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21 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
mrhid6 4c88d6e768 feat: Publish an OpenAPI 3.1 document and a Scalar reference
Chart Release / chart (push) Successful in 25s
Server Deploy / deploy (push) Successful in 10m17s
Generated from swaggo v2 annotations, committed rather than built into the
image: the runtime stage is scratch and adding codegen puts the toolchain
in the build. CI regenerates and diffs, so an annotation edited without
regenerating fails the build — without that the annotations would drift
while still looking authoritative.

Scalar is vendored rather than loaded from a CDN, because air-gapped
self-hosted installs are supported and a reference page that fails closed
offline is a support ticket.
2026-08-12 15:23:02 +00:00
mrhid6 a85a354e57 feat: Annotate workflow, step, run and workload routes
Same treatment: named types replace gin.H literals, and every handler gets
a swaggo doc block. This is the last of the handler files under
server/internal/api/.
2026-08-12 15:22:54 +00:00
mrhid6 9b18d09d9b feat: Annotate monitor, secrets and vulnerability routes
Same treatment: named types replace gin.H literals, and every handler gets
a swaggo doc block. VulnSummaryResponse uses pointer fields so the
db-freshness block stays entirely absent when no vulndb_meta document
exists yet, matching the handler's original conditional gin.H exactly.
2026-08-12 15:22:51 +00:00
mrhid6 a398da0eac feat: Annotate SSO, channel, console, instance and licence routes
Same treatment as the previous commit: named types replace gin.H literals,
and every handler gets a swaggo doc block.
2026-08-12 15:22:48 +00:00
mrhid6 edb8406e05 feat: Annotate server, key and token routes for OpenAPI
Converts their gin.H responses to the named types added in the previous
commit and adds swaggo doc blocks for every handler in handlers.go and
tokens.go.
2026-08-12 15:22:45 +00:00
mrhid6 bfd185adbb feat: Add OpenAPI response types and top-level swag annotations
Named response types for handlers that were returning anonymous gin.H
literals, so a generated annotation and what the handler actually returns
cannot disagree. main.go carries the top-level swaggo info block (title,
description, security schemes for cookie, bearer token and ESO auth).
2026-08-12 15:22:42 +00:00
mrhid6 182752d9ab feat: Manage API tokens from settings
A card in the Access group beside Members and single sign-on rather than a
new nav entry — /settings/instance was folded back in for exactly this
reason. The plaintext is shown once in a well block and never again.

Tokens outside a newly tightened lifetime policy are flagged rather than
broken, because the policy governs issuance, not existing credentials.
2026-08-12 14:58:57 +00:00
mrhid6 3b4c87a292 feat: Rate limit API token requests
600 per minute per token, in the Redis that sessions already require.
Cookie sessions are untouched. A Redis failure falls through rather than
refusing traffic — it is already a larger problem and should not become a
second outage.
2026-08-12 14:51:22 +00:00
mrhid6 2685e9ad06 fix: Distinguish caller mistakes from backend failures in CreateAPIToken
createToken's catch-all mapped every unmatched error to 400, so a
database outage reported itself as a malformed client request. Wrap the
genuine validation failures with ErrTokenInvalid and let the handler
answer 500 with a fixed message for everything else.
2026-08-12 14:48:17 +00:00
mrhid6 4de67e4bea docs: Separate caller mistakes from backend failures in the plan
createToken's catch-all answered 400 for every unmatched error, so a
database failure reported itself as the caller's malformed request. Found
in review of Task 7.
2026-08-12 14:47:36 +00:00
mrhid6 524ccc6412 feat: Add the API token endpoints
Create, list and revoke, with no update: editing what a credential already
deployed in CI can do, with no record of what it could do before, is worse
than requiring a rotation. Revoking a token that is not yours answers
not-found, since a 403 confirms it exists.

The audit actor stays the human and names the credential alongside, so a
person clicking and their CI job are told apart.
2026-08-12 14:44:50 +00:00
mrhid6 be4f488db3 feat: Enforce API token scopes from the route map
Keyed on the registered gin route pattern rather than a per-route
decorator, because a route registered without a decorator would be
unguarded. An unmapped route reached by a token is a 403, and a boot-time
check refuses to start when any /api route is missing, so the failure
lands at deploy rather than as a customer's surprise 403.
2026-08-12 14:40:00 +00:00
mrhid6 2f60b81962 fix: Stop the session middleware writing two responses on an expired cookie
sessionFromCookie already writes "session expired" when a cookie was
presented and rejected with no bearer to fall through to. Middleware
called sessionFromToken anyway, which wrote a second "not authenticated"
body onto the same response for every ordinary browser-session timeout -
gin logged "superfluous response.WriteHeader call" on ordinary use, not a
rare edge case.

Guard on c.IsAborted() after sessionFromCookie: true only in that one
rejected-cookie-no-bearer branch, so it short-circuits there while the
other three credential paths (no credential, bearer only, stale cookie
plus valid bearer) are unaffected.
2026-08-12 14:35:20 +00:00
mrhid6 92692de94d docs: Correct the middleware fallback in the plan
The plan's Middleware called sessionFromToken even when sessionFromCookie
had already answered a rejected cookie, putting two JSON bodies on the
wire for the ordinary expired-session case. Found in review of Task 5.
2026-08-12 14:34:54 +00:00
mrhid6 a5f9fca59e feat: Authenticate the API with a bearer token as well as a cookie
One middleware, two ways to arrive at the same *Session, so every handler,
role guard, licence gate and audit call is untouched. The host guard
applies to both: a token carries an instance, and the tenant boundary must
not have a token-shaped hole in it.

The effective role is min(user, token) recomputed per request, so demoting
somebody demotes their tokens with them. A stale cookie beside a valid
bearer falls through rather than refusing a credential that would work.
2026-08-12 14:32:40 +00:00
mrhid6 72e5228351 feat: Add the API token service
Mint, resolve, list and revoke, with the effective role capped at the
owner's and recomputed per request rather than frozen at creation.

Deleting a user deletes their tokens in the same call, so offboarding is
one action. Revoking somebody else's token answers not-found rather than
forbidden, since a 403 confirms the credential exists.

Also re-exports shared.APITokenMaxDays into server/internal/models,
following the existing ValidRole wrapper pattern, since the token
service needs it and it was never re-exported.
2026-08-12 14:28:10 +00:00
mrhid6 33b5ec0788 feat: Add a per-instance API token lifetime cap
A pointer with absent meaning no cap, so an upgrade allows never-expire
tokens exactly as before and an instance opts into the policy. It governs
issuance only: changing it never invalidates a token that already exists.
2026-08-12 14:22:12 +00:00
mrhid6 1b718e7c59 feat: Define the API token scope vocabulary
Eight resources with read and write, write implying read. Coarse on
purpose: a scope per endpoint is a table nobody maintains, and a route
added without an entry either breaks or is unguarded.
2026-08-12 14:19:47 +00:00
mrhid6 6ad65a1242 feat: Add the api_tokens collection and its indexes
The unique index on token_hash is what makes authentication an indexed
lookup rather than a scan, so this builder is fatal on failure like
EnsureAuthIndexes rather than warning like the secrets one.

Registered in ScopedCollections so instance purge reaches it.
2026-08-12 14:16:12 +00:00
mrhid6 a41f2b26cc docs: Plan the API token and OpenAPI implementation
Twelve tasks from model through middleware, scope enforcement, endpoints,
web UI, generated OpenAPI and documentation. Verification is build plus
curl and UI checks rather than test cycles, matching a repository with no
Go test harness beyond shared/mail.
2026-08-12 14:09:03 +00:00
mrhid6 71f9a9dca5 docs: Specify scoped API tokens and an OpenAPI reference
Adds the approved design for personal access tokens on the control plane
REST API, and for the generated OpenAPI 3.1 document served as a Scalar
reference page.

Tokens fall back into the existing session middleware rather than getting
their own route group, so every handler, role guard and audit call works
unchanged. Scope enforcement derives from the registered route pattern and
fails closed, with a boot-time check for unmapped routes.

A Terraform provider is deliberately left to a follow-on spec.
2026-08-12 13:59:03 +00:00
38 changed files with 16475 additions and 104 deletions
+18
View File
@@ -95,6 +95,24 @@ jobs:
docker login ${{ vars.DOCKER_HOST }} \
-u "${{ secrets.REGISTRY_USER }}" --password-stdin
- name: Set up Go
if: steps.changed.outputs.server == 'true'
uses: actions/setup-go@v5
with:
go-version: "1.26"
cache: true
cache-dependency-path: server/go.sum
- name: Verify the OpenAPI document is current
if: steps.changed.outputs.server == 'true'
run: |
go install github.com/swaggo/swag/v2/cmd/swag@v2.0.0-rc5
cd server
swag init --generalInfo cmd/main.go --dir ./,../shared \
--output internal/api/docs --outputTypes json --v3.1
mv -f internal/api/docs/swagger.json internal/api/docs/openapi.json
git diff --exit-code internal/api/docs/openapi.json
- name: Build and push server image
if: steps.changed.outputs.server == 'true'
run: |
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
@@ -0,0 +1,297 @@
# API tokens and OpenAPI reference
Date: 2026-08-12
Status: approved, ready for implementation planning
## Problem
The only programmatic credential the control plane issues is the ESO secrets-read
bearer token, which reaches exactly one endpoint. Everything else requires a
browser session cookie. There is therefore no supported way to drive Vantage from
CI, a script, or infrastructure-as-code, and no machine-readable description of
the REST API for anyone who wants to try.
This spec covers two deliverables that ship together: scoped API tokens, and an
OpenAPI 3.1 document rendered as a live reference page. A Terraform provider is
the intended follow-on and is explicitly out of scope here — it depends on both
of these being settled, and it is a separate Go module with its own release
cycle.
## Goals
- A person can mint a scoped, optionally expiring token and use it against the
existing REST API with no new endpoints to learn.
- A leaked token is bounded by role, by scope, and by expiry policy.
- Offboarding a person removes their tokens as a side effect of removing them.
- The API has a machine-readable description that cannot silently drift from the
handlers it describes.
- The reference page works on an air-gapped self-hosted install.
## Non-goals
- Token editing. Role and scopes are immutable; rotation replaces amendment.
- OAuth device flow or any browser-based authorisation grant.
- Per-server or per-tag restrictions on a token.
- Instance-owned service tokens that outlive their creator.
- The Terraform provider.
- General API rate limiting beyond the per-token limit described below.
## Part 1 — API tokens
### Token format and storage
A token is `vt_` followed by 32 random bytes, hex encoded. It is displayed once,
at creation, and never again.
Only the SHA-256 hash is stored, in a unique index. This follows the precedent
already set by `servers.agent_token_hash` and the ESO read token. bcrypt is
deliberately not used: the value is full-entropy random rather than a
user-chosen password, so a fast hash is sufficient, and a per-token salt would
force a collection scan where an indexed lookup is wanted.
The first eight characters are stored in clear as `hint`, so the list can
identify a token without revealing it.
### Authentication path
`auth.Middleware()` gains a fallback. When there is no `km_session` cookie it
looks for `Authorization: Bearer vt_…`. Both paths end by placing a `*Session` in
the gin context, so every handler, `auth.RequireRole`, `RequireActiveLicense`,
`RequireFeature` and `actorFromCtx` continue to work unmodified.
```
Session{
UserID: token.UserID
InstanceID: token.InstanceID
Role: min(user.Role, token.Role) // owner > admin > member
Email: user.Email
TokenID: token.TokenID // "" for cookie sessions
Scopes: token.Scopes // nil for cookie sessions
}
```
The effective role is recomputed on every request rather than frozen at
creation. Demoting the user demotes the token with them. No caching is required
because the user document is already read to confirm the user still exists.
The existing host guard applies identically. A token carries an `instance_id`,
and a request arriving at a different instance's host is rejected exactly as a
mismatched cookie session is. The tenant boundary must not have a token-shaped
hole in it.
`last_used_at` is written best-effort and only when the stored value is more
than 60 seconds old, so it does not become a Mongo write per request.
Rejections:
| Condition | Status | Body |
| -------------------- | ------ | -------------------------------------- |
| No credential at all | 401 | `not authenticated` |
| Unknown token | 401 | `invalid token` |
| Expired token | 401 | `code: token_expired` |
| Owning user deleted | 401 | `invalid token` |
| Missing scope | 403 | names the required scope |
| Wrong instance host | 403 | `instance host mismatch` |
### Data model
New collection `api_tokens`, added to `services.ScopedCollections` so instance
purge reaches it.
```
instance_id string
token_id string
user_id string
name string 1-64 chars, unique per user
hint string first 8 chars of the plaintext
token_hash string sha256
role string owner|admin|member
scopes []string
expires_at *time.Time nil means never
created_at time.Time
last_used_at *time.Time
created_by_ip string
```
Indexes: unique on `token_hash`; compound on `(instance_id, user_id)`.
Deleting a user deletes their tokens as part of the same service call as
`DeleteInstanceUser`, so offboarding is one action rather than two.
### Expiry policy
Expiry is optional by default: a token may be created with no expiry at all.
Instance settings gain `api_token_max_days *int`, editable by owner and admin:
- `nil` — no cap; never-expire is allowed. This is the default, so an upgrade
changes nothing.
- `n > 0` — a new token must expire within `n` days, and a never-expire token is
refused.
Changing the setting does not retroactively invalidate existing tokens; it is a
policy on issuance. Tokens already outside the new cap are flagged in the UI so
that someone can rotate them deliberately, rather than discovering the change
when a pipeline breaks.
### Scopes
Eight resources, each with `:read` and `:write`. Write implies read on the same
resource.
```
servers keys secrets workflows
monitors vulns workloads settings
```
Scope enforcement is a single middleware, `RequireScopes()`, mounted once in the
`/api` stack. It derives the required resource from the matched gin route
pattern using a map, rather than from a per-route decorator: a route registered
without a decorator would otherwise be unguarded, and this repo already prefers
guards that come from where a route is mounted rather than from someone
remembering.
- Cookie sessions skip the check entirely.
- A token-authenticated request whose route pattern is absent from the map is
denied with 403. Fail closed.
- A startup check fails boot if any registered `/api` route pattern is missing
from the map, so the failure surfaces at deploy rather than at the first call.
Deliberate placements:
- `keys:read` covers `GET /keys/:id/private-key`. Reading a private key is
reading a key.
- `secrets:read` does not cover `GET /api/secrets/:group/values`. That endpoint
keeps its separate ESO bearer path and is unaffected by this work.
- `workloads:write` covers both container control actions and log reads, which
are already restricted to owner and admin.
- The token endpoints themselves map to the `settings` resource: `GET
/api/tokens` requires `settings:read`, and `POST` and `DELETE` require
`settings:write`. A token can therefore mint or revoke tokens only when
explicitly granted that scope, and never above its own role.
### Endpoints
```
GET /api/tokens list; a member sees their own, owner|admin see all
POST /api/tokens create; returns the plaintext once
DELETE /api/tokens/:id revoke; own always, owner|admin any
```
There is no `PUT`. Editing a token's role or scopes changes what a credential
already deployed in a CI system can do, with no record of what it could do
before. Rotation replaces amendment.
`POST` body: `name`, `role`, `scopes[]`, `expires_in_days` (omitted means never,
and is refused when `api_token_max_days` is set).
Refusals: 400 for an unknown scope, 409 for a duplicate name for that user, 403
for a role above the creator's own, 422 for an expiry beyond policy.
### Web UI
A new "API tokens" card in the Access group of `/settings`, alongside Members
and single sign-on. Not a new nav entry — `/settings/instance` was folded back
into `/settings` for precisely this reason, and the card lives in
`web/components/settings/` with the others, reusing the shared `Field` and
`inputClass`.
The card lists name, hint, role, scope chips, last used, and expiry with a
distinct state for expired and for over-policy. Revoke is per row and confirms.
Create opens a modal. The plaintext is shown once in a `--well` block with
copy-to-clipboard and an explicit line saying it will not be shown again.
Members see only their own rows. Owner and admin get an "All tokens" toggle.
`api_token_max_days` is a field on the same card, visible to owner and admin
only.
### Audit
New events:
- `token.created`
- `token.revoked`
- `token.expired_use` — a rejected expired token, which is how a forgotten CI
job becomes visible
- `settings.token_policy_updated`
The actor is the human's email throughout, so `actorFromCtx` needs no change.
Every existing audit event written during a token-authenticated request gains
`via: "token:<name>"` in its detail, so the log distinguishes a person clicking
from their credential acting.
### Rate limiting
Token-authenticated requests are limited per token in Redis at 600 per minute,
answering 429 with `Retry-After`. Cookie sessions are untouched. This is narrow
on purpose: it is not the general API rate-limiting project, only enough that a
runaway script cannot take an instance down.
## Part 2 — OpenAPI and the reference page
### Generation
`swaggo/swag` v2, pinned, emitting OpenAPI 3.1. v1 emits Swagger 2.0, which
Scalar renders poorly.
Handlers in `server/internal/api/*.go` gain annotation comments. Request and
response bodies that are currently anonymous inline structs become named
structs. This is real churn across roughly fifteen files and is the honest cost
of choosing generation over a hand-written document.
The generated `server/internal/api/docs/openapi.json` is committed and embedded
with `go:embed`, not generated during the image build: `server/Dockerfile`
produces a `scratch` runtime from a Go build stage, and adding codegen there
means putting the toolchain in the build image.
`server-deploy.yml` gains a check that regenerates the spec and runs
`git diff --exit-code`. An annotation edited without regenerating fails the
build. Without this check the annotations are worth less than a hand-written
document, because they would drift while appearing authoritative.
### Serving
```
GET /api/openapi.json the spec, session or token authenticated
GET /api/docs HTML page loading a vendored Scalar bundle
```
The Scalar standalone bundle is vendored under `server/internal/api/docs/`, with
its version recorded in a comment beside it and refreshed by hand. No CDN:
air-gapped self-hosted installs are supported, and a reference page that fails
closed on an offline site is a support ticket.
Because the page is served by the instance itself, "Try it" acts against the
reader's own API with their own session.
### Documented auth schemes
Three, kept distinct:
- `cookieAuth` — the `km_session` cookie.
- `bearerAuth` — a `vt_…` API token.
- The ESO secrets endpoint is marked as its own separate scheme, so nobody wires
a personal access token into External Secrets Operator.
## Documentation
- `docsite/docs/reference/api-tokens.md`: creating a token, the scope table,
curl examples, rotation, and the maximum-lifetime policy.
- `CLAUDE.md`: the three token routes under REST API, the `api_tokens`
collection, and a note that `openapi.json` is generated and CI-verified.
## Risks
- The anonymous-struct-to-named-struct conversion is the bulk of the work and
touches handler code this feature otherwise has no business in.
- The vendored Scalar bundle is a manual refresh that nobody will remember. The
version comment is the only mitigation.
