feat: documentation site
Docusaurus 3 docs-only site at docsite/, served statically by nginx under /docs on the marketing host. Covers getting started (self-hosted install through first server and first licence), the control plane, Vantage HQ, a reference section and operations. Wired into docker-compose.site.yml as docsite (3005:80) and into the image build workflow, rebuilding on its own directory only. Never added to the self-hosted compose file.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
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---
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id: audit-log
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title: Audit log
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sidebar_label: Audit log
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---
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Every mutating API path writes an audit event. The log is at **Audit**.
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## What an event carries
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| Field | Meaning |
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| --- | --- |
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| Action | A dotted name, e.g. `server.created`, `settings.updated` |
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| Actor | Who did it |
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| Target | The object acted on |
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| Detail | A short human-readable note |
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| Time | When |
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## What is recorded
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Creation, modification and deletion across the product: servers and enrolments,
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keys and assignments, workflow and step changes, runs triggered, monitors and
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channels, secret groups and reveals, console sessions opened, settings and
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member changes, licence installs.
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Reads are not recorded, with one deliberate exception: **revealing a secret**
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writes an event, because reading that particular thing is an act rather than a
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lookup.
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## What is not recorded
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- Sign-ins and sign-out.
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- Anything inside a console session.
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- Step output. That lives in the run log, kept under the workflow retention
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setting rather than with the audit log.
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## Retention
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Audit events are not swept by the workflow log retention setting — that setting
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governs run logs only. Audit history stays until the instance does.
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:::warning It is a log, not a control
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The audit log tells you what happened. It does not restrict what can happen, and
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an admin can do anything an admin can do. Use roles for restriction and the log
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for accountability.
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:::
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## Getting events out
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`GET /api/audit` returns recent events as JSON and accepts a `limit`. There is
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no streaming or push export; if you need events in a SIEM, poll that endpoint.
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---
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id: browser-console
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title: Browser console
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sidebar_label: Browser console
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---
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An SSH, RDP or VNC session in a browser tab, with no client software and no
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inbound port on the target beyond the one the protocol already uses.
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Protocol handling is Apache Guacamole's — the control plane proxies a WebSocket
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to a **guacd** daemon and manages credentials around it.
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## Requirements
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- `guacd` running and reachable from the server. The bundled Compose stack
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includes it; `GUACD_ADDR` defaults to `guacd:4822`.
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- `KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY` set, since every credential involved is stored encrypted.
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- Network reachability **from the control plane to the target** on the protocol
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port. This is the one part of Vantage that is not agent-mediated: guacd
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connects directly, so a machine reachable only by its agent cannot be
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consoled.
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## Opening a session
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From a server's page, choose **Console**. Then:
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1. The UI calls `POST /api/console/connect`, which mints a **one-time** session
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token.
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2. The browser opens a WebSocket to `GET /api/console/tunnel` with that token.
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3. The server marks the token consumed — atomically, so a second use cannot
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race — and proxies the connection to guacd.
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## Credentials
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### SSH
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Authenticates with a private key stored in the [key library](./ssh-keys.md). The
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key must have its private half uploaded; a public-only key cannot open a
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session.
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### RDP and VNC
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You supply credentials when connecting. They are encrypted, **single-use**, and
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consumed when the tunnel opens. They are not retained for the next session.
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:::info Why single-use
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A stored console credential is a standing grant to that machine for anyone who
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can reach the endpoint. Consuming it at tunnel-open means a leaked session token
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is worth one connection at most, and only until it is used.
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:::
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## Session behaviour
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Closing the tab ends the session. There is no reconnect and no session
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persistence — reopening mints a new token and a new connection.
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## Auditing
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Opening a console is an audited action, with actor, server and time. What
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happens *inside* the session is not recorded: there is no session capture or
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keystroke log. If you need that, it has to come from the target machine.
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## When it does not work
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| Symptom | Cause |
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| --- | --- |
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| Connects then closes immediately | guacd unreachable — check `GUACD_ADDR` and that the container is up |
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| SSH refuses the key | The stored key has no private half, or is not in the target's `authorized_keys` |
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| RDP fails on a fresh credential | Credentials are consumed on open; a retry needs them entered again |
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| Hangs at connecting | The control plane cannot reach the target on the protocol port |
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---
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id: monitors
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title: Monitors
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sidebar_label: Monitors
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---
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Monitors check that something is answering. Four types, two places they can run
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from, and a notification path when they stop being satisfied.
