CreateWorkflow and UpdateWorkflow validated TargetServerIDs against the
caller's scope but never checked TargetTags, letting a restricted token
save a workflow with an empty ID list and an out-of-scope tag selector,
then reach those hosts once the scheduler fires it as the system with no
restriction of its own. Add validateWorkflowTargetScope, applying the
same all-or-nothing rule the MCP create_workflow tool already enforces:
resolve the full target set unscoped and scoped, refuse unless they
match. Update the PUT /api/workflows/:id/schedule fleetWide comment to
say why it is safe now (targets are constrained at write time) rather
than repeating the falsified claim that scheduling reaches nothing new.
TestServerScopeMapCoversEveryScopedRoute wrongly required serverScopedRoutes
to be a subset of routeScopes, which only covers the authenticated /api
group. The ESO route is registered on the root router and is exempt from
routeScopes by design, so it failed the test despite being correctly
declared. Lift the hardcoded exception in AssertScopeMapComplete into a
named routesOutsideAPIGroup set that both scopes.go and the test read.
GET /api/monitors and GET /api/monitors/:id returned Monitor.Runner
unfiltered; for an agent-pushed monitor that field is literally a server
ID, so a restricted token learned which out-of-scope server a monitor
runs on directly, not merely that one exists. services.RedactMonitorRunner
replaces Runner with models.RunnerRestricted when it names a server
outside the caller's scope, resolved once via the new
services.VisibleServerIDs rather than per monitor. The monitor itself is
still returned — a restricted operator may legitimately need to see that
it exists and is up or down — only the runner field goes neutral; omitting
the monitor entirely was considered and rejected as more surprising than
one field changing. Runner "server" (control-plane-run) is never
touched. The MCP list_monitors/get_monitor_status projections never had a
Runner field to begin with, so REST and the tool surface already agreed;
a comment now records why.
GET /api/workflows and GET /api/workflows/:id returned
Workflow.TargetServerIDs unfiltered — directly naming out-of-scope
servers, worse than a count. services.FilterVisibleServerIDs narrows the
list to what VisibleServerIDs admits and reports hidden (no count) when
at least one target was dropped; WorkflowResponse wraps *models.Workflow
with a scoped TargetServerIDs and a TargetsRestricted flag. TargetTags is
left untouched — the tag vocabulary is already ruled acceptable to
expose. The MCP list_workflows/get_workflow tools get the identical
treatment: list_workflows' target count is now based on the filtered ID
list, and get_workflow's workflowDetail carries the same
TargetsRestricted flag, so a model that sees a filtered target list and
then has run_workflow refuse the same workflow for out-of-scope targets
is not left concluding the refusal invented a problem the list never
mentioned.
All four routes recorded in serverScopedRoutes as true; none is
boot-enforced, for the same substring-filter reason as the key routes
added in the previous round.
GET /api/keys returned each key's AssignedCount as a raw
CountDocuments over every non-revoked assignment, with no scope filter —
a tag-restricted token reading the list saw a nonzero count for a key it
can see nothing assigned to in its own scope, which is enough to tell it
an assignment exists on a host it must not know about. Same class of leak
getKey's assignment-list filter closed on the detail route, surviving on
the list route through a count instead of a server object.
services.ListKeys now takes the caller's tokenScope. An unrestricted
caller (empty scope) takes the original unfiltered per-key
CountDocuments with no extra work, so the common case is not slower. A
restricted caller resolves the visible fleet once via ListServers before
the per-key loop, then counts each key's assignments with an added
server_id $in filter — one extra query total, not one per key.
ListKeys had exactly one caller (listKeys), so the parameter went there
rather than adding a second entry point.
Recorded GET /api/keys in serverScopedRoutes as true; its path, like GET
/api/keys/:id, matches none of serverTouchingRoutes' substrings, so the
entry is not boot-enforced. Deliberately did not widen the filter to
catch "keys" — that would sweep in create/delete/private-key routes with
no server data at all. The real fix for this shape of gap is the
declare-by-default inversion already recorded as a follow-up.
serverTouchingRoutes in cmd/main.go filtered on "server"/"console"/an exact
workflows-run match, which is how POST /api/keys/:id/assign reached
production with no scope check and no boot-time signal at all: its path
names neither. Widen the filter to also match ":serverId" and "assign",
and document at the filter why a substring match is the weak part of this
design — a route that acts on a server without saying so in its path stays
invisible to it — noting that inverting the model (every /api route
declares itself, with an exemption list) would be the stronger fix and is
left as a follow-up. Re-running the mechanical check against the widened
filter swept in no route beyond what serverScopedRoutes already declared.
GET /api/keys/:id also leaked out-of-scope hostnames: it returned every
assignment for a key, server attached, unfiltered by the caller's tag
restriction. getKey now drops any assignment whose server fails
services.ServerInTokenScope before returning the list — silently, so the
response carries no count of what was removed — while still returning the
key itself, since a restricted token may legitimately hold a key also
assigned outside its scope. GetAssignmentsWithServers has exactly one
caller (getKey), so the filtering is done in the handler rather than
threaded into the service. Recorded in serverScopedRoutes; its path
matches none of the filter's substrings either, so it is not boot-enforced
and is kept as a considered decision, same as the assign/revoke entries.
