);border-radius:var(--r)}
.rows > * + *{border-top:1px solid var(--rule-soft)}
.comp{padding:16px}
.comp__top{display:flex;align-items:center;justify-content:space-between;gap:16px;margin-bottom:10px}
.comp__name{font-weight:600;font-size:.92rem}
.state{display:inline-flex;align-items:center;gap:7px;font-size:.78rem;color:var(--ink-2);white-space:nowrap}
.dot{width:7px;height:7px;border-radius:999px;display:block;flex-shrink:0}
.dot--up{background:var(--up)} .dot--down{background:var(--down)}
.dot--maint{background:var(--accent)} .dot--pend{background:var(--pend)}
.dot--none{background:var(--rule)}
.bar{display:flex;gap:2px;overflow-x:auto;padding-bottom:2px}
.bar span{height:26px;width:3px;border-radius:999px;flex:0 0 auto;background:var(--rule)}
.bar .up{background:var(--up)} .bar .down{background:var(--down)}
.bar .maint{background:var(--accent)} .bar .none{background:var(--rule)}
.scale{display:flex;justify-content:space-between;margin-top:7px;font-size:.7rem;color:var(--ink-3)}
.scale b{color:var(--ink-2);font-weight:600;font-variant-numeric:tabular-nums}
.inc{padding:14px 16px}
.inc__top{display:flex;align-items:baseline;justify-content:space-between;gap:14px}
.inc__title{font-weight:600;font-size:.92rem}
.inc__meta{font-size:.75rem;color:var(--ink-3);margin-top:3px}
.inc__affects{font-size:.75rem;color:var(--ink-2);margin-top:5px}
.pill{font-family:var(--mono);font-size:.62rem;text-transform:uppercase;letter-spacing:.1em;border-radius:999px;padding:3px 9px;border:1px solid;white-space:nowrap}
.pill--inv{color:var(--down);border-color:rgba(226,112,90,.35);background:rgba(226,112,90,.10)}
.pill--mon{color:var(--pend);border-color:rgba(214,166,63,.35);background:rgba(214,166,63,.10)}
.pill--res{color:var(--up);border-color:rgba(79,180,132,.35);background:rgba(79,180,132,.10)}
.pill--sch{color:var(--accent);border-color:rgba(91,155,232,.35);background:rgba(91,155,232,.10)}
.pill--draft{color:var(--ink-2);border-color:var(--rule);background:var(--panel-2)}
.pill--live{color:var(--up);border-color:rgba(79,180,132,.35);background:rgba(79,180,132,.10)}
.timeline{margin-top:12px;border-left:1px solid var(--rule);padding-left:14px;display:flex;flex-direction:column;gap:12px}
.tl__head{display:flex;align-items:baseline;gap:9px}
.tl__st{font-family:var(--mono);font-size:.62rem;text-transform:uppercase;letter-spacing:.1em;color:var(--ink-2)}
.tl__at{font-size:.7rem;color:var(--ink-3);font-variant-numeric:tabular-nums}
.tl__body{font-size:.85rem;margin-top:3px;color:var(--ink)}
.pub__foot{text-align:center;font-size:.72rem;color:var(--ink-3);padding-top:6px}
/* ---------- editor ---------- */
.app{display:grid;grid-template-columns:236px 1fr;min-height:660px}
.side{background:var(--panel);border-right:1px solid var(--rule);display:flex;flex-direction:column}
.side__brand{height:64px;display:flex;align-items:center;gap:12px;padding:0 20px;border-bottom:1px solid var(--rule);flex-shrink:0}
.side__brand .mark{width:32px;height:32px;font-size:.78rem}
.side__brand b{font-size:1rem;font-weight:800;letter-spacing:-.035em;display:block;line-height:1.2}
.side__nav{padding:16px 12px;display:flex;flex-direction:column;gap:16px}
.navgrp + .navgrp{border-top:1px solid var(--rule);padding-top:16px}
.navgrp > .cap{padding:0 12px 6px}
.navgrp ul{list-style:none;display:flex;flex-direction:column;gap:4px}
.navgrp a{position:relative;display:flex;align-items:center;gap:12px;border-radius:var(--r);padding:9px 12px;font-size:.85rem;font-weight:500;color:var(--ink-2);text-decoration:none}
.navgrp a:hover{background:var(--panel-2);color:var(--ink)}
.navgrp a.on{background:var(--panel-2);color:var(--ink);font-weight:600}
.navgrp a.on::before{content:"";position:absolute;left:0;top:4px;bottom:4px;width:2px;border-radius:999px;background:var(--accent)}
.navgrp svg{width:16px;height:16px;flex-shrink:0;opacity:.9}
.main{padding:26px 28px 36px;display:flex;flex-direction:column;gap:22px;min-width:0}
.back{font-size:.78rem;color:var(--ink-2);text-decoration:none;display:inline-flex;gap:6px;align-items:center}
.back:hover{color:var(--ink)}
.phead{display:flex;align-items:flex-start;justify-content:space-between;gap:20px;flex-wrap:wrap}
.phead h2{font-size:1.3rem;font-weight:800;letter-spacing:-.03em}
.record{display:flex;align-items:center;gap:8px;margin-top:6px}
.record code{font-family:var(--mono);font-size:.72rem;color:var(--ink-2);background:var(--well);border:1px solid var(--rule);border-radius:var(--r);padding:3px 8px}
.copy{background:none;border:0;color:var(--ink-3);cursor:pointer;font-size:.72rem;font-family:var(--mono)}
.copy:hover{color:var(--accent)}
.acts{display:flex;gap:9px;flex-wrap:wrap}
.btn{font-size:.82rem;font-weight:600;border-radius:var(--r);padding:8px 14px;border:1px solid var(--rule);background:var(--panel);color:var(--ink);cursor:pointer;text-decoration:none;display:inline-flex;align-items:center;gap:7px}
.btn:hover{background:var(--panel-2)}
.btn--p{background:var(--accent);border-color:var(--accent);color:var(--accent-ink)}
.btn--p:hover{background:var(--accent-hover)}
.panel{border:1px solid var(--rule);background:var(--panel);border-radius:var(--r)}
.panel__head{display:flex;align-items:center;justify-content:space-between;gap:14px;padding:13px 16px;border-bottom:1px solid var(--rule)}
.panel__head h3{font-size:.95rem;font-weight:700}
.panel__head p{font-size:.76rem;color:var(--ink-3);margin-top:2px}
.panel__body{padding:16px;display:flex;flex-direction:column;gap:16px}
.fields{display:grid;grid-template-columns:repeat(auto-fit,minmax(230px,1fr));gap:14px}
.field{display:flex;flex-direction:column;gap:6px;min-width:0}
.field > label{font-size:.76rem;font-weight:600;color:var(--ink-2)}
.field .hint{font-size:.72rem;color:var(--ink-3)}
.in{background:var(--well);border:1px solid var(--rule);border-radius:var(--r);padding:8px 11px;font:inherit;font-size:.85rem;color:var(--ink);width:100%}
.in::placeholder{color:var(--ink-3)}
.in:focus{outline:2px solid var(--accent);outline-offset:-1px;border-color:var(--accent)}
.in--mono{font-family:var(--mono);font-size:.8rem}
.toggle{display:flex;align-items:center;justify-content:space-between;gap:16px;background:var(--panel-2);border:1px solid var(--rule);border-radius:var(--r);padding:12px 14px}
.toggle p{font-size:.76rem;color:var(--ink-3);margin-top:3px;max-width:52ch}
.toggle b{font-size:.85rem}
.sw{width:38px;height:21px;border-radius:999px;background:var(--up);border:0;position:relative;cursor:pointer;flex-shrink:0}
.sw::after{content:"";position:absolute;top:2px;left:19px;width:17px;height:17px;border-radius:999px;background:var(--accent-ink)}
.sw[aria-checked="false"]{background:var(--rule)}
.sw[aria-checked="false"]::after{left:2px;background:var(--ink-3)}
.sect{border:1px solid var(--rule);border-radius:var(--r);background:var(--panel-2)}
.sect__head{display:flex;align-items:center;gap:10px;padding:10px 12px;border-bottom:1px solid var(--rule)}
.sect__head .in{max-width:220px}
.sect__head .rm{margin-left:auto}
.rm{background:none;border:0;color:var(--ink-3);font-size:.75rem;cursor:pointer;font-family:var(--mono)}
.rm:hover{color:var(--down)}
.entry{display:grid;grid-template-columns:1fr 1fr auto;gap:12px;align-items:center;padding:11px 12px}
.entry + .entry{border-top:1px solid var(--rule-soft)}
.entry__mon{display:flex;flex-direction:column;gap:2px;min-width:0}
.entry__mon b{font-size:.84rem;font-weight:600}
.entry__mon span{font-family:var(--mono);font-size:.68rem;color:var(--ink-3)}
.adds{display:flex;gap:9px;flex-wrap:wrap;padding:0 12px 12px}
.inc-row{display:flex;align-items:flex-start;justify-content:space-between;gap:14px;padding:13px 14px}
.inc-row + .inc-row{border-top:1px solid var(--rule-soft)}
.inc-row__l{min-width:0}
.inc-row__l b{font-size:.88rem;font-weight:600;display:block}
.inc-row__l span{font-size:.74rem;color:var(--ink-3)}
.inc-row__r{display:flex;align-items:center;gap:9px;flex-shrink:0}
.notes{border-top:1px solid var(--rule);padding-top:14px;display:flex;flex-direction:column;gap:7px}
.notes li{font-size:.82rem;color:var(--ink-2);display:flex;gap:10px;list-style:none}
.notes li b{color:var(--ink);font-weight:600}
.notes .k{font-family:var(--mono);font-size:.66rem;text-transform:uppercase;letter-spacing:.1em;color:var(--ink-3);flex:0 0 76px;padding-top:2px}
@media (max-width:820px){
.app{grid-template-columns:1fr}
.side{display:none}
.entry{grid-template-columns:1fr}
.page{padding:32px 16px 64px}
}
</style>
<div class="page">
<header class="lede">
<p class="cap" style="margin-bottom:10px">Vantage · status pages · mockup for approval</p>
<h1>Two screens: what the public sees, and what the operator edits</h1>
<p>Drawn with the real <code style="font-family:var(--mono);font-size:.85em">web/</code> dark tokens and the existing sidebar idioms, so what gets approved here is what gets built. The public page is shown mid-incident rather than all-green, because that is the state it exists for.</p>
</header>
<!-- ================= PUBLIC ================= -->
<section class="board">
<div class="board__head">
<p class="cap">1 · Public status page</p>
<p class="board__route">web/app/status/[pageId]/page.tsx · no auth, no sidebar</p>
</div>
<div class="frame">
<div class="addr">
<span class="addr__dots"><i></i><i></i><i></i></span>
<span class="addr__url">https://acme.vantage.example.com<b>/status/api</b></span>
<span class="addr__tag">signed out</span>
</div>
<div class="pub">
<div class="pub__inner">
<div class="pub__head">
<div class="mark">AC</div>
<div>
<h2>Acme Platform Status</h2>
<p>Live availability for the Acme API and dashboard.</p>
</div>
</div>
<div class="overall overall--down">
<svg class="glyph" viewBox="0 0 16 16" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="1.6" aria-hidden="true">
<circle cx="8" cy="8" r="6.4"/><path d="M8 4.8v3.6M8 11.1h.01" stroke-linecap="round"/>
</svg>
Service disruption
</div>
<div class="banner">
<svg class="glyph" viewBox="0 0 16 16" fill="none" stroke="var(--accent)" stroke-width="1.6" aria-hidden="true" style="margin-top:2px">
<circle cx="8" cy="8" r="6.4"/><path d="M8 7.4v3.8M8 5.1h.01" stroke-linecap="round"/>
</svg>
<span><b>Europe region only.</b> US and APAC are unaffected. Follow this page for updates.</span>
</div>
<div class="group">
<p class="cap">Active</p>
<div class="card">
<article class="inc">
<div class="inc__top">
<div>
<p class="inc__title">Elevated error rates on database writes</p>
<p class="inc__meta">Started 24 Aug 2026, 09:12 UTC</p>
</div>
<span class="pill pill--mon">monitoring</span>
</div>
<p class="inc__affects">Affects Primary database, Public API</p>
<div class="timeline">
<div>
<div class="tl__head"><span class="tl__st">monitoring</span><span class="tl__at">11:40 UTC</span></div>
<p class="tl__body">Failover completed. Write latency is back to normal and we are watching for recurrence before calling this resolved.</p>
</div>
<div>
<div class="tl__head"><span class="tl__st">identified</span><span class="tl__at">09:48 UTC</span></div>
<p class="tl__body">A failing disk on the primary database node is causing write timeouts. Failover to the standby node is in progress.</p>
</div>
<div>
<div class="tl__head"><span class="tl__st">investigating</span><span class="tl__at">09:15 UTC</span></div>
<p class="tl__body">We are investigating a rise in write errors affecting the API.</p>
</div>
</div>
</article>
</div>
</div>
<div class="group">
<p class="cap">Scheduled maintenance</p>
<div class="card">
<article class="inc">
<div class="inc__top">
<div>
<p class="inc__title">Object storage capacity upgrade</p>
<p class="inc__meta">31 Aug 2026, 02:00 04:00 UTC</p>
</div>
<span class="pill pill--sch">scheduled</span>
</div>
<p class="inc__affects">Affects Object storage</p>
</article>
</div>
</div>
<div class="group">
<p class="cap">API</p>
<div class="card rows">
<div class="comp" data-bar="api" data-state="down">
<div class="comp__top">
<span class="comp__name">Public API</span>
<span class="state"><i class="dot dot--down"></i>Down</span>
</div>
<div class="bar"></div>
<div class="scale"><span>90 days ago</span><span><b>99.81%</b> uptime</span><span>Today</span></div>
</div>
<div class="comp" data-bar="hooks" data-state="up">
<div class="comp__top">
<span class="comp__name">Webhook delivery</span>
<span class="state"><i class="dot dot--up"></i>Operational</span>
</div>
<div class="bar"></div>
<div class="scale"><span>90 days ago</span><span><b>99.99%</b> uptime</span><span>Today</span></div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="group">
<p class="cap">Web</p>
<div class="card rows">
<div class="comp" data-bar="dash" data-state="up">
<div class="comp__top">
<span class="comp__name">Dashboard</span>
<span class="state"><i class="dot dot--up"></i>Operational</span>
</div>
<div class="bar"></div>
<div class="scale"><span>90 days ago</span><span><b>99.97%</b> uptime</span><span>Today</span></div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="group">
<p class="cap">Data</p>
<div class="card rows">
<div class="comp" data-bar="db" data-state="down">
<div class="comp__top">
<span class="comp__name">Primary database</span>
<span class="state"><i class="dot dot--down"></i>Down</span>
</div>
<div class="bar"></div>
<div class="scale"><span>90 days ago</span><span><b>99.62%</b> uptime</span><span>Today</span></div>
</div>
<div class="comp" data-bar="obj" data-state="maint">
<div class="comp__top">
<span class="comp__name">Object storage</span>
<span class="state"><i class="dot dot--maint"></i>Maintenance</span>
</div>
<div class="bar"></div>
<div class="scale"><span>90 days ago</span><span><b>99.94%</b> uptime</span><span>Today</span></div>
</div>
<div class="comp" data-bar="new" data-state="up">
<div class="comp__top">
<span class="comp__name">Search index</span>
<span class="state"><i class="dot dot--up"></i>Operational</span>
</div>
<div class="bar"></div>
<div class="scale"><span>90 days ago</span><span><b>100.00%</b> uptime</span><span>Today</span></div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="group">
<p class="cap">Past incidents</p>
<div class="card rows">
<article class="inc">
<div class="inc__top">
<div>
<p class="inc__title">Public API unavailable</p>
<p class="inc__meta">2 Aug 2026, 14:02 UTC — resolved 14:19 UTC</p>
</div>
<span class="pill pill--res">resolved</span>
</div>
<p class="inc__affects">Affects Public API</p>
</article>
<article class="inc">
<div class="inc__top">
<div>
<p class="inc__title">Slow dashboard loads in Europe</p>
<p class="inc__meta">17 Jul 2026, 08:30 UTC — resolved 10:05 UTC</p>
</div>
<span class="pill pill--res">resolved</span>
</div>
<p class="inc__affects">Affects Dashboard</p>
</article>
</div>
</div>
<p class="pub__foot">Updated 24 Aug 2026, 11:58 UTC · refreshes every 60 seconds</p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<ul class="notes">
<li><span class="k">Redacted</span><span>No target URL, host, port or failure text anywhere on this page. <b>Search index</b> shows the no-data tail as grey cells rather than claiming 100% for days before it existed.</span></li>
<li><span class="k">Maintenance</span><span><b>Object storage</b> reads as Maintenance, not Down — but its uptime figure is untouched. The window changes how it is drawn, never what the numbers say.</span></li>
<li><span class="k">Colour</span><span>Every state carries a word and a shape as well as a hue. The page is readable with colour vision differences and in greyscale print.</span></li>
</ul>
</section>
<!-- ================= EDITOR ================= -->
<section class="board">
<div class="board__head">
<p class="cap">2 · Status page editor</p>
<p class="board__route">web/app/(app)/status-pages/[pageId]/page.tsx · owner or admin</p>
</div>
<div class="frame">
<div class="app">
<aside class="side">
<div class="side__brand">
<div class="mark">V</div>
<div>
<b>Vantage</b>
<span class="cap">Acme Ltd</span>
</div>
</div>
<nav class="side__nav">
<div class="navgrp">
<p class="cap">Fleet</p>
<ul>
<li><a href="#"><svg viewBox="0 0 16 16" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="1.5"><rect x="2" y="3" width="12" height="4" rx="1"/><rect x="2" y="9" width="12" height="4" rx="1"/></svg>Servers</a></li>
<li><a href="#"><svg viewBox="0 0 16 16" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="1.5"><rect x="2.5" y="2.5" width="11" height="11" rx="1.5"/><path d="M6 6h4v4H6z"/></svg>Workloads</a></li>
<li><a href="#"><svg viewBox="0 0 16 16" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="1.5" stroke-linecap="round"><path d="M1.5 8.5h3l2-4 3 7 2-3h3"/></svg>Monitors</a></li>
</ul>
</div>
<div class="navgrp">
<p class="cap">Access</p>
<ul>
<li><a href="#"><svg viewBox="0 0 16 16" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="1.5"><circle cx="5.5" cy="8" r="3"/><path d="M8.5 8h6M12 8v2.5"/></svg>SSH Keys</a></li>
<li><a href="#"><svg viewBox="0 0 16 16" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="1.5"><rect x="3" y="7" width="10" height="6.5" rx="1.5"/><path d="M5.5 7V5a2.5 2.5 0 015 0v2"/></svg>Secrets</a></li>
</ul>
</div>
<div class="navgrp">
<p class="cap">Instance</p>
<ul>
<li><a href="#" class="on"><svg viewBox="0 0 16 16" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="1.5"><rect x="2" y="3" width="12" height="10" rx="1.5"/><path d="M4.5 10.5v-2M8 10.5v-4M11.5 10.5v-3" stroke-linecap="round"/></svg>Status Pages</a></li>
<li><a href="#"><svg viewBox="0 0 16 16" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="1.5"><path d="M3 3h10v10H3z"/><path d="M5.5 6.5h5M5.5 9.5h3"/></svg>Audit Log</a></li>
<li><a href="#"><svg viewBox="0 0 16 16" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="1.5"><circle cx="8" cy="8" r="2.2"/><path d="M8 1.8v1.6M8 12.6v1.6M14.2 8h-1.6M3.4 8H1.8"/></svg>Settings</a></li>
</ul>
</div>
</nav>
</aside>
<div class="main">
<a class="back" href="#">
<svg class="glyph" viewBox="0 0 16 16" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="1.6" stroke-linecap="round"><path d="M9.5 3.5L5 8l4.5 4.5"/></svg>
All status pages
</a>
<div class="phead">
<div>
<h2>Acme Platform Status</h2>
<div class="record">
<code>acme.vantage.example.com/status/api</code>
<button class="copy" type="button">copy</button>
</div>
</div>
<div class="acts">
<a class="btn" href="#">
<svg class="glyph" viewBox="0 0 16 16" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="1.6" stroke-linecap="round"><path d="M6.5 3.5h6v6M12.5 3.5L7 9"/><path d="M11 10.5v2h-8v-8h2"/></svg>
View page
</a>
<button class="btn btn--p" type="button">Save changes</button>
</div>
</div>
<div class="panel">
<div class="panel__head">
<div>
<h3>Details</h3>
<p>What visitors see at the top of the page.</p>
</div>
<span class="pill pill--live">published</span>
</div>
<div class="panel__body">
<div class="toggle">
<div>
<b>Published</b>
<p>Anyone with the link can read this page. Unpublished pages return not found, so you can compose before announcing.</p>
</div>
<button class="sw" type="button" role="switch" aria-checked="true" aria-label="Published"></button>
</div>
<div class="fields">
<div class="field">
<label for="f-title">Title</label>
<input class="in" id="f-title" value="Acme Platform Status">
</div>
<div class="field">
<label for="f-id">Page address</label>
<input class="in in--mono" id="f-id" value="api" disabled>
<span class="hint">Fixed once created — the link is already out there.</span>
</div>
<div class="field">
<label for="f-desc">Description</label>
<input class="in" id="f-desc" value="Live availability for the Acme API and dashboard.">
</div>
<div class="field">
<label for="f-logo">Logo URL</label>
<input class="in in--mono" id="f-logo" placeholder="https://acme.example.com/logo.svg">
</div>
</div>
<div class="field">
<label for="f-ban">Notice</label>
<input class="in" id="f-ban" value="Europe region only. US and APAC are unaffected. Follow this page for updates.">
<span class="hint">Shown above everything else. Clear it to remove the notice.</span>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="panel">
<div class="panel__head">
<div>
<h3>Components</h3>
<p>Monitors grouped for the public page. Grouping here is separate from the groups on Monitors.</p>
</div>
<button class="btn" type="button">Add section</button>
</div>
<div class="panel__body">
<div class="sect">
<div class="sect__head">
<input class="in" value="API" aria-label="Section name">
<button class="rm" type="button">remove section</button>
</div>
<div class="entry">
<div class="entry__mon">
<b>prod-api-eu-health</b>
<span>http · every 30s</span>
</div>
<input class="in" value="Public API" aria-label="Public name for prod-api-eu-health">
<button class="rm" type="button">remove</button>
</div>
<div class="entry">
<div class="entry__mon">
<b>hooks-dispatch-probe</b>
<span>http · every 60s</span>
</div>
<input class="in" value="Webhook delivery" aria-label="Public name for hooks-dispatch-probe">
<button class="rm" type="button">remove</button>
</div>
<div class="adds"><button class="btn" type="button">Add monitor</button></div>
</div>
<div class="sect">
<div class="sect__head">
<input class="in" value="Data" aria-label="Section name">
<button class="rm" type="button">remove section</button>
</div>
<div class="entry">
<div class="entry__mon">
<b>pg-primary-10-0-0-5</b>
<span>tcp · every 30s</span>
</div>
<input class="in" value="Primary database" aria-label="Public name for pg-primary-10-0-0-5">
<button class="rm" type="button">remove</button>
</div>
<div class="entry">
<div class="entry__mon">
<b>minio-gw</b>
<span>http · every 60s</span>
</div>
<input class="in" placeholder="minio-gw" aria-label="Public name for minio-gw">
<button class="rm" type="button">remove</button>
</div>
<div class="adds"><button class="btn" type="button">Add monitor</button></div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="panel">
<div class="panel__head">
<div>
<h3>Incidents</h3>
<p>Written by you. Outages Vantage detects appear on the page automatically.</p>
</div>
<div class="acts">
<button class="btn" type="button">Schedule maintenance</button>
<button class="btn btn--p" type="button">Open incident</button>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div class="inc-row">
<div class="inc-row__l">
<b>Elevated error rates on database writes</b>
<span>Opened 09:12 UTC · 3 updates · affects Primary database, Public API</span>
</div>
<div class="inc-row__r">
<span class="pill pill--mon">monitoring</span>
<button class="btn" type="button">Post update</button>
</div>
</div>
<div class="inc-row">
<div class="inc-row__l">
<b>Object storage capacity upgrade</b>
<span>31 Aug, 02:0004:00 UTC · affects Object storage</span>
</div>
<div class="inc-row__r">
<span class="pill pill--sch">scheduled</span>
<button class="btn" type="button">Edit</button>
</div>
</div>
<div class="inc-row">
<div class="inc-row__l">
<b>Slow dashboard loads in Europe</b>
<span>17 Jul · resolved after 1h 35m · affects Dashboard</span>
</div>
<div class="inc-row__r">
<span class="pill pill--res">resolved</span>
<button class="btn" type="button">Edit</button>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<ul class="notes">
<li><span class="k">Naming</span><span>The monitor's own identifier stays visible on the left; the <b>public name</b> is a separate field beside it. An empty field falls back to the identifier, which the placeholder shows — so publishing an internal name is always a visible choice.</span></li>
<li><span class="k">Address</span><span>The page address is fixed after creation and the record line carries the whole URL, click to copy. It is what gets pasted into a support article.</span></li>
<li><span class="k">Copy</span><span>Buttons name the outcome: <b>Open incident</b>, <b>Post update</b>, <b>Schedule maintenance</b> — the same words the public timeline then shows.</span></li>
</ul>
</section>
</div>
<script>
// 90 daily cells per component. Seeded rather than random so the mockup is
// stable between reloads and reviewers are looking at the same picture.
const PATTERNS = {
api: { downs: [2, 22], maint: [], noData: 0 },
hooks: { downs: [], maint: [], noData: 0 },
dash: { downs: [38], maint: [], noData: 0 },
db: { downs: [0, 1, 12, 13, 47], maint: [], noData: 0 },
obj: { downs: [61], maint: [0], noData: 0 },
new: { downs: [], maint: [], noData: 61 }
};
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const p = PATTERNS[comp.dataset.bar];
const bar = comp.querySelector(".bar");
const frag = document.createDocumentFragment();
for (let i = 89; i >= 0; i--) {
const cell = document.createElement("span");
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if (i >= 90 - p.noData) cls = "none";
else if (p.maint.includes(i)) cls = "maint";
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cell.className = cls;
cell.title = cls === "none" ? "no data" : cls === "maint" ? "maintenance" : cls === "down" ? "outage" : "operational";
frag.appendChild(cell);
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bar.appendChild(frag);
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</script>
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
@@ -1,142 +0,0 @@
# Fleet Inventory — Design
**Date:** 2026-07-20
**Status:** Approved (design) — ready for implementation planning
**Scope:** Fleet Inventory only. Server Workflows and SaaS/auth are separate sub-projects.
---
## 1. Summary
Each agent collects hardware/OS inventory about its host and reports it to the server, which stores the latest snapshot per server and surfaces it in the UI. Two cadences:
- **Metrics (near-real-time):** CPU load/usage, RAM used/total, swap used/total — every **30s** (aligned with existing poll rhythm).
- **Static inventory (slow):** disks, partitions and their usage, CPU model/cores, total RAM, OS details — every **15 min**.
Transport: a **new unary gRPC `ReportInventory` RPC** (mirrors the existing `ReportUpdates` pattern). No streaming.