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## Types
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| Type | Checks | Options |
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| --- | --- | --- |
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| `http` | An HTTP(S) URL | method, expected status, keyword that must appear in the body, allow insecure TLS |
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| `tcp` | A host and port accept a connection | — |
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| `icmp` | A host answers ping | — |
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| `tls` | A certificate is valid and not expiring | warn N days before expiry |
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An `http` monitor with a keyword is usually the one you want for an application:
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a 200 that returns an error page still fails the keyword.
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## Where a check runs
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Every monitor has a **runner**:
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| Runner | Meaning |
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| --- | --- |
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| `server` | The control plane's scheduler performs the check |
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| a server ID | That server's agent performs it locally and reports the result |
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Use `server` for anything reachable from the control plane — public endpoints,
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your own front door. Use an agent for anything only reachable from inside the
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target network: a database on a private subnet, a service bound to localhost, a
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device on a management VLAN.
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:::tip Agent-run monitors measure what your users can't
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A check run from the control plane tells you the service is reachable from
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there. A check run on the machine tells you the process is alive. Those are
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different questions, and outages usually live in the gap.
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:::
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## Interval, retries and state
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- **Interval** — how often to check.
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- **Retries** — how many consecutive failures are tolerated before the state
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flips.
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A monitor sits in `pending` until its first result. Failures accumulate; once
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they exceed `retries`, the monitor goes `down`, an **incident** opens and the
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attached notification channels fire. A subsequent success closes the incident.
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Retries are what keeps one dropped packet from paging you. Set them to at least
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`1` for anything crossing the public internet.
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## Notifications
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Attach one or more [notification channels](./notification-channels.md) to a
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monitor. Channels are shared, so one Slack destination can serve every monitor
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you have.
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Notification state is tracked per monitor, so a service that is down for six
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hours does not send a message per interval.
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## Uptime and incidents
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The monitor detail page shows:
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- **Uptime**, from hourly rollup records — checks performed, how many were up,
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and mean latency per hour. Rollups are what make the graph cheap to draw over
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long windows.
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- **Incidents**, each with a start, a resolution and the cause recorded at the
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moment it opened.
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## Disabling versus deleting
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Disabling stops the checks and keeps the history. Deleting removes the monitor.
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Prefer disabling for anything seasonal — the uptime record is usually the part
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you wanted.
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@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
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---
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id: notification-channels
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title: Notification channels
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||||
sidebar_label: Notification channels
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---
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A channel is a destination for alerts. [Monitors](./monitors.md) reference
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channels by ID, so one destination serves as many monitors as you like.
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Manage them at **Settings → Notifications**.
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## Types
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### Webhook
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Posts JSON to a URL you choose.
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| Setting | |
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| --- | --- |
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| `url` | Required |
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```json
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{
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"monitor": "API front door",
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"type": "http",
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"old_status": "up",
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"new_status": "down",
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"message": "HTTP 502",
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"time": "2026-07-28T09:14:02Z"
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}
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```
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Any response of 300 or above counts as a delivery failure. The request times out
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after 10 seconds.
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### Discord
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| Setting | |
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| --- | --- |
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| `url` | Discord webhook URL |
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Posts the alert as message content.
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### Slack
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||||
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| Setting | |
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||||
| --- | --- |
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| `url` | Slack incoming webhook URL |
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### Telegram
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|
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| Setting | |
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| --- | --- |
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| `token` | Bot token |
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| `chat_id` | Target chat |
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### SMTP
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| Setting | |
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| --- | --- |
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| `host`, `port` | Required |
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| `from`, `to` | Required |
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| `username`, `password` | Optional; auth is skipped when the username is empty |
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Port `465` uses implicit TLS; anything else uses STARTTLS.
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Alert emails are rendered by the same email system that sends licence and
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account mail, so a monitor alert and an account email look like the same
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product.
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## The message
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Non-webhook channels all send the same one-line title:
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```
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[Vantage] API front door (http) is DOWN: HTTP 502
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```
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Recoveries read `recovered` in place of `is DOWN`. The webhook payload carries
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the same information as fields, which is the one to use if you are routing into
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something that needs to branch on status.
