20 KiB
Vantage
A self-hosted, multi-tenant infrastructure control plane. It started as SSH key management and has grown into fleet management: SSH key assignment, workflow/script execution, service monitoring, a secrets vault, a browser console (SSH/RDP/VNC), and OS update management.
A central server (Go + Next.js + MongoDB + Redis) drives a lightweight Go agent installed on each managed server. Agents poll over gRPC and also hold a bidirectional command stream for push-style commands.
Architecture Overview
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Next.js 16 Frontend (web, :3000) │
│ servers · keys · workflows · monitors │
│ secrets · audit · console · settings │
└───────────────┬──────────────────────────────┘
│ REST + cookie session
┌───────────────▼──────────────────────────────┐
│ Go Backend (server) │
│ :8080 REST (gin) :9090 gRPC (agents) │
│ MongoDB (state) · Redis (sessions) │
│ monitor scheduler · workflow runner │
│ guacd tunnel proxy for browser console │
└───────────────┬──────────────────────────────┘
│ gRPC (TLS) — outbound from agent only
┌───────────────▼──────────────────────────────┐
│ Go Agent (per server, Linux + Windows) │
│ polls SyncKeys · CommandStream │
│ rewrites authorized_keys (Linux only) │
│ runs workflow steps · monitors · inventory │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────┘
Multi-tenancy: every domain document carries org_id, and every service query is scoped by it. Org is resolved from the session, and optionally cross-checked against the request host (<slug>.vantage.<tld>).
Repository Structure
vantage/
├── agent/
│ ├── cmd/main.go # flags: -generate-key
│ └── internal/
│ ├── checker/ # monitor check execution
│ ├── config/ # config.yaml load/save
│ ├── exec/ # workflow step execution
│ ├── grpc/ # client + generated pb
│ ├── inventory/ # CPU/mem/disk collection (linux/other)
│ ├── keys/ # authorized_keys read/diff/write
│ ├── monitors/ # agent-run monitor loop
│ ├── sync/ # poll loop + command stream
│ └── updates/ # OS package update check/apply
├── server/
│ ├── cmd/main.go
│ └── internal/
│ ├── api/ # REST handlers
│ ├── auth/ # local, OIDC, session, middleware, orghost
│ ├── checker/ # server-run monitor checks
│ ├── db/ # mongo connect + Col()
│ ├── grpc/ # gRPC server + generated pb
│ ├── models/ # MongoDB documents
│ ├── monitorsched/ # server-side monitor scheduler
│ ├── notify/ # smtp, http, templating, dispatch
│ └── services/ # business logic + migrations
├── web/
│ ├── app/(app)/ # authed routes
│ ├── app/login, app/setup # unauthed routes
│ ├── components/ # ui/, workflows/, monitors/, Sidebar
│ └── lib/ # api client, guac console, query client
├── proto/vantage/v1/vantage.proto
├── installer/ # Windows: setup.ps1, nssm.exe, WiX .wxs
├── deploy/ # docker-compose.yml, agent.service
└── .gitea/workflows/ # agent-release.yml, server-deploy.yml
Subsystems
SSH keys
Upload a public key, assign it per server, revoke softly. The agent diffs desired vs on-disk state and rewrites /root/.ssh/authorized_keys atomically. Keys can also be generated on a server by the agent; the private half can optionally be uploaded and is stored AES-256-GCM encrypted.
Workflows
A library of reusable steps (bash or PowerShell scripts with declared inputs, outputs, and secret refs) composed into workflows targeting a set of servers. Running one snapshots the resolved steps into a WorkflowRun, then dispatches RunStepCmd over the agent command stream. Step stdout/stderr streams back as StepOutputChunk and is written to a log file on disk; the UI streams it live. Steps support on_failure: stop|continue|retry, per-run env passed between steps via output_env, and a per-run workspace directory the agent cleans up at the end.
Default steps are seeded per org at boot (SeedDefaultSteps). Logs are swept by retention (workflow_log_retention_days; nil = 30 days, 0 = forever).
Monitors
HTTP, TCP, ICMP and TLS checks. Each monitor has a runner: "server" (executed by the server-side scheduler) or a server_id (pushed to that agent, which runs it locally and reports results). Consecutive failures beyond retries flip state to down, open an Incident, and notify. Hourly Rollup documents back the uptime graphs.
Notification channels
Per-org outbound destinations: webhook, smtp, discord, slack, telegram. Monitors reference channels by ID. Channels are testable from the UI.
