CreateAPIToken capped a new token's role at the creator's role but never
capped its scopes against the calling credential's scopes, and POST
/api/tokens required only settings:write. A token holding settings:write
alone could therefore mint a token holding keys:write or secrets:write,
reaching every SSH private key and vault secret in the instance.
createToken now refuses (403 scope_confinement) when the calling
credential is itself a token and any requested scope is not satisfied by
that token's own scopes, via services.ScopeSatisfied so servers:write
still permits granting servers:read. Cookie sessions are unaffected,
since their authority is the user's role. Also correct the createToken
doc comment, which claimed the scope cap already existed.
Also document why Hint stores 5 hex characters of the token secret.
createToken's catch-all mapped every unmatched error to 400, so a
database outage reported itself as a malformed client request. Wrap the
genuine validation failures with ErrTokenInvalid and let the handler
answer 500 with a fixed message for everything else.
Mint, resolve, list and revoke, with the effective role capped at the
owner's and recomputed per request rather than frozen at creation.
Deleting a user deletes their tokens in the same call, so offboarding is
one action. Revoking somebody else's token answers not-found rather than
forbidden, since a 403 confirms the credential exists.
Also re-exports shared.APITokenMaxDays into server/internal/models,
following the existing ValidRole wrapper pattern, since the token
service needs it and it was never re-exported.
A pointer with absent meaning no cap, so an upgrade allows never-expire
tokens exactly as before and an instance opts into the policy. It governs
issuance only: changing it never invalidates a token that already exists.
Eight resources with read and write, write implying read. Coarse on
purpose: a scope per endpoint is a table nobody maintains, and a route
added without an entry either breaks or is unguarded.
The unique index on token_hash is what makes authentication an indexed
lookup rather than a scan, so this builder is fatal on failure like
EnsureAuthIndexes rather than warning like the secrets one.
Registered in ScopedCollections so instance purge reaches it.
The page rendered a map of eleven event types to labels and seven to colours.
The server emits forty-seven. Everything unmapped fell through to its raw
string, so "Key Assigned" in green sat above "workflow.schedule_updated" in
grey — the same kind of fact in two formats, which made the column look like it
carried a meaning it did not.
Presentation is now derived rather than enumerated. Event types are named
<category>.<action> by every call site, so the category becomes a chip, the
action is humanised, and the tone comes from the verb. A type added to the
server tomorrow gets a sensible label and colour with no second list to update;
the override table holds only the dozen the rule reads badly for. Every row is
one treatment, and colour never carries meaning alone — the sentence beside it
says the same thing in words.
Paging and filtering are server-side, unlike the fleet lists that answer with
everything and slice in the browser. audit_retention_days is a licensed
entitlement measured in months, and this log is read to answer questions about
the past, so a browser filtering the most recent page would report "no results"
for events that exist. GET /api/audit now takes q, category, limit and skip and
answers {events, total} — a short page is not evidence of the end of the log,
which is why the total is counted rather than inferred.
audit_logs had no indexes at all: every read was a collection scan with an
in-memory sort over an append-only collection. Adds (instance_id, created_at)
and warns rather than failing, matching EnsureSecretIndexes.
Two bugs found by running the deriver over all forty-seven real types rather
than eyeballing it: the tone rules matched only past-tense verbs, leaving
auth_provider.delete drawn as neutral beside key.deleted in red; and
"unaccepted" matched "accepted", so withdrawing an acceptance read as the same
caution as granting one.
Adds license.FeatureVulnScanning as the one name for the feature and a
catalogue row per deployment/tier, following console and oidc: features
are opt-in per customer, so no plan bundles it.
Documents the subsystem in CLAUDE.md, including that ScopedCollections is
the canonical registry instance deletion derives from — there is no
separate deletion list, which the plan had wrong.
Completes tasks 10-15 and fixes what was outstanding:
- vulndb.Pull implemented with oras-go, streaming the ~50MB layer and
staging both files before replacing either, so a failed pull leaves the
previous database intact rather than a half-written one.
- db.go: Vulnerability.Severity is a string, not trivy Severity, so the
int conversion did not compile. Severity now resolves vendor (highest
when vendors disagree) then NVD then unknown, and CVSS is read too.
