The missing /me/step-up/webauthn/begin and /finish were a plan defect,
not an acceptable gap: a user whose only factor is a passkey was
offered only recovery codes for step-up, burning one every ten
minutes. Adds the handlers in package auth (session-authenticated,
not themselves behind RequireStepUp, modeled on
HandleMFAWebAuthnBegin/finishAssertion) and registers both routes
behind the same RateLimitAuth() as /me/step-up. StepUpModal now offers
"Use passkey" when the server names webauthn and the browser supports
WebAuthn.
Adds the global re-authentication modal for guarded routes and the
owner/admin MFA controls on the settings page.
request() in lib/api.ts now intercepts a 403 step_up_required response,
awaits re-authentication through a callback registered by StepUpModal
(lib/stepup.ts), and retries the original request exactly once. The
modal offers TOTP, recovery code and password, since the webauthn
step-up routes (/me/step-up/webauthn/begin and /finish) are not
registered server-side yet; it omits the passkey option rather than
calling a route that does not exist.
me.stepUp posts one factor to /api/me/step-up. The settings page gains
an owner-only "Require MFA" toggle and the members table gains an MFA
column and a "Reset MFA" action, both routed through the existing
PUT /api/settings and DELETE /api/org/users/:id/mfa.
apt lists phased updates as upgradable while an upgrade defers them until
Ubuntu selects the host, so a freshly patched server kept reporting pending
updates. The agent now flags them; the server stores the flag and leaves them
out of patch run counts, and the server page shows them in their own section.
A card in the Access group beside Members and single sign-on rather than a
new nav entry — /settings/instance was folded back in for exactly this
reason. The plaintext is shown once in a well block and never again.
Tokens outside a newly tightened lifetime policy are flagged rather than
broken, because the policy governs issuance, not existing credentials.
The page rendered a map of eleven event types to labels and seven to colours.
The server emits forty-seven. Everything unmapped fell through to its raw
string, so "Key Assigned" in green sat above "workflow.schedule_updated" in
grey — the same kind of fact in two formats, which made the column look like it
carried a meaning it did not.
Presentation is now derived rather than enumerated. Event types are named
<category>.<action> by every call site, so the category becomes a chip, the
action is humanised, and the tone comes from the verb. A type added to the
server tomorrow gets a sensible label and colour with no second list to update;
the override table holds only the dozen the rule reads badly for. Every row is
one treatment, and colour never carries meaning alone — the sentence beside it
says the same thing in words.
Paging and filtering are server-side, unlike the fleet lists that answer with
everything and slice in the browser. audit_retention_days is a licensed
entitlement measured in months, and this log is read to answer questions about
the past, so a browser filtering the most recent page would report "no results"
for events that exist. GET /api/audit now takes q, category, limit and skip and
answers {events, total} — a short page is not evidence of the end of the log,
which is why the total is counted rather than inferred.
audit_logs had no indexes at all: every read was a collection scan with an
in-memory sort over an append-only collection. Adds (instance_id, created_at)
and warns rather than failing, matching EnsureSecretIndexes.
Two bugs found by running the deriver over all forty-seven real types rather
than eyeballing it: the tone rules matched only past-tense verbs, leaving
auth_provider.delete drawn as neutral beside key.deleted in red; and
"unaccepted" matched "accepted", so withdrawing an acceptance read as the same
caution as granting one.
Fleet board grouped by CVE, a per-server section on server detail, and
alert rules beside the channels they consume.
The server detail page has no tab pattern despite the plan saying to
follow one, so this adds a section in the existing vertical stack.
Three states are kept visually distinct because they are identical if
handled carelessly and only one is good news: never reported, no advisory
feed for the distribution, and scanned-and-clean. Database freshness sits
with the findings rather than in settings for the same reason.
Implements spec 7 tasks 2-10 on top of the six-plan payload from task 1.
