docs: correct the status page URL for self-hosted, trim to what ships

- The status page URL was given only as `<instance>.vantage.<tld>`, which a
  self-hosted install does not serve. Both deployments are now described.
- The banner is documented as one notice: the editor exposes no level picker
  and the view renders every level identically.
- `pending` added to the component states, which a monitor with no result yet
  renders.
- Delete page documented alongside un-publish.
- `TRUSTED_PROXIES` names the LAN case: with the RFC1918 default, a client on a
  private range reaching the server directly is itself trusted and can spoof
  `X-Forwarded-For` — and now `X-Forwarded-Host`. Narrow it to the proxy.
- CLAUDE.md: scopes are nine resources, not eight; `status-pages` added to the
  REST route table; the host-resolution rules recorded under Status pages.
This commit is contained in:
2026-08-25 09:05:06 +00:00
parent 32e7420d89
commit 68160dc681
3 changed files with 49 additions and 8 deletions
+25 -2
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@@ -503,6 +503,25 @@ with `available:false` and a `reason`, never a 403 or a blank page — the
reader is a member of the public who can do nothing about either condition and
deserves an explanation, not a browser error.
**The instance is resolved from `X-Forwarded-Host`, not `Host`.** The public
page is server-rendered by `web/`, and the SSR fetch cannot set `Host` at all:
it is a forbidden header name and undici drops it silently, so the Go server
saw `server:8080` and every status page 404'd on every deployment. `web/`
forwards the visitor's host in `X-Forwarded-Host` (and their address in
`X-Forwarded-For`, or the whole deployment shares one rate-limit bucket), and
`publicStatusInstance` honours that header **only when `c.RemoteIP()` is in
`TRUSTED_PROXIES`** — it selects a tenant, so an untrusted peer must not be
able to name one. It uses `RemoteIP()` and not `ClientIP()` deliberately: the
latter is reconstructed from the very headers being judged.
**A host naming no slug falls back to the sole instance on a non-cloud
deployment.** `hostSlug` requires `<slug>.vantage.<tld>`; a self-hosted install
at `vantage.acme.com` or an IP has no slug and would otherwise 404 forever. It
has exactly one instance, resolved with the same count-then-read bootstrap
uses, cached alongside the slug lookups. More than one instance is a 404, not a
guess. A host that *does* name a slug which does not exist stays a 404 —
falling back there would serve one tenant's page on another's address.
Assembled snapshots are cached in Redis for **30 seconds**, keyed per
instance and page, and every authoring write (`UpdateStatusPage`,
`DeleteStatusPage`, and every incident mutation) invalidates its page's entry
@@ -537,9 +556,9 @@ only as sha256 — the same shape as `servers.agent_token_hash` and the ESO read
token, and for the same reason: nothing downstream ever needs the plaintext
back. It belongs to the user who created it, and its role can never exceed
theirs; see the `api_tokens` note under MongoDB Collections for how that stays
true across a demotion rather than only at issuance. Scopes are eight
true across a demotion rather than only at issuance. Scopes are nine
resources — `servers`, `keys`, `secrets`, `workflows`, `monitors`, `vulns`,
`workloads`, `settings` — each split into `:read` and `:write`, with `:write`
`workloads`, `status`, `settings` — each split into `:read` and `:write`, with `:write`
satisfying a `:read` requirement on the same resource so a caller does not have
to hold both. Any signed-in member may mint and revoke their **own** tokens —
there is no `RequireRole` on `POST /tokens` or `DELETE /tokens/:id` — because
@@ -818,6 +837,10 @@ workloads GET /workloads · GET /servers/:id/workloads
POST /servers/:id/workloads/refresh
POST /servers/:id/workloads/:wid/action (owner|admin)
GET /servers/:id/workloads/:wid/logs (owner|admin)
status-pages GET,POST /status-pages · GET,PUT,DELETE /status-pages/:pageId (owner|admin)
GET,POST /status-pages/:pageId/incidents
PUT,DELETE /status-pages/:pageId/incidents/:incidentId
POST /status-pages/:pageId/incidents/:incidentId/updates
audit GET /audit
agent GET /agent/latest-version
settings GET,PUT /settings · POST /settings/secrets-token (owner|admin)
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ it is absent.
