mrhid6andClaude Opus 5
5f35b57268
The old index was load-bearing because two lookups were unscoped. Both are scoped now and the unscoped helper is gone, so the property that matters is the absence of any unscoped lookup by email. Says so, and documents auth_source hq. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
538 lines
40 KiB
Markdown
538 lines
40 KiB
Markdown
# Vantage
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A self-hosted, multi-tenant infrastructure control plane. It started as SSH key management and has grown into fleet management: SSH key assignment, workflow/script execution, service monitoring, a secrets vault, a browser console (SSH/RDP/VNC), and OS update management.
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A central server (Go + Next.js + MongoDB + Redis) drives a lightweight Go agent installed on each managed server. Agents poll over gRPC and also hold a bidirectional command stream for push-style commands.
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---
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## Architecture Overview
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```
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┌──────────────────────────────────────────────┐
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│ Next.js 16 Frontend (web, :3000) │
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│ servers · keys · workflows · monitors │
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│ secrets · audit · console · settings │
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└───────────────┬──────────────────────────────┘
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│ REST + cookie session
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┌───────────────▼──────────────────────────────┐
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│ Go Backend (server) │
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│ :8080 REST (gin) :9090 gRPC (agents) │
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│ MongoDB (state) · Redis (sessions) │
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│ monitor scheduler · workflow runner │
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│ guacd tunnel proxy for browser console │
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└───────────────┬──────────────────────────────┘
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│ gRPC (TLS) — outbound from agent only
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┌───────────────▼──────────────────────────────┐
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│ Go Agent (per server, Linux + Windows) │
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│ polls SyncKeys · CommandStream │
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│ rewrites authorized_keys (Linux only) │
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│ runs workflow steps · monitors · inventory │
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└──────────────────────────────────────────────┘
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```
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Multi-tenancy: every domain document carries `org_id`, and every service query is scoped by it. Org is resolved from the session, and optionally cross-checked against the request host (`<slug>.vantage.<tld>`).
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---
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## Repository Structure
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```
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vantage/
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├── agent/
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│ ├── cmd/main.go # flags: -generate-key
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│ └── internal/
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│ ├── checker/ # monitor check execution
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│ ├── config/ # config.yaml load/save
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│ ├── exec/ # workflow step execution
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│ ├── grpc/ # client + generated pb
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│ ├── inventory/ # CPU/mem/disk collection (linux/other)
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│ ├── keys/ # authorized_keys read/diff/write
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│ ├── monitors/ # agent-run monitor loop
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│ ├── sync/ # poll loop + command stream
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│ └── updates/ # OS package update check/apply
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├── server/
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│ ├── cmd/main.go
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│ └── internal/
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│ ├── api/ # REST handlers
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│ ├── auth/ # local, OIDC, session, middleware, orghost
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│ ├── checker/ # server-run monitor checks
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│ ├── db/ # mongo connect + Col()
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│ ├── grpc/ # gRPC server + generated pb
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│ ├── models/ # MongoDB documents
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│ ├── monitorsched/ # server-side monitor scheduler
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│ ├── notify/ # smtp, http, templating, dispatch
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│ └── services/ # business logic + migrations
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├── web/ # the application UI (authenticated)
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│ ├── app/(app)/ # authed routes
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│ ├── app/login, app/setup # unauthed routes
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│ ├── components/ # ui/, workflows/, monitors/, Sidebar
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│ └── lib/ # api client, guac console, query client
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├── site/ # public marketing site
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│ ├── app/ # one directory per route
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│ ├── components/ # Nav, Footer, Logo, InstrumentPanel, forms
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│ ├── assets/ # image sources, not served
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│ └── Dockerfile # same shape as web/: standalone, node, 3000
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├── sitesvc/ # public forms: contact mail + signup
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│ ├── cmd/main.go
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│ └── internal/