- A scope map keyed on gin route patterns breaks if a route path is renamed. The
boot-time completeness check is what turns that into a startup failure rather
than a silent 403 in production.
## Follow-on work
A Terraform provider, as its own spec and plan, consuming the tokens and the
OpenAPI document produced here.
+26
View File
@@ -29,6 +29,24 @@ import (
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
)
// @title Vantage API
// @version 1.0
// @description The Vantage control plane REST API. Authenticate with a browser session cookie, or with an API token created under Settings → API tokens.
// @BasePath /api
//
// @securityDefinitions.apikey cookieAuth
// @in cookie
// @name km_session
//
// @securityDefinitions.apikey bearerAuth
// @in header
// @name Authorization
// @description An API token, sent as "Bearer vt_…". Scoped and optionally expiring.
//
// @securityDefinitions.apikey esoAuth
// @in header
// @name Authorization
// @description The External Secrets read token, rotated under Settings. It reaches /api/secrets/{group}/values and nothing else. It is a different credential from an API token, and the two must never be substituted for one another.
func main() {
mongoURI := getEnv("MONGO_URI", "mongodb://localhost:27017")
@@ -109,6 +127,10 @@ func runSchemaSetup() {
log.Fatalf("failed to ensure auth indexes: %v", err)
}
if err := services.EnsureAPITokenIndexes(); err != nil {
log.Fatalf("api token indexes: %v", err)
}
// 0005 runs AFTER EnsureAuthIndexes: the unique (instance_id, provider_id)
// index must exist before anything inserts providers, or a concurrent
// re-run could double-insert before the index is there to refuse it.
@@ -230,6 +252,10 @@ func serve() {
r.Use(corsMiddleware())
api.RegisterRoutes(r)
if err := api.AssertScopeMapComplete(r); err != nil {
log.Fatalf("api scope map: %v", err)
}
srv := &http.Server{Addr: ":8080", Handler: r}
go func() {
log.Println("REST server listening on :8080")
+93 -8
View File
@@ -26,10 +26,30 @@ func viewOf(c *gin.Context, p models.AuthProvider) authProviderView {
}
}
// listAuthPresets godoc
//
// @Summary List SSO presets
// @Description Preset providers (Entra, Google, Okta, GitHub) that expand to a real issuer on save.
// @Tags auth-providers
// @Produce json
// @Success 200 {array} auth.Preset
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /auth/presets [get]
func listAuthPresets(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, auth.Presets())
}
// listAuthProviders godoc
//
// @Summary List SSO providers
// @Tags auth-providers
// @Produce json
// @Success 200 {array} authProviderView
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /auth/providers [get]
func listAuthProviders(c *gin.Context) {
providers, err := services.ListAuthProviders(auth.InstanceID(c))
if err != nil {
@@ -43,6 +63,18 @@ func listAuthProviders(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, out)
}
// createAuthProvider godoc
//
// @Summary Create an SSO provider
// @Tags auth-providers
// @Accept json
// @Produce json
// @Param body body object{name=string,preset=string,issuer_input=string,client_id=string,client_secret=string,enabled=bool} true "Provider parameters"
// @Success 201 {object} authProviderView
// @Failure 400 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /auth/providers [post]
func createAuthProvider(c *gin.Context) {
var body struct {
Name string `json:"name"`
@@ -80,6 +112,22 @@ func createAuthProvider(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(http.StatusCreated, viewOf(c, *p))
}
// updateAuthProvider godoc
//
// @Summary Update an SSO provider
// @Tags auth-providers
// @Accept json
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Provider ID"
// @Param body body object{name=string,issuer_input=string,client_id=string,client_secret=string,enabled=bool,order=int} true "Fields to update"
// @Success 200 {object} SavedResponse
// @Failure 400 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 404 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 409 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /auth/providers/{id} [put]
func updateAuthProvider(c *gin.Context) {
var body struct {
Name *string `json:"name"`
@@ -135,9 +183,23 @@ func updateAuthProvider(c *gin.Context) {
// document was built from the old ones.
auth.EvictProvider(providerID)
services.LogEvent(instanceID, "auth_provider.update", actorFromCtx(c), "", "", existing.Name)
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"saved": true})
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, SavedResponse{Saved: true})
}
// deleteAuthProvider godoc
//
// @Summary Delete an SSO provider
// @Description Refused when the instance would be left with no way in (no local login and no other enabled provider).
// @Tags auth-providers
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Provider ID"
// @Success 200 {object} DeletedResponse
// @Failure 404 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 409 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /auth/providers/{id} [delete]
func deleteAuthProvider(c *gin.Context) {
instanceID := auth.InstanceID(c)
providerID := c.Param("id")
@@ -161,7 +223,7 @@ func deleteAuthProvider(c *gin.Context) {
}
auth.EvictProvider(providerID)
services.LogEvent(instanceID, "auth_provider.delete", actorFromCtx(c), "", "", existing.Name)
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"deleted": true})
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, DeletedResponse{Deleted: true})
}
// guardProviderChange asks whether the instance would still have a way in.
@@ -178,6 +240,18 @@ func guardProviderChange(instanceID string, existing *models.AuthProvider, enabl
return services.CheckLockout(services.IsLocalLoginEnabled(instanceID), n-1)
}
// ackAuthProviderNotice godoc
//
// @Summary Acknowledge a provider migration notice
// @Tags auth-providers
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Provider ID"
// @Success 200 {object} AcknowledgedResponse
// @Failure 404 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /auth/providers/{id}/ack-notice [post]
func ackAuthProviderNotice(c *gin.Context) {
instanceID := auth.InstanceID(c)
providerID := c.Param("id")
@@ -191,10 +265,21 @@ func ackAuthProviderNotice(c *gin.Context) {
return
}
services.LogEvent(instanceID, "auth_provider.ack_notice", actorFromCtx(c), "", "", existing.Name)
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"acknowledged": true})
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, AcknowledgedResponse{Acknowledged: true})
}
// testAuthProvider proves the configuration is reachable. It signs nobody in.
// testAuthProvider godoc
//
// @Summary Test an SSO provider's reachability
// @Description Proves the configuration is reachable. It signs nobody in.
// @Tags auth-providers
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Provider ID"
// @Success 200 {object} TestProviderResponse
// @Failure 404 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /auth/providers/{id}/test [post]
func testAuthProvider(c *gin.Context) {
instanceID := auth.InstanceID(c)
p, err := services.GetAuthProvider(instanceID, c.Param("id"))
@@ -206,15 +291,15 @@ func testAuthProvider(c *gin.Context) {
// GitHub has no discovery document. The only meaningful check without
// a user token is that credentials are present.
if p.ClientID == "" || p.ClientSecretEnc == "" {
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"ok": false, "message": "client ID and secret are required"})
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, TestProviderResponse{OK: false, Message: "client ID and secret are required"})
return
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"ok": true, "message": "credentials are configured"})
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, TestProviderResponse{OK: true, Message: "credentials are configured"})
return
}
if _, err := oidc.NewProvider(c.Request.Context(), p.Issuer); err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"ok": false, "message": err.Error()})
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, TestProviderResponse{OK: false, Message: err.Error()})
return
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"ok": true, "message": "discovery document fetched"})
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, TestProviderResponse{OK: true, Message: "discovery document fetched"})
}
+60 -1
View File
@@ -18,6 +18,16 @@ func registerChannelRoutes(g *gin.RouterGroup) {
g.POST("/channels/:id/test", testChannel)
}
// listChannels godoc
//
// @Summary List notification channels
// @Tags channels
// @Produce json
// @Success 200 {array} models.NotificationChannel
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /channels [get]
func listChannels(c *gin.Context) {
channels, err := services.ListChannels(auth.InstanceID(c))
if err != nil {
@@ -27,6 +37,20 @@ func listChannels(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, channels)
}
// createChannel godoc
//
// @Summary Create a notification channel
// @Tags channels
// @Accept json
// @Produce json
// @Param body body models.NotificationChannel true "Channel to create"
// @Success 201 {object} models.NotificationChannel
// @Failure 400 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 403 {object} LimitExceededResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /channels [post]
func createChannel(c *gin.Context) {
var ch models.NotificationChannel
if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&ch); err != nil {
@@ -48,6 +72,20 @@ func createChannel(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(http.StatusCreated, created)
}
// updateChannel godoc
//
// @Summary Update a notification channel
// @Tags channels
// @Accept json
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Channel ID"
// @Param body body object{name=string,type=string,config=map[string]string,enabled=bool} true "Fields to update"
// @Success 204
// @Failure 400 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /channels/{id} [put]
func updateChannel(c *gin.Context) {
var body struct {
Name *string `json:"name"`
@@ -83,6 +121,16 @@ func updateChannel(c *gin.Context) {
c.Status(http.StatusNoContent)
}
// deleteChannel godoc
//
// @Summary Delete a notification channel
// @Tags channels
// @Param id path string true "Channel ID"
// @Success 204
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /channels/{id} [delete]
func deleteChannel(c *gin.Context) {
if err := services.DeleteChannel(auth.InstanceID(c), c.Param("id")); err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
@@ -91,10 +139,21 @@ func deleteChannel(c *gin.Context) {
c.Status(http.StatusNoContent)
}
// testChannel godoc
//
// @Summary Send a test notification
// @Tags channels
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Channel ID"
// @Success 200 {object} StatusResponse
// @Failure 502 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /channels/{id}/test [post]
func testChannel(c *gin.Context) {
if err := services.TestChannel(auth.InstanceID(c), c.Param("id")); err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadGateway, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"status": "sent"})
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, StatusResponse{Status: "sent"})
}
+35 -4
View File
@@ -16,6 +16,22 @@ import (
"github.com/wwt/guac"
)
// consoleConnect godoc
//
// @Summary Open a browser console session
// @Description Mints a one-time session token for the /console/tunnel websocket. Requires a live agent — answers 409 agent_offline otherwise.
// @Tags console
// @Accept json
// @Produce json
// @Param body body object{server_id=string,protocol=string,key_id=string,rdp_username=string,rdp_password=string,ssh_username=string} true "Session parameters"
// @Success 200 {object} ConsoleConnectResponse
// @Failure 400 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 404 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 409 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /console/connect [post]
func consoleConnect(c *gin.Context) {
var body struct {
ServerID string `json:"server_id" binding:"required"`
@@ -73,10 +89,10 @@ func consoleConnect(c *gin.Context) {
services.LogEvent(auth.InstanceID(c), "console.opened", actorFromCtx(c), srv.ServerID, "",
"console session opened ("+body.Protocol+", agent-relayed)")
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{
"session_id": sess.SessionID,
"token": token,
"ws_path": "/api/console/tunnel",
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, ConsoleConnectResponse{
SessionID: sess.SessionID,
Token: token,
WSPath: "/api/console/tunnel",
})
}
@@ -100,6 +116,21 @@ func queryIntDefault(r *http.Request, key string, def int) int {
//
// Lines are prefixed with the session ID so one attempt can be followed across
// pods, and the pod's own hostname so it is obvious which one served it.
// consoleTunnel godoc
//
// @Summary Console websocket tunnel
// @Description Upgrades the browser's connection to a websocket and joins it to guacd, relayed through the agent. Consumes the one-time session token from /console/connect.
// @Tags console
// @Param token query string true "One-time session token"
// @Success 101
// @Failure 401 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 403 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 404 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 409 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /console/tunnel [get]
func consoleTunnel(c *gin.Context) {
host, _ := os.Hostname()
+23
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
// Package docs holds the generated OpenAPI document and the vendored Scalar
// bundle that renders it.
//
// openapi.json is generated by `swag init` and committed rather than built into
// the image: server/Dockerfile produces a scratch runtime from a Go build
// stage, and adding codegen there means putting the toolchain in the image.
// server-deploy.yml regenerates and diffs it, so an annotation edited without
// regenerating fails the build.
//
// scalar.standalone.js is vendored from
// https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/@scalar/api-reference@latest/dist/browser/standalone.js
// and refreshed by hand. Fetched at build time it would break an air-gapped
// install; fetched at page load it would break an air-gapped install more
// visibly.
package docs
import _ "embed"
//go:embed openapi.json
var OpenAPI []byte
//go:embed scalar.standalone.js
var ScalarJS []byte
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long
+344 -39
View File
@@ -14,10 +14,17 @@ import (
)
func actorFromCtx(c *gin.Context) string {
if sess := auth.GetSessionFromContext(c); sess != nil && sess.Email != "" {
return sess.Email
sess := auth.GetSessionFromContext(c)
if sess == nil || sess.Email == "" {
return "admin"
}
return "admin"
// The actor stays the human, because a token acts on their behalf and the
// log has to name somebody. The credential is appended so a person clicking
// and their CI job are told apart.
if sess.TokenID != "" {
return fmt.Sprintf("%s (via token:%s)", sess.Email, sess.TokenName)
}
return sess.Email
}
func RegisterRoutes(r *gin.Engine) {
@@ -42,6 +49,11 @@ func RegisterRoutes(r *gin.Engine) {
apiGroup := r.Group("/api")
apiGroup.Use(auth.Middleware())
// Scope enforcement sits between authentication and the licence gate, and
// no-ops for cookie sessions. It is mounted here rather than per route so
// a route added later is covered by where it lives, not by memory.
apiGroup.Use(RequireScopes())
apiGroup.Use(RateLimitTokens())
// Deny by default: every non-GET route under /api is gated unless it is on
// the exemption list in licence.go. A route added later is covered because
// of where it is mounted, not because someone remembered.
@@ -68,6 +80,15 @@ func RegisterRoutes(r *gin.Engine) {
apiGroup.GET("/audit", listAuditEvents)
apiGroup.GET("/tokens", listTokens)
apiGroup.GET("/tokens/scopes", listTokenScopes)
apiGroup.POST("/tokens", createToken)
apiGroup.DELETE("/tokens/:id", revokeToken)
apiGroup.GET("/openapi.json", getOpenAPI)
apiGroup.GET("/docs", getAPIDocs)
apiGroup.GET("/docs/scalar.js", getScalarJS)
settings := apiGroup.Group("/settings")
settings.Use(auth.RequireRole("owner", "admin"))
{
@@ -144,6 +165,19 @@ func RegisterRoutes(r *gin.Engine) {
}
}
// listServers godoc
//
// @Summary List servers
// @Description Returns every server in the instance, optionally filtered by tag (repeatable, key:value).
// @Tags servers
// @Produce json
// @Param tag query []string false "Filter by tag as key:value, repeatable"
// @Success 200 {array} models.Server
// @Failure 400 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /servers [get]
func listServers(c *gin.Context) {
sel, err := services.ParseTagFilters(c.QueryArray("tag"))
if err != nil {
@@ -158,6 +192,17 @@ func listServers(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, servers)
}
// listKnownTags godoc
//
// @Summary List known tags
// @Description Returns every tag key currently used by any server, with the values seen for each.
// @Tags servers
// @Produce json
// @Success 200 {object} map[string][]string
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /servers/tags [get]
func listKnownTags(c *gin.Context) {
tags, err := services.KnownTags(auth.InstanceID(c))
if err != nil {
@@ -167,6 +212,22 @@ func listKnownTags(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, tags)
}
// putServerTags godoc
//
// @Summary Replace a server's tags
// @Description Replaces the whole tag map for a server. Last write wins.
// @Tags servers
// @Accept json
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Server ID"
// @Param body body object{tags=map[string]string} true "New tag map"
// @Success 200 {object} TagsResponse
// @Failure 400 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 404 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /servers/{id}/tags [put]
func putServerTags(c *gin.Context) {
var body struct {
Tags map[string]string `json:"tags"`
@@ -196,9 +257,21 @@ func putServerTags(c *gin.Context) {
services.LogEvent(instanceID, "server.tags_updated", actorFromCtx(c), serverID, "",
fmt.Sprintf("tags %v -> %v", before.Tags, body.Tags))
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"tags": body.Tags})
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, TagsResponse{Tags: body.Tags})
}
// createServer godoc
//
// @Summary Add a server
// @Description Creates a server record and a single-use pre-registration token (TTL 1 hour).
// @Tags servers
// @Produce json
// @Success 201 {object} CreateServerResponse
// @Failure 403 {object} LimitExceededResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /servers [post]
func createServer(c *gin.Context) {
s, token, err := services.CreateServer(auth.InstanceID(c))
if err != nil {
@@ -208,13 +281,26 @@ func createServer(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
c.JSON(http.StatusCreated, gin.H{
"server": s,
"token": token,
"server_id": s.ServerID,
c.JSON(http.StatusCreated, CreateServerResponse{
Server: s,
Token: token,
ServerID: s.ServerID,
})
}
// newServer godoc
//
// @Summary Add a server (install page)
// @Description Identical to POST /servers; also reachable by GET for the install page. Mints a new pre-registration token.
// @Tags servers
// @Produce json
// @Success 200 {object} NewServerResponse
// @Failure 403 {object} LimitExceededResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /servers/new [get]
// @Router /servers/new [post]
func newServer(c *gin.Context) {
s, token, err := services.CreateServer(auth.InstanceID(c))
if err != nil {
@@ -238,14 +324,26 @@ func newServer(c *gin.Context) {
host, s.ServerID, token,
)
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{
"server_id": s.ServerID,
"pre_reg_token": token,
"install_command": installCmd,
"install_command_ps": installCmdPS,
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, NewServerResponse{
ServerID: s.ServerID,
PreRegToken: token,
InstallCommand: installCmd,
InstallCommandPS: installCmdPS,
})
}
// getServer godoc
//
// @Summary Get a server
// @Description Returns a server together with its resolved key assignments.
// @Tags servers
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Server ID"
// @Success 200 {object} ServerDetailResponse
// @Failure 404 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /servers/{id} [get]
func getServer(c *gin.Context) {
id := c.Param("id")
s, err := services.GetServer(auth.InstanceID(c), id)
@@ -256,16 +354,23 @@ func getServer(c *gin.Context) {
assignments, _ := services.GetAssignmentsWithKeysForServer(auth.InstanceID(c), id)
type serverResponse struct {
*models.Server
Keys interface{} `json:"keys"`
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, serverResponse{
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, ServerDetailResponse{
Server: s,
Keys: assignments,
})
}
// deleteServer godoc
//
// @Summary Delete a server
// @Tags servers
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Server ID"
// @Success 200 {object} DeletedResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /servers/{id} [delete]
func deleteServer(c *gin.Context) {
id := c.Param("id")
s, _ := services.GetServer(auth.InstanceID(c), id)
@@ -278,9 +383,24 @@ func deleteServer(c *gin.Context) {
hostname = s.Hostname
}
services.LogEvent(auth.InstanceID(c), "server.deleted", actorFromCtx(c), id, "", fmt.Sprintf("server %s deleted", hostname))
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"deleted": true})
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, DeletedResponse{Deleted: true})
}
// generateKey godoc
//
// @Summary Generate a key on a server
// @Description Dispatches an agent command that generates a keypair on the target server and reports it back.