Every early return from a write-tool handler skipped both the tool's own
LogCall and transport.go's gated LogCall (which only fires for reads), so a
blocked mutation attempt left no audit trail. registerSDKTool now routes
every write-tool error through LogDenied (fan-out and tag-scope refusals,
by gate name) or LogFailure (everything else), keeping the successful-write
path logging its own resolved server count exactly as before.
Also close a live scope gap surfaced while reviewing this: POST
/api/keys/:id/assign called services.AssignKey with an unscoped GetServer
lookup, so a tag-restricted token could assign a key to a server outside
its restriction. The handler now resolves the target through
GetServerScoped first, matching its sibling revoke route, and the route is
recorded in serverScopedRoutes.
summariseServer compared Status against "online", a value never assigned
anywhere (the real vocabulary is pending/active/offline), so every server
misreported as offline. search_fleet's version_below used a lexicographic
comparison across dpkg/rpm/apk version schemes with no common ordering, so
it refuses that filter now and returns all matches instead of a wrong
answer. listAuditResult's Total carried the "shown" JSON tag and the
capped count; it now reports the real total alongside shown.
agent/ becomes the root of gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/vantage/vantage-agent,
with installer/ alongside it, and agent-release.yml goes with them.
Releases now come from that repository, so the six places this server
generates or reads a release URL are repointed: both install scripts,
both update scripts, and the latest-version lookup in dispatch.go. The
agent/v* tag prefix is unchanged — those scripts grep for it.
Agents built before this move have the old mrhid6/vantage path compiled
into their self-update and will 404 on the push-button update. The
remedy is the /update one-liner, which this server generates and which
therefore has to ship first.
site/ and sitesvc/ become web/ and server/ in vantage-site; docsite/
becomes the root of vantage-docs. Their images move with them, to
vantage/vantage-site/{web,server} and vantage/vantage-docs.
Nothing here imported any of them, and sitesvc turned out to read no
database at all, so both cuts are clean. docker-compose.site.yml is
deleted rather than emptied: every service it held now ships with the
repository that builds it, and deploy/docker/docker-compose.yml is once
again exactly a self-hosted install.
Corrects four comments that named sitesvc for work it no longer does.
services/crypto.go keeps its function names and its KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY
lookup and delegates the cipher, so vantagectl's verify probe can decrypt
with the same implementation rather than a second copy.
- A derived monitor outage with no `resolved_at` went to `History`, so an
ongoing disruption was listed under "Past incidents" while the component pill
beside it read Down. Unresolved now goes to `ActiveIncidents`.
- `overallState` returned `up` when nothing was counted: "all systems
operational" claimed from no evidence at all. A page with no components now
reports `no_data`, which the view already renders as "Status unknown".
- `EnsureStatusPageIndexes` returned on the first failure, so a transient
failure on the `status_pages` index left `status_incidents` with no unique
`(instance_id, incident_id)` index — a correctness property, not a scan
optimisation. All three are attempted and the failures joined.
The SSR fetch set `Host` to the visitor's hostname. `Host` is a forbidden
header name and undici discards it silently, so the Go server saw
`server:8080`, `hostSlug` returned "", `InstanceFromHost` returned false and
every public status page 404'd on every deployment. The feature did not work.
- `web/` now forwards the visitor's host as `X-Forwarded-Host`, and their
address on `X-Forwarded-For` — without the latter gin sees a request from the
Next pod with no XFF and every visitor of every page shares one 120/min
bucket, tripped by exactly the traffic an outage produces.
- `publicStatusInstance` honours `X-Forwarded-Host` only when `c.RemoteIP()` is
in `TRUSTED_PROXIES`. It is a tenant selector, so an untrusted peer must not
be able to name one; `RemoteIP()` rather than `ClientIP()` because the latter
is reconstructed from the very headers being judged. `TrustedProxies()` moves
from main.go into the api package so the variable keeps one parser.
- A host naming no slug on a non-cloud deployment resolves the sole instance,
the way bootstrap does. A self-hosted install at vantage.acme.com or an IP
has no slug and could never serve a status page; more than one instance is a
404 rather than a guess, and an unknown-but-well-formed slug stays a 404.
- `InstanceFromHost` gains an explicit-host variant rather than a second copy
of the slug rules, and now caches negative lookups: an unknown host cost a
Mongo query per anonymous request, which is also a timing oracle separating
"no such instance" from "instance exists, page does not".
- The handler's `@Router` annotation is dropped. openapi.json declares one
server of `/api`, so it published `/api/public/status/{pageId}` — a path that
does not exist. The real address is described in prose instead.
Adds owner|admin routes under /api/status-pages for authoring status pages
and their incidents/maintenance windows, gated by the status_pages licence
feature. Adds the "status" token scope resource and the ten route-scope
entries, and regenerates the committed OpenAPI document.
Also types ErrPageInvalid as a sentinel for status page/incident validation
failures (previously bare errors), so statusPageError maps them to 400
instead of 500, and createStatusIncident/updateStatusIncident route through
the shared error mapper rather than hand-rolling a 400 for any service error.
mrhid6