| `VANTAGE_LICENSE` | no | | A licence supplied at startup, so an automated install does not have to paste one in |
| `VANTAGE_TRIVY_DB_REF` | no | `ghcr.io/aquasecurity/trivy-db:2` | Where the vulnerability database is pulled from. Point it at a mirror for an air-gapped install |
| `VANTAGE_VULNDB_DISABLED` | no | | `true` switches [vulnerability scanning](../vantage/vulnerabilities.md) off entirely. Findings already stored are still served, and still shown as stale |
| `TRUSTED_PROXIES` | no | `10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16` | Comma-separated CIDRs or addresses of proxies allowed to set `X-Forwarded-For`. The shipped Docker Compose and Helm chart default to the private RFC1918 ranges, which covers Nginx Proxy Manager on the Docker bridge network and Traefik on a Kubernetes pod CIDR. An operator whose proxy sits on a public address must set this themselves, or every visitor behind it shares one address for rate-limiting purposes. Unset entirely (outside those shipped defaults) trusts none, so the client address is the direct peer |
| `TRUSTED_PROXIES` | no | `10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16` | Comma-separated CIDRs or addresses of proxies allowed to set `X-Forwarded-For`. The shipped Docker Compose and Helm chart default to the private RFC1918 ranges, which covers Nginx Proxy Manager on the Docker bridge network and Traefik on a Kubernetes pod CIDR. An operator whose proxy sits on a public address must set this themselves, or every visitor behind it shares one address for rate-limiting purposes. Unset entirely (outside those shipped defaults) trusts none, so the client address is the direct peer. **On a LAN-only install, narrow this to your proxy's address.** The RFC1918 default trusts every private range, so a client on 192.168.0.0/16 reaching the server directly is itself a "trusted proxy" and can put whatever it likes in `X-Forwarded-For` — and, on the public status route, in `X-Forwarded-Host`. Behind a proxy on a public address, or with no proxy at all, that is not reachable; on a flat LAN it is |
:::danger `KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY` has no recovery path
It encrypts SSH private keys, vault secrets, OIDC client secrets and console
+23 -5
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@@ -22,9 +22,19 @@ of lowercase letters, digits and `-`, starting and ending with a letter or
digit. It becomes part of the public URL:
```
https://<your-instance>.vantage.<yourdomain>/status/<page-id>
https://<your-vantage-address>/status/<page-id>
```
On **Vantage Cloud** that address is your instance's own subdomain, so the page
is at `https://<your-instance>.vantage.hostxtra.co.uk/status/<page-id>`.
On a **self-hosted** install it is whatever address you reach Vantage on —
`https://vantage.acme.com/status/<page-id>`, or an IP and port on a LAN
install. A self-hosted install serves exactly one Vantage instance, so no
subdomain is needed to say which one you mean. The **Copy** control next to the
page address in the editor gives you the exact URL for your install, which is
the one to hand out.
**The page id cannot be changed after creation.** Once you have shared the
link, changing the id would break it, so pick something you would still be
happy with in a year — `platform`, `api`, a customer's own name for a
@@ -38,6 +48,11 @@ so you can build out the components and copy before announcing it. Toggle
**Published** when it is ready. Un-publishing later takes it back to *not
found* rather than deleting anything.
**Delete page**, in the editor header, is the only way to correct a page id you
regret — the id is fixed once created. It takes the page, its sections and its
authored incidents with it; monitors and their history are untouched. If you
only want the page off the internet, un-publish it instead.
## Sections and components
A page is organised into **sections** — arbitrary groupings such as "API" or
@@ -55,12 +70,15 @@ more and claiming otherwise would be a false claim of health.
## What a visitor sees
- Component name, current state (up / down / under maintenance / unknown) and
a 90-day uptime percentage.
- Component name, current state (up / down / under maintenance / pending /
unknown) and a 90-day uptime percentage. **Pending** is a monitor that has
been added but has not produced a result yet; **unknown** is one nothing is
checking any more.
- A 90-day history bar per component.
- Any active incidents, upcoming maintenance, and a rolling history of both.
- An optional banner across the top of the page (info / warning / critical),
for anything you want said regardless of component state.
- An optional banner across the top of the page, for anything you want said
regardless of component state. It is one notice with one appearance — there
are no severity levels to choose between.
A visitor never sees a target URL, host or port, the check's expected status
or keyword, latency, a certificate expiry date, failure text, or which