// @Tags keys
// @Accept json
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Server ID"
// @Param body body object{label=string,key_type=string,key_size=int,passphrase=string,comment=string} false "Key generation parameters"
// @Success 202 {object} GenerateKeyResponse
// @Failure 404 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 503 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /servers/{id}/generate-key [post]
func generateKey(c *gin.Context) {
id := c.Param("id")
@@ -315,13 +435,23 @@ func generateKey(c *gin.Context) {
}
services.LogEvent(auth.InstanceID(c), "key.generation_dispatched", actorFromCtx(c), s.ServerID, "", fmt.Sprintf("key generation dispatched (label=%s type=%s)", body.Label, body.KeyType))
c.JSON(http.StatusAccepted, gin.H{
"message": "key generation command sent to agent",
"command_id": cmdID,
"server_id": s.ServerID,
c.JSON(http.StatusAccepted, GenerateKeyResponse{
Message: "key generation command sent to agent",
CommandID: cmdID,
ServerID: s.ServerID,
})
}
// listKeys godoc
//
// @Summary List keys
// @Tags keys
// @Produce json
// @Success 200 {array} models.Key
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /keys [get]
func listKeys(c *gin.Context) {
keys, err := services.ListKeys(auth.InstanceID(c))
if err != nil {
@@ -331,6 +461,19 @@ func listKeys(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, keys)
}
// createKey godoc
//
// @Summary Upload a key
// @Tags keys
// @Accept json
// @Produce json
// @Param body body object{label=string,public_key=string,private_key=string,passphrase=string} true "Key material"
// @Success 201 {object} models.Key
// @Failure 400 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /keys [post]
func createKey(c *gin.Context) {
var body struct {
Label string `json:"label" binding:"required"`
@@ -352,6 +495,18 @@ func createKey(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(http.StatusCreated, key)
}
// getPrivateKey godoc
//
// @Summary Get a key's private material
// @Description Returns the decrypted private key. Reading is a keys:read action even though the material is sensitive.
// @Tags keys
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Key ID"
// @Success 200 {object} PrivateKeyResponse
// @Failure 404 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /keys/{id}/private-key [get]
func getPrivateKey(c *gin.Context) {
id := c.Param("id")
plaintext, err := services.GetPrivateKey(auth.InstanceID(c), id)
@@ -359,9 +514,21 @@ func getPrivateKey(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(http.StatusNotFound, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"private_key": plaintext})
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, PrivateKeyResponse{PrivateKey: plaintext})
}
// getKey godoc
//
// @Summary Get a key
// @Description Returns a key together with the servers it is assigned to.
// @Tags keys
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Key ID"
// @Success 200 {object} KeyDetailResponse
// @Failure 404 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /keys/{id} [get]
func getKey(c *gin.Context) {
id := c.Param("id")
key, err := services.GetKey(auth.InstanceID(c), id)
@@ -372,16 +539,23 @@ func getKey(c *gin.Context) {
assignments, _ := services.GetAssignmentsWithServers(auth.InstanceID(c), id)
type keyResponse struct {
*models.Key
Assignments any `json:"assignments"`
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, keyResponse{
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, KeyDetailResponse{
Key: key,
Assignments: assignments,
})
}
// deleteKey godoc
//
// @Summary Delete a key
// @Tags keys
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Key ID"
// @Success 200 {object} DeletedResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /keys/{id} [delete]
func deleteKey(c *gin.Context) {
id := c.Param("id")
k, _ := services.GetKey(auth.InstanceID(c), id)
@@ -394,9 +568,23 @@ func deleteKey(c *gin.Context) {
label = k.Label
}
services.LogEvent(auth.InstanceID(c), "key.deleted", actorFromCtx(c), "", id, fmt.Sprintf("key '%s' deleted", label))
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"deleted": true})
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, DeletedResponse{Deleted: true})
}
// assignKey godoc
//
// @Summary Assign a key to a server
// @Tags keys
// @Accept json
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Key ID"
// @Param body body object{server_id=string} true "Target server"
// @Success 201 {object} models.Assignment
// @Failure 400 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /keys/{id}/assign [post]
func assignKey(c *gin.Context) {
keyID := c.Param("id")
var body struct {
@@ -416,6 +604,19 @@ func assignKey(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(http.StatusCreated, a)
}
// revokeAssignment godoc
//
// @Summary Revoke a key assignment
// @Description Soft revocation: sets revoked_at rather than deleting, preserving audit history.
// @Tags keys
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Key ID"
// @Param serverId path string true "Server ID"
// @Success 200 {object} RevokedResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /keys/{id}/assign/{serverId} [delete]
func revokeAssignment(c *gin.Context) {
keyID := c.Param("id")
serverID := c.Param("serverId")
@@ -425,18 +626,42 @@ func revokeAssignment(c *gin.Context) {
return
}
services.LogEvent(auth.InstanceID(c), "key.revoked", actorFromCtx(c), serverID, keyID, fmt.Sprintf("key %s revoked from server %s", keyID, serverID))
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"revoked": true})
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, RevokedResponse{Revoked: true})
}
// getLatestAgentVersion godoc
//
// @Summary Get the latest agent version
// @Description Reads the latest agent/v* tag from the Gitea release API.
// @Tags servers
// @Produce json
// @Success 200 {object} AgentVersionResponse
// @Failure 503 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /agent/latest-version [get]
func getLatestAgentVersion(c *gin.Context) {
version, err := services.GetLatestAgentVersion()
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusServiceUnavailable, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"version": version})
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, AgentVersionResponse{Version: version})
}
// updateAgent godoc
//
// @Summary Update a server's agent
// @Description Dispatches UpdateAgentCmd to the agent, telling it to download and replace itself.
// @Tags servers
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Server ID"
// @Success 202 {object} UpdateAgentResponse
// @Failure 404 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 503 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /servers/{id}/update-agent [post]
func updateAgent(c *gin.Context) {
id := c.Param("id")
s, err := services.GetServer(auth.InstanceID(c), id)
@@ -451,12 +676,25 @@ func updateAgent(c *gin.Context) {
return
}
services.LogEvent(auth.InstanceID(c), "agent.update_dispatched", actorFromCtx(c), s.ServerID, "", fmt.Sprintf("agent update dispatched to %s (version %s)", s.Hostname, version))
c.JSON(http.StatusAccepted, gin.H{
"message": "update command sent to agent",
"version": version,
c.JSON(http.StatusAccepted, UpdateAgentResponse{
Message: "update command sent to agent",
Version: version,
})
}
// applyUpdates godoc
//
// @Summary Apply pending OS updates on a server
// @Description Dispatches ApplyUpdatesCmd. Exempt from the licence gate: security patching is never paywalled.
// @Tags servers
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Server ID"
// @Success 202 {object} MessageResponse
// @Failure 404 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 503 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /servers/{id}/apply-updates [post]
func applyUpdates(c *gin.Context) {
id := c.Param("id")
s, err := services.GetServer(auth.InstanceID(c), id)
@@ -470,9 +708,17 @@ func applyUpdates(c *gin.Context) {
return
}
services.LogEvent(auth.InstanceID(c), "updates.applied", actorFromCtx(c), s.ServerID, "", fmt.Sprintf("package update command dispatched to %s", s.Hostname))
c.JSON(http.StatusAccepted, gin.H{"message": "apply updates command sent to agent"})
c.JSON(http.StatusAccepted, MessageResponse{Message: "apply updates command sent to agent"})
}
// handleUpdateScript godoc
//
// @Summary Agent update script (Linux)
// @Description Dynamically generated shell script that downloads and installs the latest agent.
// @Tags install
// @Produce plain
// @Success 200 {string} string "shell script"
// @Router /update [get]
func handleUpdateScript(c *gin.Context) {
giteaHost := "gitea.hostxtra.co.uk"
@@ -526,6 +772,21 @@ echo "vantage-agent updated to ${VERSION} and restarted."
c.String(http.StatusOK, script)
}
// listAuditEvents godoc
//
// @Summary List audit events
// @Description Every mutating API path writes an audit event. Paginated with a total, since a short page is not proof of the end of the log.
// @Tags audit
// @Produce json
// @Param q query string false "Free-text search"
// @Param category query string false "Filter by category"
// @Param limit query int false "Max events to return"
// @Param skip query int false "Events to skip"
// @Success 200 {object} AuditEventsResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /audit [get]
func listAuditEvents(c *gin.Context) {
f := services.AuditFilter{
Search: c.Query("q"),
@@ -549,9 +810,19 @@ func listAuditEvents(c *gin.Context) {
}
// An object rather than a bare array: a page is meaningless without the
// total it came from, and a short page is not proof of the end of the log.
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"events": events, "total": total})
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, AuditEventsResponse{Events: events, Total: total})
}
// getSettings godoc
//
// @Summary Get instance settings
// @Tags settings
// @Produce json
// @Success 200 {object} models.Settings
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /settings [get]
func getSettings(c *gin.Context) {
s, err := services.GetSettings(auth.InstanceID(c))
if err != nil {
@@ -561,17 +832,37 @@ func getSettings(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, s)
}
// saveSettings godoc
//
// @Summary Save instance settings
// @Description Owner and admin only. Refuses a change that would leave neither local login nor an enabled auth provider.
// @Tags settings
// @Accept json
// @Produce json
// @Param body body object{alerts=models.AlertSettings,workflow_log_retention_days=int,local_login_enabled=bool,api_token_max_days=int} true "Settings to save"
// @Success 200 {object} SavedResponse
// @Failure 400 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 409 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /settings [put]
func saveSettings(c *gin.Context) {
var body struct {
Alerts models.AlertSettings `json:"alerts"`
WorkflowLogRetentionDays *int `json:"workflow_log_retention_days"`
LocalLoginEnabled *bool `json:"local_login_enabled"`
APITokenMaxDays *int `json:"api_token_max_days"`
}
if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&body); err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
if err := services.SaveSettings(auth.InstanceID(c), body.Alerts, body.WorkflowLogRetentionDays, body.LocalLoginEnabled); err != nil {
if body.APITokenMaxDays != nil && *body.APITokenMaxDays < 0 {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "api_token_max_days cannot be negative"})
return
}
if err := services.SaveSettings(auth.InstanceID(c), body.Alerts, body.WorkflowLogRetentionDays, body.LocalLoginEnabled, body.APITokenMaxDays); err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, services.ErrLockout) {
c.JSON(http.StatusConflict, gin.H{"error": err.Error(), "code": "local_login_required"})
return
@@ -580,9 +871,23 @@ func saveSettings(c *gin.Context) {
return
}
services.LogEvent(auth.InstanceID(c), "settings.updated", actorFromCtx(c), "", "", "alert settings updated")
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"saved": true})
if body.APITokenMaxDays != nil {
services.LogEvent(auth.InstanceID(c), "settings.token_policy_updated", actorFromCtx(c), "", "",
fmt.Sprintf("API token maximum lifetime set to %d day(s); 0 means no cap", *body.APITokenMaxDays))
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, SavedResponse{Saved: true})
}
// handleInstallScript godoc
//
// @Summary Agent install script (Linux)
// @Description Dynamically generated shell script that downloads, verifies and installs the agent, seeded with a pre-registration token.
// @Tags install
// @Produce plain
// @Param server_id query string true "Server ID"
// @Param token query string true "Pre-registration token"
// @Success 200 {string} string "shell script"
// @Router /install [get]
func handleInstallScript(c *gin.Context) {
serverID := c.Query("server_id")
token := c.Query("token")
+59 -2
View File
@@ -10,6 +10,16 @@ import (
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
)
// listInstanceUsers godoc
//
// @Summary List instance members
// @Tags instance-users
// @Produce json
// @Success 200 {array} models.User
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /instance/users [get]
func listInstanceUsers(c *gin.Context) {
users, err := services.ListUsers(auth.InstanceID(c))
if err != nil {
@@ -23,6 +33,20 @@ func actorMayGrantOwner(c *gin.Context) bool {
return auth.Role(c) == models.RoleOwner
}
// createInstanceUser godoc
//
// @Summary Create an instance member
// @Description Only an owner can create another owner.
// @Tags instance-users
// @Accept json
// @Produce json
// @Param body body object{email=string,password=string,role=string} true "New member"
// @Success 201 {object} models.User
// @Failure 400 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 403 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /instance/users [post]
func createInstanceUser(c *gin.Context) {
var body struct {
Email string `json:"email"`
@@ -52,6 +76,24 @@ func createInstanceUser(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(http.StatusCreated, u)
}
// updateInstanceUserRole godoc
//
// @Summary Change an instance member's role
// @Description A caller cannot change their own role. Only an owner can change owner roles.
// @Tags instance-users
// @Accept json
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "User ID"
// @Param body body object{role=string} true "New role"
// @Success 200 {object} OKResponse
// @Failure 400 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 403 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 404 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 409 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /instance/users/{id}/role [put]
func updateInstanceUserRole(c *gin.Context) {
var body struct {
Role string `json:"role"`
@@ -84,9 +126,24 @@ func updateInstanceUserRole(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(orgUserErrStatus(err), gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"ok": true})
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, OKResponse{OK: true})
}
// deleteInstanceUser godoc
//
// @Summary Remove an instance member
// @Description A caller cannot remove their own account. Only an owner can remove another owner.
// @Tags instance-users
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "User ID"
// @Success 200 {object} DeletedResponse
// @Failure 403 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 404 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 409 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /instance/users/{id} [delete]
func deleteInstanceUser(c *gin.Context) {
instanceID, targetID := auth.InstanceID(c), c.Param("id")
if targetID == auth.UserID(c) {
@@ -107,7 +164,7 @@ func deleteInstanceUser(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(orgUserErrStatus(err), gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"deleted": true})
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, DeletedResponse{Deleted: true})
}
func orgUserErrStatus(err error) int {
+30 -6
View File
@@ -116,6 +116,15 @@ type licenceUsageResponse struct {
Channels int `json:"channels"`
}
// getLicence godoc
//
// @Summary Get this instance's licence state
// @Tags licence
// @Produce json
// @Success 200 {object} licenceResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /license [get]
func getLicence(c *gin.Context) {
instanceID := auth.InstanceID(c)
st := services.GetLicenseState(instanceID)
@@ -169,6 +178,21 @@ func licencePostAllowed(instanceID string) bool {
return true
}
// postLicence godoc
//
// @Summary Set this instance's licence
// @Description Self-hosted only; a cloud instance's licence is injected by admin and this endpoint answers 409 cloud_managed. Exempt from the licence gate, since pasting a valid licence is the way out of degraded mode. Rate limited to 10 attempts per instance per hour.
// @Tags licence
// @Accept json
// @Produce json
// @Param body body object{blob=string} true "Licence key blob"
// @Success 200 {object} LicencePostResponse
// @Failure 400 {object} LicenceErrorResponse
// @Failure 409 {object} LicenceErrorResponse
// @Failure 429 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /license [post]
func postLicence(c *gin.Context) {
instanceID := auth.InstanceID(c)
@@ -210,7 +234,7 @@ func postLicence(c *gin.Context) {
services.LogEvent(instanceID, "license.updated", actorFromCtx(c), "", "",
"licence accepted (tier "+st.Tier+")")
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"state": st.Status, "tier": st.Tier, "expires_at": st.ExpiresAt})
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, LicencePostResponse{State: st.Status, Tier: st.Tier, ExpiresAt: st.ExpiresAt})
}
// licenceRejectionMessage turns a machine reason into something a person can act
@@ -238,11 +262,11 @@ func limitStatus(c *gin.Context, err error) bool {
if !errors.As(err, &le) {
return false
}
c.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{
"error": "limit_exceeded",
"limit": le.Limit,
"current": le.Current,
"max": le.Max,
c.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, LimitExceededResponse{
Error: "limit_exceeded",
Limit: le.Limit,
Current: le.Current,
Max: le.Max,
})
return true
}
+85
View File
@@ -21,6 +21,16 @@ func registerMonitorRoutes(g *gin.RouterGroup) {
g.GET("/monitors/:id/uptime", getMonitorUptime)
}
// listMonitors godoc
//
// @Summary List monitors
// @Tags monitors
// @Produce json
// @Success 200 {array} models.Monitor
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /monitors [get]
func listMonitors(c *gin.Context) {
monitors, err := services.ListMonitors(auth.InstanceID(c))
if err != nil {
@@ -30,6 +40,20 @@ func listMonitors(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, monitors)
}
// createMonitor godoc
//
// @Summary Create a monitor
// @Tags monitors
// @Accept json
// @Produce json
// @Param body body models.Monitor true "Monitor to create"
// @Success 201 {object} models.Monitor
// @Failure 400 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 403 {object} LimitExceededResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /monitors [post]
func createMonitor(c *gin.Context) {
var m models.Monitor
if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&m); err != nil {
@@ -55,6 +79,18 @@ func createMonitor(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(http.StatusCreated, created)
}
// getMonitor godoc
//
// @Summary Get a monitor
// @Tags monitors
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Monitor ID"
// @Success 200 {object} models.Monitor
// @Failure 404 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /monitors/{id} [get]
func getMonitor(c *gin.Context) {
m, err := services.GetMonitor(auth.InstanceID(c), c.Param("id"))
if err != nil {
@@ -68,6 +104,20 @@ func getMonitor(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, m)
}
// updateMonitor godoc
//
// @Summary Update a monitor
// @Tags monitors
// @Accept json
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Monitor ID"
// @Param body body object{name=string,type=string,target=models.MonitorTarget,interval_sec=int,runner=string,retries=int,enabled=bool,channel_ids=[]string} true "Fields to update"
// @Success 204
// @Failure 400 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /monitors/{id} [put]
func updateMonitor(c *gin.Context) {
var body struct {
Name *string `json:"name"`
@@ -119,6 +169,16 @@ func updateMonitor(c *gin.Context) {
c.Status(http.StatusNoContent)
}
// deleteMonitor godoc
//
// @Summary Delete a monitor
// @Tags monitors
// @Param id path string true "Monitor ID"
// @Success 204
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /monitors/{id} [delete]
func deleteMonitor(c *gin.Context) {
if err := services.DeleteMonitor(auth.InstanceID(c), c.Param("id")); err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
@@ -127,6 +187,18 @@ func deleteMonitor(c *gin.Context) {
c.Status(http.StatusNoContent)
}
// getMonitorIncidents godoc
//
// @Summary List a monitor's incidents
// @Tags monitors
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Monitor ID"
// @Success 200 {array} models.Incident
// @Failure 404 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /monitors/{id}/incidents [get]
func getMonitorIncidents(c *gin.Context) {
m, err := services.GetMonitor(auth.InstanceID(c), c.Param("id"))
if err != nil {
@@ -145,6 +217,19 @@ func getMonitorIncidents(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, incidents)
}
// getMonitorUptime godoc
//
// @Summary Get a monitor's uptime rollups
// @Description Hourly rollups for the last 30 days.
