docs(monitors): document heartbeat and metric monitors; add heartbeat e2e

This commit is contained in:
2026-09-17 09:16:53 +00:00
parent 4158696388
commit 8908b435a0
4 changed files with 108 additions and 44 deletions
+13 -3
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@@ -267,7 +267,16 @@ a dark ground.
### Monitors
HTTP, TCP, ICMP and TLS checks. Each monitor has a `runner`: `"server"` (executed by the server-side scheduler) or a `server_id` (pushed to that agent, which runs it locally and reports results). Consecutive failures beyond `retries` flip state to `down`, open an `Incident`, and notify. Hourly `Rollup` documents back the uptime graphs.
HTTP, TCP, ICMP and TLS checks are pull-based. Each has a `runner`: `"server"` (executed by `monitorsched`) or a `server_id` (pushed to that agent, which runs it locally and reports results). Consecutive failures beyond `retries` flip state to `down`, open an `Incident`, and notify. Hourly `Rollup` documents back the uptime graphs.
Two passive types are never run by `monitorsched` or agents; `metricsched` sweeps them every 30s:
- `heartbeat`: jobs call `/public/hb/<token>` (plus `/start`, `/fail`), or send the token in `X-Vantage-Token` to `/public/hb[/start|/fail]`; a URL token wins. Request logs (gin formatter via `api.MaskLogPath`, bundled nginx `log_format vantage`) mask URL tokens. Down when a ping is overdue past period + grace, a start never finishes, or `/fail` is called. The token is stored hashed; plaintext is shown on create and `POST /api/monitors/:id/rotate-token` only.
- `metric`: a tag `selector` plus a rule (`disk_pct`, `disk_free_gb`, `mem_pct`, `load_per_core`, `unit_failed`, `container_unhealthy`, `reboot_pending_days`, `agent_offline_min`) evaluated against stored inventory and workloads. State is per server in `monitor_server_states`, with one incident per breaching server (`Incident.ServerID`). Inventory older than 5 minutes is skipped. Restricted tokens may only use selectors inside their tag scope.
All three paths share `applyTransition` (services/monitortransition.go) for incidents and notifications.
**Two known gaps, deferred.** Nginx's error log (not the access log) and gin's panic recovery dump can still record a URL token even with `MaskLogPath` masking normal request logs; the `X-Vantage-Token` header avoids putting the token in the URL at all, which is the mitigation until those paths are masked too. And the bundled nginx `vantage.conf` is reproduced in `vantage-docs`' self-hosted install docs, so its `log_format` change must be mirrored there as well - the routing-change rule above already says the file must be, this extends it to the log format.
### Notification channels
@@ -1084,7 +1093,8 @@ workflows GET,POST /steps · PUT,DELETE /steps/:id · GET /steps/:id/export
GET /runs/:runId · POST /runs/:runId/cancel
GET /runs/:runId/servers/:serverId/logs[/stream]
monitors GET,POST /monitors · GET,PUT,DELETE /monitors/:id
GET /monitors/:id/{incidents,uptime}
GET /monitors/:id/{incidents,uptime,samples,servers}
POST /monitors/:id/rotate-token
channels GET,POST /channels · PUT,DELETE /channels/:id · POST /channels/:id/test
secrets GET,POST /secrets · GET,PUT,DELETE /secrets/:group
POST /secrets/:group/reveal · DELETE /secrets/:group/:key
@@ -1174,7 +1184,7 @@ plane, each of which this codebase enforces:
## MongoDB Collections
`servers` · `keys` · `assignments` · `orgs` · `users` · `auth_providers` · `settings` · `secrets` · `workflows` · `workflow_steps` · `workflow_runs` · `workflow_log_lines` · `workflow_log_seq` · `monitors` · `incidents` · `monitor_rollups` · `notification_channels` · `console_sessions` · `audit_logs` · `server_packages` · `vuln_findings` · `vuln_alert_rules` · `vulndb_meta` · `server_workloads` · `api_tokens` · `status_pages` · `status_incidents` · `maintenance_windows` · `patch_policies` · `patch_runs` · `patch_run_outputs` · `user_mfa` · `webauthn_credentials` · `migrations`
`servers` · `keys` · `assignments` · `orgs` · `users` · `auth_providers` · `settings` · `secrets` · `workflows` · `workflow_steps` · `workflow_runs` · `workflow_log_lines` · `workflow_log_seq` · `monitors` · `incidents` · `monitor_rollups` · `monitor_server_states` · `notification_channels` · `console_sessions` · `audit_logs` · `server_packages` · `vuln_findings` · `vuln_alert_rules` · `vulndb_meta` · `server_workloads` · `api_tokens` · `status_pages` · `status_incidents` · `maintenance_windows` · `patch_policies` · `patch_runs` · `patch_run_outputs` · `user_mfa` · `webauthn_credentials` · `migrations`
Every document except `migrations` carries `org_id`. Struct definitions are the source of truth - see `server/internal/models/`.