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│ ├── api/ # contact, signup, verify
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│ ├── mail/ # SMTP
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│ ├── models/ # mirrors server org/user + pending signup
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│ ├── provision/ # slug rules mirrored from the control plane
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│ └── store/ # mongo: pending signups, org/user creation
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├── admin/ # licensing authority: the only signer
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│ ├── cmd/main.go # boot: two Mongo connections, reconciler, HTTP
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│ ├── cmd/adminctl/ # staff-add; deliberately has no HTTP surface
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│ └── internal/
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│ ├── api/ # customer + staff handlers, route table
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│ ├── auth/ # staff, cloud-owner and self-hosted sessions
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│ ├── inject/ # the ONE write path into the control plane
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│ ├── licensing/ # Issue, LinkInstance, Relink
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│ ├── mail/ # verification and licence delivery
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│ └── models/ # accounts, instances, licences, plans
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├── adminsite/ # staff + customer console (vantage-hq)
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│ ├── app/(customer)/ # overview, instance, link, billing
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│ ├── app/(staff)/staff/ # operations, accounts, licences, plans, audit
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│ ├── components/ # InstanceCard, Ledger, Queue, EnvBadge
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│ └── lib/ # api client, session guards, formatters
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├── shared/ # imported by server, sitesvc and admin
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│ ├── license/ # payload, sign, verify, trusted keys, plans
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│ ├── models/ # Instance, User, Settings
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│ └── cmd/lkctl/ # issue and inspect licences by hand
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├── proto/vantage/v1/vantage.proto
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├── installer/ # Windows: setup.ps1, nssm.exe, WiX .wxs
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├── deploy/ # docker-compose.yml, agent.service
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└── .gitea/workflows/ # agent-release.yml, server-deploy.yml
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```
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---
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## Subsystems
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### SSH keys
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Upload a public key, assign it per server, revoke softly. The agent diffs desired vs on-disk state and rewrites `/root/.ssh/authorized_keys` atomically. Keys can also be generated _on_ a server by the agent; the private half can optionally be uploaded and is stored AES-256-GCM encrypted.
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### Workflows
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A library of reusable **steps** (bash or PowerShell scripts with declared inputs, outputs, and secret refs) composed into **workflows** targeting a set of servers. Running one snapshots the resolved steps into a `WorkflowRun`, then dispatches `RunStepCmd` over the agent command stream. Step stdout/stderr streams back as `StepOutputChunk` and is written to a log file on disk; the UI streams it live. Steps support `on_failure: stop|continue|retry`, per-run env passed between steps via `output_env`, and a per-run workspace directory the agent cleans up at the end.
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Default steps are seeded per org at boot (`SeedDefaultSteps`). Logs are swept by retention (`workflow_log_retention_days`; nil = 30 days, 0 = forever).
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### Monitors
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HTTP, TCP, ICMP and TLS checks. Each monitor has a `runner`: `"server"` (executed by the server-side scheduler) or a `server_id` (pushed to that agent, which runs it locally and reports results). Consecutive failures beyond `retries` flip state to `down`, open an `Incident`, and notify. Hourly `Rollup` documents back the uptime graphs.
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### Notification channels
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Per-org outbound destinations: `webhook`, `smtp`, `discord`, `slack`, `telegram`. Monitors reference channels by ID. Channels are testable from the UI.
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### Secrets vault
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Key/value pairs grouped by name, encrypted at rest with AES-256-GCM. Consumed two ways: referenced by workflow steps via `secret_refs` (injected as env at execution), and read by Kubernetes External Secrets Operator via `GET /api/secrets/:group/values` using a bearer token whose SHA-256 hash is stored in settings.
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### Browser console
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`POST /api/console/connect` mints a one-time session token; `GET /api/console/tunnel` upgrades to a WebSocket and proxies to **guacd** (Apache Guacamole daemon) using `github.com/wwt/guac`. SSH connections authenticate with a stored private key; RDP/VNC credentials are encrypted, single-use, and consumed when the tunnel opens.
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### Inventory and OS updates
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Agents report CPU/memory/swap/partitions/kernel — metrics every 30s, full static snapshot every 15 min. They also check for pending OS package updates hourly and can apply them on command (`ApplyUpdatesCmd`).
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### Agent self-update
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`UpdateAgentCmd` carries a target version and Gitea base URL; the agent downloads and replaces itself.
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### Marketing site and sitesvc
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`site/` is a separate Next.js app built exactly like `web/` — `output: "standalone"`, run by Node in a `node:26-alpine` image, listening on `3000` and published as `3003`. Both of its forms post to `sitesvc`; the control plane is not involved and has no public signup endpoint.