// @Tags monitors
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Monitor ID"
// @Success 200 {array} models.Rollup
// @Failure 404 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /monitors/{id}/uptime [get]
func getMonitorUptime(c *gin.Context) {
m, err := services.GetMonitor(auth.InstanceID(c), c.Param("id"))
if err != nil {
+71
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
package api
import (
"net/http"
"gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/mrhid6/vantage/server/internal/api/docs"
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
)
// scalarPage renders the reference against this instance's own spec, so "Try
// it" acts on the reader's API with the reader's session.
const scalarPage = `<!doctype html>
<html>
<head>
<title>Vantage API</title>
<meta charset="utf-8" />
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1" />
</head>
<body>
<div id="app"></div>
<script src="/api/docs/scalar.js"></script>
<script>
Scalar.createApiReference('#app', {
url: '/api/openapi.json',
theme: 'deepSpace',
})
</script>
</body>
</html>`
// getOpenAPI godoc
//
// @Summary Get the OpenAPI document
// @Description Generated from swaggo annotations at build time and committed; served verbatim.
// @Tags docs
// @Produce json
// @Success 200 {object} map[string]any
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /openapi.json [get]
func getOpenAPI(c *gin.Context) {
c.Data(http.StatusOK, "application/json; charset=utf-8", docs.OpenAPI)
}
// getScalarJS godoc
//
// @Summary Get the vendored Scalar bundle
// @Description Served locally rather than from a CDN so the reference page works on an air-gapped install.
// @Tags docs
// @Produce application/javascript
// @Success 200 {string} string "javascript bundle"
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /docs/scalar.js [get]
func getScalarJS(c *gin.Context) {
c.Data(http.StatusOK, "application/javascript; charset=utf-8", docs.ScalarJS)
}
// getAPIDocs godoc
//
// @Summary API reference page
// @Description Renders the Scalar reference against this instance's own OpenAPI document.
// @Tags docs
// @Produce html
// @Success 200 {string} string "HTML page"
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /docs [get]
func getAPIDocs(c *gin.Context) {
c.Data(http.StatusOK, "text/html; charset=utf-8", []byte(scalarPage))
}
+57
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
package api
import (
"net/http"
"strconv"
"time"
"gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/mrhid6/vantage/server/internal/auth"
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
)
// tokenRateLimit is per token per minute. It is not the general API
// rate-limiting project: it is only enough that a runaway script cannot take an
// instance down, and cookie sessions are deliberately untouched.
const tokenRateLimit = 600
// RateLimitTokens counts requests per token in a one-minute fixed window.
//
// A fixed window rather than a sliding one because the cost of a burst at a
// boundary is a script running twice as fast for one second, and a sliding
// window is a sorted set per token for that.
func RateLimitTokens() gin.HandlerFunc {
return func(c *gin.Context) {
if !auth.IsToken(c) {
c.Next()
return
}
rdb := auth.Redis()
if rdb == nil {
c.Next()
return
}
window := time.Now().UTC().Unix() / 60
key := "vantage:tokenrate:" + auth.TokenID(c) + ":" + strconv.FormatInt(window, 10)
count, err := rdb.Incr(c.Request.Context(), key).Result()
if err != nil {
// Redis is already required for sessions, so it being down is a
// larger problem than this. Do not turn it into a second outage.
c.Next()
return
}
if count == 1 {
rdb.Expire(c.Request.Context(), key, 2*time.Minute)
}
if count > tokenRateLimit {
c.Header("Retry-After", "60")
c.AbortWithStatusJSON(http.StatusTooManyRequests, gin.H{
"error": "rate limit exceeded for this API token",
"code": "rate_limited",
})
return
}
c.Next()
}
}
+217
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,217 @@
package api
import (
"fmt"
"net/http"
"sort"
"strings"
"gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/mrhid6/vantage/server/internal/auth"
"gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/mrhid6/vantage/server/internal/services"
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
)
// routeScopes maps a registered gin route — "<METHOD> <full path pattern>" — to
// the scope an API token must hold to reach it.
//
// It is keyed on the route pattern rather than declared per route with a
// decorator, because a route registered without a decorator would be
// unguarded. AssertScopeMapComplete refuses to boot if any /api route is
// missing here, so the failure lands at deploy rather than as a surprise 403
// in production.
//
// GET is read, everything else is write. The exceptions are written out rather
// than derived, because two of them are not obvious: reading a private key is
// still reading a key, and reading a container's logs is a write-level action
// because container output is arbitrary and cannot be masked.
var routeScopes = map[string]string{
"GET /api/license": "settings:read",
"POST /api/license": "settings:write",
"GET /api/servers": "servers:read",
"GET /api/servers/tags": "servers:read",
"POST /api/servers": "servers:write",
"GET /api/servers/new": "servers:write",
"POST /api/servers/new": "servers:write",
"GET /api/servers/:id": "servers:read",
"DELETE /api/servers/:id": "servers:write",
"POST /api/servers/:id/generate-key": "keys:write",
"POST /api/servers/:id/update-agent": "servers:write",
"POST /api/servers/:id/apply-updates": "servers:write",
"PUT /api/servers/:id/tags": "servers:write",
"GET /api/agent/latest-version": "servers:read",
"GET /api/audit": "settings:read",
"GET /api/settings": "settings:read",
"PUT /api/settings": "settings:write",
"POST /api/settings/secrets-token": "settings:write",
"GET /api/secrets": "secrets:read",
"POST /api/secrets": "secrets:write",
"GET /api/secrets/:group": "secrets:read",
"PUT /api/secrets/:group": "secrets:write",
"POST /api/secrets/:group/reveal": "secrets:read",
"DELETE /api/secrets/:group": "secrets:write",
"DELETE /api/secrets/:group/:key": "secrets:write",
"GET /api/keys": "keys:read",
"POST /api/keys": "keys:write",
"GET /api/keys/:id": "keys:read",
"GET /api/keys/:id/private-key": "keys:read",
"DELETE /api/keys/:id": "keys:write",
"POST /api/keys/:id/assign": "keys:write",
"DELETE /api/keys/:id/assign/:serverId": "keys:write",
"POST /api/console/connect": "servers:write",
"GET /api/console/tunnel": "servers:write",
// Workflow, step and run routes, registered by registerWorkflowRoutes.
"GET /api/steps": "workflows:read",
"POST /api/steps": "workflows:write",
"PUT /api/steps/:id": "workflows:write",
"DELETE /api/steps/:id": "workflows:write",
"GET /api/steps/:id/export": "workflows:read",
"POST /api/steps/import": "workflows:write",
"POST /api/steps/seed-defaults": "workflows:write",
"GET /api/steps/usage": "workflows:read",
"POST /api/steps/parse": "workflows:write",
"GET /api/workflows": "workflows:read",
"POST /api/workflows": "workflows:write",
"GET /api/workflows/:id": "workflows:read",
"PUT /api/workflows/:id": "workflows:write",
"DELETE /api/workflows/:id": "workflows:write",
"POST /api/workflows/:id/run": "workflows:write",
"GET /api/workflows/:id/runs": "workflows:read",
"PUT /api/workflows/:id/schedule": "workflows:write",
"GET /api/workflows/:id/schedule/preview": "workflows:read",
"GET /api/runs/:runId": "workflows:read",
"POST /api/runs/:runId/cancel": "workflows:write",
"GET /api/runs/:runId/servers/:serverId/logs": "workflows:read",
"GET /api/runs/:runId/servers/:serverId/logs/stream": "workflows:read",
// Monitor and incident routes, registered by registerMonitorRoutes.
"GET /api/monitors": "monitors:read",
"POST /api/monitors": "monitors:write",
"GET /api/monitors/:id": "monitors:read",
"PUT /api/monitors/:id": "monitors:write",
"DELETE /api/monitors/:id": "monitors:write",
"GET /api/monitors/:id/incidents": "monitors:read",
"GET /api/monitors/:id/uptime": "monitors:read",
// Channel routes, registered by registerChannelRoutes. Channels exist to
// serve alerts, so they share the monitors scope rather than getting their
// own resource.
"GET /api/channels": "monitors:read",
"POST /api/channels": "monitors:write",
"PUT /api/channels/:id": "monitors:write",
"DELETE /api/channels/:id": "monitors:write",
"POST /api/channels/:id/test": "monitors:write",
// Instance user management and SSO configuration live on the /settings
// page in web/ (the Access group), so both share the settings scope.
"GET /api/instance/users": "settings:read",
"POST /api/instance/users": "settings:write",
"PUT /api/instance/users/:id/role": "settings:write",
"DELETE /api/instance/users/:id": "settings:write",
"GET /api/auth/providers": "settings:read",
"POST /api/auth/providers": "settings:write",
"PUT /api/auth/providers/:id": "settings:write",
"DELETE /api/auth/providers/:id": "settings:write",
"POST /api/auth/providers/:id/test": "settings:write",
"POST /api/auth/providers/:id/ack-notice": "settings:write",
"GET /api/auth/presets": "settings:read",
"GET /api/vulnerabilities": "vulns:read",
"GET /api/vulnerabilities/summary": "vulns:read",
"POST /api/vulnerabilities/rescan": "vulns:write",
"POST /api/vulnerabilities/:id/accept": "vulns:write",
"DELETE /api/vulnerabilities/:id/accept": "vulns:write",
"GET /api/servers/:id/vulnerabilities": "vulns:read",
"GET /api/servers/:id/packages": "vulns:read",
"GET /api/packages/search": "vulns:read",
"GET /api/vuln-rules": "vulns:read",
"POST /api/vuln-rules": "vulns:write",
"PUT /api/vuln-rules/:id": "vulns:write",
"DELETE /api/vuln-rules/:id": "vulns:write",
"GET /api/workloads": "workloads:read",
"GET /api/servers/:id/workloads": "workloads:read",
"POST /api/servers/:id/workloads/refresh": "workloads:read",
"POST /api/servers/:id/workloads/:wid/action": "workloads:write",
"GET /api/servers/:id/workloads/:wid/logs": "workloads:write",
"GET /api/tokens": "settings:read",
"GET /api/tokens/scopes": "settings:read",
"POST /api/tokens": "settings:write",
"DELETE /api/tokens/:id": "settings:write",
// The generated OpenAPI document and its Scalar reference page. Read-only,
// so they share the settings:read scope with the rest of the docs a token
// can already see about its own instance.
"GET /api/openapi.json": "settings:read",
"GET /api/docs": "settings:read",
"GET /api/docs/scalar.js": "settings:read",
}
// RequireScopes enforces routeScopes for token-authenticated requests and does
// nothing at all for cookie sessions, whose authority is their role.
func RequireScopes() gin.HandlerFunc {
return func(c *gin.Context) {
if !auth.IsToken(c) {
c.Next()
return
}
key := c.Request.Method + " " + c.FullPath()
required, ok := routeScopes[key]
if !ok {
// Fail closed. An unmapped route reached by a token is a route
// nobody decided the authority for.
c.AbortWithStatusJSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{
"error": "this endpoint is not available to API tokens",
"code": "scope_unmapped",
})
return
}
if !services.ScopeSatisfied(auth.Scopes(c), required) {
c.AbortWithStatusJSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{
"error": fmt.Sprintf("token is missing the %q scope", required),
"code": "scope_missing",
"required_scope": required,
})
return
}
c.Next()
}
}
// AssertScopeMapComplete fails boot when a registered /api route has no scope.
//
// Without it, adding a route silently makes it unreachable by every token, and
// the report arrives as a customer asking why their script gets 403.
func AssertScopeMapComplete(r *gin.Engine) error {
var missing []string
for _, route := range r.Routes() {
if !strings.HasPrefix(route.Path, "/api/") {
continue
}
// The ESO endpoint keeps its own bearer scheme and is deliberately
// outside the token vocabulary.
if route.Path == "/api/secrets/:group/values" {
continue
}
if _, ok := routeScopes[route.Method+" "+route.Path]; !ok {
missing = append(missing, route.Method+" "+route.Path)
}
}
if len(missing) > 0 {
sort.Strings(missing)
return fmt.Errorf("routes missing from the API token scope map: %s", strings.Join(missing, ", "))
}
return nil
}
+119 -7
View File
@@ -37,6 +37,19 @@ func secretsReadAuth() gin.HandlerFunc {
}
}
// esoGetGroup godoc
//
// @Summary Read a secret group's values (ESO)
// @Description Consumed by Kubernetes External Secrets Operator. Authenticated with a bearer token whose SHA-256 hash is stored in settings — a different credential from an API token, never substitutable for one.
// @Tags secrets
// @Produce json
// @Param group path string true "Secret group name"
// @Success 200 {object} map[string]string
// @Failure 401 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 404 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security esoAuth
// @Router /secrets/{group}/values [get]
func esoGetGroup(c *gin.Context) {
group := c.Param("group")
@@ -58,6 +71,16 @@ func esoGetGroup(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, values)
}
// listSecretGroups godoc
//
// @Summary List secret groups
// @Tags secrets
// @Produce json
// @Success 200 {array} models.GroupSummary
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /secrets [get]
func listSecretGroups(c *gin.Context) {
groups, err := services.ListSecretGroups(auth.InstanceID(c))
if err != nil {
@@ -67,6 +90,20 @@ func listSecretGroups(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, groups)
}
// createSecretGroup godoc
//
// @Summary Create a secret group
// @Tags secrets
// @Accept json
// @Produce json
// @Param body body object{group=string,values=map[string]string} true "Group and its initial key/value pairs"
// @Success 201 {object} GroupResponse
// @Failure 400 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 403 {object} LimitExceededResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /secrets [post]
func createSecretGroup(c *gin.Context) {
var body struct {
Group string `json:"group" binding:"required"`
@@ -98,9 +135,22 @@ func createSecretGroup(c *gin.Context) {
return
}
services.LogEvent(auth.InstanceID(c), "secret.updated", actorFromCtx(c), "", "", fmt.Sprintf("group '%s' created with keys: %s", body.Group, strings.Join(services.SortedKeys(body.Values), ", ")))
c.JSON(http.StatusCreated, gin.H{"group": body.Group})
c.JSON(http.StatusCreated, GroupResponse{Group: body.Group})
}
// getSecretGroup godoc
//
// @Summary Get a secret group's keys
// @Description Returns the group's key metadata, not decrypted values. See POST /secrets/{group}/reveal for a value.
// @Tags secrets
// @Produce json
// @Param group path string true "Secret group name"
// @Success 200 {object} SecretGroupResponse
// @Failure 404 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /secrets/{group} [get]
func getSecretGroup(c *gin.Context) {
group := c.Param("group")
secrets, err := services.GetSecretGroup(auth.InstanceID(c), group)
@@ -112,9 +162,24 @@ func getSecretGroup(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(http.StatusNotFound, gin.H{"error": "group not found"})
return
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"group": group, "secrets": secrets})
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, SecretGroupResponse{Group: group, Secrets: secrets})
}
// putSecretGroup godoc
//
// @Summary Replace a secret group's keys
// @Tags secrets
// @Accept json
// @Produce json
// @Param group path string true "Secret group name"
// @Param body body map[string]string true "Key/value pairs"
// @Success 200 {object} SavedResponse
// @Failure 400 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 403 {object} LimitExceededResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /secrets/{group} [put]
func putSecretGroup(c *gin.Context) {
group := c.Param("group")
if !validName(group) {
@@ -144,9 +209,23 @@ func putSecretGroup(c *gin.Context) {
return
}
services.LogEvent(auth.InstanceID(c), "secret.updated", actorFromCtx(c), "", "", fmt.Sprintf("group '%s' keys updated: %s", group, strings.Join(services.SortedKeys(values), ", ")))
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"saved": true})
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, SavedResponse{Saved: true})
}
// revealSecret godoc
//
// @Summary Reveal a secret value
// @Tags secrets
// @Accept json
// @Produce json
// @Param group path string true "Secret group name"
// @Param body body object{key=string} true "Key to reveal"
// @Success 200 {object} RevealSecretResponse
// @Failure 400 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 404 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /secrets/{group}/reveal [post]
func revealSecret(c *gin.Context) {
group := c.Param("group")
var body struct {
@@ -162,9 +241,21 @@ func revealSecret(c *gin.Context) {
return
}
services.LogEvent(auth.InstanceID(c), "secret.revealed", actorFromCtx(c), "", "", fmt.Sprintf("value of '%s/%s' revealed", group, body.Key))
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"value": value})
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, RevealSecretResponse{Value: value})
}
// deleteSecretKey godoc
//
// @Summary Delete a key from a secret group
// @Tags secrets
// @Produce json
// @Param group path string true "Secret group name"
// @Param key path string true "Key name"
// @Success 200 {object} DeletedResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /secrets/{group}/{key} [delete]
func deleteSecretKey(c *gin.Context) {
group := c.Param("group")
key := c.Param("key")
@@ -173,9 +264,20 @@ func deleteSecretKey(c *gin.Context) {
return
}
services.LogEvent(auth.InstanceID(c), "secret.deleted", actorFromCtx(c), "", "", fmt.Sprintf("key '%s' deleted from group '%s'", key, group))
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"deleted": true})
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, DeletedResponse{Deleted: true})
}
// deleteSecretGroup godoc
//
// @Summary Delete a secret group
// @Tags secrets
// @Produce json
// @Param group path string true "Secret group name"
// @Success 200 {object} DeletedResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /secrets/{group} [delete]
func deleteSecretGroup(c *gin.Context) {
group := c.Param("group")
if err := services.DeleteSecretGroup(auth.InstanceID(c), group); err != nil {
@@ -183,9 +285,19 @@ func deleteSecretGroup(c *gin.Context) {
return
}
services.LogEvent(auth.InstanceID(c), "secretgroup.deleted", actorFromCtx(c), "", "", fmt.Sprintf("group '%s' deleted", group))
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"deleted": true})
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, DeletedResponse{Deleted: true})
}
// rotateSecretsToken godoc
//
// @Summary Rotate the ESO read token
// @Tags settings
// @Produce json
// @Success 200 {object} SecretsTokenResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /settings/secrets-token [post]
func rotateSecretsToken(c *gin.Context) {
token, err := services.RotateSecretsReadToken(auth.InstanceID(c))
if err != nil {
@@ -193,5 +305,5 @@ func rotateSecretsToken(c *gin.Context) {
return
}
services.LogEvent(auth.InstanceID(c), "secrets.token_rotated", actorFromCtx(c), "", "", "ESO read token rotated")
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"token": token})
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, SecretsTokenResponse{Token: token})
}
+154
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
package api
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/mrhid6/vantage/server/internal/auth"
"gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/mrhid6/vantage/server/internal/models"
"gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/mrhid6/vantage/server/internal/services"
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
)
func elevated(c *gin.Context) bool {
r := auth.Role(c)
return r == models.RoleOwner || r == models.RoleAdmin
}
// listTokens godoc
//
// @Summary List API tokens
// @Description Returns the caller's own tokens. Owner and admin may pass all=true to see every token in the instance.