---
## 2. Locked decisions
| Topic | Decision |
|-------|----------|
| Transport | New `ReportInventory` unary RPC. |
| Cadence | Metrics every 30s; static inventory every 15 min. One RPC carries both, but static fields are only populated on the 15-min tick (empty/omitted otherwise → server keeps prior static snapshot). |
| Storage | Latest snapshot embedded on the `servers` document (`inventory` sub-doc). No history/time-series in v1. |
| Collection | Pure-Go where practical (`/proc`, `gopsutil`-style). Agent already runs as root. |
| Platform | Linux primary; Windows agent populates what it can, leaves the rest empty. |
---
## 3. Data model
Add an `Inventory` sub-document to the existing `Server` model (`server/internal/models/server.go`):
```go
type CPUInfo struct {
Model string `bson:"model,omitempty" json:"model,omitempty"`
Cores int `bson:"cores,omitempty" json:"cores,omitempty"`
UsagePct float64 `bson:"usage_pct" json:"usage_pct"` // metrics tick
Load1 float64 `bson:"load1,omitempty" json:"load1,omitempty"`
}
type MemInfo struct {
TotalBytes uint64 `bson:"total_bytes" json:"total_bytes"`
UsedBytes uint64 `bson:"used_bytes" json:"used_bytes"` // metrics tick
}
type Partition struct {
Device string `bson:"device" json:"device"`
Mountpoint string `bson:"mountpoint" json:"mountpoint"`
Fstype string `bson:"fstype,omitempty" json:"fstype,omitempty"`
TotalBytes uint64 `bson:"total_bytes" json:"total_bytes"`
UsedBytes uint64 `bson:"used_bytes" json:"used_bytes"`
}
type Inventory struct {
CPU CPUInfo `bson:"cpu" json:"cpu"`
Memory MemInfo `bson:"memory" json:"memory"`
SwapTotalBytes uint64 `bson:"swap_total_bytes" json:"swap_total_bytes"`
SwapUsedBytes uint64 `bson:"swap_used_bytes" json:"swap_used_bytes"`
Partitions []Partition `bson:"partitions,omitempty" json:"partitions,omitempty"`
Kernel string `bson:"kernel,omitempty" json:"kernel,omitempty"`
MetricsAt *time.Time `bson:"metrics_at,omitempty" json:"metrics_at,omitempty"`
StaticAt *time.Time `bson:"static_at,omitempty" json:"static_at,omitempty"`
}
```
Add `Inventory *Inventory` field to `Server`.
Server-side update rules:
- Metrics fields (`cpu.usage_pct`, `cpu.load1`, `memory.used_bytes`, swap used) always updated + `metrics_at`.
- Static fields (`cpu.model/cores`, `memory.total_bytes`, `partitions`, `kernel`, swap total) updated only when the report includes them (non-zero/non-empty) + `static_at`.
---
## 4. gRPC protocol (`proto/vantage/v1/vantage.proto` + both `pb.go` files)
```protobuf
rpc ReportInventory(InventoryReport) returns (InventoryReportResponse);
message InventoryReport {
string server_id = 1;
string agent_token = 2;
bool include_static = 3; // true on the 15-min tick
CPUReport cpu = 4;
MemReport memory = 5;
uint64 swap_total = 6;
uint64 swap_used = 7;
repeated PartitionReport partitions = 8; // only when include_static
string kernel = 9; // only when include_static
}
message CPUReport { string model = 1; int32 cores = 2; double usage_pct = 3; double load1 = 4; }
message MemReport { uint64 total_bytes = 1; uint64 used_bytes = 2; }
message PartitionReport { string device = 1; string mountpoint = 2; string fstype = 3; uint64 total_bytes = 4; uint64 used_bytes = 5; }
message InventoryReportResponse {}
```
Hand-written JSON-codec structs added to `server/internal/grpc/pb/vantage.pb.go` and `agent/internal/grpc/pb/vantage.pb.go`, plus the RPC method wiring (service interface, client method, handler registration) mirroring `ReportUpdates`.
---
## 5. Agent collection (`agent/internal/inventory/`)
- `Collect(includeStatic bool) *pb.InventoryReport` — reads:
- CPU usage: sample `/proc/stat` delta; load from `/proc/loadavg`; model/cores from `/proc/cpuinfo` (static).
- Memory/swap: `/proc/meminfo`.
- Partitions: `/proc/mounts` filtered to real filesystems + `statfs` for total/used (static).
- Kernel: `uname` / `/proc/version` (static).
- Windows: best-effort via `wmic`/PS or leave empty.
- Scheduler in the agent main loop: a 30s ticker calls `Collect(false)` and `ReportInventory`; every 30th tick (15 min) calls `Collect(true)`.
- Reuse existing gRPC client; add `Client.ReportInventory(...)` like `ReportUpdates`.
Prefer implementing the `/proc` readers directly (no new heavy deps) unless a `gopsutil` dependency is already vendored.
---
## 6. Server handler + service
- gRPC handler `ReportInventory` in `server/internal/grpc/server.go`: validate agent token (`ValidateAgentToken`), then call `services.StoreInventory(serverID, report)`.
- `services.StoreInventory` (in `server/internal/services/inventory.go`): builds the `$set` per the update rules in §3 and `UpdateOne` on `servers`.
---
## 7. Frontend
Surface inventory on the existing server detail page (`web/app/servers/[id]/page.tsx`) — add an "Inventory" panel:
- CPU usage gauge + model/cores, load.
- RAM used/total bar, swap bar.
- Partitions table: device, mount, fstype, used/total with a usage bar.
- "Updated Xs ago" from `metrics_at`/`static_at`.
Optionally add compact CPU/RAM badges to the servers list (`web/app/servers/page.tsx`). Reuse `@/components/ui` + Tailwind tokens. Poll the server detail query while the page is open (react-query `refetchInterval` ~30s) so metrics stay fresh.
---
## 8. Out of scope
- Time-series history / graphs (only latest snapshot stored).
- Alerting thresholds on usage (settings/alerts is a separate concern).
- Per-process / network / GPU inventory.
- Tests (skipped, consistent with the Workflows iteration).
@@ -1,142 +0,0 @@
# SaaS: Auth + Organizations — Design
**Date:** 2026-07-20
**Status:** Approved (design) — ready for implementation planning
**Scope:** Local auth + organizations + per-org OIDC, and org-scoping of existing data. Billing/plan-limits explicitly deferred. Fleet Inventory and Server Workflows are separate sub-projects.
---
## 1. Summary
Turn Vantage from a single-admin, single global-OIDC tool into a multi-tenant app:
1. **Replace** the global Authentik/env-based OIDC with **local email/password accounts** as the primary login.
2. **Organizations** — every user belongs to an org; every domain object (servers, keys, secrets, assignments, workflows, steps, runs, audit) carries an `org_id` and all queries are scoped to the caller's org.
3. **Per-org OpenID** — an org admin can configure their own OIDC provider (issuer/client id/secret); users in that org can then sign in through it.
No billing, no seat/server limits this iteration (schema leaves room).
---
## 2. Locked decisions
| Topic | Decision |
|-------|----------|
| Primary auth | Local email + password (bcrypt). Replaces global Authentik. |
| Org SSO | Per-org OIDC provider, configured by org admin, resolved dynamically at login. |
| Isolation | `org_id` on every collection; every service query filtered by org. Enforced in the request layer via session→org. |
| Roles | `owner`, `admin`, `member` (v1: owner/admin can manage users + org OIDC + all resources; member can use resources). Keep minimal. |
| Bootstrapping | First-run creates the initial org + owner account (setup flow) when no users exist. |
| Sessions | Keep existing Redis session store; session now carries `user_id`, `org_id`, `role`, `email`. |
| Agent auth | Unchanged (per-server agent tokens). Servers gain `org_id`; agent RPCs resolve org from the server record. |
---
## 3. Data model
### `orgs`
```json
{ "_id":"ObjectId", "org_id":"uuid", "name":"Acme", "created_at":"ISODate" }
```
### `users`
```json
{
"_id":"ObjectId", "user_id":"uuid", "org_id":"uuid",
"email":"a@b.com", "password_hash":"bcrypt...", "role":"owner|admin|member",
"auth_source":"local|oidc", "created_at":"ISODate", "last_login":"ISODate|null"
}
```
Unique index on `email` (global — email identifies the account and its org).
### `org_oidc` (per-org provider config)
```json
{
"_id":"ObjectId", "org_id":"uuid",
"issuer":"https://id.acme.com", "client_id":"...",
"client_secret_enc":"AES...", // encrypted with existing crypto.go
"redirect_url":"https://vantage.../auth/oidc/callback",
"enabled": true, "updated_at":"ISODate"
}
```
### Existing collections — add `org_id`
`servers`, `keys`, `assignments`, `secrets`, `workflows`, `workflow_steps`, `workflow_runs`, `audit` each gain `org_id string`. A **migration** backfills all existing documents into a default org (see §7).
---
## 4. Auth flows
### Local
- `POST /auth/register` — only allowed during first-run bootstrap (creates org + owner) OR by an org admin inviting a user (see below). Not open self-serve.
- `POST /auth/login` — email + password → verify bcrypt → create session with `{user_id, org_id, role, email}`.
- `POST /auth/logout` — destroy session.
- `GET /auth/me` — returns current user + org.
### Org-admin user management
- `GET /api/org/users` / `POST /api/org/users` (create local user in caller's org) / `PUT /api/org/users/:id/role` / `DELETE /api/org/users/:id`.
### Per-org OIDC
- `GET/PUT /api/org/oidc` — read/save the caller org's provider config (admin only). Secret stored encrypted.
- `GET /auth/oidc/start?org=<org_id or slug>` — look up org's `org_oidc`, build the OIDC provider on demand (cache per org), redirect to authorize.
- `GET /auth/oidc/callback` — exchange code, match/provision the user by email **within that org**, create session.
- If the email exists in the org → log in. If not → provision a `member` with `auth_source=oidc` (org admin can promote). Reject if email belongs to a different org.
### First-run bootstrap
- `GET /auth/bootstrap-status``{ needs_setup: bool }` (true when `users` is empty).
- Setup page collects org name + owner email/password → creates org + owner → session.
---
## 5. Request scoping
- `auth.Middleware` already loads the session; extend `Session` to include `OrgID`, `UserID`, `Role`. Add helper `auth.OrgID(c) string`.
- **Every service function that reads/writes a scoped collection takes an `orgID` argument** and adds `"org_id": orgID` to its filter and on insert. Handlers pass `auth.OrgID(c)`.
- Add a `requireRole(role)` gin middleware for admin-only routes (org user mgmt, org OIDC).
- Agent-facing gRPC: resolve `org_id` from the `servers` record (already tied to `server_id`); inventory/keys/sync operate on that org implicitly.
---
## 6. Removing global Authentik
- Delete/retire env-driven `InitOIDC` global provider (`OIDC_ISSUER` etc.). Keep the `go-oidc`/`oauth2` machinery but move it behind the per-org resolver.
- `authEnabled` global replaced by "auth always on" (there is always local auth). Update `middleware.go` accordingly (no more `if !authEnabled { next }` bypass — except the bootstrap endpoints and login/register which are unauthenticated).
- Login page (`web/app/login` or existing) offers: email/password form + "Sign in with your organization's SSO" (enter org, redirect to `/auth/oidc/start`).
---
## 7. Migration
One-shot migration run at startup (idempotent):
1. If `orgs` is empty AND `servers`/`keys`/etc. contain documents without `org_id`: create a **default org** ("Default").
2. Set `org_id = <default>` on all existing `servers`, `keys`, `assignments`, `secrets`, `workflows`, `workflow_steps`, `workflow_runs`, `audit` documents missing it.
3. If `OIDC_ISSUER` env was set previously and an admin email is known, optionally seed an owner user (documented manual step) — otherwise first-run bootstrap handles owner creation.
Guard with a marker (e.g. a `migrations` collection entry) so it runs once.
---
## 8. Frontend
- **Login/Setup:** `web/app/login/page.tsx` (email/password + org SSO entry) and `web/app/setup/page.tsx` (first-run). Redirect logic based on `bootstrap-status` and `auth/me`.
- **Org settings:** `web/app/settings/org/` — members list + invite/create user + role management; OIDC provider form (issuer/client id/secret/enabled).
- Existing pages unchanged functionally but now implicitly org-scoped by the backend. Show current org + user in the sidebar/header.
---
## 9. Security
- Passwords: bcrypt (cost ≥ 12). Never returned.
- Org OIDC client secret encrypted at rest (reuse `services/crypto.go` AES).
- Cross-org access prevented at the service layer (org_id in every filter) — the primary isolation boundary. Handlers must never accept an `org_id` from the client; always derive from session.
- OIDC callback must bind the returned identity to the org that initiated the flow (state carries org_id) to prevent org-mixing.
- Role checks on all org-admin mutations.
---
## 10. Out of scope
- Billing, plans, seat/server limits.
- Cross-org resource sharing, org switching for a single user (one user = one org in v1).
- SCIM / directory sync, SAML.
- Email delivery for invites (create-user sets a password or invite token; email sending deferred — document as manual/console output).
- Tests (skipped, consistent with prior iterations).
@@ -0,0 +1,297 @@
# Windows agent parity: OS updates and workloads
Date: 2026-08-13
## Goal
Bring the Windows agent up to the Linux agent on two subsystems: OS update
check/apply, and the workload registry (collection, control, logs). Everything
else about the Windows agent stays as it is.
Out of scope, deliberately:
- **Package inventory and CVE findings.** `trivy-db` carries no Windows feed, so
a Windows finding needs a different source, a different matcher and a
different version comparison. That is its own project, and until it exists a
Windows host correctly reports `status: unsupported` rather than "0 findings".
- **SSH key management on Windows.** `administrators_authorized_keys` is a real
possibility but a separate decision.
- **winget.** Third-party app upgrades are a different question from OS
patching, and winget is absent on Server Core and older builds.
## Current state
The Windows agent registers, heartbeats, reports inventory, runs workflow steps
through PowerShell, relays console connections and self-updates via MSI. Four
gates stop it doing more:
| Gate | Location |
| --- | --- |
| `runtime.GOOS != "linux"` early return | `agent/internal/workloads/workloads.go`, `agent/internal/sync/workloads.go` (twice) |
| package-manager detection finds nothing | `agent/internal/updates/updates.go` (`detectPM`) |
| hard error | `agent/internal/packages/packages.go` (out of scope here) |
| `authorized_keys` write skipped | `agent/internal/sync/sync.go` (out of scope here) |
## Approach
The platform split moves into the agent, expressed as build tags following the
existing `inventory/collect_linux.go` / `collect_windows.go` /
`collect_other.go` precedent. The control plane stays OS-blind: `ReportWorkloads`,
`ControlWorkload`, `WorkloadLogs` and `ApplyUpdates` need no changes at all,
because a Windows service is reported as the same `unit` kind a systemd service
is.
Build tags rather than `runtime.GOOS` switches so PowerShell command strings do
not ship in the Linux binary, and so a platform left unimplemented is a compile
error rather than a silent no-op at runtime.
## Updates
### Layout
```
agent/internal/updates/
updates.go # PackageUpdate; CheckAvailable/ApplyAll declared once
updates_linux.go # existing detectPM, checkApt/DnfYum/Pacman/Zypper/Apk, ApplyAll
updates_windows.go # Windows Update COM, driven through PowerShell
updates_other.go # //go:build !linux && !windows — no-ops
```
`updates_other.go` carries the build constraint for the same reason
`inventory/collect_other.go` does: `_other` is not a GOOS suffix, so without the
constraint the file compiles everywhere and collides.
### Checking
One PowerShell invocation, `-NoProfile -NonInteractive`, emitting JSON:
```powershell
$searcher = (New-Object -ComObject Microsoft.Update.Session).CreateUpdateSearcher()
$result = $searcher.Search("IsInstalled=0 and Type='Software' and IsHidden=0")
```
The Windows Update COM API is used rather than the `PSWindowsUpdate` module
because it is present on every supported Windows, needs no PowerShell Gallery
install, and works unchanged against a WSUS server on an air-gapped fleet. The
agent runs as `LocalSystem`, which has the rights the API requires.
Each result maps to a `PackageUpdate`:
| Field | Value |
| --- | --- |
| `Name` | the update Title |
| `CurrentVersion` | empty |
| `NewVersion` | the KB article ID, e.g. `KB5034123` |
`CurrentVersion` is empty because a Windows update is not a version bump of a
named package, and inventing a current version would put a wrong string in front
of an operator. The KB ID goes in `NewVersion` because it is the identifier
people actually search for.
Timeout: 10 minutes. The first search after a boot contacts Microsoft Update and
is routinely slow.
### Applying
The same COM session: `CreateUpdateDownloader` then `CreateUpdateInstaller`,
over the updates returned by the search above, skipping any that require user
input. EULAs are accepted programmatically; an update whose EULA cannot be
accepted is skipped rather than failing the batch.
The operation fails when the installer's `ResultCode` is not 2 (succeeded) or 3
(succeeded with errors).
Timeout: 60 minutes. A patch-Tuesday cumulative genuinely takes that long, and
the Linux path's existing 5-minute cap is already tight.
**The agent never reboots the host.** A control plane silently restarting a
production server is unrecoverable from the UI, and the reboot is a decision a
person or a workflow makes. Instead the need for one is reported.
### Reboot required
A new field `reboot_required` on `InventoryReport`, added to
`proto/vantage/v1/vantage.proto` and to both hand-written `pb` copies
(`agent/internal/grpc/pb`, `server/internal/grpc/pb`) in the same commit.
It travels on the inventory report rather than the update report because it is a
host property like the kernel version, and it is set on the **static** snapshot
only — every 15 minutes rather than every 30 seconds. A host rebooted by hand
clears the flag in a quarter of an hour instead of showing it for up to a full
one, and the detection costs a PowerShell process on Windows, which is not
something to spawn twice a minute forever.
It is set in `agentsync.runInventory`, not inside the `inventory` package, so
`inventory` gains no dependency on `updates`.
Both platforms set it, since parity is free here:
- Linux: `/var/run/reboot-required` exists, or `dnf needs-restarting -r` exits
non-zero.
- Windows: the `Microsoft.Update.SystemInfo` COM object's `RebootRequired`
property, falling back to the pending-reboot registry keys
(`Component Based Servicing\RebootPending`,
`WindowsUpdate\Auto Update\RebootRequired`,
`Session Manager\PendingFileRenameOperations`).
`services.ReportInventory` stores it on `servers.inventory`.
## Workloads
### Layout
```
agent/internal/workloads/
workloads.go # Result, Collect, Hash — Collect calls collectUnits
docker.go # unchanged, shared: shells to the docker binary
systemd_linux.go # was systemd.go
services_windows.go # new: Win32_Service collection
control.go # shared validation; platform halves split out
control_linux.go # docker/systemctl, /proc/self/cgroup own-container check
control_windows.go # Start/Stop/Restart-Service, VantageAgent protection
logs.go # shared: capLog, MaxLogLines, MaxLogBytes
logs_linux.go # docker logs / journalctl
logs_windows.go # docker logs / Get-WinEvent
```
`Collect` loses its `runtime.GOOS != "linux"` return and calls
`collectUnits(ctx)`, which is the systemd collector on Linux and the service
collector on Windows. `runWorkloads` and `reportWorkloads` in
`agent/internal/sync/workloads.go` lose all three of their platform returns.
`docker.go` stays shared and ungated. It shells to the `docker` binary, which
behaves identically on Windows, so a Docker Desktop or Mirantis host reports its
containers with no new code. `DockerOK` / `DockerError` keep their existing
three-state meaning: not installed (the common case, not a fault), installed but
not responding, and running nothing.
### Collecting Windows services
`Get-CimInstance Win32_Service` converted to JSON — not `Get-Service`, which
exposes neither `PathName` nor `StartMode`, and the filter needs both.
A service is reported when its executable does **not** resolve under
`%SystemRoot%\System32`, and it is running, failed, or has `StartMode=Auto`
while stopped. This mirrors the systemd collector's intent: show what an
operator installed, and show what is meant to be up but is not.
Path parsing strips surrounding quotes and trailing arguments before the
`%SystemRoot%` comparison. `"C:\Program Files\X\x.exe" -service` is one path
with one argument, and splitting naively on whitespace misfiles a substantial
share of a real fleet.
Field mapping:
| Workload field | Source |
| --- | --- |
| `Kind` | `"unit"` |
| `ID` | `Name` (the service name) |
| `Name` | `DisplayName` |
| `State` | `running` / `stopped` / `failed`, from `State` plus `ExitCode` |
| `Health`, `Image`, `Stack`, `Ports`, `Restarts` | unset |
`Kind: "unit"` and the existing `systemd_ok` / `systemd_error` fields are reused
rather than a `service` kind and `services_ok` fields being added. That would
cost a proto change, both pb copies, the server model, the service layer and the
web client, and would teach every existing consumer a second kind — to describe
the same thing. The naming is corrected where it is read, in the UI, which knows
the server's OS.
`State` values match the ones the UI already colours, so no web change is needed
for the rows themselves.
### Protection
The protected set stays computed and enforced agent-side, as it is on Linux: the
control plane may name a target, but the agent decides what it will do to
itself.
On Windows the protected workload is the `VantageAgent` service — the NSSM
service name written by `installer/setup.ps1` — matched case-insensitively,
because Windows service names are. `detectOwnContainer` and its
`/proc/self/cgroup` read move to `control_linux.go`; the Windows build returns
no own-container ID.
`ErrProtected` still surfaces as HTTP 409 from the API, and the reported
`Protected` flag remains a courtesy that greys the button rather than the
boundary.
### Control
`Start-Service`, `Stop-Service -Force`, `Restart-Service -Force`, under the same
90-second `controlTimeout`, with the error text taken from PowerShell's stderr.
`sc.exe` is avoided because it returns before the operation completes, which
turns a timeout into a false success. `-Force` is required because
`Stop-Service` without it refuses when other services depend on the target, and
that refusal reads to an operator as a silent no-op.
### Logs
`Get-WinEvent` with a filter hashtable over the `System` and `Application` logs,
provider names matching the service name, its display name, and
`Service Control Manager`, newest first, capped by the requested tail.
Each event is formatted as `<ISO 8601 timestamp> <Level> <Message>`, which is
the same shape `journalctl --output=short-iso` produces, so the log dialog needs
no per-platform rendering.
Service Control Manager logs every service on the host under one provider, so
its events are filtered client-side to those naming the target service.
`capLog` is shared and unchanged: 500 lines and 256KB, whichever binds first,
trimmed from the front. There is still no follow mode.
An empty result returns an empty string and no error. A service that has logged
nothing is normal, and an error there would read as a broken feature.
## Server and web
The server changes in one place: `services.ReportInventory` persists
`reboot_required`.
The web changes in three, all keyed on the same `os_info` test
`MaintenanceTab.tsx` already uses (`server.os_info?.toLowerCase().includes("windows")`)
rather than on `os_type`. `os_type` is stored and serialised but unread by
`web/` today, and introducing a second Windows test in the same component is how
the two come to disagree. `WorkloadList` takes the result as a prop, since it
receives only a `serverId`:
1. `web/components/workloads/WorkloadList.tsx` — takes an `isWindows` prop from
the server detail page, and the systemd status lines become
platform-worded. On Windows the error line reads "Windows services could not
be read" and the "systemd is not in use on this server" line is not rendered
at all. The empty-state line drops "on Linux only". The Docker lines are
unchanged.
2. Server detail — a `Reboot required` pill beside the update count when the
flag is set, placed with the update panel because that is what caused it.
3. The Updates panel's Windows copy describes a list of KB articles rather than
package upgrades, since `current_version` is empty on that platform.
## Testing
The Windows collectors are, in substance, parsers of PowerShell output. Parsing
is separated from invocation and table-tested against captured real output. The
`agent` module has no tests at all today, so these are the first — they live
beside the parsers as ordinary `_test.go` files, run with `go test ./...` from
`agent/`, and need no new dependency:
- `Win32_Service` JSON, including a quoted path with arguments, a
`%SystemRoot%\System32` service that must be filtered out, a stopped
`StartMode=Auto` service that must be kept, and a failed service with a
non-zero `ExitCode`.
- Update searcher JSON, including an update with no KB ID.
- `Get-WinEvent` JSON, including a Service Control Manager event for another
service that must be filtered out.
- Pending-reboot detection from registry key presence.
`capLog` and `Hash` are unchanged and gain no tests.
The invocation halves are verified by hand on a Windows host: check, apply,
service start/stop/restart, a protected refusal on `VantageAgent`, and logs on
both a chatty service and a silent one.
`GOOS=windows go build ./...` and `GOOS=linux go build ./...` both belong in the
implementation plan as explicit steps — a build-tag split is exactly the change
that compiles on the machine you are sitting at and nowhere else. CI already
cross-builds the agent on release, so no workflow change is needed.
@@ -0,0 +1,286 @@
# Public status pages
Date: 2026-08-24
## Goal
Let an operator publish one or more public status pages from a Vantage
instance, at `<slug>.vantage.<tld>/status/<page-id>`, showing the state of any
monitors they choose, plus incidents and maintenance windows they author by
hand. The pages are completely public: no session, no token, no login.
Out of scope, deliberately:
- **Custom domains** (`status.customer.com`). Needs certificate provisioning and
a host-to-page lookup that bypasses `hostSlug` entirely. Its own sub-project.
- **Per-page themes.** `web/` is locked dark by design and a public page is not
the place to break that.
- **Subscriber notifications.** Email or webhook on incident updates is a
notification subsystem, and one already exists for monitors; wiring the two
together is a separate decision.
- **SLA reporting.** Uptime percentages are shown; contractual SLA calculation
with credits and exclusions is a different product.
## Current state
Everything needed to draw a status page already exists and is already scoped by
instance:
| Data | Where |
| --- | --- |
| Monitor identity and live state | `models.Monitor`, `Monitor.State` |
| Outage records | `models.Incident`, opened when a monitor flips down |
| Hourly uptime history | `models.Rollup` (`monitor_rollups`) |
| Sub-hour history | `models.MonitorSample`, TTL-expired |
| Instance from hostname | `auth.InstanceFromHost`, 60s cached |
Three things do not exist: any concept of a page, any operator-authored
incident, and any unauthenticated read path. The third is the constraint that
shapes the rest — every route under `/api` carries `auth.Middleware`,
`RequireScopes`, `RateLimitTokens` and `RequireActiveLicense` by virtue of where
it is mounted, and `AssertScopeMapComplete` fails boot on an `/api` route with
no scope entry.
## Approach
Two new collections hold the page and the authored incidents. A single
assembly function reads them alongside the existing monitor data and emits a
purpose-built public struct. The public route is mounted outside `/api`, is
cached in Redis, and is rate limited per client address.
The redaction boundary is the assembly function, and it is the security
property of this whole feature.
## Data model
Both collections carry `instance_id` and both must be added to
`services.ScopedCollections`, or their rows outlive a deleted instance.
### `status_pages`
One document per page. It is read whole, always, so its structure is embedded
rather than joined: one page is one Mongo read is one cache fill.
```
_id, instance_id
page_id // operator-chosen slug, [a-z0-9-], 3-40 chars
title, description, logo_url
published bool
banner { enabled, level, text }
sections [ { name, entries: [ { monitor_id, display_name } ] } ]
created_at, updated_at
```
Unique index on `(instance_id, page_id)`. The slug is operator-chosen rather
than random because it is a URL handed to customers and printed on support
pages; a random identifier would be unguessable and unmemorable in equal
measure.
`published` exists so a page can be composed before anyone sees it. An
unpublished page answers the same 404 as a page that does not exist — a
distinct 403 would confirm it exists.
Sections are page-local and unrelated to `Monitor.Group`, which is a display
label on the authenticated monitors list. One monitor may appear under "API" on
the customer page and "Edge" on the partner page, under two different display
names. That is the point of the override: a monitor's internal name is often
not a name you want published.
The banner is three fields on the page rather than a collection, because it is
one string with no lifecycle.
### `status_incidents`
Manual incidents and maintenance windows share one shape, because they share a
timeline, an impact and a set of affected components; splitting them into two
collections would duplicate all three.
```
_id, instance_id, incident_id
page_ids []string // which pages show it
kind "incident" | "maintenance"
title
impact // none | minor | major | critical
affected_monitors []string // monitor_ids
status // incident: investigating | identified | monitoring | resolved
// maintenance: scheduled | in_progress | completed
scheduled_start, scheduled_end // maintenance only
updates [ { at, status, body, author } ]
started_at, resolved_at, created_at, updated_at
```
Updates are embedded for the same reason sections are: they are few, and they
are never read apart from their incident.
`page_ids` is explicit rather than derived from `affected_monitors`. Deriving it
would be less to fill in, but adding a monitor to a page later would
retroactively republish old incidents to a new audience. An operator publishing
to customers chooses that audience.
### Auto-incidents are derived, never copied
The existing `incidents` collection remains the only writer for
monitor-detected outages. The public snapshot derives them at assembly time:
filter to the monitors on the page, last 90 days, render as display name, start,
end and duration.
`Incident.Cause` is dropped. It is where `dial tcp 10.0.0.5:5432: connect
refused` lives.
Copying auto-incidents into `status_incidents` would be a second writer for the
same fact, arriving by a different route with its own opportunity to disagree —
the same argument that keeps `RefreshWorkloadsCmd` from returning workloads
inline.