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`adminsite/` is built the same way and published as `3004`, served at **`vantage-hq.hostxtra.co.uk`** — deliberately *outside* `*.vantage.hostxtra.co.uk`, because that namespace is per-tenant instance subdomains and `APP_ROOT_LABEL` resolves an org from the label before `vantage`. It shares `site/`'s design tokens verbatim (see Frontend below) and, unlike `web/`, does **not** proxy through a Next rewrite: the browser calls `admin` directly, so `ADMIN_API_URL` must be browser-reachable and listed in admin's `ADMIN_ORIGIN`. Authenticated requests work cross-origin only because both hosts share the registrable domain `hostxtra.co.uk`, which keeps `admin_session`'s `SameSite=Lax` cookie in play.
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`sitesvc/` (port `8082`) owns both flows end to end:
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| Form | Endpoint | Effect |
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| ------------------- | ------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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| Contact | `POST /api/contact` | Emails `support@hostxtra.co.uk`, `Reply-To` the sender. Nothing stored. |
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| Create organisation | `POST /api/signup` | Records a pending signup and emails a verification link. |
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| Verification link | `GET /api/verify?token=…` | Creates the org and its owner, then redirects to the org's sign-in page (`APP_LOGIN_URL` with `{slug}` filled in). |
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All three are deliberately **excluded from the self-hosted deployment**: `deploy/docker-compose.yml` mentions none of them, and they live in `deploy/docker-compose.site.yml` instead.
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```bash
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# self-hosted install — no marketing site, no sitesvc
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docker compose up -d
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# vantage.hostxtra.co.uk — control plane plus the public site
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docker compose -f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.site.yml up -d
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```
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### Signup and verification
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**Nothing is written to `orgs` or `users` until the emailed link is opened.** A signup lands in sitesvc's own `site_pending_signups` collection holding the org name, the address, and the password already bcrypt-hashed at cost 12. The consequence is worth stating: an address nobody controls can never occupy an email, hold an organisation slug, or produce an account that can sign in. It also means the control plane's login path needs no concept of "unverified".
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- The token is 32 random bytes; only its **SHA-256 hash** is stored, so a leaked database yields no working links.
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- `Verify` deletes the pending record **atomically before provisioning** (`FindOneAndDelete`), so a double-clicked link cannot create two organisations — the second delete matches nothing.
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- Links expire after 24 hours, and a **TTL index** lets Mongo drop abandoned signups so password hashes do not linger.
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- Re-submitting the form for the same address replaces the previous pending record, so only the newest link works.
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- If the owner insert fails after the org is created, the org is rolled back rather than stranded holding a slug. The rollback refuses to touch an org that has users.
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- Rate limited to 3 signups per client IP per hour, plus a honeypot field.
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### The one piece of duplicated logic
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`sitesvc/internal/provision` and `sitesvc/internal/models` mirror the control plane's slug rules, reserved names, bcrypt cost and document shapes. They are duplicated rather than imported because sitesvc is a separate module that deliberately does not depend on the server.
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**Nothing enforces the match automatically.** If the control plane's `Slugify`, `reservedSlugs`, `CreateOrg` or `CreateUser` change, update `sitesvc/internal/provision` in the same commit — a divergence would provision tenants under rules the app does not agree with.
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sitesvc also (re)declares the unique indexes on `users.email` and `orgs.slug` at boot so it does not depend on the server having started first. Creating an existing index is a no-op.
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---
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## Auth and Orgs
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- **Bootstrap** — first run has no users. `GET /auth/bootstrap-status` drives `/setup`, `POST /auth/bootstrap` creates the first org plus its owner.
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- **Local auth** — email + password (bcrypt), `POST /auth/login`.
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- **OIDC** — configured _per org_ (`org_oidc`), issuer + client ID + encrypted client secret. `/auth/oidc/start` → `/auth/oidc/callback`.
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- **Sessions** — opaque 32-byte hex ID in the `km_session` cookie, session body stored in Redis with a 24h TTL.
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- **Roles** — `owner`, `admin`, `member`. `/api/settings` and `/api/org/*` require owner or admin.
