apt lists phased updates as upgradable while an upgrade defers them until
Ubuntu selects the host, so a freshly patched server kept reporting pending
updates. The agent now flags them; the server stores the flag and leaves them
out of patch run counts, and the server page shows them in their own section.
- no dispatch in the last 15 minutes of a window; no-result timeout from dispatch time
- per-server output moves to patch_run_outputs (16MB document limit)
- reboot proven by a changed boot time; RebootTimeout 45m, ResultGrace 20m
- window update and delete are server-scoped against the policies using them
- scheduler puts the claim back on an error after it, so the next tick retries
- cancelled runs with failures alert; MCP apply_updates audits per server
- apply-updates 503 body documented; openapi regenerated
- web: cleared numeric fields no longer save as 0; Run now asks for confirmation
Fix round 1 review findings on the patch run service:
- advanceRun no longer runs every server's dispatch claim and failed-send
reset on the caller's shared short context; each gets its own fresh
patchCtx(), and a failed reset write is logged instead of discarded.
- The dispatch claim (queued/waiting_offline -> patching) now also requires
the run to still be status running with no cancelled_at, closing a race
where a tick that loaded the run just before CancelPatchRun wrote
cancelled_at could still dispatch.
- RecordPatchResult's write is now guarded on command_id too, so a late
result for a superseded command cannot land on a re-dispatched attempt.
Named patch_window.go (not patch_windows.go) since the _windows.go
suffix is Go's implicit GOOS build constraint and would silently
exclude the file on non-Windows builds.
The previous tests reimplemented the target-scope rule instead of calling
validateWorkflowTargetScope, so they proved nothing about CreateWorkflow
or UpdateWorkflow's actual enforcement. Split the check into a pure
decideWorkflowTargetScope (tested directly, no database) and a thin
wrapper behind an overridable listServersForScope seam, so tests can
invoke the real CreateWorkflow/UpdateWorkflow without a live database and
fail if the call sites are removed.
Close the time-of-write/time-of-fire gap: a restricted caller could
previously save target_tags matching no server today (a selector aimed
at hosts not yet provisioned or not yet tagged), pass validation on an
empty set, and have the scheduler fire on those hosts the moment they
appeared. Now a restricted caller specifying targets that resolve to
nothing is refused with the same message as an out-of-scope match; a
workflow with no targets at all, and an unrestricted caller, are
unaffected.
A database error while resolving the fleet now surfaces as an error
instead of folding into a pass.
Correct three comments that overstated what the code does: the
create/update route comment now mentions the tag-scope check, not only
validateTargetServers; the schedule route comment explains its safety
holds only for workflows written after this check existed, not for rows
already in the database under the old rule.
CreateWorkflow and UpdateWorkflow validated TargetServerIDs against the
caller's scope but never checked TargetTags, letting a restricted token
save a workflow with an empty ID list and an out-of-scope tag selector,
then reach those hosts once the scheduler fires it as the system with no
restriction of its own. Add validateWorkflowTargetScope, applying the
same all-or-nothing rule the MCP create_workflow tool already enforces:
resolve the full target set unscoped and scoped, refuse unless they
match. Update the PUT /api/workflows/:id/schedule fleetWide comment to
say why it is safe now (targets are constrained at write time) rather
than repeating the falsified claim that scheduling reaches nothing new.
GET /api/monitors and GET /api/monitors/:id returned Monitor.Runner
unfiltered; for an agent-pushed monitor that field is literally a server
ID, so a restricted token learned which out-of-scope server a monitor
runs on directly, not merely that one exists. services.RedactMonitorRunner
replaces Runner with models.RunnerRestricted when it names a server
outside the caller's scope, resolved once via the new
services.VisibleServerIDs rather than per monitor. The monitor itself is
still returned — a restricted operator may legitimately need to see that
it exists and is up or down — only the runner field goes neutral; omitting
the monitor entirely was considered and rejected as more surprising than
one field changing. Runner "server" (control-plane-run) is never
touched. The MCP list_monitors/get_monitor_status projections never had a
Runner field to begin with, so REST and the tool surface already agreed;
a comment now records why.