Secrets vault
Key/value pairs grouped by name, encrypted at rest with AES-256-GCM. Consumed two ways: referenced by workflow steps via secret_refs (injected as env at execution), and read by Kubernetes External Secrets Operator via GET /api/secrets/:group/values using a bearer token whose SHA-256 hash is stored in settings.
Browser console
POST /api/console/connect mints a one-time session token; GET /api/console/tunnel upgrades to a WebSocket and proxies to guacd (Apache Guacamole daemon) using github.com/wwt/guac. SSH connections authenticate with a stored private key; RDP/VNC credentials are encrypted, single-use, and consumed when the tunnel opens.
Inventory and OS updates
Agents report CPU/memory/swap/partitions/kernel — metrics every 30s, full static snapshot every 15 min. They also check for pending OS package updates hourly and can apply them on command (ApplyUpdatesCmd).
Agent self-update
UpdateAgentCmd carries a target version and Gitea base URL; the agent downloads and replaces itself.
Auth and Orgs
- Bootstrap — first run has no users.
GET /auth/bootstrap-statusdrives/setup,POST /auth/bootstrapcreates the first org plus its owner. - Local auth — email + password (bcrypt),
POST /auth/login. - OIDC — configured per org (
org_oidc), issuer + client ID + encrypted client secret./auth/oidc/start→/auth/oidc/callback. - Sessions — opaque 32-byte hex ID in the
km_sessioncookie, session body stored in Redis with a 24h TTL. - Roles —
owner,admin,member./api/settingsand/api/org/*require owner or admin. - Host/org guard —
APP_ROOT_LABEL(defaultvantage) defines the app root label. A request to<slug>.vantage.<tld>resolves that org from the slug and rejects sessions belonging to a different one. Org lookups are cached for 60s.
Unique indexes on user email and org slug are a security property, not an optimisation: GetUserByEmail does an unscoped FindOne, so duplicates would let the OIDC cross-org guard compare against an arbitrary user. Same for duplicate settings docs and duplicate ESO token hashes.
gRPC API
service Vantage {
rpc Register(RegisterRequest) returns (RegisterResponse);
rpc SyncKeys(SyncRequest) returns (SyncResponse);
rpc UploadGeneratedKey(UploadKeyRequest) returns (UploadKeyResponse);
rpc ReportUpdates(ReportUpdatesRequest) returns (ReportUpdatesResponse);
rpc ReportInventory(InventoryReport) returns (InventoryReportResponse);
rpc SyncMonitors(SyncMonitorsRequest) returns (SyncMonitorsResponse);
rpc ReportChecks(ReportChecksRequest) returns (ReportChecksResponse);
rpc CommandStream(stream AgentMessage) returns (stream ServerCommand);
}
CommandStream is the only streaming RPC: the agent authenticates once with AgentReady, then the server pushes ServerCommands and the agent replies with CommandResult, StepResult, or StepOutputChunk.
ServerCommand variants: GenerateKeyCmd, DeleteKeyCmd, UpdateAgentCmd, ApplyUpdatesCmd, RunStepCmd, CleanupWorkspaceCmd.
Key-state polling stays on the 30s SyncKeys interval. Full message definitions live in proto/vantage/v1/vantage.proto.
REST API
Unauthenticated:
GET /install /install.ps1 # dynamic agent install scripts
GET /update /update.ps1
GET /auth/bootstrap-status
POST /auth/bootstrap /auth/login /auth/logout
GET /auth/me /auth/oidc/start /auth/oidc/callback
GET /api/secrets/:group/values # bearer token (ESO)
Session-authed under /api:
servers GET,POST /servers · GET,POST /servers/new · GET,DELETE /servers/:id
POST /servers/:id/{generate-key,update-agent,apply-updates}
keys GET,POST /keys · GET,DELETE /keys/:id · GET /keys/:id/private-key
POST /keys/:id/assign · DELETE /keys/:id/assign/:serverId
workflows GET,POST /steps · PUT,DELETE /steps/:id · GET /steps/:id/export
POST /steps/{import,seed-defaults,parse} · GET /steps/usage
GET,POST /workflows · GET,PUT,DELETE /workflows/:id
POST /workflows/:id/run · GET /workflows/:id/runs
GET /runs/:runId · POST /runs/:runId/cancel
GET /runs/:runId/servers/:serverId/logs[/stream]
monitors GET,POST /monitors · GET,PUT,DELETE /monitors/:id
GET /monitors/:id/{incidents,uptime}
channels GET,POST /channels · PUT,DELETE /channels/:id · POST /channels/:id/test
secrets GET,POST /secrets · GET,PUT,DELETE /secrets/:group
POST /secrets/:group/reveal · DELETE /secrets/:group/:key
console POST /console/connect · GET /console/tunnel (websocket)
audit GET /audit
agent GET /agent/latest-version
settings GET,PUT /settings · POST /settings/secrets-token (owner|admin)
org GET,POST /org/users · PUT /org/users/:id/role · DELETE /org/users/:id
GET,PUT /org/oidc (owner|admin)
MongoDB Collections
servers · keys · assignments · orgs · users · org_oidc · settings · secrets · workflows · workflow_steps · workflow_runs · monitors · incidents · monitor_rollups · notification_channels · console_sessions · audit_logs · migrations
Every document except migrations carries org_id. Struct definitions are the source of truth — see server/internal/models/.
