feat: public status page endpoint with per-address rate limit

server/cmd/main.go

@@ -263,6 +263,14 @@ func serve() {
 	})
 
 	r := gin.New()
+	// Without this gin trusts every proxy and ClientIP() is whatever the
+	// caller wrote in X-Forwarded-For. That was survivable while ClientIP()
+	// only produced audit strings; the public status limiter makes it load
+	// bearing. Empty means trust nobody, which is correct for a direct
+	// exposure and wrong behind a proxy — hence the explicit setting.
+	if err := r.SetTrustedProxies(trustedProxies()); err != nil {
+		log.Fatalf("trusted proxies: %v", err)
+	}
 	r.Use(gin.Recovery())
 	r.Use(gin.LoggerWithConfig(gin.LoggerConfig{SkipPaths: []string{"/api/console/tunnel"}}))
 	r.Use(corsMiddleware())
@@ -318,6 +326,25 @@ func corsMiddleware() gin.HandlerFunc {
 	}
 }
 
+// trustedProxies reads TRUSTED_PROXIES, a comma-separated list of CIDRs or
+// addresses. Unset means trust none: ClientIP() is then the peer address,
+// which is right for a direct exposure and means every request behind an
+// un-configured proxy shares one address for rate limiting. That is a visible
+// failure (one client limited) rather than an invisible one (no limit at all).
+func trustedProxies() []string {
+	v := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("TRUSTED_PROXIES"))
+	if v == "" {
+		return nil
+	}
+	out := []string{}
+	for _, p := range strings.Split(v, ",") {
+		if p = strings.TrimSpace(p); p != "" {
+			out = append(out, p)
+		}
+	}
+	return out
+}
+
 func getEnv(key, fallback string) string {
 	if v := os.Getenv(key); v != "" {
 		return v