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- **Host/org guard** — `APP_ROOT_LABEL` (default `vantage`) defines the app root label. A request to `<slug>.vantage.<tld>` resolves that org from the slug and rejects sessions belonging to a different one. Org lookups are cached for 60s.
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Unique indexes are a **security property**, not an optimisation. `users` is
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unique on `(instance_id, email)` — one address is one user *within* an instance,
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and the same address may hold a user in several instances, because an account's
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people are projected into each instance they are granted. This is sufficient only
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because **every lookup by email is scoped by instance**; there is deliberately no
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unscoped lookup anywhere, and adding one would let the login path return an
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arbitrary one of several matching users. Instance slug, settings instance and ESO
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token hash remain globally unique.
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---
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## gRPC API
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```protobuf
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service Vantage {
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rpc Register(RegisterRequest) returns (RegisterResponse);
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rpc SyncKeys(SyncRequest) returns (SyncResponse);
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rpc UploadGeneratedKey(UploadKeyRequest) returns (UploadKeyResponse);
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rpc ReportUpdates(ReportUpdatesRequest) returns (ReportUpdatesResponse);
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rpc ReportInventory(InventoryReport) returns (InventoryReportResponse);
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rpc SyncMonitors(SyncMonitorsRequest) returns (SyncMonitorsResponse);
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rpc ReportChecks(ReportChecksRequest) returns (ReportChecksResponse);
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rpc CommandStream(stream AgentMessage) returns (stream ServerCommand);
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}
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```
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`CommandStream` is the only streaming RPC: the agent authenticates once with `AgentReady`, then the server pushes `ServerCommand`s and the agent replies with `CommandResult`, `StepResult`, or `StepOutputChunk`.
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`ServerCommand` variants: `GenerateKeyCmd`, `DeleteKeyCmd`, `UpdateAgentCmd`, `ApplyUpdatesCmd`, `RunStepCmd`, `CleanupWorkspaceCmd`.
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Key-state polling stays on the 30s `SyncKeys` interval. Full message definitions live in `proto/vantage/v1/vantage.proto`.
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---
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## REST API
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Unauthenticated:
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```
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GET /install /install.ps1 # dynamic agent install scripts
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GET /update /update.ps1
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GET /auth/bootstrap-status
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POST /auth/bootstrap /auth/login /auth/logout
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GET /auth/me /auth/oidc/start /auth/oidc/callback
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GET /api/secrets/:group/values # bearer token (ESO)
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```
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Session-authed under `/api`:
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```
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servers GET,POST /servers · GET,POST /servers/new · GET,DELETE /servers/:id
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POST /servers/:id/{generate-key,update-agent,apply-updates}
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keys GET,POST /keys · GET,DELETE /keys/:id · GET /keys/:id/private-key
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POST /keys/:id/assign · DELETE /keys/:id/assign/:serverId
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workflows GET,POST /steps · PUT,DELETE /steps/:id · GET /steps/:id/export
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POST /steps/{import,seed-defaults,parse} · GET /steps/usage
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GET,POST /workflows · GET,PUT,DELETE /workflows/:id
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POST /workflows/:id/run · GET /workflows/:id/runs
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GET /runs/:runId · POST /runs/:runId/cancel
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GET /runs/:runId/servers/:serverId/logs[/stream]
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monitors GET,POST /monitors · GET,PUT,DELETE /monitors/:id
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GET /monitors/:id/{incidents,uptime}
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channels GET,POST /channels · PUT,DELETE /channels/:id · POST /channels/:id/test
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secrets GET,POST /secrets · GET,PUT,DELETE /secrets/:group
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POST /secrets/:group/reveal · DELETE /secrets/:group/:key
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console POST /console/connect · GET /console/tunnel (websocket)
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audit GET /audit
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agent GET /agent/latest-version
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settings GET,PUT /settings · POST /settings/secrets-token (owner|admin)
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org GET,POST /org/users · PUT /org/users/:id/role · DELETE /org/users/:id
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GET,PUT /org/oidc (owner|admin)
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```
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---
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## Admin REST API (`admin`, :8083)
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A separate service with its own session cookie (`admin_session`) and its own database. Unauthenticated:
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```
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GET /healthz
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GET /auth/me # who am I; 401 drives the UI's redirects
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POST /auth/staff/login /auth/login /auth/logout
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POST /auth/signup # self-hosted only; honeypot + rate limited
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GET /auth/verify?token=…
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```
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Customer-session (`/api`), every instance resolved through `ownedInstance`:
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```
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GET /account # account, instances, max_relinks
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POST /instances/link · /instances/:id/relink
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GET /instances/:id/license · /instances/:id/license/download
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GET /subscriptions
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```
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Staff-session (`/api/staff`):
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```
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GET,POST /accounts · GET /accounts/:id # search by name, email, Paddle ID or instance UUID
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GET,POST /instances · GET /instances/:id # instance + account + licence history + injection state
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POST /instances/:id/issue · /instances/:id/relink
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GET /licenses · /subscriptions · /audit · /plans · PUT /plans/:tier
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GET /health/injection
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```
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**Customer endpoints answer 404, never 403, for another account's resource** — a 403 confirms the resource exists. Route-group guards in `adminsite/` mirror this, but the backend is the layer that matters.