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## Testing
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Every channel has a **Test** button. It dispatches a fabricated down event for a
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monitor called "Test monitor", through the real delivery path — so a test that
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arrives proves the credentials, the network path and the destination, not just
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the configuration form.
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|
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:::tip Test after every change
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Channel settings are only exercised when something breaks, which is the worst
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time to discover a stale webhook URL. Re-test after rotating a token.
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:::
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|
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## Choosing destinations
|
||||
|
||||
- Use a **chat channel** for awareness, and make sure someone owns it.
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- Use **SMTP** where a durable record matters.
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- Use a **webhook** to reach an on-call system that does escalation properly.
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||||
Vantage does not do escalation, rotas or acknowledgement; a webhook into
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something that does is the intended answer.
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@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
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---
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id: secrets
|
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title: Secrets vault
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sidebar_label: Secrets
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||||
---
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Key/value pairs, grouped by name, encrypted at rest with AES-256-GCM under
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`KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY`. Two things consume them: workflow steps, and Kubernetes
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External Secrets Operator.
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|
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## Groups and values
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||||
|
||||
A **group** is a named bundle — `prod-db`, `registry`, `acme-api`. Inside it are
|
||||
key/value pairs.
|
||||
|
||||
Group by consumer, not by type. A group is the unit a workflow step references
|
||||
and the unit ESO reads, so a group that matches one consumer is one reference;
|
||||
a group holding everything is over-sharing to every step that needs any of it.
|
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|
||||
## Managing them
|
||||
|
||||
**Secrets → New group**, then add keys.
|
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|
||||
Values are write-then-hidden. The list shows keys, never values. **Reveal** is a
|
||||
separate action on a separate endpoint, and it writes an audit event — so
|
||||
looking at a secret is a recorded act.
|
||||
|
||||
Deleting a single key and deleting the whole group are separate operations.
|
||||
|
||||
## Using secrets in workflows
|
||||
|
||||
Add the group name to a step's `secret_refs`. At execution the group's pairs are
|
||||
injected into the step's environment:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# secret_refs: ["registry"]
|
||||
echo "$REGISTRY_PASSWORD" | docker login registry.example.com -u "$REGISTRY_USER" --password-stdin
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
A workflow can also override `secret_refs` per step, without changing the
|
||||
library entry.
|
||||
|
||||
:::warning A step can print its own secrets
|
||||
Injection puts values in the environment. If your script echoes them, or runs
|
||||
with `set -x`, they land in the run log — which is stored on disk and readable
|
||||
in the UI. Vantage does not scrub step output.
|
||||
:::
|
||||
|
||||
## Kubernetes External Secrets Operator
|
||||
|
||||
`GET /api/secrets/:group/values` returns a group's pairs for ESO, authenticated
|
||||
with a **bearer token** rather than a session.
|
||||
|
||||
1. Generate the token at **Settings → Integrations**. It is shown once; only its
|
||||
SHA-256 is stored.
|
||||
2. Put it in a Kubernetes secret.
|
||||
3. Point an ESO `SecretStore` at the endpoint with that bearer token.
|
||||
|
||||
The token is rotatable: generating a new one replaces the stored hash and
|
||||
invalidates the old one immediately.
|
||||
|
||||
:::danger This token reads every group
|
||||
It is instance-wide, not scoped to one group. Treat it as a credential to the
|
||||
whole vault: store it as a secret in the cluster, never in a manifest in git,
|
||||
and rotate it when anyone with access leaves.
|
||||
:::
|
||||
|
||||
## What the vault is not
|
||||
|
||||
- **Not a password manager.** There is no sharing, expiry or per-user
|
||||
visibility. Anyone who can sign in and reveal, can reveal.
|
||||
- **Not versioned.** Overwriting a value loses the previous one.
|
||||
- **Not recoverable without the key.** If `KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY` is lost, so is
|
||||
every value. Back it up separately from the database.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
id: servers
|
||||
title: Servers
|
||||
sidebar_label: Servers
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
The fleet. Every managed machine runs an agent that connects outbound to the
|
||||
control plane, and everything else in Vantage — keys, workflows, monitors,
|
||||
consoles — targets these records.
|
||||
|
||||
## Enrolling a server
|
||||
|
||||
Covered step by step in [Add your first server](../getting-started/first-server.md).
|
||||
In short: **Servers → Add server** issues a single-use, one-hour token and shows
|
||||
a one-liner to run as root on the target machine.