// @Tags tokens
// @Produce json
// @Param all query bool false "Include every token in the instance (owner and admin only)"
// @Success 200 {object} ListTokensResponse
// @Failure 401 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 403 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /tokens [get]
func listTokens(c *gin.Context) {
all := c.Query("all") == "true" && elevated(c)
tokens, err := services.ListAPITokens(auth.InstanceID(c), auth.UserID(c), all)
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, ListTokensResponse{Tokens: tokens, All: all})
}
// listTokenScopes godoc
//
// @Summary List available token scopes
// @Description Advertises the scope vocabulary so the UI never hardcodes it.
// @Tags tokens
// @Produce json
// @Success 200 {object} TokenScopesResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /tokens/scopes [get]
func listTokenScopes(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, TokenScopesResponse{Scopes: services.AllScopes()})
}
// createToken godoc
//
// @Summary Create an API token
// @Description The plaintext token is returned exactly once and stored nowhere. A token's role and scopes cannot exceed the creator's own.
// @Tags tokens
// @Accept json
// @Produce json
// @Param body body CreateTokenRequest true "Token parameters"
// @Success 201 {object} CreateTokenResponse
// @Failure 400 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 403 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 409 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 422 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /tokens [post]
func createToken(c *gin.Context) {
var body struct {
Name string `json:"name" binding:"required"`
Role string `json:"role" binding:"required"`
Scopes []string `json:"scopes" binding:"required"`
ExpiresInDays *int `json:"expires_in_days"`
}
if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&body); err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
tok, plaintext, err := services.CreateAPIToken(
auth.InstanceID(c), auth.UserID(c),
body.Name, body.Role, body.Scopes, body.ExpiresInDays, c.ClientIP(),
)
switch {
case errors.Is(err, services.ErrTokenNameTaken):
c.JSON(http.StatusConflict, gin.H{"error": err.Error(), "code": "name_taken"})
return
case errors.Is(err, services.ErrTokenRoleTooHigh):
c.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{"error": err.Error(), "code": "role_too_high"})
return
case errors.Is(err, services.ErrTokenExpiryPolicy):
c.JSON(http.StatusUnprocessableEntity, gin.H{"error": err.Error(), "code": "expiry_policy"})
return
case errors.Is(err, services.ErrInvalidScope):
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": err.Error(), "code": "invalid_scope"})
return
case errors.Is(err, services.ErrTokenInvalid):
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
case err != nil:
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": "failed to create token"})
return
}
expiry := "no expiry"
if tok.ExpiresAt != nil {
expiry = "expires " + tok.ExpiresAt.Format("2006-01-02")
}
services.LogEvent(auth.InstanceID(c), "token.created", actorFromCtx(c), "", "",
fmt.Sprintf("API token '%s' created with role %s, scopes %v, %s", tok.Name, tok.Role, tok.Scopes, expiry))
// The plaintext is returned exactly once and is not stored anywhere.
c.JSON(http.StatusCreated, CreateTokenResponse{Token: plaintext, Record: *tok})
}
// revokeToken godoc
//
// @Summary Revoke an API token
// @Tags tokens
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Token ID"
// @Success 200 {object} RevokedResponse
// @Failure 401 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 404 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /tokens/{id} [delete]
func revokeToken(c *gin.Context) {
requester, err := services.GetUserInInstance(auth.InstanceID(c), auth.UserID(c))
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusUnauthorized, gin.H{"error": "user not found"})
return
}
tok, err := services.RevokeAPIToken(auth.InstanceID(c), c.Param("id"), requester)
if errors.Is(err, services.ErrTokenNotFound) {
c.JSON(http.StatusNotFound, gin.H{"error": "token not found"})
return
}
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
services.LogEvent(auth.InstanceID(c), "token.revoked", actorFromCtx(c), "", "",
fmt.Sprintf("API token '%s' revoked", tok.Name))
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, RevokedResponse{Revoked: true})
}
+239
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,239 @@
package api
import (
"time"
"gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/mrhid6/vantage/server/internal/models"
"gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/mrhid6/vantage/shared/license"
)
// ErrorResponse is the shape every failing endpoint answers with. Some also
// carry a machine-readable code; it is omitted when absent rather than empty.
type ErrorResponse struct {
Error string `json:"error"`
Code string `json:"code,omitempty"`
}
// LimitExceededResponse is what a create route answers when a licence cap
// would be exceeded.
type LimitExceededResponse struct {
Error string `json:"error"`
Limit string `json:"limit"`
Current int `json:"current"`
Max int `json:"max"`
}
// LicenceErrorResponse pairs an error with a machine-readable reason rather
// than a code — used only on the two licence rejection paths that predate the
// error/code convention used everywhere else.
type LicenceErrorResponse struct {
Error string `json:"error"`
Reason string `json:"reason,omitempty"`
}
// Small, reused acknowledgement shapes. Several unrelated handlers happen to
// answer with exactly one of these.
type DeletedResponse struct {
Deleted bool `json:"deleted"`
}
type RevokedResponse struct {
Revoked bool `json:"revoked"`
}
type SavedResponse struct {
Saved bool `json:"saved"`
}
type AcknowledgedResponse struct {
Acknowledged bool `json:"acknowledged"`
}
type OKResponse struct {
OK bool `json:"ok"`
}
type CancelledResponse struct {
Cancelled bool `json:"cancelled"`
}
type UpdatedResponse struct {
Updated bool `json:"updated"`
}
type MessageResponse struct {
Message string `json:"message"`
}
type StatusResponse struct {
Status string `json:"status"`
}
// --- servers / keys ---
type TagsResponse struct {
Tags map[string]string `json:"tags"`
}
type CreateServerResponse struct {
Server *models.Server `json:"server"`
Token string `json:"token"`
ServerID string `json:"server_id"`
}
type NewServerResponse struct {
ServerID string `json:"server_id"`
PreRegToken string `json:"pre_reg_token"`
InstallCommand string `json:"install_command"`
InstallCommandPS string `json:"install_command_ps"`
}
// ServerDetailResponse is a server with its resolved key assignments.
type ServerDetailResponse struct {
*models.Server
Keys interface{} `json:"keys"`
}
type GenerateKeyResponse struct {
Message string `json:"message"`
CommandID string `json:"command_id"`
ServerID string `json:"server_id"`
}
type PrivateKeyResponse struct {
PrivateKey string `json:"private_key"`
}
// KeyDetailResponse is a key with its resolved server assignments.
type KeyDetailResponse struct {
*models.Key
Assignments any `json:"assignments"`
}
type AgentVersionResponse struct {
Version string `json:"version"`
}
type UpdateAgentResponse struct {
Message string `json:"message"`
Version string `json:"version"`
}
type AuditEventsResponse struct {
Events []models.AuditEvent `json:"events"`
Total int64 `json:"total"`
}
// --- tokens ---
type ListTokensResponse struct {
Tokens []models.APIToken `json:"tokens"`
All bool `json:"all"`
}
type TokenScopesResponse struct {
Scopes []string `json:"scopes"`
}
type CreateTokenRequest struct {
Name string `json:"name"`
Role string `json:"role"`
Scopes []string `json:"scopes"`
ExpiresInDays *int `json:"expires_in_days,omitempty"`
}
type CreateTokenResponse struct {
// Token is the plaintext, returned exactly once and stored nowhere.
Token string `json:"token"`
Record models.APIToken `json:"record"`
}
// --- secrets ---
type GroupResponse struct {
Group string `json:"group"`
}
type SecretGroupResponse struct {
Group string `json:"group"`
Secrets []models.Secret `json:"secrets"`
}
type RevealSecretResponse struct {
Value string `json:"value"`
}
type SecretsTokenResponse struct {
Token string `json:"token"`
}
// --- auth providers ---
type TestProviderResponse struct {
OK bool `json:"ok"`
Message string `json:"message"`
}
// --- licence ---
type LicencePostResponse struct {
State license.State `json:"state"`
Tier string `json:"tier"`
ExpiresAt *time.Time `json:"expires_at"`
}
// --- vulnerabilities ---
// VulnSummaryResponse's four DB-freshness fields are only present at all when
// a vulndb_meta document exists; LastError is separately omitted from that
// group when empty, matching the handler's original conditional gin.H.
type VulnSummaryResponse struct {
Counts map[string]int `json:"counts"`
DBVersion *int `json:"db_version,omitempty"`
PulledAt *time.Time `json:"pulled_at,omitempty"`
LastFullScanAt *time.Time `json:"last_full_scan_at,omitempty"`
LastError string `json:"last_error,omitempty"`
}
type QueuedResponse struct {
Queued int64 `json:"queued"`
}
type ReportedResponse struct {
Reported bool `json:"reported"`
}
// --- workflows ---
type SeedDefaultsResponse struct {
Created int `json:"created"`
Updated int `json:"updated"`
}
type RunWorkflowResponse struct {
RunID string `json:"run_id"`
}
type ScheduleResponse struct {
Schedule models.Schedule `json:"schedule"`
NextRunAt *time.Time `json:"next_run_at"`
}
type OccurrencesResponse struct {
Occurrences []time.Time `json:"occurrences"`
}
// --- console ---
type ConsoleConnectResponse struct {
SessionID string `json:"session_id"`
Token string `json:"token"`
WSPath string `json:"ws_path"`
}
// --- workloads ---
type WorkloadLogsResponse struct {
Text string `json:"text"`
Truncated bool `json:"truncated"`
}
+157 -11
View File
@@ -26,6 +26,22 @@ type vulnGroup struct {
Findings []models.VulnFinding `json:"findings"`
}
// listVulnerabilities godoc
//
// @Summary List vulnerabilities
// @Description Groups findings by CVE, most severe first — the same CVE on forty servers is one decision, not forty rows.
// @Tags vulnerabilities
// @Produce json
// @Param severity query string false "Filter by severity"
// @Param state query string false "Filter by state (default open)"
// @Param server query string false "Filter by server ID"
// @Param tag query []string false "Filter by tag as key:value, repeatable"
// @Param has_fix query bool false "Filter by whether a vendor fix exists"
// @Success 200 {array} vulnGroup
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /vulnerabilities [get]
func listVulnerabilities(c *gin.Context) {
findings, err := services.ListInstanceFindings(auth.InstanceID(c), services.FindingFilter{
Severity: c.Query("severity"),
@@ -115,6 +131,17 @@ func tagsFromQuery(c *gin.Context) map[string]string {
return out
}
// vulnerabilitySummary godoc
//
// @Summary Get vulnerability counts and database freshness
// @Description Counts travel with the database version and pull time, since a fleet scanned against a stale database must say so wherever its findings are read.
// @Tags vulnerabilities
// @Produce json
// @Success 200 {object} VulnSummaryResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /vulnerabilities/summary [get]
func vulnerabilitySummary(c *gin.Context) {
counts, err := services.CountOpenFindingsBySeverity(auth.InstanceID(c))
if err != nil {
@@ -122,24 +149,32 @@ func vulnerabilitySummary(c *gin.Context) {
return
}
resp := gin.H{"counts": counts}
resp := VulnSummaryResponse{Counts: counts}
// Database freshness travels with the counts rather than living in
// settings: a fleet scanned against a three-week-old database must say so
// wherever its findings are read, not somewhere the reader has to go and
// look for it.
if meta, err := services.GetVulnDBMeta(); err == nil && meta != nil {
resp["db_version"] = meta.DBVersion
resp["pulled_at"] = meta.PulledAt
resp["last_full_scan_at"] = meta.LastFullScanAt
if meta.LastError != "" {
resp["last_error"] = meta.LastError
}
resp.DBVersion = &meta.DBVersion
resp.PulledAt = &meta.PulledAt
resp.LastFullScanAt = &meta.LastFullScanAt
resp.LastError = meta.LastError
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, resp)
}
// rescanVulnerabilities godoc
//
// @Summary Queue the fleet for a vulnerability rescan
// @Tags vulnerabilities
// @Produce json
// @Success 200 {object} QueuedResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /vulnerabilities/rescan [post]
func rescanVulnerabilities(c *gin.Context) {
instanceID := auth.InstanceID(c)
@@ -151,7 +186,7 @@ func rescanVulnerabilities(c *gin.Context) {
services.LogEvent(instanceID, "vuln.rescan", actorFromCtx(c), "", "",
"queued "+strconv.FormatInt(n, 10)+" server(s) for rescan")
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"queued": n})
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, QueuedResponse{Queued: n})
}
type acceptFindingRequest struct {
@@ -159,6 +194,22 @@ type acceptFindingRequest struct {
Until time.Time `json:"until"`
}
// acceptFinding godoc
//
// @Summary Accept a finding
// @Description Requires a reason and a future expiry. Reopens automatically at expiry — permanent dismissal is never allowed.
// @Tags vulnerabilities
// @Accept json
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Finding ID"
// @Param body body acceptFindingRequest true "Reason and expiry"
// @Success 200 {object} models.VulnFinding
// @Failure 400 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 404 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /vulnerabilities/{id}/accept [post]
func acceptFinding(c *gin.Context) {
var req acceptFindingRequest
if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&req); err != nil {
@@ -192,6 +243,18 @@ func acceptFinding(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, f)
}
// unacceptFinding godoc
//
// @Summary Return an accepted finding to open
// @Tags vulnerabilities
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Finding ID"
// @Success 200 {object} models.VulnFinding
// @Failure 404 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /vulnerabilities/{id}/accept [delete]
func unacceptFinding(c *gin.Context) {
instanceID := auth.InstanceID(c)
actor := actorFromCtx(c)
@@ -215,6 +278,17 @@ func writeFindingError(c *gin.Context, err error) {
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
}
// listServerVulnerabilities godoc
//
// @Summary List a server's vulnerabilities
// @Tags vulnerabilities
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Server ID"
// @Success 200 {array} models.VulnFinding
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /servers/{id}/vulnerabilities [get]
func listServerVulnerabilities(c *gin.Context) {
findings, err := services.ListFindings(c.Request.Context(), auth.InstanceID(c), c.Param("id"))
if err != nil {
@@ -227,6 +301,18 @@ func listServerVulnerabilities(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, findings)
}
// getServerPackages godoc
//
// @Summary Get a server's package inventory
// @Description A server that has not reported yet answers reported=false rather than 404 — that is the normal state for the first hour after install.
// @Tags vulnerabilities
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Server ID"
// @Success 200 {object} models.ServerPackages
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /servers/{id}/packages [get]
func getServerPackages(c *gin.Context) {
sp, err := services.ListPackages(auth.InstanceID(c), c.Param("id"))
if err != nil {
@@ -237,12 +323,24 @@ func getServerPackages(c *gin.Context) {
// Not a 404: an agent that has not reported yet is the normal state for
// the first hour after install, and is a different thing from a bad
// server id.
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"reported": false})
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, ReportedResponse{Reported: false})
return
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, sp)
}
// searchPackages godoc
//
// @Summary Search packages fleet-wide
// @Tags vulnerabilities
// @Produce json
// @Param name query string true "Package name"
// @Success 200 {array} services.PackageHit
// @Failure 400 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /packages/search [get]
func searchPackages(c *gin.Context) {
name := c.Query("name")
if name == "" {
@@ -257,6 +355,16 @@ func searchPackages(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, hits)
}
// listVulnRules godoc
//
// @Summary List vulnerability alert rules
// @Tags vulnerabilities
// @Produce json
// @Success 200 {array} models.VulnAlertRule
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /vuln-rules [get]
func listVulnRules(c *gin.Context) {
rules, err := services.ListVulnRules(auth.InstanceID(c))
if err != nil {
@@ -266,6 +374,18 @@ func listVulnRules(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, rules)
}
// createVulnRule godoc
//
// @Summary Create a vulnerability alert rule
// @Tags vulnerabilities
// @Accept json
// @Produce json
// @Param body body models.VulnAlertRule true "Rule to create"
// @Success 201 {object} models.VulnAlertRule
// @Failure 400 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /vuln-rules [post]
func createVulnRule(c *gin.Context) {
var r models.VulnAlertRule
if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&r); err != nil {
@@ -284,6 +404,20 @@ func createVulnRule(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(http.StatusCreated, created)
}
// updateVulnRule godoc
//
// @Summary Update a vulnerability alert rule
// @Tags vulnerabilities
// @Accept json
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Rule ID"
// @Param body body models.VulnAlertRule true "Rule fields"
// @Success 200 {object} StatusResponse
// @Failure 400 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 404 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /vuln-rules/{id} [put]
func updateVulnRule(c *gin.Context) {
var r models.VulnAlertRule
if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&r); err != nil {
@@ -302,9 +436,21 @@ func updateVulnRule(c *gin.Context) {
}
services.LogEvent(instanceID, "vuln.rule_updated", actorFromCtx(c), "", "", "rule "+r.Name)
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"status": "updated"})
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, StatusResponse{Status: "updated"})
}
// deleteVulnRule godoc
//
// @Summary Delete a vulnerability alert rule
// @Tags vulnerabilities
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Rule ID"
// @Success 200 {object} StatusResponse
// @Failure 404 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /vuln-rules/{id} [delete]
func deleteVulnRule(c *gin.Context) {
instanceID := auth.InstanceID(c)
if err := services.DeleteVulnRule(instanceID, c.Param("id")); err != nil {
@@ -317,5 +463,5 @@ func deleteVulnRule(c *gin.Context) {
}
services.LogEvent(instanceID, "vuln.rule_deleted", actorFromCtx(c), "", "", "rule "+c.Param("id"))
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"status": "deleted"})
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, StatusResponse{Status: "deleted"})
}
+277 -10
View File
@@ -47,6 +47,20 @@ func registerWorkflowRoutes(g *gin.RouterGroup) {
var uuidLike = regexp.MustCompile(`^[a-zA-Z0-9-]{1,64}$`)
// getServerRunLog godoc
//
// @Summary Get a run's log for one server
// @Description Streams the stored log in pages rather than loading it whole; capped at 200k lines per server-run.
// @Tags workflows
// @Produce plain
// @Param runId path string true "Run ID"
// @Param serverId path string true "Server ID"
// @Success 200 {string} string "plain-text log"
// @Failure 400 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 404 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /runs/{runId}/servers/{serverId}/logs [get]
func getServerRunLog(c *gin.Context) {
runID, serverID := c.Param("runId"), c.Param("serverId")
if !uuidLike.MatchString(runID) || !uuidLike.MatchString(serverID) {
@@ -83,6 +97,20 @@ func getServerRunLog(c *gin.Context) {
// is one or two queries, small enough that no single response buffers much.
const logPageSize = 2000
// streamServerRunLog godoc
//
// @Summary Stream a run's log for one server (SSE)
// @Description Server-sent events; sends new lines every 500ms until the server's run reaches a terminal state.
