site/ and sitesvc/ become web/ and server/ in vantage-site; docsite/
becomes the root of vantage-docs. Their images move with them, to
vantage/vantage-site/{web,server} and vantage/vantage-docs.
Nothing here imported any of them, and sitesvc turned out to read no
database at all, so both cuts are clean. docker-compose.site.yml is
deleted rather than emptied: every service it held now ships with the
repository that builds it, and deploy/docker/docker-compose.yml is once
again exactly a self-hosted install.
Corrects four comments that named sitesvc for work it no longer does.
services/crypto.go keeps its function names and its KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY
lookup and delegates the cipher, so vantagectl's verify probe can decrypt
with the same implementation rather than a second copy.
- A derived monitor outage with no `resolved_at` went to `History`, so an
ongoing disruption was listed under "Past incidents" while the component pill
beside it read Down. Unresolved now goes to `ActiveIncidents`.
- `overallState` returned `up` when nothing was counted: "all systems
operational" claimed from no evidence at all. A page with no components now
reports `no_data`, which the view already renders as "Status unknown".
- `EnsureStatusPageIndexes` returned on the first failure, so a transient
failure on the `status_pages` index left `status_incidents` with no unique
`(instance_id, incident_id)` index — a correctness property, not a scan
optimisation. All three are attempted and the failures joined.
Adds owner|admin routes under /api/status-pages for authoring status pages
and their incidents/maintenance windows, gated by the status_pages licence
feature. Adds the "status" token scope resource and the ten route-scope
entries, and regenerates the committed OpenAPI document.
Also types ErrPageInvalid as a sentinel for status page/incident validation
failures (previously bare errors), so statusPageError maps them to 400
instead of 500, and createStatusIncident/updateStatusIncident route through
the shared error mapper rather than hand-rolling a 400 for any service error.
CreateAPIToken capped a new token's role at the creator's role but never
capped its scopes against the calling credential's scopes, and POST
/api/tokens required only settings:write. A token holding settings:write
alone could therefore mint a token holding keys:write or secrets:write,
reaching every SSH private key and vault secret in the instance.
createToken now refuses (403 scope_confinement) when the calling
credential is itself a token and any requested scope is not satisfied by
that token's own scopes, via services.ScopeSatisfied so servers:write
still permits granting servers:read. Cookie sessions are unaffected,
since their authority is the user's role. Also correct the createToken
doc comment, which claimed the scope cap already existed.
Also document why Hint stores 5 hex characters of the token secret.
createToken's catch-all mapped every unmatched error to 400, so a
database outage reported itself as a malformed client request. Wrap the
genuine validation failures with ErrTokenInvalid and let the handler
answer 500 with a fixed message for everything else.
Mint, resolve, list and revoke, with the effective role capped at the
owner's and recomputed per request rather than frozen at creation.
Deleting a user deletes their tokens in the same call, so offboarding is
one action. Revoking somebody else's token answers not-found rather than
forbidden, since a 403 confirms the credential exists.
Also re-exports shared.APITokenMaxDays into server/internal/models,
following the existing ValidRole wrapper pattern, since the token
service needs it and it was never re-exported.
A pointer with absent meaning no cap, so an upgrade allows never-expire
tokens exactly as before and an instance opts into the policy. It governs
issuance only: changing it never invalidates a token that already exists.
Eight resources with read and write, write implying read. Coarse on
purpose: a scope per endpoint is a table nobody maintains, and a route
added without an entry either breaks or is unguarded.
The unique index on token_hash is what makes authentication an indexed
lookup rather than a scan, so this builder is fatal on failure like
EnsureAuthIndexes rather than warning like the secrets one.
Registered in ScopedCollections so instance purge reaches it.
The page rendered a map of eleven event types to labels and seven to colours.
The server emits forty-seven. Everything unmapped fell through to its raw
string, so "Key Assigned" in green sat above "workflow.schedule_updated" in
grey — the same kind of fact in two formats, which made the column look like it
carried a meaning it did not.