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## MongoDB Collections
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`servers` · `keys` · `assignments` · `orgs` · `users` · `org_oidc` · `settings` · `secrets` · `workflows` · `workflow_steps` · `workflow_runs` · `monitors` · `incidents` · `monitor_rollups` · `notification_channels` · `console_sessions` · `audit_logs` · `migrations`
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Every document except `migrations` carries `org_id`. Struct definitions are the source of truth — see `server/internal/models/`.
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`site_pending_signups` is written only by sitesvc and holds unverified signups; the control plane neither reads nor knows about it.
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Notes that are not obvious from the structs:
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- `servers.agent_token_hash` stores SHA-256 of the token, never plaintext. `pre_reg_token` is cleared after `Register()`. `status` is `pending` → `active` on register, `offline` when `last_seen` passes the threshold (swept every 2 min).
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- `servers.inventory` holds the latest metrics snapshot with separate `metrics_at` / `static_at` timestamps.
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- `keys.private_key_enc` and `passphrase_enc` are AES-256-GCM; the JSON form exposes only `has_private_key` / `has_passphrase`.
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- `assignments.revoked_at: null` means active. Revocation is soft, preserving audit history.
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- `workflow_runs.steps_snapshot` freezes the resolved steps so editing the library never rewrites history.
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- `console_sessions.token_consumed_at` is set atomically to enforce one-time use.
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- `users.auth_source` is `local`, `oidc` or `hq`. An `hq` user was projected from a Vantage HQ account and carries `hq_user_id`; HQ owns its role, password and existence.
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### Migrations
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`services.RunMigrations()` runs at boot, recording markers in `migrations`:
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- `0001_default_org_backfill`
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- `0002_settings_org_backfill` (must run before 0003 — 0003 can create a `default` org, which pushes 0002 into its ambiguous multi-org branch)
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- `0003_missed_org_scopes`
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Index builders (`EnsureAuthIndexes`, `EnsureSettingsIndexes`) are fatal on failure; `EnsureSecretIndexes` and `EnsureWorkflowIndexes` only warn.
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---
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## Agent Lifecycle
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### Config file
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Linux `/etc/vantage/config.yaml`, Windows `%ProgramData%\vantage\config.yaml`. Directory `0700`, file `0600`.
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```yaml
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server_url: "vantage.yourdomain.com:9090"
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server_id: "<uuid>"
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pre_reg_token: "<token>" # removed after first successful Register()
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agent_token: "" # written by agent after Register()
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poll_interval: 30s
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tls: true
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```
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### Startup
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```
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1. Load config
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2. If pre_reg_token present → Register() → save agent_token, clear pre_reg_token, reconnect
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3. Start goroutines: command stream · update check (hourly) · inventory · monitors
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4. Enter SyncKeys poll loop (default 30s)
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```
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### Poll loop
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```
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1. SyncKeys(server_id, agent_token, agent_version)
|
|
2. Non-Linux hosts stop here — Windows agents register and heartbeat only
|
|
3. Diff desired keys against /root/.ssh/authorized_keys; unchanged → no write
|
|
4. Changed → write .tmp, os.Rename() over the real file, chmod 0600
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
### Install
|
|
|
|
Linux: systemd unit at `/etc/systemd/system/vantage-agent.service`, `Restart=always`, runs as root.
|
|
Windows: MSI built by CI (WiX), or `installer/setup.ps1` registering the agent as a service via NSSM.
