A fingerprint comparison proves two archives agree about a key. Only
opening real ciphertext from the target proves the key in hand reads the
data, which is the question an operator actually has.
Every refusal happens before the first write: format, checksums, key
policy, then target inspection. A unique index that will not build aborts,
because the unique indexes here are tenant-isolation properties rather
than optimisations.
Collections are enumerated live rather than from a list, so a collection
added later is backed up with no code change. Documents are written as the
raw BSON the driver returned, so Decimal128, ObjectId, DateTime and binary
subtypes survive byte for byte.
Open extracts and verifies every member against the manifest before the
reader is usable, so a corrupt archive is refused before a restore writes
its first document rather than halfway through.
services/crypto.go keeps its function names and its KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY
lookup and delegates the cipher, so vantagectl's verify probe can decrypt
with the same implementation rather than a second copy.
A pointer with absent meaning no cap, so an upgrade allows never-expire
tokens exactly as before and an instance opts into the policy. It governs
issuance only: changing it never invalidates a token that already exists.
Adds license.FeatureVulnScanning as the one name for the feature and a
catalogue row per deployment/tier, following console and oidc: features
are opt-in per customer, so no plan bundles it.
Documents the subsystem in CLAUDE.md, including that ScopedCollections is
the canonical registry instance deletion derives from — there is no
separate deletion list, which the plan had wrong.
Completes tasks 10-15 and fixes what was outstanding:
- vulndb.Pull implemented with oras-go, streaming the ~50MB layer and
staging both files before replacing either, so a failed pull leaves the
previous database intact rather than a half-written one.
- db.go: Vulnerability.Severity is a string, not trivy Severity, so the
int conversion did not compile. Severity now resolves vendor (highest
when vendors disagree) then NVD then unknown, and CVSS is read too.
- findings.go: added sweepFixedFindings plus the fleet query, severity
counts, rescan flag and accept/unaccept the API needs.
- vulnrules.go: added rule CRUD and the digest builder. ResolveTargets
returns []models.Server, not []string, so filterByServers was wrong.
- api/vulnerabilities.go was an empty file while handlers.go registered
twelve routes against it; written, grouped by CVE.
- shared/mail: added the missing sender. The templates were orphaned and
the HTML one was a copy of the text one, defining "subject" (which
html/template would escape) and emitting no markup. render.go parses
every template in init(), so a bad one panics server, admin and sitesvc
at boot — go build never runs init(), which is why nothing complained.
- notify: digests dispatch through their own path so SMTP gets the digest
template rather than arriving dressed as a monitor alert.
Plans are keyed on (deployment, tier) rather than tier alone, which is what
ends Free being cloud-only by construction - there is a self-hosted Free
plan now, so the one-per-account rule has to be enforced per deployment
instead of falling out of the plan table.
tier self_hosted becomes a legacy value no new licence carries.
NormaliseTier maps it to self-hosted Professional, which is what it always
granted, so blobs we cannot re-sign keep working.
Limits.FillUnset exists because a licence signed before a field existed
decodes it as 0, and 0 would read as no monitors and an audit log trimmed
to nothing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Free has no features, so a nil Go slice served "features": null. The
portal's type said string[], called .length on it, and took the page down.
The guarantee lives on a named Features type with its own MarshalJSON
rather than at each of the six places a licence or plan is serialised,
because the seventh is the one that would have been forgotten. Applying it
at marshal time also fixes rows already holding null in Mongo, which a
write-side fix alone would not.
Same class, found while checking the rest: staffListInstances built its
expiring filter from a nil []string, marshalling to $in: null, which Mongo
rejects — so the quiet week when nothing is expiring is precisely when the
staff Operations page's own query would have failed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Nothing writes them yet. They land now so phases 2 and 3 do not require a
second rebuild of every service that consumes the shared module.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
One address is one user within an instance, not globally, so an account's
people can be projected into every instance they are granted.
The replacement index is created before email_1 is dropped, so a failure
at any point leaves a working constraint. The drop is idempotent and
tolerates two services racing it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The 1.26.4 floor meant a base toolchain of 1.26.2 could not load the
workspace at all: the terminal worked only because GOTOOLCHAIN=auto
silently swapped in a downloaded 1.26.4, and gopls -- which does not get
that switch -- failed every packages.Load with
go: go.work requires go >= 1.26.4 (running go 1.26.2)
Nothing needed the patch-level floor. agent/go.mod already declared plain
go 1.26, so this makes the workspace uniform rather than introducing a new
convention, and CI is unaffected because golang:1.26 is already newer.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
go build inside the Docker image runs outside the workspace, so server/go.sum
needed the hyperboloide/lk entry that GOWORK resolution was supplying locally.
Caught by the image build, not by go build.
Probed the library before building against it. Two corrections to plan 1:
- PublicKey.ToB32String() returns one value, not (string, error)
- The scheme is ECDSA P-384 with SHA-256, not ed25519 as the spec and plan
claim. Design is unaffected; the prose needs fixing.
mrhid6
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5