### Maintenance does not rewrite uptime
During a maintenance window, affected components render as "under maintenance"
rather than down. The uptime percentage and the history bar still come from the
rollups, unmodified.
Rollups are the durable record. Bending them so a page looks better is a lie
pointed the other way, and the operator who later asks "what was our actual
availability" gets an answer that was edited for publication.
## The redaction boundary
`services.BuildStatusSnapshot(instanceID, pageID)` is the only function that
reads `monitors`, `incidents`, `monitor_rollups` and `status_incidents` on
behalf of an anonymous caller, and it emits a purpose-built struct.
**`models.Monitor` is never marshalled to a public caller.** Target URL, host,
port, method, keyword, `state.message`, `state.cert_expiry_at` and
`channel_ids` all stay behind the boundary. A field added to `Monitor` next year
is private by default rather than published by accident.
What the snapshot contains, per entry: display name, current status, uptime
percentage over the last 90 days, and a 90-day history bar of one cell per day.
A cell is up, down, under maintenance, or no-data — `no-data` for days before
the monitor existed, which is a distinct thing from a day it was down. No
latency, no addresses, no failure text.
## Public read path
```
GET /public/status/:pageId
```
Mounted on the gin root, not under `apiGroup`. Putting it under `/api` would
require exempting it from authentication, scope enforcement, token rate
limiting and the licence gate — four holes, each one something a later change
can widen. Outside `/api` it needs none of them.
The instance is resolved from the request host through `auth.InstanceFromHost`.
A host with no instance label, an unknown slug, an unknown page and an
unpublished page all answer **404**, identically.
### The feature gate answers 200, not 403
Status pages are gated by a new `license.FeatureStatusPages = "status_pages"`,
on both the authoring routes and the public read.
The public side checks inline rather than through `RequireFeature`, which
aborts with a 403 JSON body. A public page needs to render an explanation:
```json
{ "available": false, "reason": "feature_unavailable", "title": "Acme Status" }
```
`reason` is `feature_unavailable` when the tier does not include the feature and
`licence_inactive` when the licence has lapsed. The title is included so the
page does not look broken; nothing else is.
**This is not only a server change.** The feature must be added to admin's
`plans` rows per `(deployment, tier)`, or every instance reads it as absent and
the feature ships dark.
### Cache
Redis key `vantage:status:<instance_id>:<page_id>` holds the assembled JSON with
a 30-second TTL. N visitors cost one Mongo read regardless of traffic.
Authoring writes delete the key, so an operator posting an incident update sees
it immediately rather than wondering for half a minute whether it saved.
Redis rather than Next ISR because with `replicaCount > 1` each `web` pod would
cache separately and two visitors would see different states during an incident.
### Rate limit
Per client address, one-minute fixed window, 120 requests, 429 with
`Retry-After` — the same shape as `RateLimitTokens`, including its most
important property: **when Redis is unavailable, allow rather than deny.** A
status page must survive the outage it exists to report.
### Trusted proxies
Nothing calls `r.SetTrustedProxies`, so gin trusts every proxy and
`c.ClientIP()` takes `X-Forwarded-For` verbatim. That is spoofable per request,
which makes a per-address limiter decorative.
This has not mattered so far because `ClientIP()` is only used for audit
strings. It matters now, so this work adds a trusted-proxy configuration and
sets it at boot. Without it the rate limit is theatre.
## Authoring API
Under `/api`, owner or admin, behind `RequireFeature("status_pages")`, every
mutation audited:
```
GET,POST /status-pages
GET,PUT,DELETE /status-pages/:pageId
GET,POST /status-pages/:pageId/incidents
PUT,DELETE /status-pages/:pageId/incidents/:incidentId
POST /status-pages/:pageId/incidents/:incidentId/updates
```
This adds a ninth scope resource, `status:read` and `status:write`. The entries
are required, not optional: `AssertScopeMapComplete` fails boot on an `/api`
route with no scope entry, which is exactly the safeguard working.
Handlers need `@…` annotations and `openapi.json` must be regenerated and
committed — `server-deploy.yml` runs `git diff --exit-code` against the
committed copy, so a handler whose annotation drifted fails CI.
## Frontend
`web/app/status/[pageId]/page.tsx`, **outside the `(app)` route group**, so it
inherits no sidebar, no session fetch and no auth redirect. Server-rendered
against the Go endpoint, with a client refresh every 60 seconds.
`web/next.config.ts` gains a `/public/:path*` rewrite so that client refresh
reaches the server.
The page stays dark, like the rest of `web/`, and carries no hex values — the
existing token palette covers every state it needs.
Authoring UI at `/status-pages` inside `(app)`, in the **Instance** sidebar
group. It is `adminOnly`, and since the whole group is, a member sees the group
disappear entirely rather than a labelled section with nothing under it.
## Testing
The snapshot tests are the ones that matter, because they are the redaction
boundary made executable:
- `BuildStatusSnapshot` output contains no target URL or host, no
`state.message`, no `incident.cause`, no `channel_ids`, no latency.
- A monitor on no page never appears in any page's snapshot.
- An unpublished page and an unknown page both 404.
- Feature absent and licence inactive both return 200 with `available: false`
and the matching `reason`.
- A cache hit performs no Mongo read; an authoring write invalidates the key.
- Slug validation: character set, length, uniqueness within an instance.
- Maintenance window renders the component as under maintenance while leaving
the uptime percentage untouched.
## Migration and rollout
No migration is needed — both collections are new and absent means empty. Index
builders follow the `EnsureWorkflowIndexes` precedent and warn rather than being
fatal: a missing index on a small collection degrades to a scan, which is no
reason to refuse to serve the fleet.
The feature ships dark until the `status_pages` feature is added to the plan
rows in admin.
@@ -0,0 +1,330 @@
# Control plane backup and restore
Date: 2026-09-07
Status: approved, ready for implementation planning
## Problem
Vantage has no backup story. A self-hosted deployment holds its entire state in
MongoDB and encrypts the sensitive half of it — SSH private keys, key
passphrases, vault secrets, OIDC client secrets, RDP and VNC credentials — with
AES-256-GCM under a single 32-byte key supplied as the `KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY`
environment variable.
That key is a bare value. It carries no identifier, is not wrapped, and is not
recorded anywhere alongside the data it protects. Restoring a database without
it produces a control plane whose every secret is permanently unreadable, and
nothing in the product tells an operator this before it happens.
`mongodump` exists and operators can use it, but it says nothing about the
encryption key, so the most common way to lose everything is to hold a perfectly
good database dump and no key.
## Goal
A standalone command-line tool that backs up and restores a whole Vantage
deployment, and that makes the key relationship impossible to get wrong by
accident.
Explicitly not a goal: point-in-time recovery, incremental backups, built-in
storage backends, encryption of the archive itself, per-tenant export, and
backups scheduled from inside the server. Each is a separate decision and
several are better served by tools the operator already has.
## Design
### Scope of a backup
One backup covers one MongoDB database: every collection in it, whether or not
that collection is tenant-scoped. A deployment-level disaster recovery tool that
skipped `migrations` or `vulndb_meta` would restore a database the server
refuses to boot against.
Collections are enumerated live with `ListCollectionNames` rather than read from
a hardcoded list. This is the opposite choice to `services.ScopedCollections`,
and deliberately so: that list can afford to be hand-maintained because
`AssertNoScopedCollectionMissed` fails boot when it drifts. A backup tool has no
such assertion available, so a second hand-maintained registry would drift
silently and the first symptom would be a restore missing a collection nobody
noticed was added.
`--exclude` accepts collection names for the volume-heavy ones —
`workflow_log_lines`, `monitor_samples`, `audit_logs`. Whatever is excluded is
recorded in the manifest, so an archive can never claim to be complete when it
is not.
Redis is not backed up. It holds sessions only; losing it logs everyone out and
nothing else, which is already the documented behaviour. The restore output says
so explicitly rather than leaving an operator to wonder.
### Where the code lives
Two units.
`shared/backup/` holds the logic: dump, restore, manifest construction, archive
reading and writing, and key fingerprinting. It depends on the MongoDB driver
and the standard library, and on no CLI framework. Keeping it in `shared/` and
free of cobra is what lets `server` import it later if backups scheduled from
inside the control plane are ever built, without pulling a command-line parser
into the server binary.
`vantagectl/` is a new module in `go.work`, importing `shared`. It holds the
cobra command tree and nothing else. A separate module rather than a package
under `shared/` because adding cobra to `shared/go.mod` would put cobra and
pflag into the module graph of `server`, `admin` and `sitesvc`, none of which
use them. Binaries are unaffected — Go links only what is imported — but three
`go.sum` files would grow and three CI builds would fetch a dependency they do
not need. `agent/` is already a separate module for the same reason.
The tool imports nothing from `server/`. No `db.Col()`, no `services`, no config
loader, and it never dials the REST or gRPC API. It needs only network reach to
MongoDB, a database name, and `KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY` in its own environment. This
is what lets it run against a control plane that is down, half-migrated, or was
deleted an hour ago — which is the only condition under which anyone runs a
restore.
### Dump implementation
The dump is written against the MongoDB driver, not by shelling out to
`mongodump`.
Two reasons. `server`'s runtime image is `scratch` and carries no shell and no
mongo tools, so a wrapper would depend on a matching `mongodump` version being
installed on whatever host runs the tool. And the manifest must be written by
the same process that read the documents, or the fingerprint and per-collection
checksums are claims about data the writer never saw.
The cost is that BSON round-tripping is ours to get right. Documents are written
as raw BSON exactly as the driver returns them, without an intermediate map, so
`ObjectId`, `Decimal128`, `DateTime`, binary subtypes and nulls survive
unchanged. A round-trip test asserting byte-equal BSON is the guard.
### Archive format
A gzipped tar named `vantage-backup-<db>-<RFC3339>.tar.gz`:
```
manifest.json
collections/<name>.bson concatenated raw BSON documents
indexes/<name>.json index specifications
```
`manifest.json` carries:
| Field | Purpose |
| --- | --- |
| `format_version` | Currently `1`. Restore refuses an unknown version rather than guessing at it |
| `created_at` | RFC3339, UTC |
| `vantage_version` | Build stamp of the tool that wrote the archive |
| `hostname` | Provenance; which machine produced this |
| `mongo_db` | Source database name |
| `mongo_server_version` | Restore warns on a major version gap |
| `key_fingerprint` | `sha256` of the raw 32 key bytes, hex, or `null`. Never the key |
| `collections[]` | Per collection: name, document count, uncompressed bytes, `sha256` of the `.bson` member |
| `excluded[]` | Collection names passed to `--exclude` |
Per-collection checksums mean a truncated or corrupted archive is detected
before a single document is written, rather than halfway through a restore.
### Key custody
The key never enters the archive. The archive is exactly as sensitive as a
`mongodump` of the same database, and no more.
What the archive carries is `sha256` of the raw key bytes. A hash of the key
proves identity without being a hint at the value, which is what allows an
operator to answer "will this archive restore into this deployment" without
holding both in front of them.
Backup refuses to run when `KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY` is unset or malformed. An
archive full of ciphertext whose key was never recorded is worse than no archive
at all, because it looks like a backup. `--allow-no-key` exists for a deployment
that genuinely stores no encrypted material; it stamps `key_fingerprint: null`,
which restore then reports loudly rather than treating as a match.
Restore compares the archive's fingerprint against the key in the current
environment:
- Fingerprints match: proceed.
- Fingerprints differ: refuse, printing both.
- Archive has a fingerprint, environment has no key: refuse.
- `--ignore-key-mismatch`: proceed, having first printed exactly which
collections hold ciphertext that will be undecryptable — `keys`, `secrets`,
`auth_providers`, `console_sessions`, `settings`.
### Restore semantics
The order is fixed:
1. Read `manifest.json` and check `format_version`.
2. Verify every archive member against its manifest checksum. Nothing is written
before this passes.
3. Apply the fingerprint rules above.
4. Inspect the target: `ListCollectionNames` and document counts. A non-empty
database is refused, printing what was found. `--force` proceeds.
5. Per collection: under `--force`, drop it first; then bulk-insert in batches
of 1000 with `ordered=false`.
6. Replay index specifications from `indexes/<name>.json`, skipping `_id_`.
7. Print a summary: collection, documents restored, indexes created.
Restore is not idempotent, and says so. A second run without `--force` is
refused because step 4 now finds data. A restore interrupted during step 5
leaves a partial database that the next run refuses to touch — correct, because
the alternative is a silent merge. There are no merge or upsert semantics at
all: merging two control planes reconciles nothing and produces a fleet that
half works, and upserting by `_id` resurrects rows deleted since the backup,
which for revoked keys and deleted users is a security regression wearing the
costume of a convenience.
Index replay is fatal per collection when a unique index fails to build, and a
warning when a non-unique one does. A unique index that cannot be created means
the restored data violates it, and the unique indexes here — `(instance_id,
email)`, instance slug, settings instance, the ESO token hash — are
tenant-isolation properties rather than optimisations. The failure names the
offending index.
### Destructive confirmation
Restore under `--force` requires a typed confirmation when stdin is a TTY.
When stdin is not a TTY — a Kubernetes Job, a CI step, a cron entry — the
confirmation comes from `--confirm-db <name>`, whose value must equal the
resolved target database name or restore refuses. Naming the database in the
argument means a copy-pasted restore command carries its intended target with
it and cannot destroy a different one.
A dynamic flag name containing the database name was considered and rejected:
cobra registers flags before parsing, and the target database is not known at
registration time.
### Command surface
```
vantagectl root; prints help
├── backup --out DIR|- --exclude a,b --allow-no-key
├── restore ARCHIVE --force --confirm-db NAME --ignore-key-mismatch
├── inspect ARCHIVE
└── verify ARCHIVE
```
Persistent flags on the root command, so every subcommand accepts them and they
are documented once: `--mongo-uri` (env `MONGO_URI`) and `--db` (env `MONGO_DB`,
falling back to the URI path). There is no `--log-level`: the tool's entire
output is what it is telling the operator, and a level that could hide a key
warning is worth not having.
Environment fallback is wired with an explicit `Changed` check on each flag
rather than through viper. Viper is a configuration-file and remote-config
system; this tool reads no configuration file, and pulling it in to call
`os.Getenv` would make the largest dependency in the binary the one doing the
smallest job.
`inspect` prints the manifest — when the archive was made, by what version,
which collections it holds, how many documents, what was excluded, and the key
fingerprint — and contacts no database. It is what an operator runs to find out
whether an archive they have found is worth anything.
`verify` adds a live check: whether the archive's fingerprint matches the key in
the current environment, and — when `--mongo-uri` is given — whether that key
actually decrypts the target database. The second half is a probe: read one
ciphertext field from `secrets`, `keys` or `auth_providers` and attempt to open
it. A fingerprint comparison proves two archives agree; only a probe proves the
key in hand opens the data in front of you. `verify` is the command that
distinguishes "we have backups" from "we have backups that will restore", and
the documentation recommends running it on a schedule.
The probe needs AES-256-GCM open, which today lives in
`server/internal/services/crypto.go` and cannot be imported from another module.
Rather than copy it — the exact hazard `CLAUDE.md` names around mirrored token
blocks and `web/lib/targets.ts` — the primitives move to a new `shared/cryptobox`
package, and `services/crypto.go` becomes a thin delegation that keeps its
existing unexported function names and its `KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY` lookup. One
implementation of the cipher, two callers.
`--out -` streams the tarball to stdout, so piping into `aws s3 cp -`, `restic`
or `age` covers storage and archive encryption without the tool growing backends
of its own.
### Distribution
Three ways to run it, because the deployments that need it run Docker Compose,
Kubernetes, or neither.
**Loose binary.** A new `.gitea/workflows/vantagectl-release.yml`, triggered on
`vantagectl/v*` tags, shaped like `agent-release.yml`. Builds `linux/amd64`,
`linux/arm64`, `darwin/arm64` and `windows/amd64` with `CGO_ENABLED=0`, writes
`checksums.txt`, and creates a Gitea release.
**Container image.** `vantagectl/Dockerfile` — the repo's convention is a
Dockerfile per module built from the repository root, because every Go module
depends on `shared` through a replace directive — produces a `scratch`
image holding the static binary and an explicitly copied `/tmp`, which the
archive is staged in before compression — the same omission that silently
disabled `vulnsched` on a scratch image. Pushed by `server-deploy.yml` as an
eighth image.
```bash
docker run --rm --network vantage_default \
-e MONGO_URI -e MONGO_DB -e KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY \
-v /backups:/out \
gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/mrhid6/vantagectl backup --out /out
```
**Kubernetes.** The chart gains `backup.enabled`, defaulting to **false**,
rendering a `CronJob` that runs the same image and mounts the existing MongoDB
and `KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY` secrets by reference rather than re-declaring them.
Output goes to a PVC named in values. The default is off because a backup with
nowhere durable to land is a false sense of safety and the chart cannot know
where that is; `NOTES.txt` says so on install.
Restore in Kubernetes is the same image run as a one-shot `Job`. The chart ships
no restore manifest: a restore is an operator decision with a confirmation
attached to it, and must never be something a `helm upgrade` can trigger.
`server-deploy.yml`'s rebuild trigger table gains a `vantagectl` row —
`vantagectl/`, `shared/`, `go.work` — which makes `shared/` fan out to four Go
images rather than three. That table is already called out in `CLAUDE.md` as a
place where a missed entry ships a stale image.
## Testing
`shared/backup` is tested against a real MongoDB, via `testcontainers-go` if the
module graph tolerates it and otherwise behind a `MONGO_TEST_URI` environment
variable that skips when unset.
Required cases:
- Round trip: seed one document of every awkward BSON type — `ObjectId`,
`Decimal128`, `DateTime`, binary, null, nested arrays — back up, restore into
a second database, assert byte-equal BSON.
- A single corrupted byte in a `.bson` member causes restore to refuse before
writing anything.
- Fingerprint mismatch is refused; `--ignore-key-mismatch` proceeds and names
the ciphertext-bearing collections.
- A non-empty target is refused; `--force` replaces it.
- An excluded collection is absent from the archive and named in the manifest.
- A unique index that cannot be built aborts the restore, naming the index.
Fingerprint computation is a pure function and is tested without a database.
## Documentation
`docsite/docs/operations/backup-and-restore.md`, covering:
- What `KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY` is, that it is not in the backup, and that losing it
is unrecoverable. This comes first on the page, not as a note at the bottom.
- The three run modes above, each as a command that can be copied.
- A restore drill: restore into a scratch database and run `verify`, because an
untested backup is a hypothesis.
- What is not covered: Redis sessions, the vulnerability database (re-pulled
automatically), and agent state on managed servers — agents reconnect on their
own and `servers.agent_token_hash` is in the backup, so no re-enrolment is
needed.
`CLAUDE.md` gains a section describing the tool, since a new module, a new
image, a new workflow and a new chart toggle are each something that drifts
quietly.
## Open questions
None. Every decision above was settled during design.
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param(
[string]$ServerId,
[string]$Token,
[string]$ServerUrl,
[string]$InstallDir,
[switch]$Uninstall
)
$ErrorActionPreference = "Stop"
$logDir = Join-Path $env:ProgramData "vantage"
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Force -Path $logDir | Out-Null
$log = Join-Path $logDir "install.log"
function Write-Log($msg) {
$line = "{0} {1}" -f (Get-Date -Format "s"), $msg
Add-Content -Path $log -Value $line
}
# Fail native-exe (nssm) calls loudly: check $LASTEXITCODE after each call
function Invoke-Native {
param([string]$File, [string[]]$Arguments)
Write-Log ("RUN: {0} {1}" -f $File, ($Arguments -join " "))
$out = & $File @Arguments 2>&1
if ($out) { Write-Log ("OUT: {0}" -f ($out -join "`n")) }
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) {
throw ("{0} exited {1}" -f $File, $LASTEXITCODE)
}
}
# Like Invoke-Native but never throws — for teardown, where a missing/stopped
# service must not abort the uninstall.
function Invoke-NativeSoft {
param([string]$File, [string[]]$Arguments)
Write-Log ("RUN(soft): {0} {1}" -f $File, ($Arguments -join " "))
# Native stderr merged via 2>&1 becomes terminating errors under
# ErrorActionPreference=Stop; force Continue in this scope so a benign nssm
# message (e.g. "service has not been started") never aborts setup.
$ErrorActionPreference = "Continue"
$out = & $File @Arguments 2>&1
if ($out) { Write-Log ("OUT: {0}" -f ($out -join "`n")) }
Write-Log ("EXIT: {0}" -f $LASTEXITCODE)
}
if ($Uninstall) {
try {
Write-Log "=== teardown start ==="
if (-not $InstallDir) { $InstallDir = $PSScriptRoot }
$nssm = Join-Path $InstallDir "nssm.exe"
if (Test-Path $nssm) {
Invoke-NativeSoft -File $nssm -Arguments @("stop", "VantageAgent")
Invoke-NativeSoft -File $nssm -Arguments @("remove", "VantageAgent", "confirm")
} else {
Write-Log "nssm.exe not found at $nssm - using sc.exe fallback"
Invoke-NativeSoft -File "sc.exe" -Arguments @("stop", "VantageAgent")
Invoke-NativeSoft -File "sc.exe" -Arguments @("delete", "VantageAgent")
}
Write-Log "=== teardown ok ==="
exit 0
}
catch {
Write-Log ("TEARDOWN ERROR: {0}" -f $_.Exception.Message)
# Never block uninstall
exit 0
}
}
try {
Write-Log "=== setup start ==="
Write-Log ("ServerId={0} ServerUrl={1} InstallDir={2}" -f $ServerId, $ServerUrl, $InstallDir)
$cfgDir = Join-Path $env:ProgramData "vantage"
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Force -Path $cfgDir | Out-Null
$cfgPath = Join-Path $cfgDir "config.yaml"
# Preserve existing config on upgrade. A MajorUpgrade re-runs this script with
# no SERVERID/TOKEN, so blindly rewriting would wipe the agent_token the agent
# persisted after Register(). Only (re)write when a ServerId is supplied
# (fresh install / explicit re-register).
if ((Test-Path $cfgPath) -and (-not $ServerId)) {
Write-Log "config.yaml exists and no ServerId supplied - preserving existing config (upgrade)"
}
else {
$cfg = @"
server_url: "$ServerUrl"
server_id: "$ServerId"
pre_reg_token: "$Token"
agent_token: ""
poll_interval: 30s
tls: true
"@
Set-Content -Path $cfgPath -Value $cfg -Encoding utf8
Write-Log "wrote $cfgPath"
# Lock down ACL: SYSTEM + Administrators only
Invoke-Native -File "icacls" -Arguments @($cfgPath, "/inheritance:r", "/grant:r", "SYSTEM:F", "Administrators:F")
}
if (-not $InstallDir) { $InstallDir = $PSScriptRoot }
$nssm = Join-Path $InstallDir "nssm.exe"
$exe = Join-Path $InstallDir "vantage-agent.exe"
if (-not (Test-Path $nssm)) { throw "nssm.exe not found at $nssm" }
if (-not (Test-Path $exe)) { throw "vantage-agent.exe not found at $exe" }
# Install only if the service isn't already registered (an upgrade may leave
# it in place). "nssm install" on an existing service errors otherwise.
$exists = Get-Service -Name "VantageAgent" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
if (-not $exists) {
Invoke-Native -File $nssm -Arguments @("install", "VantageAgent", $exe)
} else {
Write-Log "VantageAgent service already exists - updating binary path"
Invoke-Native -File $nssm -Arguments @("set", "VantageAgent", "Application", $exe)
}
Invoke-Native -File $nssm -Arguments @("set", "VantageAgent", "Start", "SERVICE_AUTO_START")
# Redirect service stdout/stderr to log files (nssm discards them otherwise)
# with online rotation at ~1MB.
$outLog = Join-Path $logDir "agent-stdout.log"
$errLog = Join-Path $logDir "agent-stderr.log"
Invoke-Native -File $nssm -Arguments @("set", "VantageAgent", "AppStdout", $outLog)
Invoke-Native -File $nssm -Arguments @("set", "VantageAgent", "AppStderr", $errLog)
Invoke-Native -File $nssm -Arguments @("set", "VantageAgent", "AppStdoutCreationDisposition", "4")
Invoke-Native -File $nssm -Arguments @("set", "VantageAgent", "AppStderrCreationDisposition", "4")
Invoke-Native -File $nssm -Arguments @("set", "VantageAgent", "AppRotateFiles", "1")
Invoke-Native -File $nssm -Arguments @("set", "VantageAgent", "AppRotateOnline", "1")
Invoke-Native -File $nssm -Arguments @("set", "VantageAgent", "AppRotateBytes", "1048576")
# Service is freshly (re)installed and stopped here (teardown removed the old
# one on upgrade), so start it. "restart" would try to stop a not-running
# service and emit a stderr error.
Invoke-NativeSoft -File $nssm -Arguments @("start", "VantageAgent")
Write-Log "=== setup ok ==="
exit 0
}
catch {
Write-Log ("ERROR: {0}" -f $_.Exception.Message)
Write-Log ($_.ScriptStackTrace)
exit 1
}
-82
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@@ -1,82 +0,0 @@
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<?ifndef Version ?>
<?define Version = "0.0.0.0" ?>
<?endif?>
<Wix xmlns="http://wixtoolset.org/schemas/v4/wxs">
<Package Name="Vantage Agent" Manufacturer="Vantage"
Version="$(var.Version)" UpgradeCode="7d1e6d2c-2a5f-4b3e-9c3a-8a1b2c3d4e5f"
Scope="perMachine">
<MajorUpgrade DowngradeErrorMessage="A newer version is already installed."
Schedule="afterInstallInitialize" />
<MediaTemplate EmbedCab="yes" />
<!-- Public properties settable via msiexec: SERVERID, TOKEN, SERVERURL -->
<Property Id="SERVERID" Secure="yes" />
<Property Id="TOKEN" Secure="yes" />
<Property Id="SERVERURL" Secure="yes" />
<StandardDirectory Id="ProgramFiles64Folder">
<Directory Id="INSTALLDIR" Name="Vantage">
<Component Id="AgentExe" Guid="*">
<File Id="AgentExe" Source="vantage-agent-windows-amd64.exe" Name="vantage-agent.exe" KeyPath="yes" />
</Component>
<Component Id="NssmExe" Guid="*">
<File Id="NssmExe" Source="nssm.exe" Name="nssm.exe" KeyPath="yes" />
</Component>
<Component Id="SetupScript" Guid="*">
<File Id="SetupScript" Source="setup.ps1" Name="setup.ps1" KeyPath="yes" />
</Component>
</Directory>
</StandardDirectory>
<Feature Id="Main">
<ComponentRef Id="AgentExe" />
<ComponentRef Id="NssmExe" />
<ComponentRef Id="SetupScript" />
</Feature>
<!-- Write config.yaml, then install + start the service via nssm.
Implemented as sequenced CustomActions running a helper script.
Deferred CustomActions run out-of-process (and with Impersonate="no",
as SYSTEM) with NO access to the installer property table, so
"[SERVERID]"/"[TOKEN]"/"[SERVERURL]"/"[INSTALLDIR]" would resolve to
empty strings if referenced directly on the deferred action. The fix
is the standard CustomActionData marshaling pattern: an immediate
SetProperty (type 51) with the SAME Id as the deferred CustomAction
runs first (while property values are still visible) and resolves
the formatted string; the deferred Directory/ExeCommand CustomAction
that shares that Id then receives the resolved string back as its
CustomActionData, referenced here as "[WriteConfig]". This avoids
pulling in the WixToolset.Util extension (WixQuietExec64) purely to
get CustomActionData plumbing.