|
||||
|
||||
## Lifecycle
|
||||
|
||||
| Status | Meaning |
|
||||
| --- | --- |
|
||||
| `pending` | Enrolment created; the agent has not registered yet |
|
||||
| `active` | The agent registered and is syncing |
|
||||
| `offline` | Last-seen passed the threshold |
|
||||
|
||||
The offline sweep runs every two minutes, so a machine that has just gone away
|
||||
takes a little while to be marked as such. That delay is intentional — a single
|
||||
missed poll is not an outage.
|
||||
|
||||
## The server detail page
|
||||
|
||||
### Keys
|
||||
|
||||
Which SSH keys are assigned to this machine, and their state. See
|
||||
[SSH keys](./ssh-keys.md).
|
||||
|
||||
### Inventory
|
||||
|
||||
Agents report:
|
||||
|
||||
| Data | Refreshed |
|
||||
| --- | --- |
|
||||
| CPU, memory, swap, load | every 30 seconds |
|
||||
| Partitions, kernel, full static snapshot | every 15 minutes |
|
||||
|
||||
The two carry separate timestamps, so a stale static snapshot beside fresh
|
||||
metrics is normal rather than a fault.
|
||||
|
||||
### OS updates
|
||||
|
||||
Agents check for pending package updates hourly and report the count. From the
|
||||
server page you can:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Apply updates** — pushes `ApplyUpdatesCmd` down the command stream. The
|
||||
agent runs the platform's package manager and reports back.
|
||||
- **Update agent** — pushes `UpdateAgentCmd` with a target version; the agent
|
||||
downloads the release, verifies it and replaces itself. See
|
||||
[Agent updates](../operations/agent-updates.md).
|
||||
|
||||
:::warning Applying updates is not scheduled or staged
|
||||
It runs now, on that machine. If you need ordering, health gates or a canary,
|
||||
build it as a [workflow](./workflows.md) instead — that is what workflows exist
|
||||
for.
|
||||
:::
|
||||
|
||||
### Console
|
||||
|
||||
Opens a browser SSH, RDP or VNC session. See [Browser console](./browser-console.md).
|
||||
|
||||
## Windows servers
|
||||
|
||||
Windows agents register, heartbeat, run workflow steps and report inventory.
|
||||
They do not manage `authorized_keys` — the poll loop stops after the heartbeat
|
||||
on any non-Linux host. This is a deliberate scope decision, not a gap being
|
||||
worked on.
|
||||
|
||||
## Removing a server
|
||||
|
||||
Deleting the server record removes it from the fleet. It does **not** uninstall
|
||||
the agent, which will keep trying to sync and failing. Uninstall it on the
|
||||
machine too:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
systemctl disable --now vantage-agent
|
||||
rm -f /usr/local/bin/vantage-agent /etc/systemd/system/vantage-agent.service
|
||||
rm -rf /etc/vantage
|
||||
systemctl daemon-reload
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Keys previously written to `authorized_keys` stay on disk, because the agent is
|
||||
no longer running to remove them. Revoke and let the agent apply the change
|
||||
**before** you delete the server if that matters to you.
|
||||
|
||||
## Agent tokens
|
||||
|
||||
Each server has its own token. The control plane stores only its SHA-256; the
|
||||
plaintext exists in the agent's `0600` config and nowhere else. There is no way
|
||||
to read a token back out of the control plane — if one is lost, re-enrol the
|
||||
machine.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
id: settings
|
||||
title: Settings
|
||||
sidebar_label: Settings
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
One page, three groups: **Access**, **Monitoring** and **Integrations**. Plus
|
||||
the licence, which has its own page.
|
||||
|
||||
Settings require the `owner` or `admin` role.
|
||||
|
||||
:::info Where instance settings went
|
||||
Members and single sign-on used to live at `/settings/instance`. They are now
|
||||
the Access group at the top of this page — splitting "who can sign in" from "how
|
||||
this instance behaves" produced two half-pages and a nav entry nobody could
|
||||
distinguish from Settings. The old path still redirects.
|
||||
:::
|
||||
|
||||
## Access
|
||||
|
||||
### Members
|
||||
|
||||
Add, remove and re-role the people who can sign in.
