Hourly sweep marks expired Free instances lapsed and sends at most one
notice per instance per pass, most urgent first, recorded on the document
so a restart cannot re-send.
Deletion warnings are suppressed when the reaper is off. Promising a
deletion that will never happen is a lie, and a scarier one than silence.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Provisions the control-plane instance and its owner, records the
admin_instances row, issues and injects a Free licence, and emails the
customer where it is and when it expires.
Licence issuance and email cannot fail the request. The instance exists
and the customer can sign in; rolling back something they can already see
would be worse than shipping it unlicensed for staff to fix.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds REDIS_USERNAME and REDIS_PASSWORD. Both are optional, so an
unauthenticated instance still works unchanged. Redis 6+ ACL auth takes
both; a legacy requirepass instance takes the password with an empty
username, which is what go-redis needs to send single-argument AUTH.
Admin now defaults to the external Redis at 10.10.10.2:6379 rather than the
compose-local one, and no longer declares depends_on: redis -- it is not
starting that container any more. The base stack keeps its own Redis for
`server`, which still has no auth support.
Also fixes SMTP_PASSWORD in the admin block: it read `$SMTP_PASSWORD:-}`
rather than `${SMTP_PASSWORD:-}`, which appended a literal `:-}` to the
password and would have failed SMTP auth at the first verification email.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Completes the service -- this is the first commit where the whole thing
compiles and serves.
staffCreateInstance adopts a cloud instance that already exists in the
control plane, taking its name and slug from there and refusing when no
such instance exists: an admin row pointing at nothing would issue licences
nobody can use. Adopt then issue is how the existing read-only cloud
instances get licensed.
staffRelink has no attempt cap. The customer-facing limit exists to put a
human in front of the fourth attempt, and this is that human.
Editing a plan changes what a tier grants from now on only; existing
licences snapshotted theirs at issue time.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Mirrors the pattern sitesvc already proves: 32 random bytes, only the
SHA-256 hash stored, a 24-hour expiry, and the token cleared on use -- so a
leaked database yields no working links.
Unverified login returns a distinct "verify your email address first" rather
than the generic error. The address is already known to be theirs, so there
is nothing to disclose and that is the only useful thing to say.
Licence blobs are emailed inline. A blob is signed public data, not a
secret: it is useless on any instance other than the one it names.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
One Redis session store and one cookie for all three identities. Staff
login returns the same error for every failure mode and spends a bcrypt
comparison against a dummy hash when no user exists, so neither the message
nor the timing confirms which addresses have accounts.
Staff users are created only by adminctl. There is no signup endpoint: a
licensing authority that can be joined over the internet is not one.
Pins gin and go-redis to the versions server/ already uses rather than the
latest tidy would pick.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Injection is a single UpdateOne of three licence fields, so it is
idempotent and safe to re-run. The control plane caches licence state for
60 seconds, so an injected licence takes effect within a minute with no
restart.
Deliver never fails its caller. The reconciler, not the issuance path, is
what actually guarantees a cloud instance ends up holding the licence admin
says it holds -- injection at issue time is best-effort and this is the
backstop.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Issue is the only place that signs. It records the licence, supersedes its
predecessor and updates the instance -- but deliberately does not deliver.
The ordering matters: a licence recorded but not delivered is recoverable,
because the customer can download it. A licence delivered but not recorded
is a support mystery with no paper trail.
Free stays cloud-only through one comparison of plan against instance
deployment, not a flag. Renewals reset relink_count because the cap is per
term.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds admin's own documents, its unique indexes and the plan seed from
shared/license.
Licences are append-only -- a renewal writes a new row and supersedes the
old one -- because the history is the support tool. Plans are seeded with
$setOnInsert only, so a redeploy never stamps over staff edits to limits,
features or Paddle IDs.
admin_instances.instance_id unique is a correctness property, not an
optimisation: without it two customers could both claim one self-hosted
UUID and both be issued licences for it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds the admin module: env config with fail-fast validation, two MongoDB
connections (its own vantage_admin database plus a narrow path into the
control plane), the boot sequence and the image.
Config refuses to start without a signing key, and both Mongo URIs must
name their database inline -- admin talks to two databases, so a bare
MONGO_DB would be ambiguous about which.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
mrhid6andClaude Opus 5