NOTE: this only builds/validates the MSI's XML in CI - it has not
been verified with a real install on Windows. Needs a smoke test
(msiexec /i, confirm C:\ProgramData\Vantage\config.yaml or similar
is written with the correct values, and the service starts) on an
actual Windows machine before this is trusted in production. -->
<SetProperty Id="WriteConfig"
Before="WriteConfig" Sequence="execute" Condition="NOT Installed"
Value='cmd.exe /c powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File "[INSTALLDIR]setup.ps1" -ServerId "[SERVERID]" -Token "[TOKEN]" -ServerUrl "[SERVERURL]"' />
<CustomAction Id="WriteConfig" Directory="INSTALLDIR" ExeCommand="[WriteConfig]"
Execute="deferred" Impersonate="no" Return="check" />
<!-- Teardown on uninstall: stop + remove the service BEFORE RemoveFiles
deletes nssm.exe/setup.ps1. Same CustomActionData marshaling pattern
as WriteConfig. REMOVE="ALL" = full uninstall (not a component-level
repair/modify). -->
<SetProperty Id="RemoveService"
Before="RemoveService" Sequence="execute" Condition="REMOVE=&quot;ALL&quot;"
Value='cmd.exe /c powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File "[INSTALLDIR]setup.ps1" -Uninstall' />
<CustomAction Id="RemoveService" Directory="INSTALLDIR" ExeCommand="[RemoveService]"
Execute="deferred" Impersonate="no" Return="ignore" />
<InstallExecuteSequence>
<Custom Action="WriteConfig" After="InstallFiles" Condition="NOT Installed" />
<Custom Action="RemoveService" Before="RemoveFiles" Condition="REMOVE=&quot;ALL&quot;" />
</InstallExecuteSequence>
</Package>
</Wix>
-220
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@@ -1,220 +0,0 @@
syntax = "proto3";
package vantage.v1;
option go_package = "github.com/mrhid6/vantage/server/internal/grpc/pb";
service Vantage {
rpc Register(RegisterRequest) returns (RegisterResponse);
rpc SyncKeys(SyncRequest) returns (SyncResponse);
rpc UploadGeneratedKey(UploadKeyRequest) returns (UploadKeyResponse);
rpc ReportUpdates(ReportUpdatesRequest) returns (ReportUpdatesResponse);
rpc ReportInventory(InventoryReport) returns (InventoryReportResponse);
rpc SyncMonitors(SyncMonitorsRequest) returns (SyncMonitorsResponse);
rpc ReportChecks(ReportChecksRequest) returns (ReportChecksResponse);
// Bidirectional stream: agent sends auth once, server pushes commands.
rpc CommandStream(stream AgentMessage) returns (stream ServerCommand);
}
message RegisterRequest {
string server_id = 1;
string pre_reg_token = 2;
string hostname = 3;
string ip_address = 4;
string os_info = 5;
}
message RegisterResponse {
string agent_token = 1;
}
message SyncRequest {
string server_id = 1;
string agent_token = 2;
string agent_version = 3;
}
message SyncResponse {
repeated string public_keys = 1;
}
message UploadKeyRequest {
string server_id = 1;
string agent_token = 2;
string public_key = 3;
string label = 4;
string private_key = 5;
}
message UploadKeyResponse {
string key_id = 1;
}
// CommandStream messages
message AgentMessage {
string server_id = 1;
string agent_token = 2;
oneof payload {
AgentReady ready = 3;
CommandResult result = 4;
StepResult step_result = 5;
StepOutputChunk step_output = 6;
}
}
message AgentReady {}
message CommandResult {
string command_id = 1;
bool success = 2;
string message = 3;
}
message PackageUpdate {
string name = 1;
string current_version = 2;
string new_version = 3;
}
message ReportUpdatesRequest {
string server_id = 1;
string agent_token = 2;
repeated PackageUpdate updates = 3;
}
message ReportUpdatesResponse {}
message CPUReport {
string model = 1;
int32 cores = 2;
double usage_pct = 3;
double load1 = 4;
}
message MemReport {
uint64 total_bytes = 1;
uint64 used_bytes = 2;
}
message PartitionReport {
string device = 1;
string mountpoint = 2;
string fstype = 3;
uint64 total_bytes = 4;
uint64 used_bytes = 5;
}
message InventoryReport {
string server_id = 1;
string agent_token = 2;
bool include_static = 3;
CPUReport cpu = 4;
MemReport memory = 5;
uint64 swap_total = 6;
uint64 swap_used = 7;
repeated PartitionReport partitions = 8;
string kernel = 9;
}
message InventoryReportResponse {}
message MonitorSpec {
string monitor_id = 1;
string type = 2;
string url = 3;
string host = 4;
int32 port = 5;
string method = 6;
int32 expected_status = 7;
string keyword = 8;
int32 tls_warn_days = 9;
int32 interval_sec = 10;
int32 retries = 11;
bool insecure = 12;
}
message SyncMonitorsRequest {
string server_id = 1;
string agent_token = 2;
}
message SyncMonitorsResponse {
repeated MonitorSpec monitors = 1;
}
message CheckResult {
string monitor_id = 1;
bool up = 2;
int32 latency_ms = 3;
string message = 4;
int64 cert_expiry_unix = 5;
}
message ReportChecksRequest {
string server_id = 1;
string agent_token = 2;
repeated CheckResult results = 3;
}
message ReportChecksResponse {}
message ApplyUpdatesCmd {}
message ServerCommand {
string command_id = 1;
oneof command {
GenerateKeyCmd generate_key = 2;
DeleteKeyCmd delete_key = 3;
UpdateAgentCmd update_agent = 4;
ApplyUpdatesCmd apply_updates = 5;
RunStepCmd run_step = 6;
CleanupWorkspaceCmd cleanup_workspace = 7;
}
}
// CleanupWorkspaceCmd tells the agent to recursively remove the run's working
// directory once all steps on that server have finished.
message CleanupWorkspaceCmd {
string workspace_id = 1;
}
message DeleteKeyCmd {
string label = 1;
}
message UpdateAgentCmd {
string version = 1; // e.g. "1.2.3"
string gitea_base_url = 2; // e.g. "https://gitea.example.com"
}
message GenerateKeyCmd {
string label = 1;
string key_type = 2; // ed25519 | rsa | ecdsa (default: ed25519)
int32 key_size = 3; // bits; used for rsa and ecdsa
string passphrase = 4; // empty = no passphrase
string comment = 5; // embedded in public key
}
message RunStepCmd {
string interpreter = 1; // "bash" | "powershell"
string script = 2;
map<string, string> env = 3;
int32 timeout_seconds = 4;
string workspace_id = 5; // per-run working dir the agent creates & uses as cwd
}
message StepResult {
string command_id = 1;
int32 exit_code = 2;
string stdout = 3;
string stderr = 4;
map<string, string> output_env = 5;
}
message StepOutputChunk {
string command_id = 1;
uint64 seq = 2;
bytes data = 3;
bool eof = 4;
}
+30 -7
View File
@@ -1,24 +1,47 @@
# Build stage
#
# Context is still the repository root, not server/, because the runtime stage
# copies default_steps/ from it.
#
# vantage-shared is a private module, so every step that resolves it needs a
# credential. It arrives as a BuildKit secret rather than a build arg: an arg
# is baked into the builder layer's history, and this one is a Gitea token.
FROM golang:1.26 AS builder
WORKDIR /app
WORKDIR /src
# Download dependencies first (layer cache)
COPY go.mod go.sum ./
RUN go mod download
ENV GOPRIVATE=gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/*
# Copy source and build
COPY . .
# Manifests first so the dependency layer caches independently of source edits.
COPY server/go.mod server/go.sum ./server/
RUN --mount=type=secret,id=netrc,target=/root/.netrc \
cd server && go mod download
COPY server/ ./server/
ARG VERSION=dev
RUN CGO_ENABLED=0 GOOS=linux go build -ldflags="-s -w -X main.Version=${VERSION}" -o /vantage-server ./cmd
RUN --mount=type=secret,id=netrc,target=/root/.netrc \
cd server && CGO_ENABLED=0 GOOS=linux go build \
-ldflags="-s -w -X main.Version=${VERSION}" -o /vantage-server ./cmd
# Staged so the scratch image below can have a /tmp. It cannot mkdir one
# itself — scratch has no shell — and os.MkdirTemp fails outright without it.
RUN mkdir -p /staging/tmp && chmod 1777 /staging/tmp
# Runtime stage
FROM scratch
COPY --from=builder /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt /etc/ssl/certs/
# vulndb unpacks the ~50MB trivy-db here. Without it the scheduler stops at
# "temp dir: stat /tmp: no such file or directory" and no scanning happens,
# while everything else in the process runs perfectly well.
COPY --from=builder /staging/tmp /tmp
COPY --from=builder /vantage-server /vantage-server
COPY default_steps/ /opt/default-steps/
ENV VANTAGE_DEFAULT_STEPS_DIR=/opt/default-steps
EXPOSE 8080 9090
ENTRYPOINT ["/vantage-server"]
+276 -36
View File
@@ -2,88 +2,317 @@ package main
import (
"context"
"errors"
"log"
"net/http"
"os"
"os/signal"
"strings"
"syscall"
"time"
// Embeds the IANA zone database in the binary. Load-bearing: server/Dockerfile
// builds on Alpine, which ships no zoneinfo, so without this
// time.LoadLocation("Europe/London") fails in production and every workflow
// schedule silently falls back to UTC.
_ "time/tzdata"
"gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/mrhid6/vantage/server/internal/api"
"gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/mrhid6/vantage/server/internal/auth"
"gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/mrhid6/vantage/server/internal/bus"
"gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/mrhid6/vantage/server/internal/db"
grpcserver "gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/mrhid6/vantage/server/internal/grpc"
"gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/mrhid6/vantage/server/internal/monitorsched"
"gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/mrhid6/vantage/server/internal/services"
"gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/mrhid6/vantage/server/internal/vulnsched"
"gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/mrhid6/vantage/server/internal/workflowsched"
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
"github.com/mrhid6/vantage/server/internal/api"
"github.com/mrhid6/vantage/server/internal/auth"
"github.com/mrhid6/vantage/server/internal/db"
grpcserver "github.com/mrhid6/vantage/server/internal/grpc"
"github.com/mrhid6/vantage/server/internal/monitorsched"
"github.com/mrhid6/vantage/server/internal/services"
)
// @title Vantage API
// @version 1.0
// @description The Vantage control plane REST API. Authenticate with a browser session cookie, or with an API token created under Settings → API tokens.
// @BasePath /api
// Each @securityDefinitions.apikey block below is deliberately its own
// comment group, separated by a real blank line rather than a bare "//": Go's
// parser only splits ast.CommentGroups on an actual blank line, and
// swag v2.0.0-rc5's parseSecAttributesV3 resolves a scheme's map key by
// scanning from the start of whatever comment group it was handed — so three
// stacked blocks sharing one group all collapse onto the first block's name.
// Three groups means three independent scans, each finding its own name.
// @securityDefinitions.apikey cookieAuth
// @in cookie
// @name km_session
// @securityDefinitions.apikey bearerAuth
// @in header
// @name Authorization
// @description An API token, sent as "Bearer vt_…". Scoped and optionally expiring.
// @securityDefinitions.apikey esoAuth
// @in header
// @name Authorization
// @description The External Secrets read token, rotated under Settings. It reaches /api/secrets/{group}/values and nothing else. It is a different credential from an API token, and the two must never be substituted for one another.
func main() {
mongoURI := getEnv("MONGO_URI", "mongodb://localhost:27017")
dbName := getEnv("MONGO_DB", "vantage")
if err := db.Connect(mongoURI, dbName); err != nil {
// Two flags, so the schema work can be lifted out of the serving pods.
//
// Under Docker Compose neither is set and nothing changes: one process
// migrates and then serves. Under Kubernetes with more than one replica
// that is unsafe — every pod would run MigrateOrgToInstance at once, and
// renaming collections while a sibling reads them is not a race anyone
// wins. The chart therefore runs a pre-upgrade Job with MIGRATE_ONLY and
// starts the Deployment with SKIP_MIGRATIONS.
migrateOnly := boolEnv("VANTAGE_MIGRATE_ONLY")
skipMigrations := boolEnv("VANTAGE_SKIP_MIGRATIONS")
// Not required in migrate-only mode: that process never serves gRPC, and
// demanding it would put an agent-facing address in a Job that has no
// business knowing one.
if !migrateOnly && os.Getenv("GRPC_HOST") == "" {
log.Fatal("GRPC_HOST is required (host:port agents dial for gRPC)")
}
// DB name comes from the MONGO_URI path; "vantage" is the fallback.
if err := db.Connect(mongoURI, "vantage"); err != nil {
log.Fatalf("failed to connect to MongoDB: %v", err)
}
log.Println("connected to MongoDB")
if migrateOnly || !skipMigrations {
runSchemaSetup()
} else {
log.Println("VANTAGE_SKIP_MIGRATIONS set: assuming migrations ran elsewhere")
}
if migrateOnly {
log.Println("VANTAGE_MIGRATE_ONLY set: schema setup complete, exiting")
return
}
serve()
}
// runSchemaSetup performs every write that must happen exactly once before the
// application serves: migrations, index builders and default step seeding. It
// is fatal on anything that would leave the schema half-moved.
func runSchemaSetup() {
// Migrations 0001 to 0003 still speak the pre-rename shape (orgs, org_id),
// so they must run before 0004 renames everything underneath them.
if err := services.RunMigrations(); err != nil {
log.Fatalf("migration failed: %v", err)
}
// 0002 must precede 0003: 0003 can create a "default" org, which pushes
// 0002 into its ambiguous multi-org branch.
if err := services.MigrateSettingsOrg(); err != nil {
log.Fatalf("settings org migration failed: %v", err)
}
if err := services.MigrateMissedOrgScopes(); err != nil {
log.Fatalf("missed org scope migration failed: %v", err)
}
// 0004 renames orgs to instances. It must run BEFORE the index builders:
// EnsureAuthIndexes creates instances.slug, which would create an empty
// instances collection and make 0004 refuse to rename onto it.
migCtx, migCancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Minute)
migErr := services.MigrateOrgToInstance(migCtx, db.Database)
migCancel()
if migErr != nil {
log.Fatalf("instance rename migration failed: %v", migErr)
}
assertCtx, assertCancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second)
assertErr := services.AssertNoScopedCollectionMissed(assertCtx, db.Database)
assertCancel()
if assertErr != nil {
log.Fatalf("scoped collection check failed: %v", assertErr)
}
if err := services.EnsureAuthIndexes(); err != nil {
log.Fatalf("failed to ensure auth indexes: %v", err)
}
if err := services.EnsureAPITokenIndexes(); err != nil {
log.Fatalf("api token indexes: %v", err)
}
// 0005 runs AFTER EnsureAuthIndexes: the unique (instance_id, provider_id)
// index must exist before anything inserts providers, or a concurrent
// re-run could double-insert before the index is there to refuse it.
if err := services.MigrateAuthProviders(); err != nil {
log.Fatalf("auth provider migration failed: %v", err)
}
if err := services.EnsureSecretIndexes(); err != nil {
log.Printf("warning: failed to ensure secret indexes: %v", err)
}
if err := services.EnsureServerIndexes(); err != nil {
log.Printf("warning: failed to ensure server indexes: %v", err)
}
if err := services.EnsureSettingsIndexes(); err != nil {
log.Fatalf("failed to ensure settings indexes: %v", err)
}
if err := services.EnsureWorkflowIndexes(); err != nil {
log.Printf("warning: failed to ensure workflow indexes: %v", err)
}
if created, updated, err := services.SeedDefaultSteps(); err != nil {
log.Printf("warning: failed to seed default steps: %v", err)
} else {
log.Printf("default steps seeded: %d created, %d updated", created, updated)
if err := services.EnsureMonitorSampleIndexes(); err != nil {
log.Printf("warning: failed to ensure monitor sample indexes: %v", err)
}
services.StartLogSweeper()
if err := services.EnsureVulnIndexes(); err != nil {
log.Printf("warning: failed to ensure vuln indexes: %v", err)
}
if err := services.EnsureWorkloadIndexes(); err != nil {
log.Printf("warning: failed to ensure workload indexes: %v", err)
}
if err := services.EnsureStatusPageIndexes(); err != nil {
log.Printf("warning: failed to ensure status page indexes: %v", err)
}
if err := services.EnsureAuditIndexes(); err != nil {
log.Printf("warning: failed to ensure audit indexes: %v", err)
}
if instanceIDs, err := services.ListInstanceIDs(); err != nil {
log.Printf("warning: failed to list instances for default step seeding: %v", err)
} else {
for _, instanceID := range instanceIDs {
if created, updated, err := services.SeedDefaultSteps(instanceID); err != nil {
log.Printf("warning: failed to seed default steps for instance %s: %v", instanceID, err)
} else {
log.Printf("default steps seeded for instance %s: %d created, %d updated", instanceID, created, updated)
}
}
}
}
func serve() {
redisAddr := getEnv("REDIS_ADDR", "localhost:6379")
if err := auth.InitRedis(redisAddr); err != nil {
redisUser := os.Getenv("REDIS_USERNAME")
redisPass := os.Getenv("REDIS_PASSWORD")
if err := auth.InitRedis(redisAddr, redisUser, redisPass); err != nil {
log.Fatalf("failed to connect to Redis: %v", err)
}
log.Println("connected to Redis")
if err := auth.InitOIDC(context.Background()); err != nil {
log.Fatalf("failed to initialise OIDC: %v", err)
// The bus carries agent commands and step results between replicas. It is
// not optional even on a single-replica deployment: dispatch takes the same
// path either way, so the code exercised in production is the code
// exercised everywhere.
if err := bus.Init(redisAddr, redisUser, redisPass); err != nil {
log.Fatalf("failed to connect the message bus: %v", err)
}
log.Printf("message bus ready as node %s", bus.NodeID())
// Cancelled on SIGTERM/SIGINT. Everything below that takes a context — the
// housekeeping jobs, the leader lock — stops when the pod is asked to.
ctx, shutdown := signal.NotifyContext(context.Background(), os.Interrupt, syscall.SIGTERM)
defer shutdown()
stopGRPC, err := grpcserver.StartGRPC(9090)
if err != nil {
log.Fatalf("gRPC server error: %v", err)
}
// Background goroutine to mark offline servers
go func() {
// Everything below runs on exactly one replica at a time.
//
// These are cluster-singleton jobs, not per-pod work: N replicas would mean
// every monitor check firing N times, every incident notification delivered
// to the customer N times, every retention sweep deleting concurrently, and
// N reapers racing to purge the same instance. They share one lock rather
// than holding four, because they are one role — housekeeping — and
// splitting them would only spread that role across pods for no benefit.
bus.RunAsLeader(ctx, "housekeeping", func(jobCtx context.Context) {
services.StartLogSweeper(jobCtx)
services.StartAuditSweeper(jobCtx)
services.StartReaper(jobCtx)
monitorsched.Start(jobCtx)
workflowsched.Start(jobCtx, workflowsched.Deps{
TriggerWorkflow: services.TriggerWorkflow,
LogEvent: services.LogEvent,
})
vulnsched.Start(jobCtx, vulnsched.Deps{
LogEvent: services.LogEvent,
SendDigest: services.SendVulnDigest,
})
services.StartVulnSweeper(jobCtx)
ticker := time.NewTicker(2 * time.Minute)
defer ticker.Stop()
for range ticker.C {
if err := services.MarkOfflineServers(); err != nil {
log.Printf("mark offline error: %v", err)
for {
select {
case <-jobCtx.Done():
return
case <-ticker.C:
if err := services.MarkOfflineServers(); err != nil {
log.Printf("mark offline error: %v", err)
}
}
}
}()
})
// Start gRPC server
go func() {
if err := grpcserver.StartGRPC(9090); err != nil {
log.Fatalf("gRPC server error: %v", err)
}
}()
// Start the server-side monitor scheduler.
monitorsched.Start(context.Background())
// Start REST server
r := gin.New()
// Without this gin trusts every proxy and ClientIP() is whatever the
// caller wrote in X-Forwarded-For. That was survivable while ClientIP()
// only produced audit strings; the public status limiter makes it load
// bearing. Empty means trust nobody, which is correct for a direct
// exposure and wrong behind a proxy — hence the explicit setting.
if err := r.SetTrustedProxies(api.TrustedProxies()); err != nil {
log.Fatalf("trusted proxies: %v", err)
}
r.Use(gin.Recovery())
r.Use(gin.LoggerWithConfig(gin.LoggerConfig{SkipPaths: []string{"/api/console/tunnel"}}))
r.Use(corsMiddleware())
services.SetStatusRedis(auth.Redis())
api.RegisterRoutes(r)
log.Println("REST server listening on :8080")
if err := r.Run(":8080"); err != nil {
log.Fatalf("REST server error: %v", err)
if err := api.AssertScopeMapComplete(r); err != nil {
log.Fatalf("api scope map: %v", err)
}
srv := &http.Server{Addr: ":8080", Handler: r}
go func() {
log.Println("REST server listening on :8080")
if err := srv.ListenAndServe(); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, http.ErrServerClosed) {
log.Fatalf("REST server error: %v", err)
}
}()
<-ctx.Done()
log.Println("shutdown signal received")
// gRPC first, and this ordering is the point of the whole exercise. Stopping
// it runs each CommandStream handler's deferred release, which clears that
// agent's presence claim; until that happens another replica will keep
// dispatching commands to this process. Draining HTTP first would leave the
// claims held for the length of the drain.
stopGRPC()
drainCtx, cancelDrain := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), httpDrainTimeout)
defer cancelDrain()
if err := srv.Shutdown(drainCtx); err != nil {
log.Printf("REST server shutdown: %v", err)
}
log.Println("shutdown complete")
}
// How long in-flight REST requests are given to finish. Console tunnels are
// long-lived WebSockets that will not end on their own, so this is a ceiling
// rather than a target; the relays behind them are already gone by this point.
const httpDrainTimeout = 10 * time.Second
func corsMiddleware() gin.HandlerFunc {
return func(c *gin.Context) {
c.Header("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "*")
@@ -103,3 +332,14 @@ func getEnv(key, fallback string) string {
}
return fallback
}
// boolEnv reads a flag env var. Anything other than a recognised truthy value
// is false, so a typo leaves the safe default (migrate here, serve here) rather
// than silently skipping schema setup.