|
||||
|
||||
| Role | Can |
|
||||
| --- | --- |
|
||||
| `owner` | Everything |
|
||||
| `admin` | Everything except owner-only settings |
|
||||
| `member` | Servers, keys, workflows, monitors, secrets, console |
|
||||
|
||||
Local members authenticate with email and a bcrypt-hashed password.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Members managed by Vantage HQ
|
||||
|
||||
On a cloud instance, people granted access from the HQ portal appear here as
|
||||
read-only rows with a link to the portal.
|
||||
|
||||
:::warning HQ-managed users cannot be edited locally
|
||||
Changing the role of, or deleting, an `hq`-sourced user is refused with `409`.
|
||||
HQ owns their role, their password and whether they exist at all — a local
|
||||
change would be overwritten by the next sync and would leave two writers for one
|
||||
password hash. Manage them from [People and roles](../hq/people-and-roles.md).
|
||||
:::
|
||||
|
||||
### Single sign-on (OIDC)
|
||||
|
||||
Configured per organisation:
|
||||
|
||||
| Field | |
|
||||
| --- | --- |
|
||||
| Issuer | Your provider's issuer URL |
|
||||
| Client ID | |
|
||||
| Client secret | Stored AES-256-GCM encrypted |
|
||||
|
||||
Sign-in then goes `/auth/oidc/start` → your provider → `/auth/oidc/callback`.
|
||||
|
||||
Local and OIDC users coexist. Keep at least one local owner: if the provider is
|
||||
misconfigured or unreachable, a local account is the way back in.
|
||||
|
||||
## Monitoring
|
||||
|
||||
- **Alert defaults** for monitors.
|
||||
- **Notification channels** — their own page. See
|
||||
[Notification channels](./notification-channels.md).
|
||||
|
||||
## Integrations
|
||||
|
||||
### Workflow log retention
|
||||
|
||||
How long run logs are kept.
|
||||
|
||||
| Value | Meaning |
|
||||
| --- | --- |
|
||||
| unset | 30 days |
|
||||
| a number | that many days |
|
||||
| `0` | forever |
|
||||
|
||||
### ESO read token
|
||||
|
||||
The bearer token External Secrets Operator uses to read secret groups. Shown
|
||||
once, stored as a SHA-256 hash, rotatable. See
|
||||
[Secrets](./secrets.md#kubernetes-external-secrets-operator).
|
||||
|
||||
## Licence
|
||||
|
||||
`/settings/license` shows the deployment, tier, server allowance, enabled
|
||||
features and expiry.
|
||||
|
||||
On **self-hosted**, paste a licence here. This works even while the current
|
||||
licence is expired — that is the way out of degraded mode.
|
||||
|
||||
On **cloud**, there is no paste form. The endpoint answers `409 cloud_managed`,
|
||||
because a cloud licence is written by HQ directly. The page links to the portal
|
||||
instead.
|
||||
|
||||
See [Licensing and entitlements](../hq/licensing-and-entitlements.md).
|
||||
|
||||
## Sessions
|
||||
|
||||
Sessions are an opaque token in the `km_session` cookie, held in Redis with a
|
||||
24-hour TTL. There is no per-session management UI; restarting Redis signs
|
||||
everyone out and affects nothing else.
|
||||
|
||||
## Host and organisation guard
|
||||
|
||||
On a multi-tenant deployment, a request to `<slug>.vantage.<tld>` resolves the
|
||||
organisation from the slug and rejects a session belonging to a different one.
|
||||
The label it looks for comes from `APP_ROOT_LABEL`.
|
||||
|
||||
:::warning A wrong `APP_ROOT_LABEL` disables the guard
|
||||
It does not fail loudly — it simply stops matching, and the host check stops
|
||||
protecting anything. If you serve the UI on a custom domain, set it to match.
|
||||
:::
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
id: ssh-keys
|
||||
title: SSH keys
|
||||
sidebar_label: SSH keys
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Vantage holds a library of public keys and decides, per server, which ones
|
||||
belong in `/root/.ssh/authorized_keys`. The agent makes the file match.
|
||||
|
||||
:::info root only
|
||||
Vantage manages `/root/.ssh/authorized_keys` and nothing else. There is no
|
||||
per-user key management. The agent runs as root because writing that file
|
||||
requires it.
|
||||
:::
|
||||
|
||||
## Adding a key
|
||||
|
||||
### Upload one you already have
|
||||
|
||||
**Keys → Add key**, paste the public half. Vantage stores the public key and its
|
||||
fingerprint, and never needs the private half for this path.
