go-webauthn refuses an assertion whose Backup Eligible flag differs from
the stored credential's. The flag was never stored, so it compared against
false and every synced passkey (iCloud Keychain, Google Password Manager,
1Password) failed with "Backup Eligible flag inconsistency" - in
passwordless sign-in, second-factor sign-in and step-up alike.
Registration now stores BackupEligible and BackupState. Rows registered
before this have no baseline, so their first verified assertion adopts the
signed flag and records it; a recorded value always stands, so a genuine
change is still refused.
Every WebAuthn refusal answered "that passkey could not be verified" and
discarded the library's error, leaving a misconfigured relying party
undiagnosable. Log the stage, the derived RP ID and expected origin, the
request's Origin and X-Forwarded-Proto, and the library error with its
DevInfo. None of it is secret.
The MFA routes were missing from routeScopes and serverScopedRoutes, and both
boot assertions refused to start the server. They are deliberately not
reachable by API tokens, so they go in a new sessionOnlyRoutes set rather than
receiving a scope, and are declared exempt from server scoping.
Adds a test that registers the real routes and runs both boot assertions, so
an undeclared route fails CI instead of production startup.
- OIDC sessions minted through saveSignIn with AMR oidc and StepUpAt
- passwordless passkey uses ValidateDiscoverableLogin with owner-handle check
- TOTP replay guard burns the matched step, not the current one
- enrol-only tickets refused once the user already has a factor
- bootstrap owner session minted through mintSession
The missing /me/step-up/webauthn/begin and /finish were a plan defect,
not an acceptable gap: a user whose only factor is a passkey was
offered only recovery codes for step-up, burning one every ten
minutes. Adds the handlers in package auth (session-authenticated,
not themselves behind RequireStepUp, modeled on
HandleMFAWebAuthnBegin/finishAssertion) and registers both routes
behind the same RateLimitAuth() as /me/step-up. StepUpModal now offers
"Use passkey" when the server names webauthn and the browser supports
WebAuthn.
Adds the global re-authentication modal for guarded routes and the
owner/admin MFA controls on the settings page.
request() in lib/api.ts now intercepts a 403 step_up_required response,
awaits re-authentication through a callback registered by StepUpModal
(lib/stepup.ts), and retries the original request exactly once. The
modal offers TOTP, recovery code and password, since the webauthn
step-up routes (/me/step-up/webauthn/begin and /finish) are not
registered server-side yet; it omits the passkey option rather than
calling a route that does not exist.
me.stepUp posts one factor to /api/me/step-up. The settings page gains
an owner-only "Require MFA" toggle and the members table gains an MFA
column and a "Reset MFA" action, both routed through the existing
PUT /api/settings and DELETE /api/org/users/:id/mfa.
apt lists phased updates as upgradable while an upgrade defers them until
Ubuntu selects the host, so a freshly patched server kept reporting pending
updates. The agent now flags them; the server stores the flag and leaves them
out of patch run counts, and the server page shows them in their own section.
Windows reports boot time as now minus uptime, which drifts by a second or so
between reports. A static report sent in the grace period before the reboot
could read as a changed boot and mark a server still owing a reboot as failed.
- no dispatch in the last 15 minutes of a window; no-result timeout from dispatch time
- per-server output moves to patch_run_outputs (16MB document limit)
- reboot proven by a changed boot time; RebootTimeout 45m, ResultGrace 20m
- window update and delete are server-scoped against the policies using them
- scheduler puts the claim back on an error after it, so the next tick retries
- cancelled runs with failures alert; MCP apply_updates audits per server
- apply-updates 503 body documented; openapi regenerated
- web: cleared numeric fields no longer save as 0; Run now asks for confirmation
Fix round 1 review findings on the patch run service:
- advanceRun no longer runs every server's dispatch claim and failed-send
reset on the caller's shared short context; each gets its own fresh
patchCtx(), and a failed reset write is logged instead of discarded.
- The dispatch claim (queued/waiting_offline -> patching) now also requires
the run to still be status running with no cancelled_at, closing a race
where a tick that loaded the run just before CancelPatchRun wrote
cancelled_at could still dispatch.