func boolEnv(key string) bool {
switch strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv(key))) {
case "1", "true", "yes", "on":
return true
}
return false
}
+32 -10
View File
@@ -1,19 +1,43 @@
module github.com/mrhid6/vantage/server
module gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/mrhid6/vantage/server
go 1.26
require (
github.com/aquasecurity/trivy-db v0.0.0-20260713131703-4be526083c54
github.com/coreos/go-oidc/v3 v3.18.0
github.com/gin-gonic/gin v1.10.0
github.com/google/uuid v1.6.0
github.com/knqyf263/go-apk-version v0.0.0-20200609155635-041fdbb8563f
github.com/knqyf263/go-deb-version v0.0.0-20241115132648-6f4aee6ccd23
github.com/knqyf263/go-rpm-version v0.0.0-20240918084003-2afd7dc6a38f
github.com/opencontainers/image-spec v1.1.1
github.com/redis/go-redis/v9 v9.20.1
github.com/robfig/cron/v3 v3.0.1
github.com/wwt/guac v1.3.2
go.mongodb.org/mongo-driver/v2 v2.2.2
go.mongodb.org/mongo-driver/v2 v2.8.0
golang.org/x/crypto v0.54.0
golang.org/x/oauth2 v0.36.0
google.golang.org/grpc v1.64.0
oras.land/oras-go/v2 v2.6.2
)
require (
github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.1 // indirect
github.com/hyperboloide/lk v0.0.0-20251220053519-b291812e3216 // indirect
github.com/oklog/ulid/v2 v2.1.1 // indirect
github.com/opencontainers/go-digest v1.0.0 // indirect
github.com/pmezard/go-difflib v1.0.0 // indirect
github.com/samber/lo v1.50.0 // indirect
github.com/samber/oops v1.18.1 // indirect
github.com/stretchr/objx v0.5.2 // indirect
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.11.1 // indirect
go.etcd.io/bbolt v1.4.3 // indirect
go.opentelemetry.io/otel v1.34.0 // indirect
go.opentelemetry.io/otel/trace v1.34.0 // indirect
)
require (
gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/vantage/vantage-shared v0.1.0
github.com/bytedance/sonic v1.11.6 // indirect
github.com/bytedance/sonic/loader v0.1.1 // indirect
github.com/cespare/xxhash/v2 v2.3.0 // indirect
@@ -26,10 +50,9 @@ require (
github.com/go-playground/universal-translator v0.18.1 // indirect
github.com/go-playground/validator/v10 v10.20.0 // indirect
github.com/goccy/go-json v0.10.2 // indirect
github.com/golang/snappy v1.0.0 // indirect
github.com/gorilla/websocket v1.4.1 // indirect
github.com/json-iterator/go v1.1.12 // indirect
github.com/klauspost/compress v1.16.7 // indirect
github.com/klauspost/compress v1.17.6 // indirect
github.com/klauspost/cpuid/v2 v2.2.10 // indirect
github.com/konsorten/go-windows-terminal-sequences v1.0.1 // indirect
github.com/leodido/go-urn v1.4.0 // indirect
@@ -41,16 +64,15 @@ require (
github.com/twitchyliquid64/golang-asm v0.15.1 // indirect
github.com/ugorji/go/codec v1.2.12 // indirect
github.com/xdg-go/pbkdf2 v1.0.0 // indirect
github.com/xdg-go/scram v1.1.2 // indirect
github.com/xdg-go/scram v1.2.0 // indirect
github.com/xdg-go/stringprep v1.0.4 // indirect
github.com/youmark/pkcs8 v0.0.0-20240726163527-a2c0da244d78 // indirect
go.uber.org/atomic v1.11.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/arch v0.8.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/crypto v0.33.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/net v0.25.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/sync v0.11.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/sys v0.30.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/text v0.22.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/net v0.56.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/sync v0.22.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/sys v0.47.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/text v0.40.0 // indirect
google.golang.org/genproto/googleapis/rpc v0.0.0-20240521202816-d264139d666e // indirect
google.golang.org/protobuf v1.34.2 // indirect
gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1 // indirect
+64 -20
View File
@@ -1,3 +1,9 @@
gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/vantage/vantage-shared v0.1.0 h1:H6PCb8JHucrRiqPe9kGOhXUjBD66tKFHCP3qz5TjdZc=
gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/vantage/vantage-shared v0.1.0/go.mod h1:dWjeOFLltQ8sv9Pnn1xRxGfWGgqa2fkG0esuaJLoPXQ=
github.com/aquasecurity/bolt-fixtures v0.0.0-20200903104109-d34e7f983986 h1:2a30xLN2sUZcMXl50hg+PJCIDdJgIvIbVcKqLJ/ZrtM=
github.com/aquasecurity/bolt-fixtures v0.0.0-20200903104109-d34e7f983986/go.mod h1:NT+jyeCzXk6vXR5MTkdn4z64TgGfE5HMLC8qfj5unl8=
github.com/aquasecurity/trivy-db v0.0.0-20260713131703-4be526083c54 h1:4CZNoDkNfcuACevZeDraACGmP1+L0nKkRY52+jV8k1M=
github.com/aquasecurity/trivy-db v0.0.0-20260713131703-4be526083c54/go.mod h1:iIEV2oGuZScvfyX2SMIn78iVMNnepgo0QuJJh/srgVI=
github.com/bsm/ginkgo/v2 v2.12.0 h1:Ny8MWAHyOepLGlLKYmXG4IEkioBysk6GpaRTLC8zwWs=
github.com/bsm/ginkgo/v2 v2.12.0/go.mod h1:SwYbGRRDovPVboqFv0tPTcG1sN61LM1Z4ARdbAV9g4c=
github.com/bsm/gomega v1.27.10 h1:yeMWxP2pV2fG3FgAODIY8EiRE3dy0aeFYt4l7wh6yKA=
@@ -35,8 +41,8 @@ github.com/go-playground/validator/v10 v10.20.0 h1:K9ISHbSaI0lyB2eWMPJo+kOS/FBEx
github.com/go-playground/validator/v10 v10.20.0/go.mod h1:dbuPbCMFw/DrkbEynArYaCwl3amGuJotoKCe95atGMM=
github.com/goccy/go-json v0.10.2 h1:CrxCmQqYDkv1z7lO7Wbh2HN93uovUHgrECaO5ZrCXAU=
github.com/goccy/go-json v0.10.2/go.mod h1:6MelG93GURQebXPDq3khkgXZkazVtN9CRI+MGFi0w8I=
github.com/golang/snappy v1.0.0 h1:Oy607GVXHs7RtbggtPBnr2RmDArIsAefDwvrdWvRhGs=
github.com/golang/snappy v1.0.0/go.mod h1:/XxbfmMg8lxefKM7IXC3fBNl/7bRcc72aCRzEWrmP2Q=
github.com/goccy/go-yaml v1.19.0 h1:EmkZ9RIsX+Uq4DYFowegAuJo8+xdX3T/2dwNPXbxEYE=
github.com/goccy/go-yaml v1.19.0/go.mod h1:XBurs7gK8ATbW4ZPGKgcbrY1Br56PdM69F7LkFRi1kA=
github.com/google/go-cmp v0.6.0 h1:ofyhxvXcZhMsU5ulbFiLKl/XBFqE1GSq7atu8tAmTRI=
github.com/google/go-cmp v0.6.0/go.mod h1:17dUlkBOakJ0+DkrSSNjCkIjxS6bF9zb3elmeNGIjoY=
github.com/google/gofuzz v1.0.0/go.mod h1:dBl0BpW6vV/+mYPU4Po3pmUjxk6FQPldtuIdl/M65Eg=
@@ -45,16 +51,26 @@ github.com/google/uuid v1.6.0 h1:NIvaJDMOsjHA8n1jAhLSgzrAzy1Hgr+hNrb57e+94F0=
github.com/google/uuid v1.6.0/go.mod h1:TIyPZe4MgqvfeYDBFedMoGGpEw/LqOeaOT+nhxU+yHo=
github.com/gorilla/websocket v1.4.1 h1:q7AeDBpnBk8AogcD4DSag/Ukw/KV+YhzLj2bP5HvKCM=
github.com/gorilla/websocket v1.4.1/go.mod h1:YR8l580nyteQvAITg2hZ9XVh4b55+EU/adAjf1fMHhE=
github.com/hyperboloide/lk v0.0.0-20251220053519-b291812e3216 h1:Luh+sE/W2M+V0Y+jlZN7nJefLNHc4/y93xxl+rFD7k0=
github.com/hyperboloide/lk v0.0.0-20251220053519-b291812e3216/go.mod h1:/OLW9HZj6qtQ7gWTGwuO3JrUZ+MC7I7TLRuNl14TYuo=
github.com/json-iterator/go v1.1.12 h1:PV8peI4a0ysnczrg+LtxykD8LfKY9ML6u2jnxaEnrnM=
github.com/json-iterator/go v1.1.12/go.mod h1:e30LSqwooZae/UwlEbR2852Gd8hjQvJoHmT4TnhNGBo=
github.com/klauspost/compress v1.16.7 h1:2mk3MPGNzKyxErAw8YaohYh69+pa4sIQSC0fPGCFR9I=
github.com/klauspost/compress v1.16.7/go.mod h1:ntbaceVETuRiXiv4DpjP66DpAtAGkEQskQzEyD//IeE=
github.com/klauspost/compress v1.17.6 h1:60eq2E/jlfwQXtvZEeBUYADs+BwKBWURIY+Gj2eRGjI=
github.com/klauspost/compress v1.17.6/go.mod h1:/dCuZOvVtNoHsyb+cuJD3itjs3NbnF6KH9zAO4BDxPM=
github.com/klauspost/cpuid/v2 v2.0.9/go.mod h1:FInQzS24/EEf25PyTYn52gqo7WaD8xa0213Md/qVLRg=
github.com/klauspost/cpuid/v2 v2.2.10 h1:tBs3QSyvjDyFTq3uoc/9xFpCuOsJQFNPiAhYdw2skhE=
github.com/klauspost/cpuid/v2 v2.2.10/go.mod h1:hqwkgyIinND0mEev00jJYCxPNVRVXFQeu1XKlok6oO0=
github.com/knqyf263/go-apk-version v0.0.0-20200609155635-041fdbb8563f h1:GvCU5GXhHq+7LeOzx/haG7HSIZokl3/0GkoUFzsRJjg=
github.com/knqyf263/go-apk-version v0.0.0-20200609155635-041fdbb8563f/go.mod h1:q59u9px8b7UTj0nIjEjvmTWekazka6xIt6Uogz5Dm+8=
github.com/knqyf263/go-deb-version v0.0.0-20241115132648-6f4aee6ccd23 h1:dWzdsqjh1p2gNtRKqNwuBvKqMNwnLOPLzVZT1n6DK7s=
github.com/knqyf263/go-deb-version v0.0.0-20241115132648-6f4aee6ccd23/go.mod h1:lUaIXCWzf7BRKTY5iEcrYy1TfgbYLYVIS/B2vPkJzOc=
github.com/knqyf263/go-rpm-version v0.0.0-20240918084003-2afd7dc6a38f h1:xt29M2T6STgldg+WEP51gGePQCsQvklmP2eIhPIBK3g=
github.com/knqyf263/go-rpm-version v0.0.0-20240918084003-2afd7dc6a38f/go.mod h1:i4sF0l1fFnY1aiw08QQSwVAFxHEm311Me3WsU/X7nL0=
github.com/knz/go-libedit v1.10.1/go.mod h1:MZTVkCWyz0oBc7JOWP3wNAzd002ZbM/5hgShxwh4x8M=
github.com/konsorten/go-windows-terminal-sequences v1.0.1 h1:mweAR1A6xJ3oS2pRaGiHgQ4OO8tzTaLawm8vnODuwDk=
github.com/konsorten/go-windows-terminal-sequences v1.0.1/go.mod h1:T0+1ngSBFLxvqU3pZ+m/2kptfBszLMUkC4ZK/EgS/cQ=
github.com/kr/text v0.2.0 h1:5Nx0Ya0ZqY2ygV366QzturHI13Jq95ApcVaJBhpS+AY=
github.com/kr/text v0.2.0/go.mod h1:eLer722TekiGuMkidMxC/pM04lWEeraHUUmBw8l2grE=
github.com/leodido/go-urn v1.4.0 h1:WT9HwE9SGECu3lg4d/dIA+jxlljEa1/ffXKmRjqdmIQ=
github.com/leodido/go-urn v1.4.0/go.mod h1:bvxc+MVxLKB4z00jd1z+Dvzr47oO32F/QSNjSBOlFxI=
github.com/mattn/go-isatty v0.0.20 h1:xfD0iDuEKnDkl03q4limB+vH+GxLEtL/jb4xVJSWWEY=
@@ -64,28 +80,46 @@ github.com/modern-go/concurrent v0.0.0-20180306012644-bacd9c7ef1dd h1:TRLaZ9cD/w
github.com/modern-go/concurrent v0.0.0-20180306012644-bacd9c7ef1dd/go.mod h1:6dJC0mAP4ikYIbvyc7fijjWJddQyLn8Ig3JB5CqoB9Q=
github.com/modern-go/reflect2 v1.0.2 h1:xBagoLtFs94CBntxluKeaWgTMpvLxC4ur3nMaC9Gz0M=
github.com/modern-go/reflect2 v1.0.2/go.mod h1:yWuevngMOJpCy52FWWMvUC8ws7m/LJsjYzDa0/r8luk=
github.com/niemeyer/pretty v0.0.0-20200227124842-a10e7caefd8e h1:fD57ERR4JtEqsWbfPhv4DMiApHyliiK5xCTNVSPiaAs=
github.com/niemeyer/pretty v0.0.0-20200227124842-a10e7caefd8e/go.mod h1:zD1mROLANZcx1PVRCS0qkT7pwLkGfwJo4zjcN/Tysno=
github.com/oklog/ulid/v2 v2.1.1 h1:suPZ4ARWLOJLegGFiZZ1dFAkqzhMjL3J1TzI+5wHz8s=
github.com/oklog/ulid/v2 v2.1.1/go.mod h1:rcEKHmBBKfef9DhnvX7y1HZBYxjXb0cP5ExxNsTT1QQ=
github.com/opencontainers/go-digest v1.0.0 h1:apOUWs51W5PlhuyGyz9FCeeBIOUDA/6nW8Oi/yOhh5U=
github.com/opencontainers/go-digest v1.0.0/go.mod h1:0JzlMkj0TRzQZfJkVvzbP0HBR3IKzErnv2BNG4W4MAM=
github.com/opencontainers/image-spec v1.1.1 h1:y0fUlFfIZhPF1W537XOLg0/fcx6zcHCJwooC2xJA040=
github.com/opencontainers/image-spec v1.1.1/go.mod h1:qpqAh3Dmcf36wStyyWU+kCeDgrGnAve2nCC8+7h8Q0M=
github.com/pborman/getopt v0.0.0-20170112200414-7148bc3a4c30/go.mod h1:85jBQOZwpVEaDAr341tbn15RS4fCAsIst0qp7i8ex1o=
github.com/pelletier/go-toml/v2 v2.2.2 h1:aYUidT7k73Pcl9nb2gScu7NSrKCSHIDE89b3+6Wq+LM=
github.com/pelletier/go-toml/v2 v2.2.2/go.mod h1:1t835xjRzz80PqgE6HHgN2JOsmgYu/h4qDAS4n929Rs=
github.com/pmezard/go-difflib v1.0.0 h1:4DBwDE0NGyQoBHbLQYPwSUPoCMWR5BEzIk/f1lZbAQM=
github.com/pmezard/go-difflib v1.0.0/go.mod h1:iKH77koFhYxTK1pcRnkKkqfTogsbg7gZNVY4sRDYZ/4=
github.com/redis/go-redis/v9 v9.20.1 h1:sfCU6A8P3dXbKyWes02uxA2baehGux9dZHfEKtsTB1w=
github.com/redis/go-redis/v9 v9.20.1/go.mod h1:v/M13XI1PVCDcm01VtPFOADfZtHf8YW3baQf57KlIkA=
github.com/robfig/cron/v3 v3.0.1 h1:WdRxkvbJztn8LMz/QEvLN5sBU+xKpSqwwUO1Pjr4qDs=
github.com/robfig/cron/v3 v3.0.1/go.mod h1:eQICP3HwyT7UooqI/z+Ov+PtYAWygg1TEWWzGIFLtro=
github.com/samber/lo v1.50.0 h1:XrG0xOeHs+4FQ8gJR97zDz5uOFMW7OwFWiFVzqopKgY=
github.com/samber/lo v1.50.0/go.mod h1:RjZyNk6WSnUFRKK6EyOhsRJMqft3G+pg7dCWHQCWvsc=
github.com/samber/oops v1.18.1 h1:qjhZbqbdyhWBKntkY8sxrDNKA8b4c5VHlmI1rli7X7M=
github.com/samber/oops v1.18.1/go.mod h1:xYqvimigkKV70HyLXiBZJFpIWi2CGcc6Xx7eV+2HycI=
github.com/sirupsen/logrus v1.4.2 h1:SPIRibHv4MatM3XXNO2BJeFLZwZ2LvZgfQ5+UNI2im4=
github.com/sirupsen/logrus v1.4.2/go.mod h1:tLMulIdttU9McNUspp0xgXVQah82FyeX6MwdIuYE2rE=
github.com/stretchr/objx v0.1.0/go.mod h1:HFkY916IF+rwdDfMAkV7OtwuqBVzrE8GR6GFx+wExME=
github.com/stretchr/objx v0.1.1/go.mod h1:HFkY916IF+rwdDfMAkV7OtwuqBVzrE8GR6GFx+wExME=
github.com/stretchr/objx v0.4.0/go.mod h1:YvHI0jy2hoMjB+UWwv71VJQ9isScKT/TqJzVSSt89Yw=
github.com/stretchr/objx v0.5.0/go.mod h1:Yh+to48EsGEfYuaHDzXPcE3xhTkx73EhmCGUpEOglKo=
github.com/stretchr/objx v0.5.2 h1:xuMeJ0Sdp5ZMRXx/aWO6RZxdr3beISkG5/G/aIRr3pY=
github.com/stretchr/objx v0.5.2/go.mod h1:FRsXN1f5AsAjCGJKqEizvkpNtU+EGNCLh3NxZ/8L+MA=
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.2.2/go.mod h1:a8OnRcib4nhh0OaRAV+Yts87kKdq0PP7pXfy6kDkUVs=
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.3.0/go.mod h1:M5WIy9Dh21IEIfnGCwXGc5bZfKNJtfHm1UVUgZn+9EI=
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.5.1/go.mod h1:5W2xD1RspED5o8YsWQXVCued0rvSQ+mT+I5cxcmMvtA=
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.7.0/go.mod h1:6Fq8oRcR53rry900zMqJjRRixrwX3KX962/h/Wwjteg=
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.7.1/go.mod h1:6Fq8oRcR53rry900zMqJjRRixrwX3KX962/h/Wwjteg=
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.8.0/go.mod h1:yNjHg4UonilssWZ8iaSj1OCr/vHnekPRkoO+kdMU+MU=
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.8.1/go.mod h1:w2LPCIKwWwSfY2zedu0+kehJoqGctiVI29o6fzry7u4=
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.8.4/go.mod h1:sz/lmYIOXD/1dqDmKjjqLyZ2RngseejIcXlSw2iwfAo=
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.9.0 h1:HtqpIVDClZ4nwg75+f6Lvsy/wHu+3BoSGCbBAcpTsTg=
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.9.0/go.mod h1:r2ic/lqez/lEtzL7wO/rwa5dbSLXVDPFyf8C91i36aY=
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.11.1 h1:7s2iGBzp5EwR7/aIZr8ao5+dra3wiQyKjjFuvgVKu7U=
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.11.1/go.mod h1:wZwfW3scLgRK+23gO65QZefKpKQRnfz6sD981Nm4B6U=
github.com/twitchyliquid64/golang-asm v0.15.1 h1:SU5vSMR7hnwNxj24w34ZyCi/FmDZTkS4MhqMhdFk5YI=
github.com/twitchyliquid64/golang-asm v0.15.1/go.mod h1:a1lVb/DtPvCB8fslRZhAngC2+aY1QWCk3Cedj/Gdt08=
github.com/ugorji/go/codec v1.2.12 h1:9LC83zGrHhuUA9l16C9AHXAqEV/2wBQ4nkvumAE65EE=
@@ -94,8 +128,8 @@ github.com/wwt/guac v1.3.2 h1:sH6OFGa/1tBs7ieWBVlZe7t6F5JAOWBry/tqQL/Vup4=
github.com/wwt/guac v1.3.2/go.mod h1:eKm+NrnK7A88l4UBEcYNpZQGMpZRryYKoz4D/0/n1C0=
github.com/xdg-go/pbkdf2 v1.0.0 h1:Su7DPu48wXMwC3bs7MCNG+z4FhcyEuz5dlvchbq0B0c=
github.com/xdg-go/pbkdf2 v1.0.0/go.mod h1:jrpuAogTd400dnrH08LKmI/xc1MbPOebTwRqcT5RDeI=
github.com/xdg-go/scram v1.1.2 h1:FHX5I5B4i4hKRVRBCFRxq1iQRej7WO3hhBuJf+UUySY=
github.com/xdg-go/scram v1.1.2/go.mod h1:RT/sEzTbU5y00aCK8UOx6R7YryM0iF1N2MOmC3kKLN4=
github.com/xdg-go/scram v1.2.0 h1:bYKF2AEwG5rqd1BumT4gAnvwU/M9nBp2pTSxeZw7Wvs=
github.com/xdg-go/scram v1.2.0/go.mod h1:3dlrS0iBaWKYVt2ZfA4cj48umJZ+cAEbR6/SjLA88I8=
github.com/xdg-go/stringprep v1.0.4 h1:XLI/Ng3O1Atzq0oBs3TWm+5ZVgkq2aqdlvP9JtoZ6c8=
github.com/xdg-go/stringprep v1.0.4/go.mod h1:mPGuuIYwz7CmR2bT9j4GbQqutWS1zV24gijq1dTyGkM=
github.com/youmark/pkcs8 v0.0.0-20240726163527-a2c0da244d78 h1:ilQV1hzziu+LLM3zUTJ0trRztfwgjqKnBWNtSRkbmwM=
@@ -103,8 +137,14 @@ github.com/youmark/pkcs8 v0.0.0-20240726163527-a2c0da244d78/go.mod h1:aL8wCCfTfS
github.com/yuin/goldmark v1.4.13/go.mod h1:6yULJ656Px+3vBD8DxQVa3kxgyrAnzto9xy5taEt/CY=
github.com/zeebo/xxh3 v1.1.0 h1:s7DLGDK45Dyfg7++yxI0khrfwq9661w9EN78eP/UZVs=
github.com/zeebo/xxh3 v1.1.0/go.mod h1:IisAie1LELR4xhVinxWS5+zf1lA4p0MW4T+w+W07F5s=
go.mongodb.org/mongo-driver/v2 v2.2.2 h1:9cYuS3fl1Xhqwpfazso10V7BHQD58kCgtzhfAmJYz9c=
go.mongodb.org/mongo-driver/v2 v2.2.2/go.mod h1:qQkDMhCGWl3FN509DfdPd4GRBLU/41zqF/k8eTRceps=
go.etcd.io/bbolt v1.4.3 h1:dEadXpI6G79deX5prL3QRNP6JB8UxVkqo4UPnHaNXJo=
go.etcd.io/bbolt v1.4.3/go.mod h1:tKQlpPaYCVFctUIgFKFnAlvbmB3tpy1vkTnDWohtc0E=
go.mongodb.org/mongo-driver/v2 v2.8.0 h1:CxWDGQYY8QQwNjAl/aq2sfWakdnWZynnqJ9F4DhHbP8=
go.mongodb.org/mongo-driver/v2 v2.8.0/go.mod h1:yOI9kBsufol30iFsl1slpdq1I0eHPzybRWdyYUs8K/0=
go.opentelemetry.io/otel v1.34.0 h1:zRLXxLCgL1WyKsPVrgbSdMN4c0FMkDAskSTQP+0hdUY=
go.opentelemetry.io/otel v1.34.0/go.mod h1:OWFPOQ+h4G8xpyjgqo4SxJYdDQ/qmRH+wivy7zzx9oI=
go.opentelemetry.io/otel/trace v1.34.0 h1:+ouXS2V8Rd4hp4580a8q23bg0azF2nI8cqLYnC8mh/k=
go.opentelemetry.io/otel/trace v1.34.0/go.mod h1:Svm7lSjQD7kG7KJ/MUHPVXSDGz2OX4h0M2jHBhmSfRE=
go.uber.org/atomic v1.11.0 h1:ZvwS0R+56ePWxUNi+Atn9dWONBPp/AUETXlHW0DxSjE=
go.uber.org/atomic v1.11.0/go.mod h1:LUxbIzbOniOlMKjJjyPfpl4v+PKK2cNJn91OQbhoJI0=
golang.org/x/arch v0.0.0-20210923205945-b76863e36670/go.mod h1:5om86z9Hs0C8fWVUuoMHwpExlXzs5Tkyp9hOrfG7pp8=
@@ -112,20 +152,20 @@ golang.org/x/arch v0.8.0 h1:3wRIsP3pM4yUptoR96otTUOXI367OS0+c9eeRi9doIc=
golang.org/x/arch v0.8.0/go.mod h1:FEVrYAQjsQXMVJ1nsMoVVXPZg6p2JE2mx8psSWTDQys=
golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20190308221718-c2843e01d9a2/go.mod h1:djNgcEr1/C05ACkg1iLfiJU5Ep61QUkGW8qpdssI0+w=
golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20210921155107-089bfa567519/go.mod h1:GvvjBRRGRdwPK5ydBHafDWAxML/pGHZbMvKqRZ5+Abc=
golang.org/x/crypto v0.33.0 h1:IOBPskki6Lysi0lo9qQvbxiQ+FvsCC/YWOecCHAixus=
golang.org/x/crypto v0.33.0/go.mod h1:bVdXmD7IV/4GdElGPozy6U7lWdRXA4qyRVGJV57uQ5M=
golang.org/x/crypto v0.54.0 h1:YLIA59K4fiNzHzjnZt2tUJQjQtUWfWbeHBqKtk3eScw=
golang.org/x/crypto v0.54.0/go.mod h1:KWL8ny2AZdGR2cWmzeHrp2azQPGogOv+HeQaVEXC2dk=
golang.org/x/mod v0.6.0-dev.0.20220419223038-86c51ed26bb4/go.mod h1:jJ57K6gSWd91VN4djpZkiMVwK6gcyfeH4XE8wZrZaV4=
golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20190620200207-3b0461eec859/go.mod h1:z5CRVTTTmAJ677TzLLGU+0bjPO0LkuOLi4/5GtJWs/s=
golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20210226172049-e18ecbb05110/go.mod h1:m0MpNAwzfU5UDzcl9v0D8zg8gWTRqZa9RBIspLL5mdg=
golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20220722155237-a158d28d115b/go.mod h1:XRhObCWvk6IyKnWLug+ECip1KBveYUHfp+8e9klMJ9c=
golang.org/x/net v0.25.0 h1:d/OCCoBEUq33pjydKrGQhw7IlUPI2Oylr+8qLx49kac=
golang.org/x/net v0.25.0/go.mod h1:JkAGAh7GEvH74S6FOH42FLoXpXbE/aqXSrIQjXgsiwM=
golang.org/x/net v0.56.0 h1:Rw8j/hFzGvJUZwNBXnAtf5sVDVt+65SK2C7IxCxZt5o=
golang.org/x/net v0.56.0/go.mod h1:D3Ku6r+V6JROoZK144D2XfMHFcMq/0zSfLelVTCFKec=
golang.org/x/oauth2 v0.36.0 h1:peZ/1z27fi9hUOFCAZaHyrpWG5lwe0RJEEEeH0ThlIs=
golang.org/x/oauth2 v0.36.0/go.mod h1:YDBUJMTkDnJS+A4BP4eZBjCqtokkg1hODuPjwiGPO7Q=
golang.org/x/sync v0.0.0-20190423024810-112230192c58/go.mod h1:RxMgew5VJxzue5/jJTE5uejpjVlOe/izrB70Jof72aM=
golang.org/x/sync v0.0.0-20220722155255-886fb9371eb4/go.mod h1:RxMgew5VJxzue5/jJTE5uejpjVlOe/izrB70Jof72aM=
golang.org/x/sync v0.11.0 h1:GGz8+XQP4FvTTrjZPzNKTMFtSXH80RAzG+5ghFPgK9w=
golang.org/x/sync v0.11.0/go.mod h1:Czt+wKu1gCyEFDUtn0jG5QVvpJ6rzVqr5aXyt9drQfk=
golang.org/x/sync v0.22.0 h1:SZjpbeLmrCk4xhRSZFNZW5gFUeCeFgjekvI/+gfScek=
golang.org/x/sync v0.22.0/go.mod h1:9xrNwdLfx4jkKbNva9FpL6vEN7evnE43NNNJQ2LF3+0=
golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20190215142949-d0b11bdaac8a/go.mod h1:STP8DvDyc/dI5b8T5hshtkjS+E42TnysNCUPdjciGhY=
golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20190422165155-953cdadca894/go.mod h1:h1NjWce9XRLGQEsW7wpKNCjG9DtNlClVuFLEZdDNbEs=
golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20201119102817-f84b799fce68/go.mod h1:h1NjWce9XRLGQEsW7wpKNCjG9DtNlClVuFLEZdDNbEs=
@@ -133,16 +173,16 @@ golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20210615035016-665e8c7367d1/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBc
golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20220520151302-bc2c85ada10a/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBck5+mAzfO9JrbApNNgaTdGDITg=
golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20220722155257-8c9f86f7a55f/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBck5+mAzfO9JrbApNNgaTdGDITg=
golang.org/x/sys v0.6.0/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBck5+mAzfO9JrbApNNgaTdGDITg=
golang.org/x/sys v0.30.0 h1:QjkSwP/36a20jFYWkSue1YwXzLmsV5Gfq7Eiy72C1uc=
golang.org/x/sys v0.30.0/go.mod h1:/VUhepiaJMQUp4+oa/7Zr1D23ma6VTLIYjOOTFZPUcA=
golang.org/x/sys v0.47.0 h1:o7XGOvZQCADBQQ4Y7VNq2dRWQR7JmOUW8Kxx4ZsNgWs=
golang.org/x/sys v0.47.0/go.mod h1:4GL1E5IUh+htKOUEOaiffhrAeqysfVGipDYzABqnCmw=
golang.org/x/term v0.0.0-20201126162022-7de9c90e9dd1/go.mod h1:bj7SfCRtBDWHUb9snDiAeCFNEtKQo2Wmx5Cou7ajbmo=
golang.org/x/term v0.0.0-20210927222741-03fcf44c2211/go.mod h1:jbD1KX2456YbFQfuXm/mYQcufACuNUgVhRMnK/tPxf8=
golang.org/x/text v0.3.0/go.mod h1:NqM8EUOU14njkJ3fqMW+pc6Ldnwhi/IjpwHt7yyuwOQ=
golang.org/x/text v0.3.3/go.mod h1:5Zoc/QRtKVWzQhOtBMvqHzDpF6irO9z98xDceosuGiQ=
golang.org/x/text v0.3.7/go.mod h1:u+2+/6zg+i71rQMx5EYifcz6MCKuco9NR6JIITiCfzQ=
golang.org/x/text v0.3.8/go.mod h1:E6s5w1FMmriuDzIBO73fBruAKo1PCIq6d2Q6DHfQ8WQ=
golang.org/x/text v0.22.0 h1:bofq7m3/HAFvbF51jz3Q9wLg3jkvSPuiZu/pD1XwgtM=
golang.org/x/text v0.22.0/go.mod h1:YRoo4H8PVmsu+E3Ou7cqLVH8oXWIHVoX0jqUWALQhfY=
golang.org/x/text v0.40.0 h1:Ub2Z6/xjgF1WrYQz2nuITOEegKFtiIy+rieRJ5lHZKs=
golang.org/x/text v0.40.0/go.mod h1:hpnzDAfGV753zIKo+wk3u1bVKCGPbrnF7+7LBF/UHVY=
golang.org/x/tools v0.0.0-20180917221912-90fa682c2a6e/go.mod h1:n7NCudcB/nEzxVGmLbDWY5pfWTLqBcC2KZ6jyYvM4mQ=
golang.org/x/tools v0.0.0-20191119224855-298f0cb1881e/go.mod h1:b+2E5dAYhXwXZwtnZ6UAqBI28+e2cm9otk0dWdXHAEo=
golang.org/x/tools v0.1.12/go.mod h1:hNGJHUnrk76NpqgfD5Aqm5Crs+Hm0VOH/i9J2+nxYbc=
@@ -153,10 +193,14 @@ google.golang.org/grpc v1.64.0 h1:KH3VH9y/MgNQg1dE7b3XfVK0GsPSIzJwdF617gUSbvY=
google.golang.org/grpc v1.64.0/go.mod h1:oxjF8E3FBnjp+/gVFYdWacaLDx9na1aqy9oovLpxQYg=
google.golang.org/protobuf v1.34.2 h1:6xV6lTsCfpGD21XK49h7MhtcApnLqkfYgPcdHftf6hg=
google.golang.org/protobuf v1.34.2/go.mod h1:qYOHts0dSfpeUzUFpOMr/WGzszTmLH+DiWniOlNbLDw=
gopkg.in/check.v1 v0.0.0-20161208181325-20d25e280405 h1:yhCVgyC4o1eVCa2tZl7eS0r+SDo693bJlVdllGtEeKM=
gopkg.in/check.v1 v0.0.0-20161208181325-20d25e280405/go.mod h1:Co6ibVJAznAaIkqp8huTwlJQCZ016jof/cbN4VW5Yz0=
gopkg.in/check.v1 v1.0.0-20200227125254-8fa46927fb4f h1:BLraFXnmrev5lT+xlilqcH8XK9/i0At2xKjWk4p6zsU=
gopkg.in/check.v1 v1.0.0-20200227125254-8fa46927fb4f/go.mod h1:Co6ibVJAznAaIkqp8huTwlJQCZ016jof/cbN4VW5Yz0=
gopkg.in/yaml.v2 v2.2.2/go.mod h1:hI93XBmqTisBFMUTm0b8Fm+jr3Dg1NNxqwp+5A1VGuI=
gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.0-20200313102051-9f266ea9e77c/go.mod h1:K4uyk7z7BCEPqu6E+C64Yfv1cQ7kz7rIZviUmN+EgEM=
gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1 h1:fxVm/GzAzEWqLHuvctI91KS9hhNmmWOoWu0XTYJS7CA=
gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1/go.mod h1:K4uyk7z7BCEPqu6E+C64Yfv1cQ7kz7rIZviUmN+EgEM=
nullprogram.com/x/optparse v1.0.0/go.mod h1:KdyPE+Igbe0jQUrVfMqDMeJQIJZEuyV7pjYmp6pbG50=
oras.land/oras-go/v2 v2.6.2 h1:N04RXngAp1LJKTG6ifz3xHPipasEkWr+hFmInja5YKo=
oras.land/oras-go/v2 v2.6.2/go.mod h1:PlTtg4JTDJkDe8yVHpM2wz7/YDc00GVas+i4jAW2TZ4=
rsc.io/pdf v0.1.1/go.mod h1:n8OzWcQ6Sp37PL01nO98y4iUCRdTGarVfzxY20ICaU4=
+305
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,305 @@
package api
import (
"errors"
"net/http"
"gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/mrhid6/vantage/server/internal/auth"
"gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/mrhid6/vantage/server/internal/models"
"gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/mrhid6/vantage/server/internal/services"
"github.com/coreos/go-oidc/v3/oidc"
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
"go.mongodb.org/mongo-driver/v2/mongo"
)
type authProviderView struct {
models.AuthProvider
ClientSecretSet bool `json:"client_secret_set"`
CallbackURL string `json:"callback_url"`
}
func viewOf(c *gin.Context, p models.AuthProvider) authProviderView {
return authProviderView{
AuthProvider: p,
ClientSecretSet: p.ClientSecretEnc != "",
CallbackURL: auth.CallbackURL(c, p.ProviderID),
}
}
// listAuthPresets godoc
//
// @Summary List SSO presets
// @Description Preset providers (Entra, Google, Okta, GitHub) that expand to a real issuer on save.