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
|
|
## Server Registration Flow
|
|
|
|
1. **Add Server** in the UI calls `POST /api/servers/new`, which generates a `server_id` and a pre-registration token (TTL 1 hour, single-use).
|
|
2. The UI shows a one-liner:
|
|
```bash
|
|
curl -fsSL https://vantage.yourdomain.com/install | \
|
|
bash -s -- --server-id=<id> --token=<token>
|
|
```
|
|
Windows gets the `/install.ps1` equivalent.
|
|
3. The script detects arch, downloads the agent from the Gitea release, verifies the SHA-256 checksum, writes the config, installs and starts the service.
|
|
4. The server flips to `active` on first sync.
|
|
|
|
`/install` is served dynamically, injecting the latest agent version from the Gitea API.
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
|
|
## Environment Variables (server)
|
|
|
|
| Name | Required | Notes |
|
|
| -------------------------- | --------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
|
| `GRPC_HOST` | **yes** | `host:port` agents dial. Boot fails without it — there is no safe default; falling back to the web host would hand agents a port that does not speak gRPC. |
|
|
| `MONGO_URI` | no | default `mongodb://localhost:27017` |
|
|
| `MONGO_DB` | no | default `vantage` |
|
|
| `REDIS_ADDR` | no | default `localhost:6379` |
|
|
| `KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY` | yes in practice | 64-char hex (32 bytes) for AES-256-GCM. Required for private keys, secrets, OIDC secrets, RDP credentials. |
|
|
| `GITEA_HOST` | yes | used to build install scripts and agent download URLs |
|
|
| `GUACD_ADDR` | no | default `guacd:4822` |
|
|
| `APP_ROOT_LABEL` | no | default `vantage`; wrong value disables the host/session org guard |
|
|
| `VANTAGE_WORKFLOW_LOG_DIR` | no | where run logs are written |
|
|
|
|
**sitesvc** (`deploy/docker-compose.site.yml` only):
|
|
|
|
| Name | Required | Notes |
|
|
| --------------------------------- | --------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
|
|
| `MONGO_URI` | yes | **must point at the control plane's database**, or the app will not see organisations created here. The database name is read from the URI path (`mongodb://user:pass@host:27017/vantage?authSource=vantage`); a URI without one is refused at boot rather than defaulted. Note this differs from the server, which takes `MONGO_DB` separately. |
|
|
| `PUBLIC_URL` | yes | sitesvc's own public base URL; verification links are built from it |
|
|
| `APP_LOGIN_URL` | no | template for the org sign-in URL a verified owner is redirected to. `{slug}` is replaced with the new org's slug (each org has its own subdomain), e.g. `https://{slug}.vantage.hostxtra.co.uk/login`. A value without `{slug}` is used verbatim; empty means a plain confirmation page. |
|
|
| `SMTP_HOST` / `SMTP_FROM` | yes | without them both forms refuse (503) rather than silently dropping |
|
|
| `SMTP_TO` | no | default `support@hostxtra.co.uk`; contact enquiries only |
|
|
| `SMTP_PORT` | no | default `587`; `465` uses implicit TLS |
|
|
| `SMTP_USERNAME` / `SMTP_PASSWORD` | no | auth skipped when username is empty |
|
|
| `SITE_ORIGIN` | yes in practice | comma-separated allowed origins; unset refuses every cross-origin browser request |
|
|
| `TRUST_PROXY` | no | only `true` behind a proxy that overwrites `X-Forwarded-For`, or clients spoof past the rate limiter |
|
|
|
|
`deploy/docker-compose.yml` runs four services: `redis`, `guacd`, `server` (8080 + 9090), `web` (3000). MongoDB is external. `deploy/docker-compose.site.yml` adds four more — `site` (3003), `sitesvc` (8082), `admin` (8083) and `adminsite` (3004) — and is only used on vantage.hostxtra.co.uk.
|
|
|
|
`LICENSE_SIGNING_KEY` appears in **exactly one service in exactly one compose file**: `admin` in `docker-compose.site.yml`. It must never be added to `server`, and the self-hosted `docker-compose.yml` must never mention `admin` or `adminsite` at all. Admin uses an external Redis via `REDIS_ADDR`/`REDIS_USERNAME`/`REDIS_PASSWORD`; the base compose hardcodes `redis:6379` for `server`, so those variables reach admin only.
