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vantage-docs/docs/vantage/secrets.md
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secrets Secrets vault Secrets

Key/value pairs, grouped by name, encrypted at rest with AES-256-GCM under KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY. Two things consume them: workflow steps, and Kubernetes External Secrets Operator.

Groups and values

A group is a named bundle prod-db, registry, acme-api. Inside it are key/value pairs.

Group by consumer, not by type. A group is the unit a workflow step references and the unit ESO reads, so a group that matches one consumer is one reference; a group holding everything is over-sharing to every step that needs any of it.

Managing them

Secrets → New group, then add keys.

Values are write-then-hidden. The list shows keys, never values. Reveal is a separate action on a separate endpoint, and it writes an audit event so looking at a secret is a recorded act.

Deleting a single key and deleting the whole group are separate operations.

Using secrets in workflows

Add the group name to a step's secret_refs. At execution the group's pairs are injected into the step's environment:

# secret_refs: ["registry"]
echo "$REGISTRY_PASSWORD" | docker login registry.example.com -u "$REGISTRY_USER" --password-stdin

A workflow can also override secret_refs per step, without changing the library entry.

:::warning A step can print its own secrets Injection puts values in the environment. If your script echoes them, or runs with set -x, they land in the run log which is stored on disk and readable in the UI. Vantage does not scrub step output. :::

Kubernetes External Secrets Operator

GET /api/secrets/:group/values returns a group's pairs for ESO, authenticated with a bearer token rather than a session.

  1. Generate the token at Settings → Integrations. It is shown once; only its SHA-256 is stored.
  2. Put it in a Kubernetes secret.
  3. Point an ESO SecretStore at the endpoint with that bearer token.

The token is rotatable: generating a new one replaces the stored hash and invalidates the old one immediately.

:::danger This token reads every group It is instance-wide, not scoped to one group. Treat it as a credential to the whole vault: store it as a secret in the cluster, never in a manifest in git, and rotate it when anyone with access leaves. :::

What the vault is not

  • Not a password manager. There is no sharing, expiry or per-user visibility. Anyone who can sign in and reveal, can reveal.
  • Not versioned. Overwriting a value loses the previous one.
  • Not recoverable without the key. If KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY is lost, so is every value. Back it up separately from the database.