// @Tags auth-providers
// @Produce json
// @Success 200 {array} auth.Preset
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /auth/presets [get]
func listAuthPresets(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, auth.Presets())
}
// listAuthProviders godoc
//
// @Summary List SSO providers
// @Tags auth-providers
// @Produce json
// @Success 200 {array} authProviderView
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /auth/providers [get]
func listAuthProviders(c *gin.Context) {
providers, err := services.ListAuthProviders(auth.InstanceID(c))
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
out := make([]authProviderView, 0, len(providers))
for _, p := range providers {
out = append(out, viewOf(c, p))
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, out)
}
// createAuthProvider godoc
//
// @Summary Create an SSO provider
// @Tags auth-providers
// @Accept json
// @Produce json
// @Param body body object{name=string,preset=string,issuer_input=string,client_id=string,client_secret=string,enabled=bool} true "Provider parameters"
// @Success 201 {object} authProviderView
// @Failure 400 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /auth/providers [post]
func createAuthProvider(c *gin.Context) {
var body struct {
Name string `json:"name"`
Preset string `json:"preset"`
IssuerInput string `json:"issuer_input"`
ClientID string `json:"client_id"`
ClientSecret string `json:"client_secret"`
Enabled bool `json:"enabled"`
}
if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&body); err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
issuer, err := auth.ExpandIssuer(body.Preset, body.IssuerInput)
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
instanceID := auth.InstanceID(c)
p, err := services.CreateAuthProvider(&models.AuthProvider{
InstanceID: instanceID,
Name: body.Name,
Kind: auth.KindFor(body.Preset),
Preset: body.Preset,
Issuer: issuer,
ClientID: body.ClientID,
Scopes: auth.DefaultScopes(body.Preset),
Enabled: body.Enabled,
}, body.ClientSecret)
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
services.LogEvent(instanceID, "auth_provider.create", actorFromCtx(c), "", "", p.Name)
c.JSON(http.StatusCreated, viewOf(c, *p))
}
// updateAuthProvider godoc
//
// @Summary Update an SSO provider
// @Tags auth-providers
// @Accept json
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Provider ID"
// @Param body body object{name=string,issuer_input=string,client_id=string,client_secret=string,enabled=bool,order=int} true "Fields to update"
// @Success 200 {object} SavedResponse
// @Failure 400 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 404 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 409 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /auth/providers/{id} [put]
func updateAuthProvider(c *gin.Context) {
var body struct {
Name *string `json:"name"`
IssuerInput *string `json:"issuer_input"`
ClientID *string `json:"client_id"`
ClientSecret *string `json:"client_secret"`
Enabled *bool `json:"enabled"`
Order *int `json:"order"`
}
if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&body); err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
instanceID := auth.InstanceID(c)
providerID := c.Param("id")
existing, err := services.GetAuthProvider(instanceID, providerID)
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusNotFound, gin.H{"error": "provider not found"})
return
}
if err := guardProviderChange(instanceID, existing, body.Enabled, false); err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, services.ErrLockout) {
c.JSON(http.StatusConflict, gin.H{"error": err.Error(), "code": "last_provider"})
return
}
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
in := services.AuthProviderUpdate{
Name: body.Name, ClientID: body.ClientID,
ClientSecret: body.ClientSecret, Enabled: body.Enabled, Order: body.Order,
}
if body.IssuerInput != nil {
issuer, err := auth.ExpandIssuer(existing.Preset, *body.IssuerInput)
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
in.Issuer = &issuer
}
if err := services.UpdateAuthProvider(instanceID, providerID, in); err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, mongo.ErrNoDocuments) {
c.JSON(http.StatusNotFound, gin.H{"error": "provider not found"})
return
}
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
// Issuer, client ID or secret may have changed; the cached discovery
// document was built from the old ones.
auth.EvictProvider(providerID)
services.LogEvent(instanceID, "auth_provider.update", actorFromCtx(c), "", "", existing.Name)
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, SavedResponse{Saved: true})
}
// deleteAuthProvider godoc
//
// @Summary Delete an SSO provider
// @Description Refused when the instance would be left with no way in (no local login and no other enabled provider).
// @Tags auth-providers
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Provider ID"
// @Success 200 {object} DeletedResponse
// @Failure 404 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 409 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /auth/providers/{id} [delete]
func deleteAuthProvider(c *gin.Context) {
instanceID := auth.InstanceID(c)
providerID := c.Param("id")
existing, err := services.GetAuthProvider(instanceID, providerID)
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusNotFound, gin.H{"error": "provider not found"})
return
}
if err := guardProviderChange(instanceID, existing, nil, true); err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, services.ErrLockout) {
c.JSON(http.StatusConflict, gin.H{"error": err.Error(), "code": "last_provider"})
return
}
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
if err := services.DeleteAuthProvider(instanceID, providerID); err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
auth.EvictProvider(providerID)
services.LogEvent(instanceID, "auth_provider.delete", actorFromCtx(c), "", "", existing.Name)
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, DeletedResponse{Deleted: true})
}
// guardProviderChange asks whether the instance would still have a way in.
// Deleting and disabling reach the same condition, so they share one answer.
func guardProviderChange(instanceID string, existing *models.AuthProvider, enabled *bool, deleting bool) error {
losing := deleting || (enabled != nil && !*enabled)
if !losing || !existing.Enabled {
return nil
}
n, err := services.CountEnabledAuthProviders(instanceID)
if err != nil {
return err
}
return services.CheckLockout(services.IsLocalLoginEnabled(instanceID), n-1)
}
// ackAuthProviderNotice godoc
//
// @Summary Acknowledge a provider migration notice
// @Tags auth-providers
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Provider ID"
// @Success 200 {object} AcknowledgedResponse
// @Failure 404 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /auth/providers/{id}/ack-notice [post]
func ackAuthProviderNotice(c *gin.Context) {
instanceID := auth.InstanceID(c)
providerID := c.Param("id")
existing, err := services.GetAuthProvider(instanceID, providerID)
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusNotFound, gin.H{"error": "provider not found"})
return
}
if err := services.AckAuthProviderNotice(instanceID, providerID); err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
services.LogEvent(instanceID, "auth_provider.ack_notice", actorFromCtx(c), "", "", existing.Name)
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, AcknowledgedResponse{Acknowledged: true})
}
// testAuthProvider godoc
//
// @Summary Test an SSO provider's reachability
// @Description Proves the configuration is reachable. It signs nobody in.
// @Tags auth-providers
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Provider ID"
// @Success 200 {object} TestProviderResponse
// @Failure 404 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /auth/providers/{id}/test [post]
func testAuthProvider(c *gin.Context) {
instanceID := auth.InstanceID(c)
p, err := services.GetAuthProvider(instanceID, c.Param("id"))
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusNotFound, gin.H{"error": "provider not found"})
return
}
if p.Kind == models.KindOAuth2 {
// GitHub has no discovery document. The only meaningful check without
// a user token is that credentials are present.
if p.ClientID == "" || p.ClientSecretEnc == "" {
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, TestProviderResponse{OK: false, Message: "client ID and secret are required"})
return
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, TestProviderResponse{OK: true, Message: "credentials are configured"})
return
}
if _, err := oidc.NewProvider(c.Request.Context(), p.Issuer); err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, TestProviderResponse{OK: false, Message: err.Error()})
return
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, TestProviderResponse{OK: true, Message: "discovery document fetched"})
}
+80 -10
View File
@@ -3,9 +3,10 @@ package api
import (
"net/http"
"gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/mrhid6/vantage/server/internal/auth"
"gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/mrhid6/vantage/server/internal/models"
"gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/mrhid6/vantage/server/internal/services"
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
"github.com/mrhid6/vantage/server/internal/models"
"github.com/mrhid6/vantage/server/internal/services"
"go.mongodb.org/mongo-driver/v2/bson"
)
@@ -17,15 +18,46 @@ func registerChannelRoutes(g *gin.RouterGroup) {
g.POST("/channels/:id/test", testChannel)
}
// listChannels godoc
//
// @Summary List notification channels
// @Tags channels
// @Produce json
// @Success 200 {array} models.NotificationChannel
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /channels [get]
func listChannels(c *gin.Context) {
channels, err := services.ListChannels()
channels, err := services.ListChannels(auth.InstanceID(c))
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, channels)
// Redacted here rather than in the service: the dispatchers read the same
// documents and need the real credentials, so the masking belongs to the
// boundary that hands them to a client.
out := make([]models.NotificationChannel, 0, len(channels))
for _, ch := range channels {
out = append(out, ch.Redacted())
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, out)
}
// createChannel godoc
//
// @Summary Create a notification channel
// @Tags channels
// @Accept json
// @Produce json
// @Param body body models.NotificationChannel true "Channel to create"
// @Success 201 {object} models.NotificationChannel
// @Failure 400 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 403 {object} LimitExceededResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /channels [post]
func createChannel(c *gin.Context) {
var ch models.NotificationChannel
if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&ch); err != nil {
@@ -36,14 +68,31 @@ func createChannel(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "name and type are required"})
return
}
created, err := services.CreateChannel(&ch)
created, err := services.CreateChannel(auth.InstanceID(c), &ch)
if err != nil {
if limitStatus(c, err) {
return
}
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
c.JSON(http.StatusCreated, created)
c.JSON(http.StatusCreated, created.Redacted())
}
// updateChannel godoc
//
// @Summary Update a notification channel
// @Tags channels
// @Accept json
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Channel ID"
// @Param body body object{name=string,type=string,config=map[string]string,enabled=bool} true "Fields to update"
// @Success 204
// @Failure 400 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /channels/{id} [put]
func updateChannel(c *gin.Context) {
var body struct {
Name *string `json:"name"`
@@ -72,25 +121,46 @@ func updateChannel(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "no fields to update"})
return
}
if err := services.UpdateChannel(c.Param("id"), upd); err != nil {
if err := services.UpdateChannel(auth.InstanceID(c), c.Param("id"), upd); err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
c.Status(http.StatusNoContent)
}
// deleteChannel godoc
//
// @Summary Delete a notification channel
// @Tags channels
// @Param id path string true "Channel ID"
// @Success 204
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /channels/{id} [delete]
func deleteChannel(c *gin.Context) {
if err := services.DeleteChannel(c.Param("id")); err != nil {
if err := services.DeleteChannel(auth.InstanceID(c), c.Param("id")); err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
c.Status(http.StatusNoContent)
}
// testChannel godoc
//
// @Summary Send a test notification
// @Tags channels
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Channel ID"
// @Success 200 {object} StatusResponse
// @Failure 502 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /channels/{id}/test [post]
func testChannel(c *gin.Context) {
if err := services.TestChannel(c.Param("id")); err != nil {
if err := services.TestChannel(auth.InstanceID(c), c.Param("id")); err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadGateway, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"status": "sent"})
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, StatusResponse{Status: "sent"})
}
+163 -31
View File
@@ -1,20 +1,37 @@
package api
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"log"
"net"
"net/http"
"os"
"strconv"
"time"
"gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/mrhid6/vantage/server/internal/auth"
"gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/mrhid6/vantage/server/internal/services"
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
"github.com/mrhid6/vantage/server/internal/services"
"github.com/wwt/guac"
)
// POST /api/console/connect
// Body: { server_id, protocol, key_id?, rdp_username?, rdp_password? }
// Returns: { session_id, token, ws_path }
// consoleConnect godoc
//
// @Summary Open a browser console session
// @Description Mints a one-time session token for the /console/tunnel websocket. Requires a live agent — answers 409 agent_offline otherwise.
// @Tags console
// @Accept json
// @Produce json
// @Param body body object{server_id=string,protocol=string,key_id=string,rdp_username=string,rdp_password=string,ssh_username=string} true "Session parameters"
// @Success 200 {object} ConsoleConnectResponse
// @Failure 400 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 404 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 409 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /console/connect [post]
func consoleConnect(c *gin.Context) {
var body struct {
ServerID string `json:"server_id" binding:"required"`
@@ -29,13 +46,22 @@ func consoleConnect(c *gin.Context) {
return
}
srv, err := services.GetServer(body.ServerID)
srv, err := services.GetServer(auth.InstanceID(c), body.ServerID)
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusNotFound, gin.H{"error": "server not found"})
return
}
sess, err := services.CreateConsoleSession(body.ServerID, body.Protocol, body.KeyID, actorFromCtx(c), c.ClientIP())
if srv.Status != "active" {
c.JSON(http.StatusConflict, gin.H{
"error": "agent_offline",
"message": "The agent on this server is not connected. " +
"Console sessions are relayed by the agent, so it must be online.",
})
return
}
sess, err := services.CreateConsoleSession(auth.InstanceID(c), body.ServerID, body.Protocol, body.KeyID, actorFromCtx(c), c.ClientIP())
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
@@ -47,31 +73,29 @@ func consoleConnect(c *gin.Context) {
}
if (body.Protocol == "rdp" || body.Protocol == "vnc") && (body.RDPUsername != "" || body.RDPPassword != "") {
if err := services.StashConsoleRDPCreds(sess.SessionID, body.RDPUsername, body.RDPPassword); err != nil {
if err := services.StashConsoleRDPCreds(auth.InstanceID(c), sess.SessionID, body.RDPUsername, body.RDPPassword); err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
}
if body.Protocol == "ssh" {
if err := services.SetConsoleSSHUser(sess.SessionID, body.SSHUsername); err != nil {
if err := services.SetConsoleSSHUser(auth.InstanceID(c), sess.SessionID, body.SSHUsername); err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
}
services.LogEvent("console.opened", actorFromCtx(c), srv.ServerID, "",
"console session opened ("+body.Protocol+")")
services.LogEvent(auth.InstanceID(c), "console.opened", actorFromCtx(c), srv.ServerID, "",
"console session opened ("+body.Protocol+", agent-relayed)")
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{
"session_id": sess.SessionID,
"token": token,
"ws_path": "/api/console/tunnel",
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, ConsoleConnectResponse{
SessionID: sess.SessionID,
Token: token,
WSPath: "/api/console/tunnel",
})
}
// queryIntDefault reads a positive integer query param, falling back to def
// when absent, unparseable, or non-positive.
func queryIntDefault(r *http.Request, key string, def int) int {
v, err := strconv.Atoi(r.URL.Query().Get(key))
if err != nil || v <= 0 {
@@ -80,60 +104,152 @@ func queryIntDefault(r *http.Request, key string, def int) int {
return v
}
// GET /api/console/tunnel?token=... (WebSocket upgrade)
// consoleTunnel upgrades the browser's WebSocket and joins it to guacd.
//
// Every branch here logs. That is deliberate and worth keeping: this handler
// spans four hops (session store, agent dispatch, relay announcement, guacd),
// any of which can fail, and the client is told the same near-useless thing by
// most of them — a 500 that guacamole then reports as an *upstream* error,
// naming the wrong hop entirely. Without a line per branch the only evidence a
// failure leaves is a GIN status code, and with several replicas you cannot
// even tell which process produced it.
//
// Lines are prefixed with the session ID so one attempt can be followed across
// pods, and the pod's own hostname so it is obvious which one served it.
// consoleTunnel godoc
//
// @Summary Console websocket tunnel
// @Description Upgrades the browser's connection to a websocket and joins it to guacd, relayed through the agent. Consumes the one-time session token from /console/connect.
// @Tags console
// @Param token query string true "One-time session token"
// @Success 101
// @Failure 401 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 403 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 404 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 409 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /console/tunnel [get]
func consoleTunnel(c *gin.Context) {
host, _ := os.Hostname()
token := c.Query("token")
sessionID, err := services.VerifySessionToken(token)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("console[%s]: reject: invalid session token: %v", host, err)
c.JSON(http.StatusUnauthorized, gin.H{"error": "invalid token"})
return
}
sess, err := services.GetConsoleSession(sessionID)
// Bound to the session from here on, so every later line correlates.
tlog := func(format string, args ...any) {
log.Printf("console[%s %s]: "+format, append([]any{host, sessionID}, args...)...)
}
tlog("tunnel opened by %s", actorFromCtx(c))
instanceID := auth.InstanceID(c)
sess, err := services.GetConsoleSession(instanceID, sessionID)
if err != nil {
tlog("reject: console session not found: %v", err)
c.JSON(http.StatusNotFound, gin.H{"error": "session not found"})
return
}
// User-bound: the caller (authenticated via session cookie) must be the same
// user who opened the session. Blocks a leaked token being used by someone else.
if actor := actorFromCtx(c); actor != sess.User {
tlog("reject: session belongs to %s, not %s", sess.User, actor)
c.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{"error": "session belongs to another user"})
return
}
// Single-use: atomically spend the token so a replay within its TTL is rejected.
if err := services.ConsumeSessionToken(sessionID); err != nil {
if err := services.ConsumeSessionToken(instanceID, sessionID); err != nil {
tlog("reject: token already consumed: %v", err)
c.JSON(http.StatusUnauthorized, gin.H{"error": "token already used"})
return
}
srv, err := services.GetServer(sess.ServerID)
srv, err := services.GetServer(auth.InstanceID(c), sess.ServerID)
if err != nil {
tlog("reject: server %s not found: %v", sess.ServerID, err)
c.JSON(http.StatusNotFound, gin.H{"error": "server not found"})
return
}
tlog("server %s (%s), protocol %s", srv.ServerID, srv.Hostname, sess.Protocol)
// Decrypt private key + passphrase in-memory only (ssh).
var privKey, passphrase string
if sess.Protocol == "ssh" && sess.KeyID != "" {
privKey, err = services.GetPrivateKey(sess.KeyID)
privKey, err = services.GetPrivateKey(auth.InstanceID(c), sess.KeyID)
if err != nil {
tlog("reject: key %s has no private material: %v", sess.KeyID, err)
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "selected key has no private material"})
return
}
passphrase, _ = services.GetPassphrase(sess.KeyID)
tlog("ssh key %s loaded (passphrase=%t)", sess.KeyID, passphrase != "")
}
var rdpUser, rdpPass string
if sess.Protocol == "rdp" || sess.Protocol == "vnc" {
rdpUser, rdpPass, err = services.ConsumeConsoleRDPCreds(sessionID)
rdpUser, rdpPass, err = services.ConsumeConsoleRDPCreds(instanceID, sessionID)
if err != nil {
tlog("reject: could not consume %s credentials: %v", sess.Protocol, err)
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": "could not load credentials"})
return
}
tlog("%s credentials consumed (user=%t)", sess.Protocol, rdpUser != "")
}
gp, err := services.BuildGuacParams(srv, sess.Protocol, sess.SSHUsername, privKey, passphrase, rdpUser, rdpPass)
targetPort, err := services.TargetPort(srv, sess.Protocol)
if err != nil {
tlog("reject: no target port for %s: %v", sess.Protocol, err)
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
tlog("opening relay to %s:%d", srv.ServerID, targetPort)
relay, err := services.OpenConsoleProxy(instanceID, srv.ServerID, targetPort)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, services.ErrAgentOffline) {
tlog("reject: agent offline")
c.JSON(http.StatusConflict, gin.H{"error": "agent_offline"})
return
}
// The client is deliberately told nothing specific, so this is the only
// place the real reason exists — a failed dispatch and a relay that was
// never announced are the same generic 500 to the browser.
tlog("reject: open relay: %v", err)
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": "could not open relay"})
return
}
tlog("relay %s ready at %s:%d", relay.ProxyID, relay.Host, relay.Port)
// guac.WebsocketServer.ServeHTTP returns before installing its
// OnDisconnect handler when the connect callback errors, which is exactly
// the path every relay failure this proxy introduces takes (the agent
// never claims it, dial_refused, guacd never dials, rejected). Emitting
// console.proxy_failed and ending the session here, unconditionally on
// teardown, is what makes those failures reach the audit log at all;
// OnDisconnect below only sees the rarer case of a session that was fully
// established and then failed.
defer func() {
relay.Close()
if reason := relay.Reason(); reason != "" {
tlog("relay %s ended: %s", relay.ProxyID, reason)
services.LogEvent(instanceID, "console.proxy_failed", actorFromCtx(c), srv.ServerID, "",
fmt.Sprintf("console relay failed: %s (proxy_id=%s, port=%d)", reason, relay.ProxyID, relay.Port))
} else {
tlog("relay %s closed cleanly", relay.ProxyID)
}
_ = services.EndConsoleSession(instanceID, sessionID)
tlog("tunnel finished")
}()
services.LogEvent(instanceID, "console.proxy_opened", actorFromCtx(c), srv.ServerID, "",
fmt.Sprintf("console relay opened (proxy_id=%s, port=%d)", relay.ProxyID, relay.Port))
gp, err := services.BuildGuacParams(sess.Protocol, sess.SSHUsername, privKey, passphrase,
rdpUser, rdpPass, relay.Host, relay.Port)
if err != nil {
tlog("reject: build guacd parameters: %v", err)
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
@@ -143,7 +259,6 @@ func consoleTunnel(c *gin.Context) {
guacdAddr = "guacd:4822"
}
// Build a guac tunnel config from our params.
connect := func(r *http.Request) (guac.Tunnel, error) {
config := guac.NewGuacamoleConfiguration()
config.Protocol = gp.Protocol
@@ -154,24 +269,41 @@ func consoleTunnel(c *gin.Context) {
config.OptimalScreenHeight = queryIntDefault(r, "height", 768)
config.OptimalResolution = queryIntDefault(r, "dpi", 96)
// Resolution is logged separately from the dial: a headless guacd
// Service returns pod addresses, and which one was picked is the
// difference between "guacd refused" and "we called the wrong guacd".
addr, err := net.ResolveTCPAddr("tcp", guacdAddr)
if err != nil {
tlog("guacd: resolve %s: %v", guacdAddr, err)
return nil, err
}
tlog("guacd: dialling %s (%s)", guacdAddr, addr.String())
conn, err := net.DialTCP("tcp", nil, addr)
if err != nil {
tlog("guacd: dial %s: %v", addr.String(), err)
return nil, err
}
// The handshake is where guacd connects onward to the relay, so a
// failure here is guacd reporting it could not reach %s:%d — the hop
// that has been hardest to see from either end.
stream := guac.NewStream(conn, guac.SocketTimeout)
if err := stream.Handshake(config); err != nil {
tlog("guacd: handshake for %s to relay %s:%d: %v",
gp.Protocol, relay.Host, relay.Port, err)
return nil, err
}
tlog("guacd: tunnel established (%s %dx%d)",
gp.Protocol, config.OptimalScreenWidth, config.OptimalScreenHeight)
return guac.NewSimpleTunnel(stream), nil
}
// Teardown (proxy_failed audit + EndConsoleSession) lives in the deferred
// func above, not here: this only fires once a tunnel was actually
// established, and letting both paths log would double the audit event.
wsServer := guac.NewWebsocketServer(connect)
wsServer.OnDisconnect = func(id string, r *http.Request, t guac.Tunnel) {
_ = services.EndConsoleSession(sessionID)
}
tlog("serving websocket")
wsServer.ServeHTTP(c.Writer, c.Request)
tlog("websocket returned")
}
+23
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
// Package docs holds the generated OpenAPI document and the vendored Scalar
// bundle that renders it.
//
// openapi.json is generated by `swag init` and committed rather than built into
// the image: server/Dockerfile produces a scratch runtime from a Go build
// stage, and adding codegen there means putting the toolchain in the image.
// server-deploy.yml regenerates and diffs it, so an annotation edited without
// regenerating fails the build.