// @Tags workflows
// @Produce text/event-stream
// @Param runId path string true "Run ID"
// @Param serverId path string true "Server ID"
// @Success 200 {string} string "text/event-stream"
// @Failure 400 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /runs/{runId}/servers/{serverId}/logs/stream [get]
func streamServerRunLog(c *gin.Context) {
runID, serverID := c.Param("runId"), c.Param("serverId")
if !uuidLike.MatchString(runID) || !uuidLike.MatchString(serverID) {
@@ -166,6 +194,16 @@ func splitSSE(b []byte) []string {
return strings.Split(s, "\n")
}
// listSteps godoc
//
// @Summary List workflow steps
// @Tags workflows
// @Produce json
// @Success 200 {array} models.WorkflowStep
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /steps [get]
func listSteps(c *gin.Context) {
steps, err := services.ListSteps(auth.InstanceID(c))
if err != nil {
@@ -175,6 +213,16 @@ func listSteps(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, steps)
}
// stepUsage godoc
//
// @Summary Count workflows using each step
// @Tags workflows
// @Produce json
// @Success 200 {object} map[string]int
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /steps/usage [get]
func stepUsage(c *gin.Context) {
counts, err := services.StepUsageCounts(auth.InstanceID(c))
if err != nil {
@@ -184,6 +232,19 @@ func stepUsage(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, counts)
}
// createStep godoc
//
// @Summary Create a workflow step
// @Tags workflows
// @Accept json
// @Produce json
// @Param body body models.WorkflowStep true "Step to create"
// @Success 201 {object} models.WorkflowStep
// @Failure 400 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /steps [post]
func createStep(c *gin.Context) {
var s models.WorkflowStep
if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&s); err != nil {
@@ -199,6 +260,22 @@ func createStep(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(http.StatusCreated, out)
}
// updateStep godoc
//
// @Summary Update a workflow step
// @Description A step with source "default" is read-only and refuses with 409, because seeding rewrites it on every boot.
// @Tags workflows
// @Accept json
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Step ID"
// @Param body body models.WorkflowStep true "Step fields"
// @Success 200 {object} UpdatedResponse
// @Failure 400 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 409 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /steps/{id} [put]
func updateStep(c *gin.Context) {
var s models.WorkflowStep
if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&s); err != nil {
@@ -214,9 +291,22 @@ func updateStep(c *gin.Context) {
return
}
services.LogEvent(auth.InstanceID(c), "workflow.step_updated", actorFromCtx(c), "", c.Param("id"), "step updated")
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"updated": true})
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, UpdatedResponse{Updated: true})
}
// deleteStep godoc
//
// @Summary Delete a workflow step
// @Description A step with source "default" is read-only and refuses with 409.
// @Tags workflows
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Step ID"
// @Success 200 {object} DeletedResponse
// @Failure 409 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /steps/{id} [delete]
func deleteStep(c *gin.Context) {
if err := services.DeleteStep(auth.InstanceID(c), c.Param("id")); err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, services.ErrDefaultStep) {
@@ -227,9 +317,20 @@ func deleteStep(c *gin.Context) {
return
}
services.LogEvent(auth.InstanceID(c), "workflow.step_deleted", actorFromCtx(c), "", c.Param("id"), "step deleted")
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"deleted": true})
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, DeletedResponse{Deleted: true})
}
// exportStep godoc
//
// @Summary Export a step as a downloadable JSON document
// @Tags workflows
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Step ID"
// @Success 200 {object} models.WorkflowStep
// @Failure 404 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /steps/{id}/export [get]
func exportStep(c *gin.Context) {
b, err := services.ExportStep(auth.InstanceID(c), c.Param("id"))
if err != nil {
@@ -240,6 +341,16 @@ func exportStep(c *gin.Context) {
c.Data(http.StatusOK, "application/json", b)
}
// seedDefaults godoc
//
// @Summary Sync the default step library
// @Tags workflows
// @Produce json
// @Success 200 {object} SeedDefaultsResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /steps/seed-defaults [post]
func seedDefaults(c *gin.Context) {
created, updated, err := services.SeedDefaultSteps(auth.InstanceID(c))
if err != nil {
@@ -247,11 +358,23 @@ func seedDefaults(c *gin.Context) {
return
}
services.LogEvent(auth.InstanceID(c), "workflow.defaults_synced", actorFromCtx(c), "", "", fmt.Sprintf("default steps synced: %d created, %d updated", created, updated))
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"created": created, "updated": updated})
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, SeedDefaultsResponse{Created: created, Updated: updated})
}
const maxStepBodyBytes = 1 << 20
// importStep godoc
//
// @Summary Import a step from an exported JSON document
// @Tags workflows
// @Accept json
// @Produce json
// @Param body body models.WorkflowStep true "Exported step document"
// @Success 201 {object} models.WorkflowStep
// @Failure 400 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /steps/import [post]
func importStep(c *gin.Context) {
c.Request.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(c.Writer, c.Request.Body, maxStepBodyBytes)
body, err := io.ReadAll(c.Request.Body)
@@ -268,6 +391,18 @@ func importStep(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(http.StatusCreated, out)
}
// parseStep godoc
//
// @Summary Parse a step document without saving it
// @Tags workflows
// @Accept json
// @Produce json
// @Param body body models.WorkflowStep true "Step document to parse"
// @Success 200 {object} models.WorkflowStep
// @Failure 400 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /steps/parse [post]
func parseStep(c *gin.Context) {
c.Request.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(c.Writer, c.Request.Body, maxStepBodyBytes)
body, err := io.ReadAll(c.Request.Body)
@@ -283,6 +418,16 @@ func parseStep(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, s)
}
// listWorkflows godoc
//
// @Summary List workflows
// @Tags workflows
// @Produce json
// @Success 200 {array} models.Workflow
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /workflows [get]
func listWorkflows(c *gin.Context) {
wfs, err := services.ListWorkflows(auth.InstanceID(c))
if err != nil {
@@ -292,6 +437,19 @@ func listWorkflows(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, wfs)
}
// createWorkflow godoc
//
// @Summary Create a workflow
// @Tags workflows
// @Accept json
// @Produce json
// @Param body body models.Workflow true "Workflow to create"
// @Success 201 {object} models.Workflow
// @Failure 400 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /workflows [post]
func createWorkflow(c *gin.Context) {
var w models.Workflow
if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&w); err != nil {
@@ -307,6 +465,17 @@ func createWorkflow(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(http.StatusCreated, out)
}
// getWorkflow godoc
//
// @Summary Get a workflow
// @Tags workflows
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Workflow ID"
// @Success 200 {object} models.Workflow
// @Failure 404 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /workflows/{id} [get]
func getWorkflow(c *gin.Context) {
w, err := services.GetWorkflow(auth.InstanceID(c), c.Param("id"))
if err != nil {
@@ -316,6 +485,20 @@ func getWorkflow(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, w)
}
// updateWorkflow godoc
//
// @Summary Update a workflow
// @Tags workflows
// @Accept json
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Workflow ID"
// @Param body body models.Workflow true "Workflow fields"
// @Success 200 {object} models.Workflow
// @Failure 400 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /workflows/{id} [put]
func updateWorkflow(c *gin.Context) {
var w models.Workflow
if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&w); err != nil {
@@ -335,15 +518,39 @@ func updateWorkflow(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, updated)
}
// deleteWorkflow godoc
//
// @Summary Delete a workflow
// @Tags workflows
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Workflow ID"
// @Success 200 {object} DeletedResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /workflows/{id} [delete]
func deleteWorkflow(c *gin.Context) {
if err := services.DeleteWorkflow(auth.InstanceID(c), c.Param("id")); err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
services.LogEvent(auth.InstanceID(c), "workflow.deleted", actorFromCtx(c), "", c.Param("id"), "workflow deleted")
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"deleted": true})
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, DeletedResponse{Deleted: true})
}
// runWorkflow godoc
//
// @Summary Run a workflow
// @Description Snapshots the resolved steps into a WorkflowRun and dispatches to every targeted server.
// @Tags workflows
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Workflow ID"
// @Success 202 {object} RunWorkflowResponse
// @Failure 400 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 503 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /workflows/{id}/run [post]
func runWorkflow(c *gin.Context) {
runID, err := services.TriggerWorkflow(auth.InstanceID(c), c.Param("id"), actorFromCtx(c))
if err != nil {
@@ -355,9 +562,21 @@ func runWorkflow(c *gin.Context) {
return
}
services.LogEvent(auth.InstanceID(c), "workflow.run_triggered", actorFromCtx(c), "", c.Param("id"), fmt.Sprintf("run %s triggered", runID))
c.JSON(http.StatusAccepted, gin.H{"run_id": runID})
c.JSON(http.StatusAccepted, RunWorkflowResponse{RunID: runID})
}
// listWorkflowRuns godoc
//
// @Summary List a workflow's runs
// @Tags workflows
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Workflow ID"
// @Param limit query int false "Max runs to return (default 50)"
// @Success 200 {array} models.WorkflowRun
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /workflows/{id}/runs [get]
func listWorkflowRuns(c *gin.Context) {
limit := int64(50)
if l := c.Query("limit"); l != "" {
@@ -373,6 +592,17 @@ func listWorkflowRuns(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, runs)
}
// getRun godoc
//
// @Summary Get a run
// @Tags workflows
// @Produce json
// @Param runId path string true "Run ID"
// @Success 200 {object} models.WorkflowRun
// @Failure 404 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /runs/{runId} [get]
func getRun(c *gin.Context) {
r, err := services.GetRun(auth.InstanceID(c), c.Param("runId"))
if err != nil {
@@ -382,15 +612,42 @@ func getRun(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, r)
}
// cancelRun godoc
//
// @Summary Cancel a run
// @Tags workflows
// @Produce json
// @Param runId path string true "Run ID"
// @Success 200 {object} CancelledResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /runs/{runId}/cancel [post]
func cancelRun(c *gin.Context) {
if err := services.CancelRun(auth.InstanceID(c), c.Param("runId")); err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
services.LogEvent(auth.InstanceID(c), "workflow.run_cancelled", actorFromCtx(c), "", c.Param("runId"), "run cancelled")
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"cancelled": true})
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, CancelledResponse{Cancelled: true})
}
// putWorkflowSchedule godoc
//
// @Summary Set a workflow's schedule
// @Description Standard 5-field cron and an IANA zone, both validated at save time.
// @Tags workflows
// @Accept json
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Workflow ID"
// @Param body body models.Schedule true "Schedule"
// @Success 200 {object} ScheduleResponse
// @Failure 400 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 404 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /workflows/{id}/schedule [put]
func putWorkflowSchedule(c *gin.Context) {
var body models.Schedule
if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&body); err != nil {
@@ -415,12 +672,22 @@ func putWorkflowSchedule(c *gin.Context) {
services.LogEvent(instanceID, "workflow.schedule_updated", actorFromCtx(c), "", c.Param("id"),
fmt.Sprintf("schedule %q %s enabled=%v", body.Cron, body.TZ, body.Enabled))
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"schedule": body, "next_run_at": next})
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, ScheduleResponse{Schedule: body, NextRunAt: next})
}
// previewWorkflowSchedule exists so the browser and the scheduler agree on
// what a cron string means. A client-side cron parser that disagrees with the
// server by one field is a bug found in production, at night.
// previewWorkflowSchedule godoc
//
// @Summary Preview the next occurrences of a cron schedule
// @Description Exists so the browser and the scheduler agree on what a cron string means.
// @Tags workflows
// @Produce json
// @Param cron query string true "5-field cron expression"
// @Param tz query string true "IANA time zone name"
// @Success 200 {object} OccurrencesResponse
// @Failure 400 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /workflows/{id}/schedule/preview [get]
func previewWorkflowSchedule(c *gin.Context) {
expr := c.Query("cron")
tz := c.Query("tz")
+80 -5
View File
@@ -18,6 +18,19 @@ import (
//
// A server that has never reported answers an empty list rather than 404: the
// agent may simply not have got there yet, and 404 reads as "no such server".
// getServerWorkloads godoc
//
// @Summary Get a server's workload snapshot
// @Description Returns the stored snapshot. A server that has never reported answers an empty list, not 404.
// @Tags workloads
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Server ID"
// @Success 200 {object} models.ServerWorkloads
// @Failure 404 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /servers/{id}/workloads [get]
func getServerWorkloads(c *gin.Context) {
instanceID := auth.InstanceID(c)
id := c.Param("id")
@@ -47,6 +60,19 @@ func getServerWorkloads(c *gin.Context) {
// refreshServerWorkloads nudges the agent to report now. It returns no data:
// the client refetches the stored document once the agent has written it.
// refreshServerWorkloads godoc
//
// @Summary Request a fresh workload report
// @Description Nudges the agent to report now. Returns no data; the client refetches once the agent has written it.
// @Tags workloads
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Server ID"
// @Success 202 {object} MessageResponse
// @Failure 404 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 503 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /servers/{id}/workloads/refresh [post]
func refreshServerWorkloads(c *gin.Context) {
instanceID := auth.InstanceID(c)
id := c.Param("id")
@@ -63,9 +89,28 @@ func refreshServerWorkloads(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(http.StatusServiceUnavailable, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
c.JSON(http.StatusAccepted, gin.H{"message": "refresh requested"})
c.JSON(http.StatusAccepted, MessageResponse{Message: "refresh requested"})
}
// controlWorkload godoc
//
// @Summary Start, stop or restart a workload
// @Description Owner and admin only. The protected set (vantage-agent.service and the agent's own container) is enforced agent-side and answers 409, not an error.
// @Tags workloads
// @Accept json
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Server ID"
// @Param wid path string true "Workload ID"
// @Param body body object{action=string,kind=string} true "Action (start/stop/restart) and kind (container/unit)"
// @Success 200 {object} MessageResponse
// @Failure 400 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 404 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 409 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 502 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 503 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /servers/{id}/workloads/{wid}/action [post]
func controlWorkload(c *gin.Context) {
instanceID := auth.InstanceID(c)
id := c.Param("id")
@@ -117,9 +162,27 @@ func controlWorkload(c *gin.Context) {
services.LogEvent(instanceID, "workload."+body.Action, actorFromCtx(c), s.ServerID, "",
fmt.Sprintf("%s %s %s on %s", body.Action, body.Kind, wid, s.Hostname))
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"message": body.Action + " ok"})
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, MessageResponse{Message: body.Action + " ok"})
}
// getWorkloadLogs godoc
//
// @Summary Read a workload's logs
// @Description Owner and admin only, and audited: container output is arbitrary and cannot be masked. Capped at 500 lines and 256KB, whichever binds first.
// @Tags workloads
// @Produce json
// @Param id path string true "Server ID"
// @Param wid path string true "Workload ID"
// @Param kind query string false "container or unit (default container)"
// @Param tail query int false "Lines to return, clamped to the cap"
// @Success 200 {object} WorkloadLogsResponse
// @Failure 400 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 404 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 502 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Failure 503 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /servers/{id}/workloads/{wid}/logs [get]
func getWorkloadLogs(c *gin.Context) {
instanceID := auth.InstanceID(c)
id := c.Param("id")
@@ -163,11 +226,23 @@ func getWorkloadLogs(c *gin.Context) {
services.LogEvent(instanceID, "workload.logs_read", actorFromCtx(c), s.ServerID, "",
fmt.Sprintf("read %s logs for %s on %s", kind, wid, s.Hostname))
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"text": text, "truncated": truncated})
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, WorkloadLogsResponse{Text: text, Truncated: truncated})
}
// listWorkloads answers the fleet-wide question, which is the reason the
// snapshot is stored rather than fetched on demand and discarded.
// listWorkloads godoc
//
// @Summary Search workloads fleet-wide
// @Description Answers the fleet-wide question, which is the reason the snapshot is stored rather than fetched on demand and discarded.
// @Tags workloads
// @Produce json
// @Param image query string false "Filter by image name"
// @Param stack query string false "Filter by compose stack"
// @Param state query string false "Filter by state"
// @Success 200 {array} services.WorkloadHit
// @Failure 500 {object} ErrorResponse
// @Security cookieAuth
// @Security bearerAuth
// @Router /workloads [get]
func listWorkloads(c *gin.Context) {
hits, err := services.SearchWorkloads(auth.InstanceID(c),
c.Query("image"), c.Query("stack"), c.Query("state"))
+126 -8
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,12 @@
package auth
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"strings"
"gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/mrhid6/vantage/server/internal/services"
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
)
@@ -48,17 +52,27 @@ func RequireRole(roles ...string) gin.HandlerFunc {
}
}
// Middleware authenticates a request by session cookie or by API token.
//
// Both paths end by putting a *Session in the context, which is why no handler,
// role guard, licence gate or audit call needed changing: the token path is a
// second way to arrive at the same value, not a second way through the API.
func Middleware() gin.HandlerFunc {
return func(c *gin.Context) {
cookie, err := c.Request.Cookie(sessionCookieName)
if err != nil {
c.AbortWithStatusJSON(http.StatusUnauthorized, gin.H{"error": "not authenticated"})
return
sess, ok := sessionFromCookie(c)
if !ok {
// A cookie that was presented and rejected has already had its
// response written by sessionFromCookie (no bearer was present to
// fall through to). Trying sessionFromToken anyway would write a
// second body onto the same response.
if c.IsAborted() {
return
}
sess, ok = sessionFromToken(c)
}
sess, err := GetSession(c.Request.Context(), cookie.Value)
if err != nil {
c.AbortWithStatusJSON(http.StatusUnauthorized, gin.H{"error": "session expired"})
if !ok {
// sessionFromCookie and sessionFromToken have already written the
// response describing which credential failed and why.
return
}
@@ -69,6 +83,8 @@ func Middleware() gin.HandlerFunc {
c.Set(ctxSessionKey, sess)
// The host guard applies to both credential kinds. A token carries an
// instance, and the tenant boundary must not have a token-shaped hole.
if hostInstance, ok := InstanceFromHost(c); ok && hostInstance.InstanceID != sess.InstanceID {
c.AbortWithStatusJSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{"error": "instance host mismatch"})
return
@@ -77,3 +93,105 @@ func Middleware() gin.HandlerFunc {
c.Next()
}
}
// sessionFromCookie returns false without writing a response when there is no
// cookie at all, so the token path gets its turn. It writes and aborts only
// when a cookie was presented and was not usable.
func sessionFromCookie(c *gin.Context) (*Session, bool) {
cookie, err := c.Request.Cookie(sessionCookieName)
if err != nil {
return nil, false
}
sess, err := GetSession(c.Request.Context(), cookie.Value)
if err != nil {
// A stale cookie plus a valid bearer token is a real combination —
// a browser tab left open beside a curl. Fall through rather than
// refusing a credential that would have worked.
if bearerToken(c) != "" {
return nil, false
}
c.AbortWithStatusJSON(http.StatusUnauthorized, gin.H{"error": "session expired"})
return nil, false
}
return sess, true
}
func bearerToken(c *gin.Context) string {
const prefix = "Bearer "
h := c.GetHeader("Authorization")
if len(h) <= len(prefix) || !strings.EqualFold(h[:len(prefix)], prefix) {
return ""
}
return h[len(prefix):]
}
func sessionFromToken(c *gin.Context) (*Session, bool) {
raw := bearerToken(c)
if raw == "" {
c.AbortWithStatusJSON(http.StatusUnauthorized, gin.H{"error": "not authenticated"})
return nil, false
}
tok, err := services.ResolveAPIToken(raw)
if errors.Is(err, services.ErrTokenExpired) {
// Recorded rather than only refused: an expired token still being
// presented is how a forgotten CI job becomes visible.
services.LogEvent(tok.InstanceID, "token.expired_use", tok.Name, "", "",
fmt.Sprintf("expired token '%s' was used", tok.Name))
c.AbortWithStatusJSON(http.StatusUnauthorized, gin.H{"error": "token expired", "code": "token_expired"})
return nil, false
}
if err != nil {
c.AbortWithStatusJSON(http.StatusUnauthorized, gin.H{"error": "invalid token"})
return nil, false
}
user, err := services.GetUserInInstance(tok.InstanceID, tok.UserID)
if err != nil {
// The owner is gone. DeleteUser removes tokens, so this is the
// belt-and-braces path for a row deleted some other way.
c.AbortWithStatusJSON(http.StatusUnauthorized, gin.H{"error": "invalid token"})
return nil, false
}
services.TouchAPIToken(tok)
return &Session{
UserID: tok.UserID,
InstanceID: tok.InstanceID,
// Recomputed per request, so demoting the person demotes the token.