+51
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@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
import { test, expect } from "@playwright/test";
import { ensureOwner, signIn } from "./helpers";
const BASE_URL = process.env.E2E_BASE_URL ?? "http://localhost:3000";
test("heartbeat monitor: URL ping, /fail, header ping", async ({ page, request }) => {
const owner = await ensureOwner(request);
await signIn(page, owner.email, owner.password);
const create = await page.request.post(`${BASE_URL}/api/monitors`, {
data: {
name: `e2e heartbeat ${Date.now()}`,
type: "heartbeat",
target: { period_sec: 3600, grace_sec: 300 },
enabled: true,
},
});
expect(create.status()).toBe(201);
const monitor = await create.json();
expect(monitor.heartbeat_token).toBeTruthy();
const ping = await request.get(`${BASE_URL}/public/hb/${monitor.heartbeat_token}`);
expect(ping.status()).toBe(200);
expect(await ping.text()).toBe("OK");
let got = await (await page.request.get(`${BASE_URL}/api/monitors/${monitor.monitor_id}`)).json();
expect(got.state.status).toBe("up");
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 1100)); // per-token limit is 1/s
const fail = await request.post(`${BASE_URL}/public/hb/${monitor.heartbeat_token}/fail`, { data: "disk full" });
expect(fail.status()).toBe(200);
got = await (await page.request.get(`${BASE_URL}/api/monitors/${monitor.monitor_id}`)).json();
expect(got.state.status).toBe("down");
expect(got.state.message).toContain("disk full");
const incidents = await (await page.request.get(`${BASE_URL}/api/monitors/${monitor.monitor_id}/incidents`)).json();
expect(incidents.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 1100));
const headerPing = await request.post(`${BASE_URL}/public/hb`, { headers: { "X-Vantage-Token": monitor.heartbeat_token } });
expect(headerPing.status()).toBe(200);
got = await (await page.request.get(`${BASE_URL}/api/monitors/${monitor.monitor_id}`)).json();
expect(got.state.status).toBe("up");
expect((await request.get(`${BASE_URL}/public/hb/not-a-real-token`)).status()).toBe(404);
expect((await request.post(`${BASE_URL}/public/hb`)).status()).toBe(404);
await page.goto(`${BASE_URL}/monitors/${monitor.monitor_id}`);
await expect(page.getByText(/last ping/i)).toBeVisible();
});
+36
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@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
import { type APIRequestContext, type Page } from "@playwright/test";
export const BASE_URL = process.env.E2E_BASE_URL ?? "http://localhost:3000";
let ownerEmail = process.env.E2E_OWNER_EMAIL ?? "";
let ownerPassword = process.env.E2E_OWNER_PASSWORD ?? "";
/** Ensures an owner account exists and returns its credentials, bootstrapping the instance if needed. */
export async function ensureOwner(request: APIRequestContext): Promise<{ email: string; password: string }> {
if (ownerEmail && ownerPassword) return { email: ownerEmail, password: ownerPassword };
const status = await request.get(`${BASE_URL}/auth/bootstrap-status`);
const body = await status.json();
if (!body.needs_setup) {
throw new Error(
"Instance is already bootstrapped and E2E_OWNER_EMAIL/E2E_OWNER_PASSWORD were not set - " +
"cannot create the owner account this suite needs to provision fresh members per test.",
);
}
ownerEmail = `e2e-owner-${Date.now()}@vantage.test`;
ownerPassword = "correct horse battery staple 1";
const res = await request.post(`${BASE_URL}/auth/bootstrap`, {
data: { instance_name: "E2E", email: ownerEmail, password: ownerPassword },
});
if (!res.ok()) throw new Error(`bootstrap failed: ${res.status()} ${await res.text()}`);
return { email: ownerEmail, password: ownerPassword };
}
/** Fills the login form and submits it. */
export async function signIn(page: Page, email: string, password: string) {
await page.goto("/login");
await page.getByLabel("Email").fill(email);
await page.getByLabel("Password").fill(password);
await page.getByRole("button", { name: "Sign In" }).click();
}
+8 -41
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@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
import { test, expect, type APIRequestContext, type BrowserContext, type Page } from "@playwright/test";
import { authenticator } from "otplib";
import { BASE_URL, ensureOwner, signIn } from "./helpers";
/**
* End-to-end coverage for Task 15 of the MFA design
@@ -17,33 +18,6 @@ import { authenticator } from "otplib";
* at an already-bootstrapped instance's owner instead.