- findings.go: added sweepFixedFindings plus the fleet query, severity
counts, rescan flag and accept/unaccept the API needs.
- vulnrules.go: added rule CRUD and the digest builder. ResolveTargets
returns []models.Server, not []string, so filterByServers was wrong.
- api/vulnerabilities.go was an empty file while handlers.go registered
twelve routes against it; written, grouped by CVE.
- shared/mail: added the missing sender. The templates were orphaned and
the HTML one was a copy of the text one, defining "subject" (which
html/template would escape) and emitting no markup. render.go parses
every template in init(), so a bad one panics server, admin and sitesvc
at boot — go build never runs init(), which is why nothing complained.
- notify: digests dispatch through their own path so SMTP gets the digest
template rather than arriving dressed as a monitor alert.
VulnScanningEnabled reads GetLicenseState(...).Feature("vuln_scanning")
and requires an active licence, never switching on tier. ReportPackages
re-checks it server-side: the agent flag is the optimisation, this is
the boundary.
Adds server_packages, vuln_findings and vuln_alert_rules to
ScopedCollections rather than to a separate deletion list. purgeInstance
derives its collection list from that registry, so instance deletion
follows automatically and there is no second copy to drift.
auth_providers was missing from ScopedCollections, so reap.go's
scopedCollectionsForPurge() (derived from that list) never deleted an
instance's providers, leaving orphaned rows holding encrypted client
secrets forever. Verified migration 0004's $rename over org_id->instance_id
is a no-op here since auth_providers never carried org_id.
HandleLocalLogin and HandleListPublicProviders each computed their own
answer to whether password sign-in must stay available, and they could
disagree: an instance with local login off and a licence that lapses
loses its only provider and its password form in the same moment, with
no endpoint left to recover. services.LocalLoginPermitted is now the
one predicate both call.
Implements spec 7 tasks 2-10 on top of the six-plan payload from task 1.
Admin: plans re-keyed on (deployment, tier); new catalogue collection holds
every Paddle price ID (one row per priceable component); new entitlements
collection holds desired beside granted. admin/internal/catalogue owns both
folds — entitlement to licence limits, and entitlement to Paddle line items —
so the base allowance is subtracted in exactly one place. licensing.Issue now
snapshots the instance's granted entitlement, never desired. Free is enforced
per account AND deployment. Staff endpoints for plans, catalogue and
entitlements; Free self-hosted can be claimed and renewed on its annual term;
the reaper stays cloud-only.
Server: enforces the monitor cap, audit-log retention (daily sweep, skips
Unlimited and lapsed instances), and gates the OIDC callback. Unset limits are
filled from the seed plan at the single decode site so old blobs never read as
zero.
Frontends: adminsite gains a catalogue price-ID editor, six-plan allowance
screen, and a catalogue-driven PlanConfigurator mounted on the staff instance
page. web shows monitors, audit retention and support level on the licence page.
Docs: CLAUDE.md, spec index and plan 5 preamble updated.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The API is the boundary; hiding the control in web/ is a courtesy. A role
editable in two places is a role with two answers.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The control plane owns deletion because it is the only service that knows
what an instance is made of; mirroring that collection list into admin
would drift, and a drift here deletes the wrong rows.
Defaults OFF. Eligibility is three positive assertions — Free tier, an
expiry that exists, and an expiry past the window — so a missing or stale
field is never eligible. The instance document is deleted last, making an
interrupted purge retryable rather than orphaning rows.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
users is unique on (instance_id, email) now, so an unscoped FindOne could
return an arbitrary one of several matching users. On the login path that
means signing someone into a tenant that is not theirs.
GetUserByEmail is deleted rather than left unused. Local sign-in resolves
its instance from the host, falling back to the single instance a
self-hosted deployment has, and refuses to guess otherwise. The OIDC
cross-instance guard goes: a scoped lookup cannot return another
instance's user, which is a stronger guarantee than the check it replaces.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Monitor execution and the workflow runner are deliberately unguarded: billing
state must not take away a customer's ability to know their infrastructure is
on fire, and killing a run midway leaves a half-configured server.
The plan called for a server-limit check in gRPC Register. Left out: a server
row only comes from CreateServer, which already checks the cap, so counting in
Register counts the caller itself and would reject a legitimate agent at
exactly the cap.
mrhid6
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5