Requiring user verification made password managers such as NordPass ask
for their master password on every passkey use. Every ceremony now asks
for it as preferred and no longer rejects a result without it.
This is a deliberate trade-off: a passkey used without verification is
possession-only, so passwordless sign-in and step-up rest on the device or
vault being unlocked. The spec records the decision.
Thirteen tasks, each ending in a testable deliverable and a commit.
Also drops --log-level from the spec: the tool's whole output is what it is
telling the operator, and a level that could hide a key warning is worth not
having.
vantagectl/Dockerfile follows the repo's per-module convention rather than
living under deploy/docker.
verify's live check needs AES-GCM open, so the cipher primitives move to
shared/cryptobox and services/crypto.go delegates, rather than a second
copy of the cipher existing in another module.
Standalone vantagectl CLI (cobra, own module) that dumps and restores a
whole Vantage MongoDB database, stamping a sha256 fingerprint of
KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY into the manifest so a restore cannot silently produce
a database whose secrets are unreadable.
The key itself never enters the archive.
createToken's catch-all answered 400 for every unmatched error, so a
database failure reported itself as the caller's malformed request. Found
in review of Task 7.
The plan's Middleware called sessionFromToken even when sessionFromCookie
had already answered a rejected cookie, putting two JSON bodies on the
wire for the ordinary expired-session case. Found in review of Task 5.
Twelve tasks from model through middleware, scope enforcement, endpoints,
web UI, generated OpenAPI and documentation. Verification is build plus
curl and UI checks rather than test cycles, matching a repository with no
Go test harness beyond shared/mail.
Adds the approved design for personal access tokens on the control plane
REST API, and for the generated OpenAPI 3.1 document served as a Scalar
reference page.
Tokens fall back into the existing session middleware rather than getting
their own route group, so every handler, role guard and audit call works
unchanged. Scope enforcement derives from the registered route pattern and
fails closed, with a boot-time check for unmapped routes.
A Terraform provider is deliberately left to a follow-on spec.
Both plans now verify by build, vet and manual checks written into the
tasks. Spec verification sections updated to match so they no longer
describe tests that will not be written.
Agents enumerate Docker containers, compose stacks and systemd services;
start/stop/restart and bounded log snapshots from the UI.
Sub-project B, Linux only. Live log following stays in the console.
17 tasks, TDD where the logic is pure. Corrects two spec claims:
the server reads features via License.HasFeature rather than admin's
entitlement directly, and shared/mail/render_test.go does not exist.
Agents report installed packages; the control plane matches them against
trivy-db and raises findings that link to the existing ApplyUpdatesCmd
patching path.
Scoped to sub-project A, Linux only. Container registry, image scanning
and compliance baselines are separate specs.
mrhid6