//
// scalar.standalone.js is vendored from
// https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/@scalar/api-reference@latest/dist/browser/standalone.js
// and refreshed by hand. Fetched at build time it would break an air-gapped
// install; fetched at page load it would break an air-gapped install more
// visibly.
package docs
import _ "embed"
//go:embed openapi.json
var OpenAPI []byte
//go:embed scalar.standalone.js
var ScalarJS []byte
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long
+532 -121
View File
@@ -1,48 +1,75 @@
package api
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"os"
"strconv"
"gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/mrhid6/vantage/server/internal/auth"
"gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/mrhid6/vantage/server/internal/models"
"gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/mrhid6/vantage/server/internal/services"
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
"github.com/mrhid6/vantage/server/internal/auth"
"github.com/mrhid6/vantage/server/internal/models"
"github.com/mrhid6/vantage/server/internal/services"
)
func actorFromCtx(c *gin.Context) string {
if sess := auth.GetSessionFromContext(c); sess != nil && sess.Email != "" {
return sess.Email
sess := auth.GetSessionFromContext(c)
if sess == nil || sess.Email == "" {
return "admin"
}
return "admin"
// The actor stays the human, because a token acts on their behalf and the
// log has to name somebody. The credential is appended so a person clicking
// and their CI job are told apart.
if sess.TokenID != "" {
return fmt.Sprintf("%s (via token:%s)", sess.Email, sess.TokenName)
}
return sess.Email
}
func RegisterRoutes(r *gin.Engine) {
r.GET("/healthz", handleHealthz)
r.GET("/readyz", handleReadyz)
r.GET("/install", handleInstallScript)
r.GET("/install.ps1", handleInstallScriptWindows)
r.GET("/update", handleUpdateScript)
r.GET("/update.ps1", handleUpdateScriptWindows)
// ESO read endpoint — bearer-token auth, not session auth, so Kubernetes
// External Secrets Operator can call it. Lives under /api (so the reverse
// proxy routes it to the backend) but on a distinct subpath to avoid
// colliding with the session-authed GET /api/secrets/:group. Returns a
// group as flat JSON.
r.GET("/api/secrets/:group/values", secretsReadAuth(), esoGetGroup)
// Auth endpoints (no session required)
r.GET("/auth/login", auth.HandleLogin)
r.GET("/auth/callback", auth.HandleCallback)
r.GET("/auth/logout", auth.HandleLogout)
r.GET("/auth/bootstrap-status", auth.HandleBootstrapStatus)
r.POST("/auth/bootstrap", auth.HandleBootstrap)
r.POST("/auth/login", auth.HandleLocalLogin)
r.POST("/auth/logout", auth.HandleLogout)
r.GET("/auth/me", auth.HandleMe)
r.GET("/auth/oidc/:providerId/start", auth.HandleSSOStart)
r.GET("/auth/oidc/:providerId/callback", auth.HandleSSOCallback)
r.GET("/auth/providers", auth.HandleListPublicProviders)
// Completely public: no session, no token, no licence gate. Mounted here
// rather than under /api precisely so that none of those apply.
r.GET("/public/status/:pageId", RateLimitPublicStatus(), getPublicStatusPage)
// API endpoints protected by session middleware
apiGroup := r.Group("/api")
apiGroup.Use(auth.Middleware())
// Scope enforcement sits between authentication and the licence gate, and
// no-ops for cookie sessions. It is mounted here rather than per route so
// a route added later is covered by where it lives, not by memory.
apiGroup.Use(RequireScopes())
apiGroup.Use(RateLimitTokens())
// Deny by default: every non-GET route under /api is gated unless it is on
// the exemption list in licence.go. A route added later is covered because
// of where it is mounted, not because someone remembered.
apiGroup.Use(RequireActiveLicense())
{
apiGroup.GET("/license", getLicence)
apiGroup.POST("/license", auth.RequireRole("owner"), postLicence)
apiGroup.GET("/servers", listServers)
// Static segment, registered alongside /servers/:id exactly as
// /servers/new already is — gin resolves statics ahead of wildcards.
apiGroup.GET("/servers/tags", listKnownTags)
apiGroup.POST("/servers", createServer)
apiGroup.GET("/servers/new", newServer)
apiGroup.POST("/servers/new", newServer)
@@ -51,14 +78,28 @@ func RegisterRoutes(r *gin.Engine) {
apiGroup.POST("/servers/:id/generate-key", generateKey)
apiGroup.POST("/servers/:id/update-agent", updateAgent)
apiGroup.POST("/servers/:id/apply-updates", applyUpdates)
apiGroup.PUT("/servers/:id/tags", putServerTags)
apiGroup.GET("/agent/latest-version", getLatestAgentVersion)
apiGroup.GET("/audit", listAuditEvents)
apiGroup.GET("/settings", getSettings)
apiGroup.PUT("/settings", saveSettings)
apiGroup.POST("/settings/secrets-token", rotateSecretsToken)
apiGroup.GET("/tokens", listTokens)
apiGroup.GET("/tokens/scopes", listTokenScopes)
apiGroup.POST("/tokens", createToken)
apiGroup.DELETE("/tokens/:id", revokeToken)
apiGroup.GET("/openapi.json", getOpenAPI)
apiGroup.GET("/docs", getAPIDocs)
apiGroup.GET("/docs/scalar.js", getScalarJS)
settings := apiGroup.Group("/settings")
settings.Use(auth.RequireRole("owner", "admin"))
{
settings.GET("", getSettings)
settings.PUT("", saveSettings)
settings.POST("/secrets-token", rotateSecretsToken)
}
apiGroup.GET("/secrets", listSecretGroups)
apiGroup.POST("/secrets", createSecretGroup)
@@ -76,17 +117,80 @@ func RegisterRoutes(r *gin.Engine) {
apiGroup.POST("/keys/:id/assign", assignKey)
apiGroup.DELETE("/keys/:id/assign/:serverId", revokeAssignment)
apiGroup.POST("/console/connect", consoleConnect)
apiGroup.GET("/console/tunnel", consoleTunnel)
apiGroup.POST("/console/connect", RequireFeature("console"), consoleConnect)
apiGroup.GET("/console/tunnel", RequireFeature("console"), consoleTunnel)
registerWorkflowRoutes(apiGroup)
registerMonitorRoutes(apiGroup)
registerChannelRoutes(apiGroup)
instance := apiGroup.Group("/instance")
instance.Use(auth.RequireRole("owner", "admin"))
{
instance.GET("/users", listInstanceUsers)
instance.POST("/users", createInstanceUser)
instance.PUT("/users/:id/role", updateInstanceUserRole)
instance.DELETE("/users/:id", deleteInstanceUser)
}
providers := apiGroup.Group("/auth/providers")
providers.Use(auth.RequireRole("owner", "admin"), RequireFeature("oidc"))
{
providers.GET("", listAuthProviders)
providers.POST("", createAuthProvider)
providers.PUT("/:id", updateAuthProvider)
providers.DELETE("/:id", deleteAuthProvider)
providers.POST("/:id/test", testAuthProvider)
providers.POST("/:id/ack-notice", ackAuthProviderNotice)
}
apiGroup.GET("/auth/presets", auth.RequireRole("owner", "admin"), listAuthPresets)
apiGroup.GET("/vulnerabilities", listVulnerabilities)
apiGroup.GET("/vulnerabilities/summary", vulnerabilitySummary)
apiGroup.POST("/vulnerabilities/rescan", auth.RequireRole("owner", "admin"), rescanVulnerabilities)
apiGroup.POST("/vulnerabilities/:id/accept", auth.RequireRole("owner", "admin"), acceptFinding)
apiGroup.DELETE("/vulnerabilities/:id/accept", auth.RequireRole("owner", "admin"), unacceptFinding)
apiGroup.GET("/servers/:id/vulnerabilities", listServerVulnerabilities)
apiGroup.GET("/servers/:id/packages", getServerPackages)
apiGroup.GET("/packages/search", searchPackages)
apiGroup.GET("/vuln-rules", listVulnRules)
apiGroup.POST("/vuln-rules", auth.RequireRole("owner", "admin"), createVulnRule)
apiGroup.PUT("/vuln-rules/:id", auth.RequireRole("owner", "admin"), updateVulnRule)
apiGroup.DELETE("/vuln-rules/:id", auth.RequireRole("owner", "admin"), deleteVulnRule)
// Control actions and log reads are owner|admin: container output is
// arbitrary and cannot be masked, so a member who can see the fleet
// still cannot read its logs.
apiGroup.GET("/workloads", listWorkloads)
apiGroup.GET("/servers/:id/workloads", getServerWorkloads)
apiGroup.POST("/servers/:id/workloads/refresh", refreshServerWorkloads)
apiGroup.POST("/servers/:id/workloads/:wid/action", auth.RequireRole("owner", "admin"), controlWorkload)
apiGroup.GET("/servers/:id/workloads/:wid/logs", auth.RequireRole("owner", "admin"), getWorkloadLogs)
registerStatusPageRoutes(apiGroup)
}
}
// listServers godoc
//
// @Summary List servers
// @Description Returns every server in the instance, optionally filtered by tag (repeatable, key:value).
// @Tags servers
// @Produce json
// @Param tag query []string false "Filter by tag as key:value, repeatable"
// @Success 200 {array} models.Server
// @Failure 400 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /servers [get]
func listServers(c *gin.Context) {
servers, err := services.ListServers()
sel, err := services.ParseTagFilters(c.QueryArray("tag"))
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
servers, err := services.ListServersFiltered(auth.InstanceID(c), sel)
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
@@ -94,35 +198,127 @@ func listServers(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, servers)
}
func createServer(c *gin.Context) {
s, token, err := services.CreateServer()
// listKnownTags godoc
//
// @Summary List known tags
// @Description Returns every tag key currently used by any server, with the values seen for each.
// @Tags servers
// @Produce json
// @Success 200 {object} map[string][]string
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /servers/tags [get]
func listKnownTags(c *gin.Context) {
tags, err := services.KnownTags(auth.InstanceID(c))
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
c.JSON(http.StatusCreated, gin.H{
"server": s,
"token": token,
"server_id": s.ServerID,
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, tags)
}
// putServerTags godoc
//
// @Summary Replace a server's tags
// @Description Replaces the whole tag map for a server. Last write wins.
// @Tags servers
// @Accept json
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Server ID"
// @Param body body object{tags=map[string]string} true "New tag map"
// @Success 200 {object} TagsResponse
// @Failure 400 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 404 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /servers/{id}/tags [put]
func putServerTags(c *gin.Context) {
var body struct {
Tags map[string]string `json:"tags"`
}
if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&body); err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "invalid body"})
return
}
instanceID := auth.InstanceID(c)
serverID := c.Param("id")
before, err := services.GetServer(instanceID, serverID)
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusNotFound, gin.H{"error": "server not found"})
return
}
if err := services.SetServerTags(instanceID, serverID, body.Tags); err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, services.ErrInvalidTag) {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
services.LogEvent(instanceID, "server.tags_updated", actorFromCtx(c), serverID, "",
fmt.Sprintf("tags %v -> %v", before.Tags, body.Tags))
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, TagsResponse{Tags: body.Tags})
}
// createServer godoc
//
// @Summary Add a server
// @Description Creates a server record and a single-use pre-registration token (TTL 1 hour).
// @Tags servers
// @Produce json
// @Success 201 {object} CreateServerResponse
// @Failure 403 {object} LimitExceededResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /servers [post]
func createServer(c *gin.Context) {
s, token, err := services.CreateServer(auth.InstanceID(c))
if err != nil {
if limitStatus(c, err) {
return
}
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
c.JSON(http.StatusCreated, CreateServerResponse{
Server: s,
Token: token,
ServerID: s.ServerID,
})
}
// newServer godoc
//
// @Summary Add a server (install page)
// @Description Identical to POST /servers; also reachable by GET for the install page. Mints a new pre-registration token.
// @Tags servers
// @Produce json
// @Success 200 {object} NewServerResponse
// @Failure 403 {object} LimitExceededResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /servers/new [get]
// @Router /servers/new [post]
func newServer(c *gin.Context) {
s, token, err := services.CreateServer()
s, token, err := services.CreateServer(auth.InstanceID(c))
if err != nil {
if limitStatus(c, err) {
return
}
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
services.LogEvent("server.created", actorFromCtx(c), s.ServerID, "", "pre-registration token issued")
services.LogEvent(auth.InstanceID(c), "server.created", actorFromCtx(c), s.ServerID, "", "pre-registration token issued")
giteaHost := os.Getenv("GITEA_HOST")
if giteaHost == "" {
giteaHost = "gitea.example.com"
}
host := os.Getenv("PUBLIC_HOST")
if host == "" {
host = "https://vantage.example.com"
}
host := publicHostFromRequest(c)
installCmd := fmt.Sprintf(
`curl -fsSL "%s/install?server_id=%s&token=%s" | bash`,
@@ -134,39 +330,57 @@ func newServer(c *gin.Context) {
host, s.ServerID, token,
)
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{
"server_id": s.ServerID,
"pre_reg_token": token,
"install_command": installCmd,
"install_command_ps": installCmdPS,
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, NewServerResponse{
ServerID: s.ServerID,
PreRegToken: token,
InstallCommand: installCmd,
InstallCommandPS: installCmdPS,
})
}
// getServer godoc
//
// @Summary Get a server
// @Description Returns a server together with its resolved key assignments.
// @Tags servers
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Server ID"
// @Success 200 {object} ServerDetailResponse
// @Failure 404 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /servers/{id} [get]
func getServer(c *gin.Context) {
id := c.Param("id")
s, err := services.GetServer(id)
s, err := services.GetServer(auth.InstanceID(c), id)
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusNotFound, gin.H{"error": "server not found"})
return
}
assignments, _ := services.GetAssignmentsWithKeysForServer(id)
assignments, _ := services.GetAssignmentsWithKeysForServer(auth.InstanceID(c), id)
// Build response matching ServerWithKeys shape expected by frontend
type serverResponse struct {
*models.Server
Keys interface{} `json:"keys"`
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, serverResponse{
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, ServerDetailResponse{
Server: s,
Keys: assignments,
})
}
// deleteServer godoc
//
// @Summary Delete a server
// @Tags servers
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Server ID"
// @Success 200 {object} DeletedResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /servers/{id} [delete]
func deleteServer(c *gin.Context) {
id := c.Param("id")
s, _ := services.GetServer(id)
if err := services.DeleteServer(id); err != nil {
s, _ := services.GetServer(auth.InstanceID(c), id)
if err := services.DeleteServer(auth.InstanceID(c), id); err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
@@ -174,10 +388,25 @@ func deleteServer(c *gin.Context) {
if s != nil {
hostname = s.Hostname
}
services.LogEvent("server.deleted", actorFromCtx(c), id, "", fmt.Sprintf("server %s deleted", hostname))
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"deleted": true})
services.LogEvent(auth.InstanceID(c), "server.deleted", actorFromCtx(c), id, "", fmt.Sprintf("server %s deleted", hostname))
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, DeletedResponse{Deleted: true})
}
// generateKey godoc
//
// @Summary Generate a key on a server
// @Description Dispatches an agent command that generates a keypair on the target server and reports it back.
// @Tags keys
// @Accept json
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Server ID"
// @Param body body object{label=string,key_type=string,key_size=int,passphrase=string,comment=string} false "Key generation parameters"
// @Success 202 {object} GenerateKeyResponse
// @Failure 404 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 503 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /servers/{id}/generate-key [post]
func generateKey(c *gin.Context) {
id := c.Param("id")
@@ -193,7 +422,7 @@ func generateKey(c *gin.Context) {
body.Label = "generated"
}
s, err := services.GetServer(id)
s, err := services.GetServer(auth.InstanceID(c), id)
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusNotFound, gin.H{"error": "server not found"})
return
@@ -211,16 +440,26 @@ func generateKey(c *gin.Context) {
return
}
services.LogEvent("key.generation_dispatched", actorFromCtx(c), s.ServerID, "", fmt.Sprintf("key generation dispatched (label=%s type=%s)", body.Label, body.KeyType))
c.JSON(http.StatusAccepted, gin.H{
"message": "key generation command sent to agent",
"command_id": cmdID,
"server_id": s.ServerID,
services.LogEvent(auth.InstanceID(c), "key.generation_dispatched", actorFromCtx(c), s.ServerID, "", fmt.Sprintf("key generation dispatched (label=%s type=%s)", body.Label, body.KeyType))
c.JSON(http.StatusAccepted, GenerateKeyResponse{
Message: "key generation command sent to agent",
CommandID: cmdID,
ServerID: s.ServerID,
})
}
// listKeys godoc
//
// @Summary List keys
// @Tags keys
// @Produce json
// @Success 200 {array} models.Key
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /keys [get]
func listKeys(c *gin.Context) {
keys, err := services.ListKeys()
keys, err := services.ListKeys(auth.InstanceID(c))
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
@@ -228,6 +467,19 @@ func listKeys(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, keys)
}
// createKey godoc
//
// @Summary Upload a key
// @Tags keys
// @Accept json
// @Produce json
// @Param body body object{label=string,public_key=string,private_key=string,passphrase=string} true "Key material"
// @Success 201 {object} models.Key
// @Failure 400 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /keys [post]
func createKey(c *gin.Context) {
var body struct {
Label string `json:"label" binding:"required"`
@@ -240,49 +492,80 @@ func createKey(c *gin.Context) {
return
}
key, err := services.CreateKey(body.Label, body.PublicKey, "uploaded", "", body.PrivateKey, body.Passphrase)
key, err := services.CreateKey(auth.InstanceID(c), body.Label, body.PublicKey, "uploaded", "", body.PrivateKey, body.Passphrase)
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
services.LogEvent("key.uploaded", actorFromCtx(c), "", key.KeyID, fmt.Sprintf("key '%s' uploaded", key.Label))
services.LogEvent(auth.InstanceID(c), "key.uploaded", actorFromCtx(c), "", key.KeyID, fmt.Sprintf("key '%s' uploaded", key.Label))
c.JSON(http.StatusCreated, key)
}
// getPrivateKey godoc
//
// @Summary Get a key's private material
// @Description Returns the decrypted private key. Reading is a keys:read action even though the material is sensitive.
// @Tags keys
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Key ID"
// @Success 200 {object} PrivateKeyResponse
// @Failure 404 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /keys/{id}/private-key [get]
func getPrivateKey(c *gin.Context) {
id := c.Param("id")
plaintext, err := services.GetPrivateKey(id)
plaintext, err := services.GetPrivateKey(auth.InstanceID(c), id)
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusNotFound, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"private_key": plaintext})
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, PrivateKeyResponse{PrivateKey: plaintext})
}
// getKey godoc
//
// @Summary Get a key
// @Description Returns a key together with the servers it is assigned to.
// @Tags keys
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Key ID"
// @Success 200 {object} KeyDetailResponse
// @Failure 404 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /keys/{id} [get]
func getKey(c *gin.Context) {
id := c.Param("id")
key, err := services.GetKey(id)
key, err := services.GetKey(auth.InstanceID(c), id)
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusNotFound, gin.H{"error": "key not found"})
return
}
assignments, _ := services.GetAssignmentsWithServers(id)
assignments, _ := services.GetAssignmentsWithServers(auth.InstanceID(c), id)
type keyResponse struct {
*models.Key
Assignments any `json:"assignments"`
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, keyResponse{
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, KeyDetailResponse{
Key: key,
Assignments: assignments,
})
}
// deleteKey godoc
//
// @Summary Delete a key
// @Tags keys
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Key ID"
// @Success 200 {object} DeletedResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /keys/{id} [delete]
func deleteKey(c *gin.Context) {
id := c.Param("id")
k, _ := services.GetKey(id)
if err := services.DeleteKey(id); err != nil {
k, _ := services.GetKey(auth.InstanceID(c), id)
if err := services.DeleteKey(auth.InstanceID(c), id); err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
@@ -290,10 +573,24 @@ func deleteKey(c *gin.Context) {
if k != nil {
label = k.Label
}
services.LogEvent("key.deleted", actorFromCtx(c), "", id, fmt.Sprintf("key '%s' deleted", label))
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"deleted": true})
services.LogEvent(auth.InstanceID(c), "key.deleted", actorFromCtx(c), "", id, fmt.Sprintf("key '%s' deleted", label))
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, DeletedResponse{Deleted: true})
}
// assignKey godoc
//
// @Summary Assign a key to a server
// @Tags keys
// @Accept json
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Key ID"
// @Param body body object{server_id=string} true "Target server"
// @Success 201 {object} models.Assignment
// @Failure 400 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /keys/{id}/assign [post]
func assignKey(c *gin.Context) {
keyID := c.Param("id")
var body struct {
@@ -304,39 +601,76 @@ func assignKey(c *gin.Context) {
return
}
a, err := services.AssignKey(keyID, body.ServerID)
a, err := services.AssignKey(auth.InstanceID(c), keyID, body.ServerID)
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
services.LogEvent("key.assigned", actorFromCtx(c), body.ServerID, keyID, fmt.Sprintf("key %s assigned to server %s", keyID, body.ServerID))
services.LogEvent(auth.InstanceID(c), "key.assigned", actorFromCtx(c), body.ServerID, keyID, fmt.Sprintf("key %s assigned to server %s", keyID, body.ServerID))
c.JSON(http.StatusCreated, a)
}
// revokeAssignment godoc
//
// @Summary Revoke a key assignment
// @Description Soft revocation: sets revoked_at rather than deleting, preserving audit history.
// @Tags keys
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Key ID"
// @Param serverId path string true "Server ID"
// @Success 200 {object} RevokedResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /keys/{id}/assign/{serverId} [delete]
func revokeAssignment(c *gin.Context) {
keyID := c.Param("id")
serverID := c.Param("serverId")
if err := services.RevokeAssignment(keyID, serverID); err != nil {
if err := services.RevokeAssignment(auth.InstanceID(c), keyID, serverID); err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
services.LogEvent("key.revoked", actorFromCtx(c), serverID, keyID, fmt.Sprintf("key %s revoked from server %s", keyID, serverID))
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"revoked": true})
services.LogEvent(auth.InstanceID(c), "key.revoked", actorFromCtx(c), serverID, keyID, fmt.Sprintf("key %s revoked from server %s", keyID, serverID))
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, RevokedResponse{Revoked: true})
}
// getLatestAgentVersion godoc
//
// @Summary Get the latest agent version
// @Description Reads the latest agent/v* tag from the Gitea release API.
// @Tags servers
// @Produce json
// @Success 200 {object} AgentVersionResponse
// @Failure 503 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /agent/latest-version [get]
func getLatestAgentVersion(c *gin.Context) {
version, err := services.GetLatestAgentVersion()
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusServiceUnavailable, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"version": version})
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, AgentVersionResponse{Version: version})
}
// updateAgent godoc
//
// @Summary Update a server's agent
// @Description Dispatches UpdateAgentCmd to the agent, telling it to download and replace itself.
// @Tags servers
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Server ID"
// @Success 202 {object} UpdateAgentResponse
// @Failure 404 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 503 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /servers/{id}/update-agent [post]
func updateAgent(c *gin.Context) {
id := c.Param("id")
s, err := services.GetServer(id)
s, err := services.GetServer(auth.InstanceID(c), id)
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusNotFound, gin.H{"error": "server not found"})
return
@@ -347,16 +681,29 @@ func updateAgent(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(http.StatusServiceUnavailable, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
services.LogEvent("agent.update_dispatched", actorFromCtx(c), s.ServerID, "", fmt.Sprintf("agent update dispatched to %s (version %s)", s.Hostname, version))
c.JSON(http.StatusAccepted, gin.H{
"message": "update command sent to agent",
"version": version,
services.LogEvent(auth.InstanceID(c), "agent.update_dispatched", actorFromCtx(c), s.ServerID, "", fmt.Sprintf("agent update dispatched to %s (version %s)", s.Hostname, version))
c.JSON(http.StatusAccepted, UpdateAgentResponse{
Message: "update command sent to agent",
Version: version,
})
}
// applyUpdates godoc
//
// @Summary Apply pending OS updates on a server
// @Description Dispatches ApplyUpdatesCmd. Exempt from the licence gate: security patching is never paywalled.
// @Tags servers
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Server ID"
// @Success 202 {object} MessageResponse
// @Failure 404 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 503 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /servers/{id}/apply-updates [post]
func applyUpdates(c *gin.Context) {
id := c.Param("id")
s, err := services.GetServer(id)
s, err := services.GetServer(auth.InstanceID(c), id)
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusNotFound, gin.H{"error": "server not found"})
return
@@ -366,15 +713,19 @@ func applyUpdates(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(http.StatusServiceUnavailable, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
services.LogEvent("updates.applied", actorFromCtx(c), s.ServerID, "", fmt.Sprintf("package update command dispatched to %s", s.Hostname))
c.JSON(http.StatusAccepted, gin.H{"message": "apply updates command sent to agent"})
services.LogEvent(auth.InstanceID(c), "updates.applied", actorFromCtx(c), s.ServerID, "", fmt.Sprintf("package update command dispatched to %s", s.Hostname))
c.JSON(http.StatusAccepted, MessageResponse{Message: "apply updates command sent to agent"})
}
// handleUpdateScript serves a dynamically generated shell script that
// downloads and installs the latest agent. Deliberately not in the generated
// OpenAPI document: it is registered on the bare engine, not under the /api
// group the document's BasePath assumes, so a @Router annotation here would
// publish /api/update — a path that 404s — rather than the real top-level
// /update. It serves a shell script, not JSON, so there is nothing lost by
// leaving it out of a JSON API reference.
func handleUpdateScript(c *gin.Context) {
giteaHost := os.Getenv("GITEA_HOST")
if giteaHost == "" {
giteaHost = "gitea.example.com"
}
giteaHost := "gitea.hostxtra.co.uk"
script := fmt.Sprintf(`#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
@@ -389,7 +740,7 @@ case "$ARCH" in
esac
# Get latest agent release tag
LATEST=$(curl -fsSL "https://${GITEA_HOST}/api/v1/repos/mrhid6/vantage/releases?limit=10" \
LATEST=$(curl -fsSL "https://${GITEA_HOST}/api/v1/repos/vantage/vantage-agent/releases?limit=10" \
| grep -o '"tag_name":"agent/v[^"]*"' | head -1 | sed 's/"tag_name":"//;s/"//')
if [ -z "$LATEST" ]; then
@@ -399,8 +750,8 @@ fi
VERSION="${LATEST#agent/}"
LATEST_ENCODED="${LATEST/\//%%2F}"
BINARY_URL="https://${GITEA_HOST}/mrhid6/vantage/releases/download/${LATEST_ENCODED}/vantage-agent-linux-${ARCH}"
CHECKSUM_URL="https://${GITEA_HOST}/mrhid6/vantage/releases/download/${LATEST_ENCODED}/checksums.txt"
BINARY_URL="https://${GITEA_HOST}/vantage/vantage-agent/releases/download/${LATEST_ENCODED}/vantage-agent-linux-${ARCH}"
CHECKSUM_URL="https://${GITEA_HOST}/vantage/vantage-agent/releases/download/${LATEST_ENCODED}/checksums.txt"
echo "Updating vantage-agent to ${VERSION} (${ARCH})..."
@@ -426,23 +777,59 @@ echo "vantage-agent updated to ${VERSION} and restarted."
c.String(http.StatusOK, script)
}
// listAuditEvents godoc
//
// @Summary List audit events
// @Description Every mutating API path writes an audit event. Paginated with a total, since a short page is not proof of the end of the log.
// @Tags audit
// @Produce json
// @Param q query string false "Free-text search"
// @Param category query string false "Filter by category"
// @Param limit query int false "Max events to return"
// @Param skip query int false "Events to skip"
// @Success 200 {object} AuditEventsResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /audit [get]
func listAuditEvents(c *gin.Context) {
limit := int64(100)
f := services.AuditFilter{
Search: c.Query("q"),
Category: c.Query("category"),
}
if l := c.Query("limit"); l != "" {
if n, err := strconv.ParseInt(l, 10, 64); err == nil && n > 0 {
limit = n
f.Limit = n
}
}
events, err := services.ListAuditEvents(limit)
if s := c.Query("skip"); s != "" {
if n, err := strconv.ParseInt(s, 10, 64); err == nil && n >= 0 {
f.Skip = n
}
}
events, total, err := services.ListAuditEvents(auth.InstanceID(c), f)
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, events)
// An object rather than a bare array: a page is meaningless without the
// total it came from, and a short page is not proof of the end of the log.
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, AuditEventsResponse{Events: events, Total: total})
}
// getSettings godoc
//
// @Summary Get instance settings
// @Tags settings
// @Produce json
// @Success 200 {object} models.Settings
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /settings [get]
func getSettings(c *gin.Context) {
s, err := services.GetSettings()
s, err := services.GetSettings(auth.InstanceID(c))
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
@@ -450,24 +837,58 @@ func getSettings(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, s)
}
// saveSettings godoc
//
// @Summary Save instance settings
// @Description Owner and admin only. Refuses a change that would leave neither local login nor an enabled auth provider.
// @Tags settings
// @Accept json
// @Produce json
// @Param body body object{alerts=models.AlertSettings,workflow_log_retention_days=int,local_login_enabled=bool,api_token_max_days=int} true "Settings to save"
// @Success 200 {object} SavedResponse
// @Failure 400 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 409 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /settings [put]
func saveSettings(c *gin.Context) {
var body struct {
Alerts models.AlertSettings `json:"alerts"`
Email models.EmailSettings `json:"email"`
WorkflowLogRetentionDays *int `json:"workflow_log_retention_days"`
LocalLoginEnabled *bool `json:"local_login_enabled"`
APITokenMaxDays *int `json:"api_token_max_days"`
}
if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&body); err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
if err := services.SaveSettings(body.Alerts, body.Email, body.WorkflowLogRetentionDays); err != nil {
if body.APITokenMaxDays != nil && *body.APITokenMaxDays < 0 {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "api_token_max_days cannot be negative"})
return
}
if err := services.SaveSettings(auth.InstanceID(c), body.Alerts, body.WorkflowLogRetentionDays, body.LocalLoginEnabled, body.APITokenMaxDays); err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, services.ErrLockout) {
c.JSON(http.StatusConflict, gin.H{"error": err.Error(), "code": "local_login_required"})
return
}
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
services.LogEvent("settings.updated", actorFromCtx(c), "", "", "alert settings updated")
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"saved": true})
services.LogEvent(auth.InstanceID(c), "settings.updated", actorFromCtx(c), "", "", "alert settings updated")
if body.APITokenMaxDays != nil {
services.LogEvent(auth.InstanceID(c), "settings.token_policy_updated", actorFromCtx(c), "", "",
fmt.Sprintf("API token maximum lifetime set to %d day(s); 0 means no cap", *body.APITokenMaxDays))
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, SavedResponse{Saved: true})
}
// handleInstallScript serves a dynamically generated shell script that
// downloads, verifies and installs the agent, seeded with a pre-registration
// token. Deliberately not in the generated OpenAPI document, for the same
// reason as handleUpdateScript: it is registered on the bare engine, outside
// the /api group the document's BasePath assumes, so a @Router annotation
// would publish a /api/install path that 404s.
func handleInstallScript(c *gin.Context) {
serverID := c.Query("server_id")
token := c.Query("token")
@@ -476,14 +897,7 @@ func handleInstallScript(c *gin.Context) {
if giteaHost == "" {
giteaHost = "gitea.example.com"
}
publicHost := os.Getenv("PUBLIC_HOST")
if publicHost == "" {
publicHost = "vantage.example.com"
}
grpcHost := os.Getenv("GRPC_HOST")
if grpcHost == "" {
grpcHost = publicHost
}
script := fmt.Sprintf(`#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
@@ -491,9 +905,6 @@ set -euo pipefail
SERVER_ID="%s"
TOKEN="%s"
GITEA_HOST="%s"
KM_HOST="%s"
KM_HOST="${KM_HOST#https://}"
KM_HOST="${KM_HOST#http://}"
GRPC_HOST="%s"
GRPC_HOST="${GRPC_HOST#https://}"
GRPC_HOST="${GRPC_HOST#http://}"
@@ -506,7 +917,7 @@ case "$ARCH" in
esac
# Get latest agent release tag
LATEST=$(curl -fsSL "https://${GITEA_HOST}/api/v1/repos/mrhid6/vantage/releases?limit=10" \
LATEST=$(curl -fsSL "https://${GITEA_HOST}/api/v1/repos/vantage/vantage-agent/releases?limit=10" \
| grep -o '"tag_name":"agent/v[^"]*"' | head -1 | sed 's/"tag_name":"//;s/"//')
if [ -z "$LATEST" ]; then
@@ -516,8 +927,8 @@ fi
VERSION="${LATEST#agent/}"
LATEST_ENCODED="${LATEST/\//%%2F}"
BINARY_URL="https://${GITEA_HOST}/mrhid6/vantage/releases/download/${LATEST_ENCODED}/vantage-agent-linux-${ARCH}"
CHECKSUM_URL="https://${GITEA_HOST}/mrhid6/vantage/releases/download/${LATEST_ENCODED}/checksums.txt"
BINARY_URL="https://${GITEA_HOST}/vantage/vantage-agent/releases/download/${LATEST_ENCODED}/vantage-agent-linux-${ARCH}"
CHECKSUM_URL="https://${GITEA_HOST}/vantage/vantage-agent/releases/download/${LATEST_ENCODED}/checksums.txt"
echo "Installing vantage-agent ${VERSION} (${ARCH})..."