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
|
|
## Security
|
|
|
|
- gRPC over TLS; agents connect outbound only, no inbound firewall holes on managed servers.
|
|
- Per-server agent token stored as SHA-256 on the server, plaintext only in the agent's `0600` config.
|
|
- Pre-registration tokens are short-lived (1 hour) and single-use.
|
|
- AES-256-GCM at rest for private keys, key passphrases, vault secrets, OIDC client secrets, RDP/VNC credentials.
|
|
- Console session tokens are one-time; RDP credentials are consumed on tunnel open.
|
|
- ESO read token stored as a SHA-256 hash and rotatable.
|
|
- Unique indexes on `(instance_id, email)`, instance slug, settings instance and the ESO token hash are load-bearing for tenant isolation. So is the absence of any unscoped lookup by email.
|
|
- `authorized_keys` written `0600`, owned by root. The agent runs as root because it must.
|
|
- Every mutating API path writes an audit event.
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
|
|
## Frontend
|
|
|
|
Next.js 16 (App Router) + React 18, Tailwind 3, TanStack Query. Guacamole client bundled locally in `web/lib/guacamole-common.js`.
|
|
|
|
There are **three separate visual identities**, and the split is deliberate:
|
|
|
|
| App | Ground | Accent | Themes |
|
|
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|
|
| `web/` | `#0f1117` | indigo `#6366f1` | dark only, locked |
|
|
| `site/` | token-based | brand navy `#0b2a58` / `#5b9be8` | light + dark |
|
|
| `adminsite/` | **the same tokens as `site/`** | brand navy | light + dark, light default |
|
|
|
|
`adminsite/app/globals.css` holds `site/app/globals.css`'s token blocks **copied verbatim** — same names, same values. **Change them in both files in the same commit; nothing enforces the match automatically**, the same shape of hazard as sitesvc's mirrored slug rules. Tailwind in `adminsite/` maps `var(--…)` references only, so no component may carry a hex value. `site/` names the semantic three `--up`/`--pend`/`--down` for monitor state; `adminsite/` aliases them to `valid`/`warn`/`expired` for licence state — same colours.
|
|
|
|
`adminsite/` defaults to **light** on purpose: `web/` is locked to dark, and a staff member with both open should never mistake one for the other before clicking Reissue. In dark mode the shared accent lifts to `#5b9be8`, closer to web/'s indigo, so that distinction rests on the ground — do not make dark the default. Licence state never reads by colour alone: every pill carries a distinct shape and a text label.
|
|
|
|
| Route | Purpose |
|
|
| --------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
|
| `/setup` | First-run bootstrap: create the first org and owner |
|
|
| `/login` | Local or OIDC sign-in |
|
|
| `/` | Fleet dashboard |
|
|
| `/servers`, `/servers/new`, `/servers/[id]` | Fleet list, install one-liner, server detail (keys, inventory, updates) |
|
|
| `/servers/[id]/console` | Browser SSH/RDP/VNC session |
|
|
| `/keys`, `/keys/[id]` | Key library; assign and revoke per server |
|
|
| `/workflows`, `/workflows/[id]`, `/workflows/[id]/runs[/runId]` | Compose, run, and follow live logs |
|
|
| `/steps` | Reusable step library |
|
|
| `/monitors`, `/monitors/new`, `/monitors/[id][/edit]` | Checks, uptime, incidents |
|
|
| `/secrets`, `/secrets/[group]` | Vault |
|
|
| `/audit` | Audit log |
|
|
| `/settings`, `/settings/org`, `/settings/notifications` | Alerts, members, OIDC, channels |
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
|
|
## CI/CD — Gitea Actions
|
|
|
|
### `agent-release.yml` — triggered by `agent/v*` tags
|
|
|
|
Builds `linux/amd64`, `linux/arm64`, `windows/amd64`, writes `checksums.txt`, creates a Gitea release. A second `msi` job on `windows-2022` packages the WiX installer.