Notes that are not obvious from the structs:
servers.agent_token_hashstores SHA-256 of the token, never plaintext.pre_reg_tokenis cleared afterRegister().statusispending→activeon register,offlinewhenlast_seenpasses the threshold (swept every 2 min).servers.inventoryholds the latest metrics snapshot with separatemetrics_at/static_attimestamps.keys.private_key_encandpassphrase_encare AES-256-GCM; the JSON form exposes onlyhas_private_key/has_passphrase.assignments.revoked_at: nullmeans active. Revocation is soft, preserving audit history.workflow_runs.steps_snapshotfreezes the resolved steps so editing the library never rewrites history.console_sessions.token_consumed_atis set atomically to enforce one-time use.
Migrations
services.RunMigrations() runs at boot, recording markers in migrations:
0001_default_org_backfill0002_settings_org_backfill(must run before 0003 — 0003 can create adefaultorg, which pushes 0002 into its ambiguous multi-org branch)0003_missed_org_scopes
Index builders (EnsureAuthIndexes, EnsureSettingsIndexes) are fatal on failure; EnsureSecretIndexes and EnsureWorkflowIndexes only warn.
Agent Lifecycle
Config file
Linux /etc/vantage/config.yaml, Windows %ProgramData%\vantage\config.yaml. Directory 0700, file 0600.
server_url: "vantage.yourdomain.com:9090"
server_id: "<uuid>"
pre_reg_token: "<token>" # removed after first successful Register()
agent_token: "" # written by agent after Register()
poll_interval: 30s
tls: true
Startup
1. Load config
2. If pre_reg_token present → Register() → save agent_token, clear pre_reg_token, reconnect
3. Start goroutines: command stream · update check (hourly) · inventory · monitors
4. Enter SyncKeys poll loop (default 30s)
Poll loop
1. SyncKeys(server_id, agent_token, agent_version)
2. Non-Linux hosts stop here — Windows agents register and heartbeat only
3. Diff desired keys against /root/.ssh/authorized_keys; unchanged → no write
4. Changed → write .tmp, os.Rename() over the real file, chmod 0600
Install
Linux: systemd unit at /etc/systemd/system/vantage-agent.service, Restart=always, runs as root.
Windows: MSI built by CI (WiX), or installer/setup.ps1 registering the agent as a service via NSSM.
Server Registration Flow
- Add Server in the UI calls
POST /api/servers/new, which generates aserver_idand a pre-registration token (TTL 1 hour, single-use). - The UI shows a one-liner:
Windows gets the
curl -fsSL https://vantage.yourdomain.com/install | \ bash -s -- --server-id=<id> --token=<token>/install.ps1equivalent. - The script detects arch, downloads the agent from the Gitea release, verifies the SHA-256 checksum, writes the config, installs and starts the service.
- The server flips to
activeon first sync.
/install is served dynamically, injecting the latest agent version from the Gitea API.
Environment Variables (server)
| Name | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|
GRPC_HOST |
yes | host:port agents dial. Boot fails without it — there is no safe default; falling back to the web host would hand agents a port that does not speak gRPC. |
MONGO_URI |
no | default mongodb://localhost:27017 |
MONGO_DB |
no | default vantage |
REDIS_ADDR |
no | default localhost:6379 |
KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY |
yes in practice | 64-char hex (32 bytes) for AES-256-GCM. Required for private keys, secrets, OIDC secrets, RDP credentials. |
GITEA_HOST |
yes | used to build install scripts and agent download URLs |
GUACD_ADDR |
no | default guacd:4822 |
APP_ROOT_LABEL |
no | default vantage; wrong value disables the host/session org guard |
VANTAGE_WORKFLOW_LOG_DIR |
no | where run logs are written |
deploy/docker-compose.yml runs four services: redis, guacd, server (8080 + 9090), web (3000). MongoDB is external.