Admin: plans re-keyed on (deployment, tier); new catalogue collection holds
every Paddle price ID (one row per priceable component); new entitlements
collection holds desired beside granted. admin/internal/catalogue owns both
folds — entitlement to licence limits, and entitlement to Paddle line items —
so the base allowance is subtracted in exactly one place. licensing.Issue now
snapshots the instance's granted entitlement, never desired. Free is enforced
per account AND deployment. Staff endpoints for plans, catalogue and
entitlements; Free self-hosted can be claimed and renewed on its annual term;
the reaper stays cloud-only.
Server: enforces the monitor cap, audit-log retention (daily sweep, skips
Unlimited and lapsed instances), and gates the OIDC callback. Unset limits are
filled from the seed plan at the single decode site so old blobs never read as
zero.
Frontends: adminsite gains a catalogue price-ID editor, six-plan allowance
screen, and a catalogue-driven PlanConfigurator mounted on the staff instance
page. web shows monitors, audit retention and support level on the licence page.
Docs: CLAUDE.md, spec index and plan 5 preamble updated.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A cloud instance's licence is issued in HQ and written into the control
plane by admin/internal/inject, straight to the database. The customer has
nothing to paste, so /settings/license offered them a form that could only
ever fail — and on an expired cloud instance, failed at the exact moment
they were looking for a way out.
GET /license now reports `deployment`, and the page swaps the paste form
for a short panel saying where the licence comes from, with a link to the
portal when HQ_URL is set. That is the same treatment hq-managed members
already get in the members table: read-only here, and a pointer to where
it is actually managed.
POST /license refuses with 409 cloud_managed on a cloud deployment. Hiding
a form is a courtesy; this codebase's rule is that the API is the boundary,
and the endpoint was reachable regardless of what the page rendered. It
cannot break injection, which never goes through HTTP at all.
Verified: server builds and vets clean, web builds clean.
The lock is a courtesy — the API answers 409 either way. NEXT_PUBLIC_HQ_URL
defaults empty so a self-hosted install shows a plain label rather than a
link to a portal that does not serve them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Security review of e70b2f0. The UI gating was correctly backed by
RequireRole everywhere; these are the missing validation gaps behind it.
- UpdateUserRole and createOrgUser accepted any role string verbatim, so
an admin could self-promote to owner, create an owner outright, or set
a junk role that silently stripped a user's access. Roles are now
whitelisted, only an owner may grant or remove the owner role, and an
actor cannot change their own.
- Neither demote nor delete guarded the last owner, so an org could reach
zero owners. Both now refuse when no owner would remain, returning 409.
Self-delete rejected.
- CountUsers counted across all orgs, so a locked-out org could never
re-bootstrap once another tenant existed, and the unauthenticated
bootstrap-status endpoint reported instance-wide state. It now answers
per-org on an org host, falling back to global only on the apex.
- HandleMe repeats the middleware's host/org check; it sits outside the
middleware so it can still return its own 401.
- Post-bootstrap now sends the new owner to their org host's login page.
The session cookie is deliberately scoped to the exact host, so the old
redirect landed them unauthenticated.
- AuthProvider renders an error state instead of mounting the shell with
a null user when /auth/me fails for a reason other than 401.
- api.ts unwraps {"error": ...} so these messages render as text.
- Route group (app) holds AuthProvider + Sidebar, so /login and /setup
render without app chrome and never mount the provider.
- AuthProvider drops the removed auth_enabled flag and exposes
{user, org, isAdmin}.
- New login page (password + SSO), first-run setup page, and org settings
page with a members table and the OIDC provider form.
- Settings page and the Organization nav entry are gated on role, since
/api/settings now 403s for members.
- GET /api/org/oidc gains client_secret_set so the UI can show whether a
secret is stored; the secret itself is still never serialized, and an
empty submitted value still means "keep the stored one".
- Fix logout: the sidebar linked to /auth/logout with a GET, but the route
is POST-only, so logout was 404ing.
mrhid6
mrhid6