Presentation is now derived rather than enumerated. Event types are named
<category>.<action> by every call site, so the category becomes a chip, the
action is humanised, and the tone comes from the verb. A type added to the
server tomorrow gets a sensible label and colour with no second list to update;
the override table holds only the dozen the rule reads badly for. Every row is
one treatment, and colour never carries meaning alone — the sentence beside it
says the same thing in words.
Paging and filtering are server-side, unlike the fleet lists that answer with
everything and slice in the browser. audit_retention_days is a licensed
entitlement measured in months, and this log is read to answer questions about
the past, so a browser filtering the most recent page would report "no results"
for events that exist. GET /api/audit now takes q, category, limit and skip and
answers {events, total} — a short page is not evidence of the end of the log,
which is why the total is counted rather than inferred.
audit_logs had no indexes at all: every read was a collection scan with an
in-memory sort over an append-only collection. Adds (instance_id, created_at)
and warns rather than failing, matching EnsureSecretIndexes.
Two bugs found by running the deriver over all forty-seven real types rather
than eyeballing it: the tone rules matched only past-tense verbs, leaving
auth_provider.delete drawn as neutral beside key.deleted in red; and
"unaccepted" matched "accepted", so withdrawing an acceptance read as the same
caution as granting one.
Adds license.FeatureVulnScanning as the one name for the feature and a
catalogue row per deployment/tier, following console and oidc: features
are opt-in per customer, so no plan bundles it.
Documents the subsystem in CLAUDE.md, including that ScopedCollections is
the canonical registry instance deletion derives from — there is no
separate deletion list, which the plan had wrong.
Completes tasks 10-15 and fixes what was outstanding:
- vulndb.Pull implemented with oras-go, streaming the ~50MB layer and
staging both files before replacing either, so a failed pull leaves the
previous database intact rather than a half-written one.
- db.go: Vulnerability.Severity is a string, not trivy Severity, so the
int conversion did not compile. Severity now resolves vendor (highest
when vendors disagree) then NVD then unknown, and CVSS is read too.
- findings.go: added sweepFixedFindings plus the fleet query, severity
counts, rescan flag and accept/unaccept the API needs.
- vulnrules.go: added rule CRUD and the digest builder. ResolveTargets
returns []models.Server, not []string, so filterByServers was wrong.
- api/vulnerabilities.go was an empty file while handlers.go registered
twelve routes against it; written, grouped by CVE.
- shared/mail: added the missing sender. The templates were orphaned and
the HTML one was a copy of the text one, defining "subject" (which
html/template would escape) and emitting no markup. render.go parses
every template in init(), so a bad one panics server, admin and sitesvc
at boot — go build never runs init(), which is why nothing complained.
- notify: digests dispatch through their own path so SMTP gets the digest
template rather than arriving dressed as a monitor alert.
VulnScanningEnabled reads GetLicenseState(...).Feature("vuln_scanning")
and requires an active licence, never switching on tier. ReportPackages
re-checks it server-side: the agent flag is the optimisation, this is
the boundary.
Adds server_packages, vuln_findings and vuln_alert_rules to
ScopedCollections rather than to a separate deletion list. purgeInstance
derives its collection list from that registry, so instance deletion
follows automatically and there is no second copy to drift.
auth_providers was missing from ScopedCollections, so reap.go's
scopedCollectionsForPurge() (derived from that list) never deleted an
instance's providers, leaving orphaned rows holding encrypted client
secrets forever. Verified migration 0004's $rename over org_id->instance_id
is a no-op here since auth_providers never carried org_id.
HandleLocalLogin and HandleListPublicProviders each computed their own
answer to whether password sign-in must stay available, and they could
disagree: an instance with local login off and a licence that lapses
loses its only provider and its password form in the same moment, with
no endpoint left to recover. services.LocalLoginPermitted is now the
one predicate both call.
mrhid6