- RecordPatchResult's write is now guarded on command_id too, so a late
result for a superseded command cannot land on a re-dispatched attempt.
Named patch_window.go (not patch_windows.go) since the _windows.go
suffix is Go's implicit GOOS build constraint and would silently
exclude the file on non-Windows builds.
Implements the patchrun package with a pure functional state machine for managing
patch runs. Contains no database dependencies - the services layer loads a run,
asks this package what should change, and writes changes guarded by expected status.
All 14 test cases pass, covering:
- Agent version parsing and support detection
- Concurrency limits and queueing
- Window deadlines and offline handling
- Result timeouts (ResultGrace, ManualTimeout, RebootTimeout)
- Reboot verification with boot time proof
- Run finalization logic
- Summary generation for alerts
The previous tests reimplemented the target-scope rule instead of calling
validateWorkflowTargetScope, so they proved nothing about CreateWorkflow
or UpdateWorkflow's actual enforcement. Split the check into a pure
decideWorkflowTargetScope (tested directly, no database) and a thin
wrapper behind an overridable listServersForScope seam, so tests can
invoke the real CreateWorkflow/UpdateWorkflow without a live database and
fail if the call sites are removed.
Close the time-of-write/time-of-fire gap: a restricted caller could
previously save target_tags matching no server today (a selector aimed
at hosts not yet provisioned or not yet tagged), pass validation on an
empty set, and have the scheduler fire on those hosts the moment they
appeared. Now a restricted caller specifying targets that resolve to
nothing is refused with the same message as an out-of-scope match; a
workflow with no targets at all, and an unrestricted caller, are
unaffected.
A database error while resolving the fleet now surfaces as an error
instead of folding into a pass.
Correct three comments that overstated what the code does: the
create/update route comment now mentions the tag-scope check, not only
validateTargetServers; the schedule route comment explains its safety
holds only for workflows written after this check existed, not for rows
already in the database under the old rule.
CreateWorkflow and UpdateWorkflow validated TargetServerIDs against the
caller's scope but never checked TargetTags, letting a restricted token
save a workflow with an empty ID list and an out-of-scope tag selector,
then reach those hosts once the scheduler fires it as the system with no
restriction of its own. Add validateWorkflowTargetScope, applying the
same all-or-nothing rule the MCP create_workflow tool already enforces:
resolve the full target set unscoped and scoped, refuse unless they
match. Update the PUT /api/workflows/:id/schedule fleetWide comment to
say why it is safe now (targets are constrained at write time) rather
than repeating the falsified claim that scheduling reaches nothing new.
TestServerScopeMapCoversEveryScopedRoute wrongly required serverScopedRoutes
to be a subset of routeScopes, which only covers the authenticated /api
group. The ESO route is registered on the root router and is exempt from
routeScopes by design, so it failed the test despite being correctly
declared. Lift the hardcoded exception in AssertScopeMapComplete into a
named routesOutsideAPIGroup set that both scopes.go and the test read.
GET /api/monitors and GET /api/monitors/:id returned Monitor.Runner
unfiltered; for an agent-pushed monitor that field is literally a server
ID, so a restricted token learned which out-of-scope server a monitor
runs on directly, not merely that one exists. services.RedactMonitorRunner
replaces Runner with models.RunnerRestricted when it names a server
outside the caller's scope, resolved once via the new
services.VisibleServerIDs rather than per monitor. The monitor itself is
still returned — a restricted operator may legitimately need to see that
it exists and is up or down — only the runner field goes neutral; omitting
the monitor entirely was considered and rejected as more surprising than
one field changing. Runner "server" (control-plane-run) is never
touched. The MCP list_monitors/get_monitor_status projections never had a
Runner field to begin with, so REST and the tool surface already agreed;
a comment now records why.