|
||||
|
||||
### Generate one on a server
|
||||
|
||||
Vantage can have an agent generate a keypair on a managed machine
|
||||
(`GenerateKeyCmd` over the command stream). The public half comes back to the
|
||||
library. You may optionally upload the private half too, in which case it is
|
||||
stored **AES-256-GCM encrypted** under `KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY`.
|
||||
|
||||
The JSON representation of a key exposes only `has_private_key` and
|
||||
`has_passphrase` — never the material. Retrieving a stored private key is its
|
||||
own endpoint and its own audit event.
|
||||
|
||||
:::tip Why store a private key at all
|
||||
The [browser console](./browser-console.md) needs one to open an SSH session. If
|
||||
you are not using the console, do not upload private halves.
|
||||
:::
|
||||
|
||||
## Assigning
|
||||
|
||||
Assign a key to one or more servers. Within one poll interval — 30 seconds — the
|
||||
agent picks up the change.
|
||||
|
||||
## Revoking
|
||||
|
||||
Revocation is **soft**: the assignment gets a `revoked_at` timestamp rather than
|
||||
being deleted, so the history of who had access to what, and when, survives.
|
||||
|
||||
The agent treats a revoked assignment as "not desired" and removes the line from
|
||||
`authorized_keys` on its next sync.
|
||||
|
||||
:::warning Revoking does not close open sessions
|
||||
It removes the key from the file. An SSH session already established stays up
|
||||
until it ends. Kill sessions on the machine if that matters.
|
||||
:::
|
||||
|
||||
## What the agent actually does
|
||||
|
||||
Each poll:
|
||||
|
||||
1. `SyncKeys` returns the desired set of public keys for that server.
|
||||
2. The agent reads `/root/.ssh/authorized_keys` and computes fingerprints.
|
||||
3. **If the sets match, it writes nothing.** No disk churn on unchanged state,
|
||||
which is most polls.
|
||||
4. If they differ, it writes a temporary file, then `os.Rename()`s it over the
|
||||
real one and sets mode `0600`.
|
||||
|
||||
The rename is atomic, so a machine that dies mid-write keeps the old file
|
||||
intact. There is no window in which `authorized_keys` is truncated or partial.
|
||||
|
||||
:::danger Vantage owns the whole file
|
||||
The agent rewrites `authorized_keys` to match the desired set. Keys added by
|
||||
hand on the machine are removed on the next change. If a key must survive, put
|
||||
it in Vantage.
|
||||
:::
|
||||
|
||||
## Recovering from a lockout
|
||||
|
||||
If you have removed every key from a machine and cannot get in, you still have
|
||||
the console — provided a private key is stored — or out-of-band access from your
|
||||
hosting provider. Vantage has no backdoor and does not keep a break-glass key.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
id: workflows
|
||||
title: Workflows and steps
|
||||
sidebar_label: Workflows
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
A **step** is a reusable script with declared inputs, outputs and secret
|
||||
references. A **workflow** composes steps in order and targets a set of servers.
|
||||
Running one dispatches the steps to each target's agent and streams the output
|
||||
back live.
|
||||
|
||||
## Steps
|
||||
|
||||
A step has:
|
||||
|
||||
| Field | Meaning |
|
||||
| --- | --- |
|
||||
| `name`, `description` | Library identity |
|
||||
| `interpreter` | `bash` or `powershell` |
|
||||
| `script` | The body |
|
||||
| `declared_inputs` | Named parameters with defaults and descriptions |
|
||||
| `declared_outputs` | Names this step promises to export |
|
||||
| `secret_refs` | Vault entries injected as environment variables |
|
||||
|
||||
### Passing values between steps
|
||||
|
||||
Each step runs with `WORKFLOW_ENV` set to a file path. Anything written there as
|
||||
`KEY=value` becomes an environment variable for the **later steps of the same
|
||||
run on the same server**.