@@ -566,7 +977,7 @@ systemctl daemon-reload
systemctl enable --now vantage-agent
echo "vantage-agent installed and started."
`, serverID, token, giteaHost, publicHost, grpcHost)
`, serverID, token, giteaHost, grpcHost)
c.Header("Content-Type", "text/x-shellscript")
c.String(http.StatusOK, script)
+61
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
package api
import (
"context"
"net/http"
"time"
"gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/mrhid6/vantage/server/internal/auth"
"gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/mrhid6/vantage/server/internal/db"
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
)
// The two probes answer different questions on purpose.
//
// /healthz is liveness: the process is up and serving. It touches nothing
// external, because a Mongo outage must not make Kubernetes restart every
// server pod — a restart loop cannot fix someone else's database, and it
// destroys every open command stream and console session on the way.
//
// /readyz is readiness: this pod can serve a request end to end, which needs
// both Mongo and Redis. A failing readiness probe pulls the pod out of the
// Service and leaves it running, which is the behaviour that matters during a
// dependency blip.
//
// Both sit outside /api, so neither the session middleware nor the licence
// gate applies. Neither reveals anything beyond up or down.
const probeTimeout = 2 * time.Second
func handleHealthz(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"status": "ok"})
}
func handleReadyz(c *gin.Context) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(c.Request.Context(), probeTimeout)
defer cancel()
checks := gin.H{"mongo": "ok", "redis": "ok"}
ready := true
if db.Client == nil {
checks["mongo"] = "not initialised"
ready = false
} else if err := db.Client.Ping(ctx, nil); err != nil {
checks["mongo"] = "unreachable"
ready = false
}
if err := auth.PingRedis(ctx); err != nil {
checks["redis"] = "unreachable"
ready = false
}
status := http.StatusOK
state := "ok"
if !ready {
status = http.StatusServiceUnavailable
state = "unready"
}
c.JSON(status, gin.H{"status": state, "checks": checks})
}
+7 -21
View File
@@ -12,17 +12,9 @@ func handleInstallScriptWindows(c *gin.Context) {
serverID := c.Query("server_id")
token := c.Query("token")
giteaHost := os.Getenv("GITEA_HOST")
if giteaHost == "" {
giteaHost = "gitea.example.com"
}
giteaHost := "gitea.hostxtra.co.uk"
grpcHost := os.Getenv("GRPC_HOST")
if grpcHost == "" {
grpcHost = os.Getenv("PUBLIC_HOST")
}
if grpcHost == "" {
grpcHost = "vantage.example.com"
}
script := fmt.Sprintf(
"#Requires -RunAsAdministrator\n"+
@@ -33,11 +25,11 @@ func handleInstallScriptWindows(c *gin.Context) {
"$GiteaHost = \"%s\"\n"+
"$ServerUrl = \"%s\" -replace '^https?://',''\n"+
"\n"+
"$rel = Invoke-RestMethod -Uri \"https://$GiteaHost/api/v1/repos/mrhid6/vantage/releases?limit=10\"\n"+
"$rel = Invoke-RestMethod -Uri \"https://$GiteaHost/api/v1/repos/vantage/vantage-agent/releases?limit=10\"\n"+
"$tag = ($rel | Where-Object { $_.tag_name -like 'agent/v*' } | Select-Object -First 1).tag_name\n"+
"if (-not $tag) { throw \"Could not determine latest agent version\" }\n"+
"$enc = $tag -replace '/','%%2F'\n"+
"$base = \"https://$GiteaHost/mrhid6/vantage/releases/download/$enc\"\n"+
"$base = \"https://$GiteaHost/vantage/vantage-agent/releases/download/$enc\"\n"+
"\n"+
"$tmp = Join-Path $env:TEMP \"vantage-agent.msi\"\n"+
"Invoke-WebRequest -Uri \"$base/vantage-agent.msi\" -OutFile $tmp\n"+
@@ -55,14 +47,8 @@ func handleInstallScriptWindows(c *gin.Context) {
c.String(http.StatusOK, script)
}
// handleUpdateScriptWindows serves a PowerShell one-liner that upgrades an
// already-installed Windows agent. No server_id/token needed: the MSI is a
// MajorUpgrade and setup.ps1 preserves the existing config on upgrade.
func handleUpdateScriptWindows(c *gin.Context) {
giteaHost := os.Getenv("GITEA_HOST")
if giteaHost == "" {
giteaHost = "gitea.example.com"
}
giteaHost := "gitea.hostxtra.co.uk"
script := fmt.Sprintf(
"#Requires -RunAsAdministrator\n"+
@@ -70,11 +56,11 @@ func handleUpdateScriptWindows(c *gin.Context) {
"\n"+
"$GiteaHost = \"%s\"\n"+
"\n"+
"$rel = Invoke-RestMethod -Uri \"https://$GiteaHost/api/v1/repos/mrhid6/vantage/releases?limit=10\"\n"+
"$rel = Invoke-RestMethod -Uri \"https://$GiteaHost/api/v1/repos/vantage/vantage-agent/releases?limit=10\"\n"+
"$tag = ($rel | Where-Object { $_.tag_name -like 'agent/v*' } | Select-Object -First 1).tag_name\n"+
"if (-not $tag) { throw \"Could not determine latest agent version\" }\n"+
"$enc = $tag -replace '/','%%2F'\n"+
"$base = \"https://$GiteaHost/mrhid6/vantage/releases/download/$enc\"\n"+
"$base = \"https://$GiteaHost/vantage/vantage-agent/releases/download/$enc\"\n"+
"\n"+
"$tmp = Join-Path $env:TEMP \"vantage-agent.msi\"\n"+
"Invoke-WebRequest -Uri \"$base/vantage-agent.msi\" -OutFile $tmp\n"+
+177
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
package api
import (
"errors"
"net/http"
"gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/mrhid6/vantage/server/internal/auth"
"gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/mrhid6/vantage/server/internal/models"
"gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/mrhid6/vantage/server/internal/services"
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
)
// listInstanceUsers godoc
//
// @Summary List instance members
// @Tags instance-users
// @Produce json
// @Success 200 {array} models.User
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /instance/users [get]
func listInstanceUsers(c *gin.Context) {
users, err := services.ListUsers(auth.InstanceID(c))
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, users)
}
func actorMayGrantOwner(c *gin.Context) bool {
return auth.Role(c) == models.RoleOwner
}
// createInstanceUser godoc
//
// @Summary Create an instance member
// @Description Only an owner can create another owner.
// @Tags instance-users
// @Accept json
// @Produce json
// @Param body body object{email=string,password=string,role=string} true "New member"
// @Success 201 {object} models.User
// @Failure 400 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 403 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /instance/users [post]
func createInstanceUser(c *gin.Context) {
var body struct {
Email string `json:"email"`
Password string `json:"password"`
Role string `json:"role"`
}
if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&body); err != nil || body.Email == "" {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "email required"})
return
}
if body.Role == "" {
body.Role = models.RoleMember
}
if !models.ValidRole(body.Role) {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "role must be one of owner, admin, or member"})
return
}
if body.Role == models.RoleOwner && !actorMayGrantOwner(c) {
c.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{"error": "only an owner can create another owner"})
return
}
u, err := services.CreateUser(auth.InstanceID(c), body.Email, body.Password, body.Role, "local")
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
c.JSON(http.StatusCreated, u)
}
// updateInstanceUserRole godoc
//
// @Summary Change an instance member's role
// @Description A caller cannot change their own role. Only an owner can change owner roles.
// @Tags instance-users
// @Accept json
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "User ID"
// @Param body body object{role=string} true "New role"
// @Success 200 {object} OKResponse
// @Failure 400 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 403 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 404 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 409 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /instance/users/{id}/role [put]
func updateInstanceUserRole(c *gin.Context) {
var body struct {
Role string `json:"role"`
}
if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&body); err != nil || body.Role == "" {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "role required"})
return
}
if !models.ValidRole(body.Role) {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "role must be one of owner, admin, or member"})
return
}
instanceID, targetID := auth.InstanceID(c), c.Param("id")
if targetID == auth.UserID(c) {
c.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{"error": "you cannot change your own role"})
return
}
target, err := services.GetUserInInstance(instanceID, targetID)
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusNotFound, gin.H{"error": "user not found"})
return
}
if (body.Role == models.RoleOwner || target.Role == models.RoleOwner) && !actorMayGrantOwner(c) {
c.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{"error": "only an owner can change owner roles"})
return
}
if err := services.UpdateUserRole(instanceID, targetID, body.Role); err != nil {
c.JSON(orgUserErrStatus(err), gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, OKResponse{OK: true})
}
// deleteInstanceUser godoc
//
// @Summary Remove an instance member
// @Description A caller cannot remove their own account. Only an owner can remove another owner.
// @Tags instance-users
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "User ID"
// @Success 200 {object} DeletedResponse
// @Failure 403 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 404 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 409 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /instance/users/{id} [delete]
func deleteInstanceUser(c *gin.Context) {
instanceID, targetID := auth.InstanceID(c), c.Param("id")
if targetID == auth.UserID(c) {
c.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{"error": "you cannot remove your own account"})
return
}
target, err := services.GetUserInInstance(instanceID, targetID)
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusNotFound, gin.H{"error": "user not found"})
return
}
if target.Role == models.RoleOwner && !actorMayGrantOwner(c) {
c.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{"error": "only an owner can remove another owner"})
return
}
if err := services.DeleteUser(instanceID, targetID); err != nil {
c.JSON(orgUserErrStatus(err), gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, DeletedResponse{Deleted: true})
}
func orgUserErrStatus(err error) int {
// 409 rather than 403: the caller has the right to manage members, and the
// request is refused because of the resource's state, not their permissions.
if errors.Is(err, services.ErrLastOwner) || errors.Is(err, services.ErrHQManaged) {
return http.StatusConflict
}
return http.StatusInternalServerError
}
+272
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,272 @@
package api
import (
"errors"
"net/http"
"sync"
"time"
"gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/mrhid6/vantage/server/internal/auth"
"gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/mrhid6/vantage/server/internal/services"
"gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/vantage/vantage-shared/license"
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
)
// licenceExemptPaths are routes that must work while a licence is expired or
// missing, because they are how a customer recovers or stays safe.
//
// /api/license pasting a valid licence is the way out of degraded mode
// apply-updates security patching is never paywalled
//
// All DELETE requests are exempt separately (see RequireActiveLicense): a
// customer downgraded below their current usage must be able to delete their
// way back under the cap.
var licenceExemptPaths = map[string]bool{
"/api/license": true,
}
// mutatingGETs are routes that change state despite their method. GET is
// otherwise always allowed through, so these have to be named explicitly:
// GET /api/servers/new mints a pre-registration token, which is a creation.
var mutatingGETs = map[string]bool{
"/api/servers/new": true,
}
func licenceExempt(c *gin.Context) bool {
if c.Request.Method == http.MethodDelete {
return true
}
if licenceExemptPaths[c.FullPath()] {
return true
}
if c.FullPath() == "/api/servers/:id/apply-updates" {
return true
}
return false
}
// RequireActiveLicense blocks mutating requests when the licence is not valid.
//
// Mounted on the /api group, so a route added tomorrow is gated because of where
// it lives rather than because someone remembered. GET and HEAD always pass —
// reading is never blocked.
func RequireActiveLicense() gin.HandlerFunc {
return func(c *gin.Context) {
if (c.Request.Method == http.MethodGet || c.Request.Method == http.MethodHead) &&
!mutatingGETs[c.FullPath()] {
c.Next()
return
}
if licenceExempt(c) {
c.Next()
return
}
st := services.GetLicenseState(auth.InstanceID(c))
if st.Active() {
c.Next()
return
}
c.AbortWithStatusJSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{
"error": "license_required",
"state": st.Status,
"reason": st.Reason,
})
}
}
// RequireFeature blocks a route when the licence does not grant a feature.
func RequireFeature(name string) gin.HandlerFunc {
return func(c *gin.Context) {
st := services.GetLicenseState(auth.InstanceID(c))
if st.Feature(name) {
c.Next()
return
}
c.AbortWithStatusJSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{
"error": "feature_unavailable",
"feature": name,
})
}
}
type licenceResponse struct {
InstanceID string `json:"instance_id"`
State license.State `json:"state"`
Reason string `json:"reason,omitempty"`
Tier string `json:"tier,omitempty"`
SupportLevel string `json:"support_level,omitempty"`
ExpiresAt *time.Time `json:"expires_at,omitempty"`
DaysRemaining *int `json:"days_remaining,omitempty"`
Limits license.Limits `json:"limits"`
Features map[string]bool `json:"features"`
Usage licenceUsageResponse `json:"usage"`
Source string `json:"source"`
// Deployment is what tells the UI whether this instance owns its licence.
// On cloud the licence is injected by admin and there is nothing for a
// customer to paste, so the UI sends them to the portal instead.
Deployment string `json:"deployment"`
}
type licenceUsageResponse struct {
Servers int `json:"servers"`
Monitors int `json:"monitors"`
SecretGroups int `json:"secret_groups"`
Channels int `json:"channels"`
}
// getLicence godoc
//
// @Summary Get this instance's licence state
// @Tags licence
// @Produce json
// @Success 200 {object} licenceResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /license [get]
func getLicence(c *gin.Context) {
instanceID := auth.InstanceID(c)
st := services.GetLicenseState(instanceID)
servers, monitors, groups, channels := services.LicenseUsage(instanceID)
resp := licenceResponse{
InstanceID: instanceID,
State: st.Status,
Reason: st.Reason,
Tier: st.Tier,
SupportLevel: st.SupportLevel,
ExpiresAt: st.ExpiresAt,
Limits: st.Limits,
Features: st.Features,
Usage: licenceUsageResponse{Servers: servers, Monitors: monitors, SecretGroups: groups, Channels: channels},
Source: st.Source,
Deployment: services.DeploymentMode(),
}
if st.ExpiresAt != nil {
d := int(time.Until(*st.ExpiresAt).Hours() / 24)
resp.DaysRemaining = &d
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, resp)
}
var (
licencePostMu sync.Mutex
licencePostCounts = map[string][]time.Time{}
)
const licencePostLimit = 10
// licencePostAllowed permits 10 attempts per instance per hour.
func licencePostAllowed(instanceID string) bool {
cutoff := time.Now().Add(-time.Hour)
licencePostMu.Lock()
defer licencePostMu.Unlock()
kept := licencePostCounts[instanceID][:0]
for _, t := range licencePostCounts[instanceID] {
if t.After(cutoff) {
kept = append(kept, t)
}
}
if len(kept) >= licencePostLimit {
licencePostCounts[instanceID] = kept
return false
}
licencePostCounts[instanceID] = append(kept, time.Now())
return true
}
// postLicence godoc
//
// @Summary Set this instance's licence
// @Description Self-hosted only; a cloud instance's licence is injected by admin and this endpoint answers 409 cloud_managed. Exempt from the licence gate, since pasting a valid licence is the way out of degraded mode. Rate limited to 10 attempts per instance per hour.
// @Tags licence
// @Accept json
// @Produce json
// @Param body body object{blob=string} true "Licence key blob"
// @Success 200 {object} LicencePostResponse
// @Failure 400 {object} LicenceErrorResponse
// @Failure 409 {object} LicenceErrorResponse
// @Failure 429 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /license [post]
func postLicence(c *gin.Context) {
instanceID := auth.InstanceID(c)
// A cloud instance's licence is written by admin straight into the database
// (admin/internal/inject), never through this endpoint, so refusing here
// cannot break injection. Hiding the form in web/ is a courtesy; this is the
// boundary, the same split as an hq-managed user's role.
if services.DeploymentMode() == license.DeploymentCloud {
c.JSON(http.StatusConflict, gin.H{
"error": "This instance's licence is managed in Vantage HQ and cannot be set here.",
"reason": "cloud_managed",
})
return
}
if !licencePostAllowed(instanceID) {
c.JSON(http.StatusTooManyRequests, gin.H{
"error": "Too many licence attempts. Try again later.",
})
return
}
var body struct {
Blob string `json:"blob"`
}
if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&body); err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "a licence key is required"})
return
}
st, err := services.StoreLicense(instanceID, body.Blob)
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{
"error": licenceRejectionMessage(err.Error(), instanceID),
"reason": err.Error(),
})
return
}
services.LogEvent(instanceID, "license.updated", actorFromCtx(c), "", "",
"licence accepted (tier "+st.Tier+")")
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, LicencePostResponse{State: st.Status, Tier: st.Tier, ExpiresAt: st.ExpiresAt})
}
// licenceRejectionMessage turns a machine reason into something a person can act
// on. The instance ID is included in the mismatch case because that is the one
// piece of information the customer needs and cannot guess.
func licenceRejectionMessage(reason, instanceID string) string {
switch reason {
case license.ReasonBadSignature:
return "This licence key is not valid. Check it was copied in full."
case license.ReasonDeploymentMismatch:
return "This licence was issued for a different instance type."
case license.ReasonInstanceMismatch:
return "This licence was issued for a different instance. Your instance ID is " + instanceID + "."
case license.ReasonNoLicense:
return "No licence key was provided."
default:
return "This licence could not be accepted."
}
}
// limitStatus maps a LimitError to a 403 body. Handlers that create countable
// resources call this so the UI gets a machine-readable limit name.
func limitStatus(c *gin.Context, err error) bool {
var le *services.LimitError
if !errors.As(err, &le) {
return false
}
c.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, LimitExceededResponse{
Error: "limit_exceeded",
Limit: le.Limit,
Current: le.Current,
Max: le.Max,
})
return true
}
+169 -9
View File
@@ -2,11 +2,13 @@ package api
import (
"net/http"
"strconv"
"time"
"gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/mrhid6/vantage/server/internal/auth"
"gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/mrhid6/vantage/server/internal/models"
"gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/mrhid6/vantage/server/internal/services"
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
"github.com/mrhid6/vantage/server/internal/models"
"github.com/mrhid6/vantage/server/internal/services"
"go.mongodb.org/mongo-driver/v2/bson"
)
@@ -18,10 +20,21 @@ func registerMonitorRoutes(g *gin.RouterGroup) {
g.DELETE("/monitors/:id", deleteMonitor)
g.GET("/monitors/:id/incidents", getMonitorIncidents)
g.GET("/monitors/:id/uptime", getMonitorUptime)
g.GET("/monitors/:id/samples", getMonitorSamples)
}
// listMonitors godoc
//
// @Summary List monitors
// @Tags monitors
// @Produce json
// @Success 200 {array} models.Monitor
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /monitors [get]
func listMonitors(c *gin.Context) {
monitors, err := services.ListMonitors()
monitors, err := services.ListMonitors(auth.InstanceID(c))
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
@@ -29,6 +42,20 @@ func listMonitors(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, monitors)
}
// createMonitor godoc
//
// @Summary Create a monitor
// @Tags monitors
// @Accept json
// @Produce json
// @Param body body models.Monitor true "Monitor to create"
// @Success 201 {object} models.Monitor
// @Failure 400 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 403 {object} LimitExceededResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /monitors [post]
func createMonitor(c *gin.Context) {
var m models.Monitor
if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&m); err != nil {
@@ -39,7 +66,14 @@ func createMonitor(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "name and type are required"})
return
}
created, err := services.CreateMonitor(&m)
if err := services.CheckMonitorLimit(auth.InstanceID(c)); err != nil {
if limitStatus(c, err) {
return
}
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
created, err := services.CreateMonitor(auth.InstanceID(c), &m)
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
@@ -47,8 +81,20 @@ func createMonitor(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(http.StatusCreated, created)
}
// getMonitor godoc
//
// @Summary Get a monitor
// @Tags monitors
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Monitor ID"
// @Success 200 {object} models.Monitor
// @Failure 404 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /monitors/{id} [get]
func getMonitor(c *gin.Context) {
m, err := services.GetMonitor(c.Param("id"))
m, err := services.GetMonitor(auth.InstanceID(c), c.Param("id"))
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
@@ -60,9 +106,24 @@ func getMonitor(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, m)
}
// updateMonitor godoc
//
// @Summary Update a monitor
// @Tags monitors
// @Accept json
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Monitor ID"
// @Param body body object{name=string,group=string,type=string,target=models.MonitorTarget,interval_sec=int,runner=string,retries=int,enabled=bool,channel_ids=[]string} true "Fields to update"
// @Success 204
// @Failure 400 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /monitors/{id} [put]
func updateMonitor(c *gin.Context) {
var body struct {
Name *string `json:"name"`
Group *string `json:"group"`
Type *string `json:"type"`
Target *models.MonitorTarget `json:"target"`
IntervalSec *int `json:"interval_sec"`
@@ -79,6 +140,9 @@ func updateMonitor(c *gin.Context) {
if body.Name != nil {
upd["name"] = *body.Name
}
if body.Group != nil {
upd["group"] = *body.Group
}
if body.Type != nil {
upd["type"] = *body.Type
}
@@ -104,23 +168,54 @@ func updateMonitor(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "no fields to update"})
return
}
if err := services.UpdateMonitor(c.Param("id"), upd); err != nil {
if err := services.UpdateMonitor(auth.InstanceID(c), c.Param("id"), upd); err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
c.Status(http.StatusNoContent)
}
// deleteMonitor godoc
//
// @Summary Delete a monitor
// @Tags monitors
// @Param id path string true "Monitor ID"
// @Success 204
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /monitors/{id} [delete]
func deleteMonitor(c *gin.Context) {
if err := services.DeleteMonitor(c.Param("id")); err != nil {
if err := services.DeleteMonitor(auth.InstanceID(c), c.Param("id")); err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
c.Status(http.StatusNoContent)
}
// getMonitorIncidents godoc
//
// @Summary List a monitor's incidents
// @Tags monitors
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Monitor ID"
// @Success 200 {array} models.Incident
// @Failure 404 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /monitors/{id}/incidents [get]
func getMonitorIncidents(c *gin.Context) {
incidents, err := services.ListIncidents(c.Param("id"), 50)
m, err := services.GetMonitor(auth.InstanceID(c), c.Param("id"))
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
if m == nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusNotFound, gin.H{"error": "monitor not found"})
return
}
incidents, err := services.ListIncidents(auth.InstanceID(c), c.Param("id"), 50)
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
@@ -128,9 +223,74 @@ func getMonitorIncidents(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, incidents)
}
// getMonitorSamples godoc
//
// @Summary Get a monitor's individual check results
// @Description Raw check results for the last `minutes` minutes, oldest first. Samples expire after 48 hours; use the uptime rollups for longer ranges.
// @Tags monitors
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Monitor ID"
// @Param minutes query int false "Window in minutes (default 60, max 2880)"
// @Success 200 {array} models.MonitorSample
// @Failure 404 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /monitors/{id}/samples [get]
func getMonitorSamples(c *gin.Context) {
m, err := services.GetMonitor(auth.InstanceID(c), c.Param("id"))
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
if m == nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusNotFound, gin.H{"error": "monitor not found"})
return
}
// Clamped rather than rejected: the window is a view setting, and the only
// honest answer past the TTL is the shorter window anyway.
minutes := 60
if raw := c.Query("minutes"); raw != "" {
if n, convErr := strconv.Atoi(raw); convErr == nil && n > 0 {
minutes = n
}
}
if max := int(services.MonitorSampleTTL.Minutes()); minutes > max {
minutes = max
}
samples, err := services.MonitorSamples(auth.InstanceID(c), c.Param("id"), time.Now().Add(-time.Duration(minutes)*time.Minute))
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, samples)
}
// getMonitorUptime godoc
//
// @Summary Get a monitor's uptime rollups
// @Description Hourly rollups for the last 30 days.
// @Tags monitors
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Monitor ID"
// @Success 200 {array} models.Rollup
// @Failure 404 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /monitors/{id}/uptime [get]
func getMonitorUptime(c *gin.Context) {
m, err := services.GetMonitor(auth.InstanceID(c), c.Param("id"))
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
if m == nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusNotFound, gin.H{"error": "monitor not found"})
return
}
since := time.Now().Add(-30 * 24 * time.Hour)
rollups, err := services.UptimeRollups(c.Param("id"), since)
rollups, err := services.UptimeRollups(auth.InstanceID(c), c.Param("id"), since)
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
+71
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
package api
import (
"net/http"
"gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/mrhid6/vantage/server/internal/api/docs"
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
)
// scalarPage renders the reference against this instance's own spec, so "Try
// it" acts on the reader's API with the reader's session.
const scalarPage = `<!doctype html>
<html>
<head>
<title>Vantage API</title>
<meta charset="utf-8" />
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1" />
</head>
<body>
<div id="app"></div>
<script src="/api/docs/scalar.js"></script>
<script>
Scalar.createApiReference('#app', {
url: '/api/openapi.json',
theme: 'deepSpace',
})
</script>
</body>
</html>`
// getOpenAPI godoc
//
// @Summary Get the OpenAPI document
// @Description Generated from swaggo annotations at build time and committed; served verbatim.
// @Tags docs
// @Produce json
// @Success 200 {object} map[string]any
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /openapi.json [get]
func getOpenAPI(c *gin.Context) {
c.Data(http.StatusOK, "application/json; charset=utf-8", docs.OpenAPI)
}
// getScalarJS godoc
//
// @Summary Get the vendored Scalar bundle
// @Description Served locally rather than from a CDN so the reference page works on an air-gapped install.
// @Tags docs
// @Produce application/javascript
// @Success 200 {string} string "javascript bundle"
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /docs/scalar.js [get]
func getScalarJS(c *gin.Context) {
c.Data(http.StatusOK, "application/javascript; charset=utf-8", docs.ScalarJS)
}
// getAPIDocs godoc
//
// @Summary API reference page
// @Description Renders the Scalar reference against this instance's own OpenAPI document.
// @Tags docs
// @Produce html
// @Success 200 {string} string "HTML page"
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /docs [get]
func getAPIDocs(c *gin.Context) {
c.Data(http.StatusOK, "text/html; charset=utf-8", []byte(scalarPage))
}
+51
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
package api
import (
"net"
"strings"
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
)
func publicHostFromRequest(c *gin.Context) string {
host := c.Request.Host
if h := firstForwarded(c.GetHeader("X-Forwarded-Host")); h != "" {
host = h
}
if host == "" {
return "https://vantage.example.com"
}
return schemeFor(c, host) + "://" + host
}
func schemeFor(c *gin.Context, host string) string {
if p := firstForwarded(c.GetHeader("X-Forwarded-Proto")); p != "" {
return p
}
if c.Request.TLS != nil {
return "https"
}
if isLoopback(host) {
return "http"
}
return "https"
}
func firstForwarded(v string) string {
if v == "" {
return ""
}
return strings.TrimSpace(strings.Split(v, ",")[0])
}
func isLoopback(host string) bool {
h, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(host)
if err != nil {
h = host
}
if h == "localhost" || strings.HasSuffix(h, ".localhost") {
return true
}
ip := net.ParseIP(h)
return ip != nil && ip.IsLoopback()
}

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