GET /api/workflows and GET /api/workflows/:id returned
Workflow.TargetServerIDs unfiltered — directly naming out-of-scope
servers, worse than a count. services.FilterVisibleServerIDs narrows the
list to what VisibleServerIDs admits and reports hidden (no count) when
at least one target was dropped; WorkflowResponse wraps *models.Workflow
with a scoped TargetServerIDs and a TargetsRestricted flag. TargetTags is
left untouched — the tag vocabulary is already ruled acceptable to
expose. The MCP list_workflows/get_workflow tools get the identical
treatment: list_workflows' target count is now based on the filtered ID
list, and get_workflow's workflowDetail carries the same
TargetsRestricted flag, so a model that sees a filtered target list and
then has run_workflow refuse the same workflow for out-of-scope targets
is not left concluding the refusal invented a problem the list never
mentioned.
All four routes recorded in serverScopedRoutes as true; none is
boot-enforced, for the same substring-filter reason as the key routes
added in the previous round.
GET /api/keys returned each key's AssignedCount as a raw
CountDocuments over every non-revoked assignment, with no scope filter —
a tag-restricted token reading the list saw a nonzero count for a key it
can see nothing assigned to in its own scope, which is enough to tell it
an assignment exists on a host it must not know about. Same class of leak
getKey's assignment-list filter closed on the detail route, surviving on
the list route through a count instead of a server object.
services.ListKeys now takes the caller's tokenScope. An unrestricted
caller (empty scope) takes the original unfiltered per-key
CountDocuments with no extra work, so the common case is not slower. A
restricted caller resolves the visible fleet once via ListServers before
the per-key loop, then counts each key's assignments with an added
server_id $in filter — one extra query total, not one per key.
ListKeys had exactly one caller (listKeys), so the parameter went there
rather than adding a second entry point.
Recorded GET /api/keys in serverScopedRoutes as true; its path, like GET
/api/keys/:id, matches none of serverTouchingRoutes' substrings, so the
entry is not boot-enforced. Deliberately did not widen the filter to
catch "keys" — that would sweep in create/delete/private-key routes with
no server data at all. The real fix for this shape of gap is the
declare-by-default inversion already recorded as a follow-up.
serverTouchingRoutes in cmd/main.go filtered on "server"/"console"/an exact
workflows-run match, which is how POST /api/keys/:id/assign reached
production with no scope check and no boot-time signal at all: its path
names neither. Widen the filter to also match ":serverId" and "assign",
and document at the filter why a substring match is the weak part of this
design — a route that acts on a server without saying so in its path stays
invisible to it — noting that inverting the model (every /api route
declares itself, with an exemption list) would be the stronger fix and is
left as a follow-up. Re-running the mechanical check against the widened
filter swept in no route beyond what serverScopedRoutes already declared.
GET /api/keys/:id also leaked out-of-scope hostnames: it returned every
assignment for a key, server attached, unfiltered by the caller's tag
restriction. getKey now drops any assignment whose server fails
services.ServerInTokenScope before returning the list — silently, so the
response carries no count of what was removed — while still returning the
key itself, since a restricted token may legitimately hold a key also
assigned outside its scope. GetAssignmentsWithServers has exactly one
caller (getKey), so the filtering is done in the handler rather than
threaded into the service. Recorded in serverScopedRoutes; its path
matches none of the filter's substrings either, so it is not boot-enforced
and is kept as a considered decision, same as the assign/revoke entries.
Every early return from a write-tool handler skipped both the tool's own
LogCall and transport.go's gated LogCall (which only fires for reads), so a
blocked mutation attempt left no audit trail. registerSDKTool now routes
every write-tool error through LogDenied (fan-out and tag-scope refusals,
by gate name) or LogFailure (everything else), keeping the successful-write
path logging its own resolved server count exactly as before.
Also close a live scope gap surfaced while reviewing this: POST
/api/keys/:id/assign called services.AssignKey with an unscoped GetServer
lookup, so a tag-restricted token could assign a key to a server outside
its restriction. The handler now resolves the target through
GetServerScoped first, matching its sibling revoke route, and the route is
recorded in serverScopedRoutes.
summariseServer compared Status against "online", a value never assigned
anywhere (the real vocabulary is pending/active/offline), so every server
misreported as offline. search_fleet's version_below used a lexicographic
comparison across dpkg/rpm/apk version schemes with no common ordering, so
it refuses that filter now and returns all matches instead of a wrong
answer. listAuditResult's Total carried the "shown" JSON tag and the
capped count; it now reports the real total alongside shown.
mrhid6