*/
const BASE_URL = process.env.E2E_BASE_URL ?? "http://localhost:3000";
let ownerEmail = process.env.E2E_OWNER_EMAIL ?? "";
let ownerPassword = process.env.E2E_OWNER_PASSWORD ?? "";
/** Ensures an owner account exists and returns its credentials, bootstrapping the instance if needed. */
async function ensureOwner(request: APIRequestContext): Promise<{ email: string; password: string }> {
if (ownerEmail && ownerPassword) return { email: ownerEmail, password: ownerPassword };
const status = await request.get(`${BASE_URL}/auth/bootstrap-status`);
const body = await status.json();
if (!body.needs_setup) {
throw new Error(
"Instance is already bootstrapped and E2E_OWNER_EMAIL/E2E_OWNER_PASSWORD were not set - " +
"cannot create the owner account this suite needs to provision fresh members per test.",
);
}
ownerEmail = `e2e-owner-${Date.now()}@vantage.test`;
ownerPassword = "correct horse battery staple 1";
const res = await request.post(`${BASE_URL}/auth/bootstrap`, {
data: { instance_name: "MFA E2E", email: ownerEmail, password: ownerPassword },
});
if (!res.ok()) throw new Error(`bootstrap failed: ${res.status()} ${await res.text()}`);
return { email: ownerEmail, password: ownerPassword };
}
/** Creates a fresh, unique local member with no MFA enrolled, using an owner session. */
async function createMember(request: APIRequestContext): Promise<{ email: string; password: string }> {
const owner = await ensureOwner(request);
@@ -80,19 +54,12 @@ async function addVirtualAuthenticator(context: BrowserContext, page: Page): Pro
return authenticatorId;
}
async function fillCredentials(page: Page, email: string, password: string) {
await page.goto("/login");
await page.getByLabel("Email").fill(email);
await page.getByLabel("Password").fill(password);
await page.getByRole("button", { name: "Sign In" }).click();
}
test.describe("MFA end-to-end", () => {
test("TOTP sign-in", async ({ page, request }) => {
const { email, password } = await createMember(request);
// Sign in, land on the account security page, enrol TOTP.
await fillCredentials(page, email, password);
await signIn(page, email, password);
await expect(page).toHaveURL("/");
await page.goto("/account/security");
@@ -111,7 +78,7 @@ test.describe("MFA end-to-end", () => {
// Sign out and sign back in - TOTP is now required.
await page.request.post(`${BASE_URL}/auth/logout`);
await fillCredentials(page, email, password);
await signIn(page, email, password);
await expect(page.getByText("Enter the 6-digit code")).toBeVisible();
const nextCode = authenticator.generate(secret.trim());
@@ -125,7 +92,7 @@ test.describe("MFA end-to-end", () => {
const { email, password } = await createMember(request);
await addVirtualAuthenticator(context, page);
await fillCredentials(page, email, password);
await signIn(page, email, password);
await expect(page).toHaveURL("/");
await page.goto("/account/security");
@@ -138,7 +105,7 @@ test.describe("MFA end-to-end", () => {
await expect(page.getByText(/Added .* · Last used/)).toBeVisible();
await page.request.post(`${BASE_URL}/auth/logout`);
await fillCredentials(page, email, password);
await signIn(page, email, password);
await expect(page.getByText("Enter the 6-digit code")).toBeVisible();
await page.getByRole("button", { name: "Use passkey" }).click();
@@ -151,7 +118,7 @@ test.describe("MFA end-to-end", () => {
await addVirtualAuthenticator(context, page);
// Enrol a passkey first (typing the password once, during setup only).
await fillCredentials(page, email, password);
await signIn(page, email, password);
await expect(page).toHaveURL("/");
await page.goto("/account/security");
await page.getByRole("button", { name: "Add a passkey" }).click();
@@ -180,7 +147,7 @@ test.describe("MFA end-to-end", () => {
await request.post(`${BASE_URL}/auth/logout`);
// The member, who has no MFA yet, must enrol before reaching the app.
await fillCredentials(page, email, password);
await signIn(page, email, password);
await expect(page.getByText("This instance requires a second sign-in factor. Set one up to continue.")).toBeVisible();
await page.getByRole("button", { name: "Use an authenticator app" }).click();
@@ -204,7 +171,7 @@ test.describe("MFA end-to-end", () => {
// Enrol TOTP so the account has a factor - not exercised in this test,
// since sign-in itself sets StepUpAt and the window has not gone stale.
await fillCredentials(page, email, password);
await signIn(page, email, password);
await page.goto("/account/security");
await page.getByRole("button", { name: "Set up" }).click();
await page.getByRole("button", { name: "Use an authenticator app" }).click();