Role: services.LowerRole(user.Role, tok.Role),
Email: user.Email,
Name: user.Email,
TokenID: tok.TokenID,
TokenName: tok.Name,
Scopes: tok.Scopes,
}, true
}
// TokenID is empty for a cookie session and the token's ID for a token
// request. It is what lets audit detail record which credential acted.
func TokenID(c *gin.Context) string {
if s := GetSessionFromContext(c); s != nil {
return s.TokenID
}
return ""
}
func TokenName(c *gin.Context) string {
if s := GetSessionFromContext(c); s != nil {
return s.TokenName
}
return ""
}
func Scopes(c *gin.Context) []string {
if s := GetSessionFromContext(c); s != nil {
return s.Scopes
}
return nil
}
// IsToken reports whether this request authenticated with an API token rather
// than a browser session.
func IsToken(c *gin.Context) bool { return TokenID(c) != "" }
+13
View File
@@ -22,6 +22,14 @@ type Session struct {
Role string `json:"role"`
Email string `json:"email"`
Name string `json:"name"`
// The three fields below are set only when the request authenticated with
// an API token. They are never persisted to Redis — a token authenticates
// per request and mints no session, so a revoked token stops working
// immediately rather than at the end of a session TTL.
TokenID string `json:"-"`
TokenName string `json:"-"`
Scopes []string `json:"-"`
}
var rdb *redis.Client
@@ -51,6 +59,11 @@ func PingRedis(ctx context.Context) error {
return rdb.Ping(ctx).Err()
}
// Redis exposes the session client for callers that need a counter rather than
// a session. There is one Redis in this deployment and adding a second client
// would double the connection pool for no reason.
func Redis() *redis.Client { return rdb }
func randomHex(n int) (string, error) {
b := make([]byte, n)
if _, err := rand.Read(b); err != nil {
+52
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
package models
import (
"time"
"go.mongodb.org/mongo-driver/v2/bson"
)
// APIToken is a personal access token for the REST API.
//
// The plaintext is shown once at creation and never stored: only TokenHash,
// which is sha256 hex of the value, exactly as servers.agent_token_hash and the
// ESO read token already are. bcrypt is deliberately not used — the value is
// full-entropy random rather than a chosen password, and a per-token salt would
// force a collection scan where an indexed lookup is wanted.
//
// Role and Scopes are immutable after creation. There is no update endpoint:
// editing what a credential already deployed in CI can do, with no record of
// what it could do before, is worse than requiring a rotation.
type APIToken struct {
ID bson.ObjectID `bson:"_id,omitempty" json:"-"`
TokenID string `bson:"token_id" json:"token_id"`
InstanceID string `bson:"instance_id" json:"instance_id"`
UserID string `bson:"user_id" json:"user_id"`
Name string `bson:"name" json:"name"`
// Hint is the first 8 characters of the plaintext, stored in clear so the
// list can identify a token without revealing it.
Hint string `bson:"hint" json:"hint"`
// TokenHash is never serialised to JSON.
TokenHash string `bson:"token_hash" json:"-"`
Role string `bson:"role" json:"role"`
Scopes []string `bson:"scopes" json:"scopes"`
// ExpiresAt nil means the token never expires. Whether that is allowed is
// a per-instance policy, settings.api_token_max_days.
ExpiresAt *time.Time `bson:"expires_at,omitempty" json:"expires_at,omitempty"`
CreatedAt time.Time `bson:"created_at" json:"created_at"`
LastUsedAt *time.Time `bson:"last_used_at,omitempty" json:"last_used_at,omitempty"`
CreatedByIP string `bson:"created_by_ip,omitempty" json:"created_by_ip,omitempty"`
// Email of the owning user, joined at read time for the list. Never stored.
UserEmail string `bson:"-" json:"user_email,omitempty"`
}
// Expired reports whether the token's expiry has passed. A nil ExpiresAt never
// expires.
func (t *APIToken) Expired(now time.Time) bool {
return t.ExpiresAt != nil && now.After(*t.ExpiresAt)
}
+4
View File
@@ -7,3 +7,7 @@ type (
AlertSettings = shared.AlertSettings
SecretsSettings = shared.SecretsSettings
)
// APITokenMaxDays re-exports shared.APITokenMaxDays so server/internal/services
// can read the token lifetime cap without importing shared/models directly.
func APITokenMaxDays(s *Settings) int { return shared.APITokenMaxDays(s) }
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ var ScopedCollections = []string{
"server_packages",
"vuln_findings",
"vuln_alert_rules",
"api_tokens",
"server_workloads",
}
+92
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
package services
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"sort"
"strings"
)
// ErrInvalidScope is returned when a token is requested with a scope outside
// the vocabulary below.
var ErrInvalidScope = errors.New("invalid scope")
// ScopeResources is the whole vocabulary. Eight resources, each with :read and
// :write, and write implies read on the same resource.
//
// It is deliberately coarse. A scope per endpoint is a table nobody maintains,
// and a route added without an entry either fails closed and breaks, or
// defaults open and is pointless.
var ScopeResources = []string{
"servers",
"keys",
"secrets",
"workflows",
"monitors",
"vulns",
"workloads",
"settings",
}
const (
ScopeRead = "read"
ScopeWrite = "write"
)
// AllScopes returns every valid scope string, sorted, for the API to advertise
// to the token-creation UI.
func AllScopes() []string {
out := make([]string, 0, len(ScopeResources)*2)
for _, r := range ScopeResources {
out = append(out, r+":"+ScopeRead, r+":"+ScopeWrite)
}
sort.Strings(out)
return out
}
func validScope(s string) bool {
resource, action, ok := strings.Cut(s, ":")
if !ok || (action != ScopeRead && action != ScopeWrite) {
return false
}
for _, r := range ScopeResources {
if r == resource {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// ValidScopes rejects an unknown scope and an empty list. A token with no
// scopes can reach nothing, so creating one is a mistake worth naming rather
// than a credential worth issuing.
func ValidScopes(scopes []string) error {
if len(scopes) == 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("%w: at least one scope is required", ErrInvalidScope)
}
for _, s := range scopes {
if !validScope(s) {
return fmt.Errorf("%w: %q", ErrInvalidScope, s)
}
}
return nil
}
// ScopeSatisfied reports whether the held scopes cover the required one.
// Holding "servers:write" satisfies a requirement of "servers:read"; the
// converse is false.
func ScopeSatisfied(held []string, required string) bool {
resource, action, ok := strings.Cut(required, ":")
if !ok {
return false
}
for _, h := range held {
if h == required {
return true
}
if action == ScopeRead && h == resource+":"+ScopeWrite {
return true
}
}
return false
}
+4 -1
View File
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ func ResolveSecretsReadToken(token string) (string, bool) {
return s.InstanceID, true
}
func SaveSettings(instanceID string, alerts models.AlertSettings, retentionDays *int, localLoginEnabled *bool) error {
func SaveSettings(instanceID string, alerts models.AlertSettings, retentionDays *int, localLoginEnabled *bool, apiTokenMaxDays *int) error {
if alerts.OfflineThresholdMinutes <= 0 {
alerts.OfflineThresholdMinutes = 5
}
@@ -149,6 +149,9 @@ func SaveSettings(instanceID string, alerts models.AlertSettings, retentionDays
if localLoginEnabled != nil {
set["local_login_enabled"] = *localLoginEnabled
}
if apiTokenMaxDays != nil {
set["api_token_max_days"] = *apiTokenMaxDays
}
_, err := db.Col("settings").UpdateOne(ctx,
bson.M{"instance_id": instanceID},
bson.M{"$set": set, "$setOnInsert": bson.M{"instance_id": instanceID}},
+39
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
package services
import (
"context"
"time"
"gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/mrhid6/vantage/server/internal/db"
"go.mongodb.org/mongo-driver/v2/bson"
"go.mongodb.org/mongo-driver/v2/mongo"
"go.mongodb.org/mongo-driver/v2/mongo/options"
)
// EnsureAPITokenIndexes declares the indexes the token path depends on.
//
// The unique index on token_hash is a security property, not an optimisation:
// it is what makes authentication a single indexed lookup rather than a scan,
// and what makes two tokens hashing to one value impossible to store.
//
// Fatal on failure, like EnsureAuthIndexes and unlike the secrets and workflow
// builders: without the unique index the auth path would still answer, which is
// exactly the wrong kind of degradation.
func EnsureAPITokenIndexes() error {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second)
defer cancel()
if _, err := db.Col("api_tokens").Indexes().CreateOne(ctx, mongo.IndexModel{
Keys: bson.D{{Key: "token_hash", Value: 1}},
Options: options.Index().SetUnique(true),
}); err != nil {
return err
}
if _, err := db.Col("api_tokens").Indexes().CreateOne(ctx, mongo.IndexModel{
Keys: bson.D{{Key: "instance_id", Value: 1}, {Key: "user_id", Value: 1}},
}); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}
+258
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,258 @@
package services
import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"strings"
"time"
"gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/mrhid6/vantage/server/internal/db"
"gitea.hostxtra.co.uk/mrhid6/vantage/server/internal/models"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"go.mongodb.org/mongo-driver/v2/bson"
"go.mongodb.org/mongo-driver/v2/mongo"
)
var (
ErrTokenNotFound = errors.New("token not found")
ErrTokenExpired = errors.New("token expired")
ErrTokenNameTaken = errors.New("a token with that name already exists")
ErrTokenRoleTooHigh = errors.New("cannot create a token above your own role")
ErrTokenExpiryPolicy = errors.New("expiry exceeds this instance's maximum token lifetime")
// ErrTokenInvalid marks a caller mistake as distinct from a backend
// failure, which is what lets the handler choose 400 or 500.
ErrTokenInvalid = errors.New("invalid token request")
)
// TokenPrefix is on every plaintext so a leaked value is recognisable in a log
// or a paste, and so a wrong credential fails at the prefix check rather than
// as an anonymous 401.
const TokenPrefix = "vt_"
const tokenNameMax = 64
// roleRank orders the three roles so a token can be capped at its owner's.
func roleRank(role string) int {
switch role {
case models.RoleOwner:
return 3
case models.RoleAdmin:
return 2
case models.RoleMember:
return 1
}
return 0
}
// LowerRole returns whichever of the two roles grants less. It is what makes a
// token's authority follow its owner: demote the person and the token demotes
// with them, because this is recomputed on every request rather than frozen at
// creation.
func LowerRole(a, b string) string {
if roleRank(a) <= roleRank(b) {
return a
}
return b
}
// CreateAPIToken mints a token and returns the document plus the plaintext.
// The plaintext is the only copy: it is returned once and never stored.
func CreateAPIToken(instanceID, userID, name, role string, scopes []string, expiresInDays *int, ip string) (*models.APIToken, string, error) {
name = strings.TrimSpace(name)
if name == "" || len(name) > tokenNameMax {
return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("%w: token name must be 1 to %d characters", ErrTokenInvalid, tokenNameMax)
}
if !models.ValidRole(role) {
return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("%w: invalid role %q", ErrTokenInvalid, role)
}
if err := ValidScopes(scopes); err != nil {
return nil, "", err
}
owner, err := GetUserInInstance(instanceID, userID)
if err != nil {
return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("%w: user not found", ErrTokenInvalid)
}
if roleRank(role) > roleRank(owner.Role) {
return nil, "", ErrTokenRoleTooHigh
}
settings, err := GetSettings(instanceID)
if err != nil {
return nil, "", err
}
maxDays := models.APITokenMaxDays(settings)
var expiresAt *time.Time
switch {
case expiresInDays != nil:
if *expiresInDays <= 0 {
return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("%w: expires_in_days must be positive", ErrTokenInvalid)
}
if maxDays > 0 && *expiresInDays > maxDays {
return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("%w: maximum is %d day(s)", ErrTokenExpiryPolicy, maxDays)
}
t := time.Now().UTC().AddDate(0, 0, *expiresInDays)
expiresAt = &t
case maxDays > 0:
// A policy is set, so a token with no expiry is refused rather than
// silently capped: the caller asked for something the instance does not
// allow, and quietly giving them something else is worse than a 422.
return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("%w: an expiry of at most %d day(s) is required", ErrTokenExpiryPolicy, maxDays)
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
existing := db.Col("api_tokens").FindOne(ctx, bson.M{"instance_id": instanceID, "user_id": userID, "name": name})
if existing.Err() == nil {
return nil, "", ErrTokenNameTaken
} else if !errors.Is(existing.Err(), mongo.ErrNoDocuments) {
return nil, "", existing.Err()
}
secret, err := generateToken(32)
if err != nil {
return nil, "", err
}
plaintext := TokenPrefix + secret
tok := &models.APIToken{
TokenID: uuid.NewString(),
InstanceID: instanceID,
UserID: userID,
Name: name,
Hint: plaintext[:8],
TokenHash: HashToken(plaintext),
Role: role,
Scopes: scopes,
ExpiresAt: expiresAt,
CreatedAt: time.Now().UTC(),
CreatedByIP: ip,
}
if _, err := db.Col("api_tokens").InsertOne(ctx, tok); err != nil {
return nil, "", err
}
return tok, plaintext, nil
}
// ResolveAPIToken looks a plaintext up by hash.
//
// It returns ErrTokenExpired distinctly from ErrTokenNotFound so the auth layer
// can say which happened: a forgotten CI job hitting an expired token is worth
// seeing in the audit log, and an anonymous 401 hides it.
func ResolveAPIToken(plaintext string) (*models.APIToken, error) {
if !strings.HasPrefix(plaintext, TokenPrefix) {
return nil, ErrTokenNotFound
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
var tok models.APIToken
err := db.Col("api_tokens").FindOne(ctx, bson.M{"token_hash": HashToken(plaintext)}).Decode(&tok)
if errors.Is(err, mongo.ErrNoDocuments) {
return nil, ErrTokenNotFound
}
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if tok.Expired(time.Now().UTC()) {
return &tok, ErrTokenExpired
}
return &tok, nil
}
// TouchAPIToken records use, but only when the stored value is more than a
// minute stale. Without the check this is a Mongo write on every API call.
func TouchAPIToken(tok *models.APIToken) {
now := time.Now().UTC()
if tok.LastUsedAt != nil && now.Sub(*tok.LastUsedAt) < time.Minute {
return
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 3*time.Second)
defer cancel()
_, _ = db.Col("api_tokens").UpdateOne(ctx,
bson.M{"token_id": tok.TokenID, "instance_id": tok.InstanceID},
bson.M{"$set": bson.M{"last_used_at": now}},
)
tok.LastUsedAt = &now
}
// ListAPITokens returns a user's own tokens, or every token in the instance
// when all is true. The caller decides whether all is permitted.
func ListAPITokens(instanceID string, userID string, all bool) ([]models.APIToken, error) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
filter := bson.M{"instance_id": instanceID}
if !all {
filter["user_id"] = userID
}
cursor, err := db.Col("api_tokens").Find(ctx, filter)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer cursor.Close(ctx)
var tokens []models.APIToken
if err := cursor.All(ctx, &tokens); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if tokens == nil {
tokens = []models.APIToken{}
}
// Join the owning email so an admin's list names people rather than UUIDs.
users, err := ListUsers(instanceID)
if err == nil {
byID := make(map[string]string, len(users))
for _, u := range users {
byID[u.UserID] = u.Email
}
for i := range tokens {
tokens[i].UserEmail = byID[tokens[i].UserID]
}
}
return tokens, nil
}
// RevokeAPIToken deletes a token. A member may revoke only their own; owner and
// admin may revoke any token in the instance.
func RevokeAPIToken(instanceID, tokenID string, requester *models.User) (*models.APIToken, error) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
var tok models.APIToken
err := db.Col("api_tokens").FindOne(ctx, bson.M{"instance_id": instanceID, "token_id": tokenID}).Decode(&tok)
if errors.Is(err, mongo.ErrNoDocuments) {
return nil, ErrTokenNotFound
}
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
elevated := requester.Role == models.RoleOwner || requester.Role == models.RoleAdmin
if tok.UserID != requester.UserID && !elevated {
// Not 403: confirming the token exists tells a member about somebody
// else's credential. Same argument as admin's customer endpoints.
return nil, ErrTokenNotFound
}
if _, err := db.Col("api_tokens").DeleteOne(ctx, bson.M{"instance_id": instanceID, "token_id": tokenID}); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &tok, nil
}
// DeleteTokensForUser removes every token belonging to a user. Offboarding is
// one action, not two: a token that outlives its owner is an access path with
// nobody attached to it.
func DeleteTokensForUser(instanceID, userID string) error {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
_, err := db.Col("api_tokens").DeleteMany(ctx, bson.M{"instance_id": instanceID, "user_id": userID})
return err
}
+11 -1
View File
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"log"
"strings"
"time"
@@ -175,5 +176,14 @@ func DeleteUser(instanceID, userID string) error {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
_, err = db.Col("users").DeleteOne(ctx, bson.M{"user_id": userID, "instance_id": instanceID})
return err
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Offboarding is one action. A token outliving its owner is an access path
// with nobody attached to it.
if err := DeleteTokensForUser(instanceID, userID); err != nil {
log.Printf("delete tokens for user %s: %v", userID, err)
}
return nil
}
+22
View File
@@ -39,6 +39,18 @@ type Settings struct {
// WorkflowLogRetentionDays is: absent must mean the default, not zero.
// Nil is 90 days, 0 is forever. Only "fixed" findings are ever swept.
VulnFindingRetentionDays *int `bson:"vuln_finding_retention_days,omitempty" json:"vuln_finding_retention_days,omitempty"`
// APITokenMaxDays caps how long a newly created API token may live.
//
// A pointer for the same reason the retention fields are: absent must mean
// the default, and the default here is no cap at all — never-expire tokens
// are allowed until an instance decides otherwise, so an upgrade changes
// nothing. Nil or 0 is no cap. A positive value refuses both a longer
// expiry and a token with no expiry.
