fix: default TRUSTED_PROXIES in shipped deployments and route /public/ through ingress

This commit is contained in:
2026-08-24 14:35:29 +00:00
parent a3c6b2a305
commit 6ba54f690c
4 changed files with 6 additions and 1 deletions
@@ -72,6 +72,8 @@ both read it.
value: {{ .Values.server.env.proxyAdvertiseHost | quote }}
- name: PROXY_LISTEN_HOST
value: {{ .Values.server.env.proxyListenHost | quote }}
- name: TRUSTED_PROXIES
value: {{ .Values.server.env.trustedProxies | quote }}
{{- if eq .Values.server.env.deploymentType "cloud" }}
- name: VANTAGE_DEPLOYMENT
value: "cloud"
+2
View File
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ server:
appRootLabel: vantage
proxyAdvertiseHost: "{{ .Release.Name }}-server"
proxyListenHost: "0.0.0.0"
trustedProxies: "10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16"
persistence:
enabled: false
size: 1Gi
@@ -94,6 +95,7 @@ ingress:
paths:
- /api/
- /auth/
- /public/
- /update
- /install
- /update.ps1
+1
View File
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ services:
KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY: ${KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY:-}
GUACD_ADDR: guacd:4822
PROXY_ADVERTISE_HOST: server
TRUSTED_PROXIES: ${TRUSTED_PROXIES:-10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16}
depends_on:
redis:
condition: service_healthy
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ it is absent.
| `VANTAGE_LICENSE` | no | | A licence supplied at startup, so an automated install does not have to paste one in |
| `VANTAGE_TRIVY_DB_REF` | no | `ghcr.io/aquasecurity/trivy-db:2` | Where the vulnerability database is pulled from. Point it at a mirror for an air-gapped install |
| `VANTAGE_VULNDB_DISABLED` | no | | `true` switches [vulnerability scanning](../vantage/vulnerabilities.md) off entirely. Findings already stored are still served, and still shown as stale |
| `TRUSTED_PROXIES` | no | | Comma-separated CIDRs or addresses of proxies allowed to set `X-Forwarded-For`. Unset trusts none, so the client address is the direct peer — behind a reverse proxy that makes every visitor share one address for rate-limiting purposes. Set it to your proxy's range |
| `TRUSTED_PROXIES` | no | `10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16` | Comma-separated CIDRs or addresses of proxies allowed to set `X-Forwarded-For`. The shipped Docker Compose and Helm chart default to the private RFC1918 ranges, which covers Nginx Proxy Manager on the Docker bridge network and Traefik on a Kubernetes pod CIDR. An operator whose proxy sits on a public address must set this themselves, or every visitor behind it shares one address for rate-limiting purposes. Unset entirely (outside those shipped defaults) trusts none, so the client address is the direct peer |
:::danger `KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY` has no recovery path
It encrypts SSH private keys, vault secrets, OIDC client secrets and console