Mask base64 and URL-encoded forms of secret values, each line of a
multi-line secret, and secrets loaded by earlier steps of the run.
Replace longer values first so overlapping secrets mask cleanly.
Requiring user verification made password managers such as NordPass ask
for their master password on every passkey use. Every ceremony now asks
for it as preferred and no longer rejects a result without it.
This is a deliberate trade-off: a passkey used without verification is
possession-only, so passwordless sign-in and step-up rest on the device or
vault being unlocked. The spec records the decision.
go-webauthn refuses an assertion whose Backup Eligible flag differs from
the stored credential's. The flag was never stored, so it compared against
false and every synced passkey (iCloud Keychain, Google Password Manager,
1Password) failed with "Backup Eligible flag inconsistency" - in
passwordless sign-in, second-factor sign-in and step-up alike.
Registration now stores BackupEligible and BackupState. Rows registered
before this have no baseline, so their first verified assertion adopts the
signed flag and records it; a recorded value always stands, so a genuine
change is still refused.
Every WebAuthn refusal answered "that passkey could not be verified" and
discarded the library's error, leaving a misconfigured relying party
undiagnosable. Log the stage, the derived RP ID and expected origin, the
request's Origin and X-Forwarded-Proto, and the library error with its
DevInfo. None of it is secret.
The MFA routes were missing from routeScopes and serverScopedRoutes, and both
boot assertions refused to start the server. They are deliberately not
reachable by API tokens, so they go in a new sessionOnlyRoutes set rather than
receiving a scope, and are declared exempt from server scoping.
Adds a test that registers the real routes and runs both boot assertions, so
an undeclared route fails CI instead of production startup.
- OIDC sessions minted through saveSignIn with AMR oidc and StepUpAt
- passwordless passkey uses ValidateDiscoverableLogin with owner-handle check
- TOTP replay guard burns the matched step, not the current one
- enrol-only tickets refused once the user already has a factor
- bootstrap owner session minted through mintSession
The missing /me/step-up/webauthn/begin and /finish were a plan defect,
not an acceptable gap: a user whose only factor is a passkey was
offered only recovery codes for step-up, burning one every ten
minutes. Adds the handlers in package auth (session-authenticated,
not themselves behind RequireStepUp, modeled on
HandleMFAWebAuthnBegin/finishAssertion) and registers both routes
behind the same RateLimitAuth() as /me/step-up. StepUpModal now offers
"Use passkey" when the server names webauthn and the browser supports
WebAuthn.
Adds the global re-authentication modal for guarded routes and the
owner/admin MFA controls on the settings page.
request() in lib/api.ts now intercepts a 403 step_up_required response,
awaits re-authentication through a callback registered by StepUpModal
(lib/stepup.ts), and retries the original request exactly once. The
modal offers TOTP, recovery code and password, since the webauthn
step-up routes (/me/step-up/webauthn/begin and /finish) are not
registered server-side yet; it omits the passkey option rather than
calling a route that does not exist.
me.stepUp posts one factor to /api/me/step-up. The settings page gains
an owner-only "Require MFA" toggle and the members table gains an MFA
column and a "Reset MFA" action, both routed through the existing
PUT /api/settings and DELETE /api/org/users/:id/mfa.
apt lists phased updates as upgradable while an upgrade defers them until
Ubuntu selects the host, so a freshly patched server kept reporting pending
updates. The agent now flags them; the server stores the flag and leaves them
out of patch run counts, and the server page shows them in their own section.
mrhid6