GET /api/workflows and GET /api/workflows/:id returned
Workflow.TargetServerIDs unfiltered — directly naming out-of-scope
servers, worse than a count. services.FilterVisibleServerIDs narrows the
list to what VisibleServerIDs admits and reports hidden (no count) when
at least one target was dropped; WorkflowResponse wraps *models.Workflow
with a scoped TargetServerIDs and a TargetsRestricted flag. TargetTags is
left untouched — the tag vocabulary is already ruled acceptable to
expose. The MCP list_workflows/get_workflow tools get the identical
treatment: list_workflows' target count is now based on the filtered ID
list, and get_workflow's workflowDetail carries the same
TargetsRestricted flag, so a model that sees a filtered target list and
then has run_workflow refuse the same workflow for out-of-scope targets
is not left concluding the refusal invented a problem the list never
mentioned.
All four routes recorded in serverScopedRoutes as true; none is
boot-enforced, for the same substring-filter reason as the key routes
added in the previous round.
GET /api/keys returned each key's AssignedCount as a raw
CountDocuments over every non-revoked assignment, with no scope filter —
a tag-restricted token reading the list saw a nonzero count for a key it
can see nothing assigned to in its own scope, which is enough to tell it
an assignment exists on a host it must not know about. Same class of leak
getKey's assignment-list filter closed on the detail route, surviving on
the list route through a count instead of a server object.
services.ListKeys now takes the caller's tokenScope. An unrestricted
caller (empty scope) takes the original unfiltered per-key
CountDocuments with no extra work, so the common case is not slower. A
restricted caller resolves the visible fleet once via ListServers before
the per-key loop, then counts each key's assignments with an added
server_id $in filter — one extra query total, not one per key.
ListKeys had exactly one caller (listKeys), so the parameter went there
rather than adding a second entry point.
Recorded GET /api/keys in serverScopedRoutes as true; its path, like GET
/api/keys/:id, matches none of serverTouchingRoutes' substrings, so the
entry is not boot-enforced. Deliberately did not widen the filter to
catch "keys" — that would sweep in create/delete/private-key routes with
no server data at all. The real fix for this shape of gap is the
declare-by-default inversion already recorded as a follow-up.
agent/ becomes the root of gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/vantage/vantage-agent,
with installer/ alongside it, and agent-release.yml goes with them.
Releases now come from that repository, so the six places this server
generates or reads a release URL are repointed: both install scripts,
both update scripts, and the latest-version lookup in dispatch.go. The
agent/v* tag prefix is unchanged — those scripts grep for it.
Agents built before this move have the old mrhid6/vantage path compiled
into their self-update and will 404 on the push-button update. The
remedy is the /update one-liner, which this server generates and which
therefore has to ship first.
site/ and sitesvc/ become web/ and server/ in vantage-site; docsite/
becomes the root of vantage-docs. Their images move with them, to
vantage/vantage-site/{web,server} and vantage/vantage-docs.
Nothing here imported any of them, and sitesvc turned out to read no
database at all, so both cuts are clean. docker-compose.site.yml is
deleted rather than emptied: every service it held now ships with the
repository that builds it, and deploy/docker/docker-compose.yml is once
again exactly a self-hosted install.
Corrects four comments that named sitesvc for work it no longer does.
services/crypto.go keeps its function names and its KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY
lookup and delegates the cipher, so vantagectl's verify probe can decrypt
with the same implementation rather than a second copy.
- A derived monitor outage with no `resolved_at` went to `History`, so an
ongoing disruption was listed under "Past incidents" while the component pill
beside it read Down. Unresolved now goes to `ActiveIncidents`.
- `overallState` returned `up` when nothing was counted: "all systems
operational" claimed from no evidence at all. A page with no components now
reports `no_data`, which the view already renders as "Status unknown".
- `EnsureStatusPageIndexes` returned on the first failure, so a transient
failure on the `status_pages` index left `status_incidents` with no unique
`(instance_id, incident_id)` index — a correctness property, not a scan
optimisation. All three are attempted and the failures joined.
Adds owner|admin routes under /api/status-pages for authoring status pages
and their incidents/maintenance windows, gated by the status_pages licence
feature. Adds the "status" token scope resource and the ten route-scope
entries, and regenerates the committed OpenAPI document.
Also types ErrPageInvalid as a sentinel for status page/incident validation
failures (previously bare errors), so statusPageError maps them to 400
instead of 500, and createStatusIncident/updateStatusIncident route through
the shared error mapper rather than hand-rolling a 400 for any service error.
mrhid6