Security
- gRPC over TLS; agents connect outbound only, no inbound firewall holes on managed servers.
- Per-server agent token stored as SHA-256 on the server, plaintext only in the agent's
0600config. - Pre-registration tokens are short-lived (1 hour) and single-use.
- AES-256-GCM at rest for private keys, key passphrases, vault secrets, OIDC client secrets, RDP/VNC credentials.
- Console session tokens are one-time; RDP credentials are consumed on tunnel open.
- ESO read token stored as a SHA-256 hash and rotatable.
- Unique indexes on user email, org slug, settings org, and ESO token hash are load-bearing for tenant isolation.
authorized_keyswritten0600, owned by root. The agent runs as root because it must.- Every mutating API path writes an audit event.
Frontend
Next.js 16 (App Router) + React 18, Tailwind 3, TanStack Query. Guacamole client bundled locally in web/lib/guacamole-common.js.
| Route | Purpose |
|---|---|
/setup |
First-run bootstrap: create the first org and owner |
/login |
Local or OIDC sign-in |
/ |
Fleet dashboard |
/servers, /servers/new, /servers/[id] |
Fleet list, install one-liner, server detail (keys, inventory, updates) |
/servers/[id]/console |
Browser SSH/RDP/VNC session |
/keys, /keys/[id] |
Key library; assign and revoke per server |
/workflows, /workflows/[id], /workflows/[id]/runs[/runId] |
Compose, run, and follow live logs |
/steps |
Reusable step library |
/monitors, /monitors/new, /monitors/[id][/edit] |
Checks, uptime, incidents |
/secrets, /secrets/[group] |
Vault |
/audit |
Audit log |
/settings, /settings/org, /settings/notifications |
Alerts, members, OIDC, channels |
CI/CD — Gitea Actions
agent-release.yml — triggered by agent/v* tags
Builds linux/amd64, linux/arm64, windows/amd64, writes checksums.txt, creates a Gitea release. A second msi job on windows-2022 packages the WiX installer.
GOOS=linux GOARCH=amd64 go build \
-ldflags="-s -w -X main.Version=${VERSION}" \
-o dist/vantage-agent-linux-amd64 ./cmd
server-deploy.yml — triggered on push to main
Builds and pushes the server and web images to the Gitea container registry, then deploys over SSH:
cd /opt/vantage && docker compose pull && docker compose up -d --remove-orphans
Tagging
git tag agent/v1.0.0 && git push origin agent/v1.0.0 # agent release
git push origin main # server + web deploy
Secrets / variables
| Name | Type | Value |
|---|---|---|
RELEASE_TOKEN |
Secret | Gitea API token, write:release |
REGISTRY_USER |
Secret | Gitea username |
REGISTRY_PASSWORD |
Secret | Gitea token, write:packages |
DEPLOY_HOST |
Secret | server VM host |
DEPLOY_USER |
Secret | SSH user for deploy |
DEPLOY_SSH_KEY |
Secret | deploy private key |
GITEA_HOST |
Variable | gitea.hostxtra.co.uk |
Design Decisions
- gRPC for agent traffic — strong typing and cheap versioning; polling for state, one bidirectional stream for commands.
- Outbound-only agents — no inbound ports on managed servers, works behind NAT.
- Poll for keys, push for commands — a 30s key poll is fine, but running a workflow step should not wait up to 30s.
- Atomic
authorized_keysrewrite — temp file plusos.Rename(); a machine that dies mid-write keeps the old file. - Fingerprint diffing before write — no disk churn on unchanged state.
- Soft revocation —
revoked_atrather than deletes; preserves audit history. - Run snapshots — workflow runs freeze their resolved steps so editing a step never rewrites past runs.
- Monitors run in two places — server-side for external endpoints, agent-side for anything only reachable from inside the target network.
- Redis for sessions only — all durable state stays in MongoDB; losing Redis logs everyone out and nothing else.
- guacd for console — protocol handling is Guacamole's problem, not ours; we proxy the WebSocket and manage credentials.
org_idon every document — isolation enforced at the query layer, not by separate databases.- root only — manages
/root/.ssh/authorized_keys; no per-user key management. - Windows agents are second-class by design — register, heartbeat, run steps, report inventory; no
authorized_keysmanagement.