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
HOSTNAME=$(hostname)
|
||||
echo "$HOSTNAME"
|
||||
echo "HOSTNAME=$HOSTNAME" >> $WORKFLOW_ENV
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
That is the whole mechanism. `declared_outputs` documents what a step exports so
|
||||
the designer can show it; the file is what actually carries the value.
|
||||
|
||||
### Secrets
|
||||
|
||||
List a vault group in `secret_refs` and its key/value pairs are injected as
|
||||
environment variables when the step runs. They are not written to the run log
|
||||
unless your own script echoes them. See [Secrets](./secrets.md).
|
||||
|
||||
### The workspace
|
||||
|
||||
Every run gets a per-run working directory on each target. Steps share it, so
|
||||
one step can leave a file for the next. The agent removes it at the end of the
|
||||
run (`CleanupWorkspaceCmd`).
|
||||
|
||||
Do not use it for anything that must outlive the run.
|
||||
|
||||
## Default steps
|
||||
|
||||
A small library is seeded into every organisation at boot from the image, so a
|
||||
new install is not staring at an empty page.
|
||||
|
||||
:::warning Default steps are read-only
|
||||
Editing or deleting one is refused with `409`. Seeding rewrites them on every
|
||||
boot, so an edit would silently revert and a delete would come back at the next
|
||||
restart — refusing is the honest answer.
|
||||
|
||||
To customise one, use the per-step **script override** in the workflow designer,
|
||||
which belongs to that workflow and is not touched by seeding. To add to the
|
||||
shared library permanently, a file has to be committed to the repository and the
|
||||
server image rebuilt.
|
||||
:::
|
||||
|
||||
The UI mirrors this — the step modal opens read-only and Delete is hidden — but
|
||||
the API is the boundary; the UI is the courtesy.
|
||||
|
||||
## Building a workflow
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Workflows → New**.
|
||||
2. Add steps in order from the library.
|
||||
3. Set inputs per step.
|
||||
4. Set failure behaviour per step.
|
||||
5. Choose target servers.
|
||||
|
||||
### Failure behaviour
|
||||
|
||||
| `on_failure` | Effect |
|
||||
| --- | --- |
|
||||
| `stop` | Abort this server's run. Other servers continue |
|
||||
| `continue` | Record the failure, run the next step anyway |
|
||||
| `retry` | Re-run the step up to `max_retries`, then treat it as a failure |
|
||||
|
||||
### Per-step overrides
|
||||
|
||||
A workflow can override a step's script or its secret references without
|
||||
touching the library entry. This is how you adapt a default step, and it is
|
||||
scoped to that workflow.
|
||||
|
||||
## Running
|
||||
|
||||
**Run** snapshots the resolved steps into the run record and dispatches
|
||||
`RunStepCmd` to each target's agent over the command stream — no waiting for the
|
||||
next poll.
|
||||
|
||||
:::info Runs freeze their steps
|
||||
The snapshot is why editing a step tomorrow never rewrites what happened today.
|
||||
A run shows the script that actually executed, not the current library version.
|
||||
:::
|
||||
|
||||
Targets run **in parallel**; steps within one server run **in order**.
|
||||
|
||||
## Watching a run
|
||||
|
||||
Step stdout and stderr stream back as chunks, are appended to a log file on the
|
||||
server, and the UI follows them live. Each step records status, attempts, exit
|
||||
code and its exported environment.
|
||||
|
||||
**Cancel** stops a run in progress. Steps already running on an agent finish;
|
||||
nothing further is dispatched.
|
||||
|
||||
## Log retention
|
||||
|
||||
Run logs are swept on a schedule set by `workflow_log_retention_days` in
|
||||
Settings:
|
||||
|
||||
| Value | Meaning |
|
||||
| --- | --- |
|
||||
| unset | 30 days |
|
||||
| a number | that many days |
|
||||
| `0` | keep forever |
|
||||
|
||||
## Import and export
|
||||
|
||||
Steps export to a JSON file (`vantage.step/v1`) and import back, which is how
|
||||
you move a step between instances or keep one in version control. There is also
|
||||
a parse endpoint that turns a pasted script into a draft step by reading its
|
||||
declared inputs and outputs.
|
||||
|
||||
## Practical notes
|
||||
|
||||
- A step is a script. It runs as root, on the target, with no sandbox. Review
|
||||
what you import.
|
||||
- Keep steps small and single-purpose; compose them in the workflow. That is
|
||||
what makes the library reusable rather than a folder of near-duplicates.
|
||||
- PowerShell steps only make sense on Windows targets and bash steps on Linux
|
||||
ones. Nothing stops you targeting the wrong one; the step simply fails.
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user