|
|
|
|
```bash
|
|
GOOS=linux GOARCH=amd64 go build \
|
|
-ldflags="-s -w -X main.Version=${VERSION}" \
|
|
-o dist/vantage-agent-linux-amd64 ./cmd
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
### `server-deploy.yml` — triggered on every push to `main`
|
|
|
|
Builds and pushes six images to the Gitea container registry: `server`, `web`, `site`, `sitesvc`, `admin` and `adminsite`.
|
|
|
|
Note that despite the name, **this workflow does not deploy** — it only builds and pushes. There is no SSH step and no path filter; every push to `main` rebuilds all three images. Rolling them out is a separate manual step on the host:
|
|
|
|
```bash
|
|
cd /opt/vantage && docker compose -f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.site.yml pull && \
|
|
docker compose -f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.site.yml up -d --remove-orphans
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
### Tagging
|
|
|
|
```bash
|
|
git tag agent/v1.0.0 && git push origin agent/v1.0.0 # agent release
|
|
git push origin main # server + web deploy
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
### Secrets / variables
|
|
|
|
| Name | Type | Value |
|
|
| -------------------- | -------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
|
| `RELEASE_TOKEN` | Secret | Gitea API token, `write:release` |
|
|
| `REGISTRY_USER` | Secret | Gitea username |
|
|
| `REGISTRY_PASSWORD` | Secret | Gitea token, `write:packages` |
|
|
| `GITEA_HOST` | Variable | `gitea.hostxtra.co.uk` |
|
|
| `DOCKER_HOST` | Variable | registry host used for image tags |
|
|
| `API_URL` | Variable | baked into the `web` image at build time |
|
|
| `SITE_API_URL` | Variable | **browser-reachable** sitesvc URL, baked into the `site` image. Required — if empty, both forms report "not connected" and submit nowhere. Must also be in sitesvc's `SITE_ORIGIN`. |
|
|
| `SITE_CONTACT_EMAIL` | Variable | optional; address shown when a form is misconfigured |
|
|
| `ADMIN_API_URL` | Variable | **browser-reachable** admin URL, baked into the `adminsite` image. Same footgun as `SITE_API_URL`: wrong here and every request fails at runtime with the not-connected panel. Must also be in admin's `ADMIN_ORIGIN`. |
|
|
| `ADMIN_ENV` | Variable | `production` or `sandbox`; drives the persistent environment badge. Anything but `sandbox` reads as production. |
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
|
|
## Design Decisions
|
|
|
|
- **gRPC for agent traffic** — strong typing and cheap versioning; polling for state, one bidirectional stream for commands.
|
|
- **Outbound-only agents** — no inbound ports on managed servers, works behind NAT.
|
|
- **Poll for keys, push for commands** — a 30s key poll is fine, but running a workflow step should not wait up to 30s.
|
|
- **Atomic `authorized_keys` rewrite** — temp file plus `os.Rename()`; a machine that dies mid-write keeps the old file.
|
|
- **Fingerprint diffing before write** — no disk churn on unchanged state.
|
|
- **Soft revocation** — `revoked_at` rather than deletes; preserves audit history.
|
|
- **Run snapshots** — workflow runs freeze their resolved steps so editing a step never rewrites past runs.
|
|
- **Monitors run in two places** — server-side for external endpoints, agent-side for anything only reachable from inside the target network.
|
|
- **Redis for sessions only** — all durable state stays in MongoDB; losing Redis logs everyone out and nothing else.
|
|
- **guacd for console** — protocol handling is Guacamole's problem, not ours; we proxy the WebSocket and manage credentials.
|
|
- **`org_id` on every document** — isolation enforced at the query layer, not by separate databases.
|
|
- **root only** — manages `/root/.ssh/authorized_keys`; no per-user key management.
|
|
- **Windows agents are second-class by design** — register, heartbeat, run steps, report inventory; no `authorized_keys` management.
|