//
// It is a policy on issuance, not on use: raising or lowering it never
// invalidates a token that already exists.
APITokenMaxDays *int `bson:"api_token_max_days,omitempty" json:"api_token_max_days,omitempty"`
}
// LocalLoginEnabled reads the setting with its absent-means-on default. Every
@@ -49,3 +61,13 @@ func LocalLoginEnabled(s *Settings) bool {
}
return *s.LocalLoginEnabled
}
// APITokenMaxDays reads the token lifetime cap with its absent-means-uncapped
// default. 0 means no cap. Every caller must go through this rather than
// dereferencing the field.
func APITokenMaxDays(s *Settings) int {
if s == nil || s.APITokenMaxDays == nil || *s.APITokenMaxDays < 0 {
return 0
}
return *s.APITokenMaxDays
}
+14
View File
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import { Field } from "@/components/settings/Field";
import { Group } from "@/components/settings/Group";
import { SectionCard } from "@/components/settings/SectionCard";
import { MembersCard } from "@/components/settings/MembersCard";
import { ApiTokensCard } from "@/components/settings/ApiTokensCard";
import { AuthProvidersCard } from "@/components/settings/AuthProvidersCard";
const numberInputClass =
@@ -144,6 +145,7 @@ export default function SettingsPage() {
const [thresholdMinutes, setThresholdMinutes] = useState(5);
const [logRetentionDays, setLogRetentionDays] = useState(30);
const [offlineChannelIds, setOfflineChannelIds] = useState<string[]>([]);
const [apiTokenMaxDays, setApiTokenMaxDays] = useState(0);
const toast = useToast();
useEffect(() => {
@@ -151,6 +153,7 @@ export default function SettingsPage() {
setThresholdMinutes(settings.alerts.offline_threshold_minutes || 5);
setLogRetentionDays(settings.workflow_log_retention_days ?? 30);
setOfflineChannelIds(settings.alerts.offline_channel_ids ?? []);
setApiTokenMaxDays(settings.api_token_max_days ?? 0);
}, [settings]);
// The one place the in-progress form is turned into a payload. Both the
@@ -163,6 +166,7 @@ export default function SettingsPage() {
offline_channel_ids: offlineChannelIds,
},
workflow_log_retention_days: logRetentionDays,
api_token_max_days: apiTokenMaxDays,
};
}
@@ -220,6 +224,7 @@ export default function SettingsPage() {
<div className="space-y-10">
<Group label="Access">
<MembersCard />
<ApiTokensCard />
<AuthProvidersCard
localLoginEnabled={settings?.local_login_enabled ?? true}
onLocalLoginChange={(v) => {
@@ -291,6 +296,15 @@ export default function SettingsPage() {
<Field label="Log retention (days)" hint="0 = keep forever. Applies to per-run step output logs.">
<input type="number" min={0} value={logRetentionDays} onChange={(e) => setLogRetentionDays(Number(e.target.value))} className={numberInputClass} />
</Field>
<div className="mt-6">
<Field
label="Maximum API token lifetime (days)"
hint="0 means no cap, and tokens may be created with no expiry. Changing this affects new tokens only."
>
<input type="number" min={0} value={apiTokenMaxDays} onChange={(e) => setApiTokenMaxDays(Number(e.target.value))} className={numberInputClass} />
</Field>
</div>
</SectionCard>
</div>
+389
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,389 @@
"use client";
import { useEffect, useState } from "react";
import { useMutation, useQuery, useQueryClient } from "@tanstack/react-query";
import { api, type ApiToken, type Role } from "@/lib/api";
import { useAuth } from "@/components/AuthProvider";
import { Badge, Button, ConfirmDialog, Modal, Table, Tbody, Td, Th, Thead, Tr, friendlyMessage, useToast } from "@/components/ui";
import { Field, inputClass } from "./Field";
import { SectionCard } from "./SectionCard";
const ROLES: Role[] = ["owner", "admin", "member"];
const EXPIRY_OPTIONS: { label: string; days: number | null }[] = [
{ label: "30 days", days: 30 },
{ label: "60 days", days: 60 },
{ label: "90 days", days: 90 },
{ label: "365 days", days: 365 },
{ label: "Never", days: null },
];
const SEVEN_DAYS_MS = 7 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
/** The token a pending revoke refers to, carried so the dialog and the
* confirmation message name a token rather than a token_id. */
type PendingRevoke = { id: string; name: string };
function TokenIcon() {
return (
<svg className="h-5 w-5" fill="none" viewBox="0 0 24 24" stroke="currentColor" strokeWidth={1.5}>
<path
strokeLinecap="round"
strokeLinejoin="round"
d="M14.25 9.75L16.5 12l-2.25 2.25m-4.5 0L7.5 12l2.25-2.25M6 20.25h12A2.25 2.25 0 0020.25 18V6A2.25 2.25 0 0018 3.75H6A2.25 2.25 0 003.75 6v12A2.25 2.25 0 006 20.25z"
/>
</svg>
);
}
function roleVariant(role: Role) {
if (role === "owner") return "accent" as const;
if (role === "admin") return "warning" as const;
return "neutral" as const;
}
function rolesAtOrBelow(role: Role): Role[] {
const idx = ROLES.indexOf(role);
return idx === -1 ? ROLES : ROLES.slice(idx);
}
/** Renders a token's expiry, plus a policy note when the cap has tightened
* since the token was issued. The policy is not applied retroactively, so an
* outside-policy token is a prompt to rotate, not a failure of any kind. */
function ExpiryCell({ token, capDays }: { token: ApiToken; capDays: number }) {
const outsidePolicy = capDays > 0 && (!token.expires_at || new Date(token.expires_at).getTime() > Date.now() + capDays * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000);
if (!token.expires_at) {
return (
<div>
<span className="text-text-secondary"> never</span>
{outsidePolicy && <p className="mt-0.5 text-xs text-warning">outside the current policy rotate when convenient</p>}
</div>
);
}
const expiresAt = new Date(token.expires_at);
const expired = expiresAt.getTime() <= Date.now();
const soon = !expired && expiresAt.getTime() - Date.now() <= SEVEN_DAYS_MS;
return (
<div>
<span className={expired ? "text-danger" : soon ? "text-warning" : "text-text-secondary"}>
{expired ? `Expired ${expiresAt.toLocaleDateString()}` : expiresAt.toLocaleDateString()}
</span>
{outsidePolicy && <p className="mt-0.5 text-xs text-warning">outside the current policy rotate when convenient</p>}
</div>
);
}
export function ApiTokensCard() {
const queryClient = useQueryClient();
const { user, isAdmin } = useAuth();
const toast = useToast();
const [showAll, setShowAll] = useState(false);
const [createOpen, setCreateOpen] = useState(false);
const [revoking, setRevoking] = useState<PendingRevoke | null>(null);
const [name, setName] = useState("");
const [role, setRole] = useState<Role>("member");
const [scopes, setScopes] = useState<string[]>([]);
const [expiryDays, setExpiryDays] = useState<number | null>(30);
const [result, setResult] = useState<{ token: string; record: ApiToken } | null>(null);
const [copied, setCopied] = useState(false);
const { data: settings } = useQuery({ queryKey: ["settings"], queryFn: api.getSettings, enabled: isAdmin });
const capDays = settings?.api_token_max_days ?? 0;
const {
data: tokensData,
isLoading,
error,
} = useQuery({ queryKey: ["api-tokens", showAll], queryFn: () => api.listApiTokens(showAll) });
const tokens = tokensData?.tokens;
const { data: scopesData } = useQuery({ queryKey: ["token-scopes"], queryFn: api.listTokenScopes, enabled: createOpen });
const availableScopes = scopesData?.scopes ?? [];
const resources = Array.from(new Set(availableScopes.map((s) => s.split(":")[0])));
const invalidate = () => queryClient.invalidateQueries({ queryKey: ["api-tokens"] });
function resetForm() {
setName("");
setRole("member");
setScopes([]);
setExpiryDays(30);
setResult(null);
setCopied(false);
}
// Once the policy is known, default to the shortest option the policy still
// allows rather than a value the submit is about to be refused for.
useEffect(() => {
if (!createOpen) return;
const valid = EXPIRY_OPTIONS.find((o) => !(capDays > 0 && (o.days === null || o.days > capDays)));
if (valid) setExpiryDays(valid.days);
}, [createOpen, capDays]);
const {
mutate: createToken,
isPending: creating,
error: createError,
reset: resetCreateError,
} = useMutation({
mutationFn: () => api.createApiToken({ name, role, scopes, expires_in_days: expiryDays ?? undefined }),
onSuccess: (res) => {
setResult(res);
},
});
const {
mutate: revokeToken,
isPending: isRevoking,
error: revokeError,
reset: resetRevoke,
} = useMutation({
mutationFn: (t: PendingRevoke) => api.revokeApiToken(t.id),
onSuccess: (_data, t) => {
invalidate();
toast.success(`Revoked ${t.name}.`);
setRevoking(null);
},
});
function toggleScope(s: string) {
setScopes((prev) => (prev.includes(s) ? prev.filter((x) => x !== s) : [...prev, s]));
}
function closeCreate() {
// The plaintext is gone once this closes, so only invalidate having
// shown it — closing before a result exists is a plain cancel.
if (result) invalidate();
setCreateOpen(false);
resetCreateError();
resetForm();
}
async function copyToken() {
if (!result) return;
await navigator.clipboard.writeText(result.token);
setCopied(true);
setTimeout(() => setCopied(false), 2000);
}
const assignableRoles = user ? rolesAtOrBelow(user.role) : ROLES;
return (
<SectionCard
title="API tokens"
description="Scoped, personal tokens for scripts and CI to call the REST API without a browser session."
icon={<TokenIcon />}
actions={
<div className="flex items-center gap-3">
{isAdmin && (
<label className="flex items-center gap-1.5 text-xs text-text-secondary">
<input
type="checkbox"
checked={showAll}
onChange={(e) => setShowAll(e.target.checked)}
className="h-4 w-4 rounded border-border bg-surface-2 accent-accent"
/>
All tokens
</label>
)}
<Button variant="primary" size="sm" onClick={() => setCreateOpen(true)}>
Create token
</Button>
</div>
}
>
{isLoading ? (
<div className="flex justify-center py-8">
<div className="h-6 w-6 animate-spin rounded-full border-2 border-border border-t-accent" />
</div>
) : error ? (
<p className="py-6 text-sm text-danger">{friendlyMessage(error)}</p>
) : !tokens || tokens.length === 0 ? (
<p className="py-6 text-sm text-text-secondary">No API tokens yet.</p>
) : (
<Table>
<Thead>
<Tr>
<Th>Name</Th>
{showAll && <Th>Owner</Th>}
<Th>Role</Th>
<Th>Scopes</Th>
<Th>Last used</Th>
<Th>Expires</Th>
<Th className="text-right">Actions</Th>
</Tr>
</Thead>
<Tbody>
{tokens.map((t) => (
<Tr key={t.token_id}>
<Td label="Name">
<span className="font-medium text-text-primary">{t.name}</span>
<div className="font-mono text-xs text-text-secondary">{t.hint}</div>
</Td>
{showAll && <Td label="Owner" className="text-text-secondary">{t.user_email ?? t.user_id}</Td>}
<Td label="Role">
<Badge variant={roleVariant(t.role)}>{t.role}</Badge>
</Td>
<Td label="Scopes">
<div className="flex flex-wrap gap-1">
{t.scopes.map((s) => (
<Badge key={s} variant="neutral">
{s}
</Badge>
))}
</div>
</Td>
<Td label="Last used" className="text-text-secondary">
{t.last_used_at ? new Date(t.last_used_at).toLocaleString() : "Never"}
</Td>
<Td label="Expires">
<ExpiryCell token={t} capDays={capDays} />
</Td>
<Td label="Actions" className="text-right">
<Button
variant="ghost"
size="sm"
className="text-danger hover:text-danger"
onClick={() => setRevoking({ id: t.token_id, name: t.name })}
>
Revoke<span className="sr-only"> {t.name}</span>
</Button>
</Td>
</Tr>
))}
</Tbody>
</Table>
)}
<ConfirmDialog
open={revoking !== null}
title="Revoke token"
confirmLabel="Revoke token"
loading={isRevoking}
error={revokeError ? friendlyMessage(revokeError) : null}
onClose={() => {
resetRevoke();
setRevoking(null);
}}
onConfirm={() => revoking && revokeToken(revoking)}
body={
<p>
<span className="text-text-primary">{revoking?.name}</span> stops authenticating immediately. Any script or CI job using it
will start failing on its next call.
</p>
}
/>
<Modal open={createOpen} title={result ? "Token created" : "Create API token"} onClose={closeCreate}>
{result ? (
<div className="space-y-4">
<p className="text-sm text-text-secondary">This is the only time this token will be shown. Store it now.</p>
<div className="flex items-center gap-2">
<code className="flex-1 overflow-x-auto rounded bg-well p-3 font-mono text-sm break-all text-text-primary">{result.token}</code>
</div>
<div className="flex justify-end gap-2">
<Button type="button" variant="secondary" onClick={copyToken}>
{copied ? "Copied!" : "Copy"}
</Button>
<Button type="button" variant="primary" onClick={closeCreate}>
Done
</Button>
</div>
</div>
) : (
<form
onSubmit={(e) => {
e.preventDefault();
createToken();
}}
className="space-y-4"
>
<Field label="Name" hint="A short label identifying what will use this token, e.g. the CI pipeline or the script.">
<input required value={name} onChange={(e) => setName(e.target.value)} className={inputClass} />
</Field>
<Field label="Role">
<select value={role} onChange={(e) => setRole(e.target.value as Role)} className={inputClass}>
{assignableRoles.map((r) => (
<option key={r} value={r}>
{r}
</option>
))}
</select>
</Field>
<Field label="Scopes" hint="What this token may call. Grant only what the caller actually needs.">
<div className="grid grid-cols-1 gap-2 sm:grid-cols-2">
{resources.map((r) => {
const readScope = `${r}:read`;
const writeScope = `${r}:write`;
return (
<div key={r} className="flex items-center justify-between gap-4 rounded border border-border bg-surface-2 px-3 py-2">
<span className="text-sm capitalize text-text-primary">{r}</span>
<div className="flex gap-3">
<label className="flex items-center gap-1.5 text-xs text-text-secondary">
<input
type="checkbox"
checked={scopes.includes(readScope)}
onChange={() => toggleScope(readScope)}
className="h-4 w-4 rounded border-border bg-surface-2 accent-accent"
/>
read
</label>
<label className="flex items-center gap-1.5 text-xs text-text-secondary">
<input
type="checkbox"
checked={scopes.includes(writeScope)}
onChange={() => toggleScope(writeScope)}
className="h-4 w-4 rounded border-border bg-surface-2 accent-accent"
/>
write
</label>
</div>
</div>
);
})}
</div>
</Field>
<Field
label="Expires"
hint={capDays > 0 ? `This instance caps new tokens at ${capDays} days. Options beyond that, and Never, are disabled.` : "Never means the token has no expiry."}
>
<select
value={expiryDays === null ? "never" : String(expiryDays)}
onChange={(e) => setExpiryDays(e.target.value === "never" ? null : Number(e.target.value))}
className={inputClass}
>
{EXPIRY_OPTIONS.map((o) => {
const disabled = capDays > 0 && (o.days === null || o.days > capDays);
return (
<option key={o.label} value={o.days === null ? "never" : String(o.days)} disabled={disabled}>
{o.label}
</option>
);
})}
</select>
</Field>
{createError && <div className="rounded border border-danger/30 bg-danger/10 px-3 py-2 text-sm text-danger">{friendlyMessage(createError)}</div>}
<div className="flex justify-end gap-2">
<Button type="button" variant="ghost" onClick={closeCreate}>
Cancel
</Button>
<Button type="submit" variant="primary" loading={creating}>
Create token
</Button>
</div>
</form>
)}
</Modal>
</SectionCard>
);
}
+39 -1
View File
@@ -197,8 +197,22 @@ export interface Settings {
secrets: SecretsSettings;
workflow_log_retention_days?: number | null;
local_login_enabled?: boolean;
api_token_max_days?: number | null;
}
export type ApiToken = {
token_id: string;
name: string;
hint: string;
role: Role;
scopes: string[];
expires_at?: string | null;
created_at: string;
last_used_at?: string | null;
user_id: string;
user_email?: string;
};
export interface SecretGroupSummary {
group: string;
key_count: number;
@@ -683,7 +697,12 @@ export const api = {
return request<Settings>("/settings");
},
saveSettings(settings: { alerts: AlertSettings; workflow_log_retention_days?: number | null; local_login_enabled?: boolean }): Promise<{ saved: boolean }> {
saveSettings(settings: {
alerts: AlertSettings;
workflow_log_retention_days?: number | null;
local_login_enabled?: boolean;
api_token_max_days?: number | null;
}): Promise<{ saved: boolean }> {
return request<{ saved: boolean }>("/settings", {
method: "PUT",
body: JSON.stringify(settings),
@@ -694,6 +713,25 @@ export const api = {
return request<{ token: string }>("/settings/secrets-token", { method: "POST" });
},
listApiTokens(all = false): Promise<{ tokens: ApiToken[]; all: boolean }> {
return request<{ tokens: ApiToken[]; all: boolean }>(`/tokens${all ? "?all=true" : ""}`);
},
listTokenScopes(): Promise<{ scopes: string[] }> {
return request<{ scopes: string[] }>("/tokens/scopes");
},
createApiToken(body: { name: string; role: Role; scopes: string[]; expires_in_days?: number | null }): Promise<{ token: string; record: ApiToken }> {
return request<{ token: string; record: ApiToken }>("/tokens", {
method: "POST",
body: JSON.stringify(body),
});
},
revokeApiToken(tokenId: string): Promise<{ revoked: boolean }> {
return request<{ revoked: boolean }>(`/tokens/${tokenId}`, { method: "DELETE" });
},
listSecretGroups(): Promise<SecretGroupSummary[]> {
return request<SecretGroupSummary[]>("/secrets");
},
+5
View File
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ export const AUDIT_CATEGORIES: { value: string; label: string }[] = [
{ value: "updates", label: "OS updates" },
{ value: "auth_provider", label: "Single sign-on" },
{ value: "settings", label: "Settings" },
{ value: "token", label: "API tokens" },
{ value: "license", label: "Licence" },
{ value: "instance", label: "Instance" },
];
@@ -98,6 +99,10 @@ const OVERRIDES: Record<string, string> = {
"instance.reaped": "Instance deleted",
"vuln.rescan": "Rescan requested",
"workload.logs_read": "Workload logs read",
"token.created": "API token created",
"token.revoked": "API token revoked",
"token.expired_use": "Expired API token used",
"settings.token_policy_updated": "API token policy updated",
};
export interface AuditEventDisplay {